THE OUTER SEVEN
INDIAN REACTIONS TO THE CHINESE

THE WORLD TODAY

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CONTENTS

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CONTENTS

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THE WORLD TODAY

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Notes of the Month

ʾresident Eisenhower in Karachi, Kabul, and New Delhi

'VISIT of personal discovery' was President Eisenhower's own lescription of his hurried visit to India (9–14 December); this no loubt applied equally to his shorter visit to Karachi (7–9 Decem- ›er), and his few hours' halt in Kabul on 9 December. From all ccounts, the 'pilgrimage in quest of peace' (as Mr Nehru called t) was a tremendous success. If numbers are any guide, the size of he crowds who welcomed him in the three cities and their sur- oundings was eloquent. In Karachi, some 750,000 persons, half he city's population, turned out to greet the President. Kabul's ›opulation is 20,000: a crowd of 500,000 (consisting largely of ribesmen from the surrounding hills) cheered the President. The limax came in New Delhi, where a crowd 1½ million strong ;ave the President the biggest and warmest welcome recorded in he city's history, dwarfing the scenes during the visits of Mr ʒulganin and Mr Khrushchev in 1955 and of Chou En-Lai in 954. It was, however, the spontaneity and sincerity of the masses hat made their welcome real; and this was epitomized in Mr ˀehru's words to the President: 'We have honoured you because 'ou have found an echo in the hearts of our millions.'

Nevertheless, in the drama of enthusiasm and colour, the grim eality of the situation was not lost. The debate which took place in he Indian Parliament on the Government's policy towards China, ›n the morning of Mr Eisenhower's arrival, served as a reminder hat the shadow of 'the neighbour across the mountain' still oomed over the Indian mind. And the MIG fighters of the Royal ʌfghan Air Force which escorted Mr Eisenhower's Boeing 707, he Kabul airstrip constructed and maintained by Soviet personnel ʋho watched his arrival and departure, the buildings and the 'ehicles plying around the airport—all gifts of Moscow—afforded ›n-the-spot proof of Soviet 'presence' in Afghanistan.

Mr Eisenhower in fact warned the leaders of Afghanistan against

too much dependence on Moscow for technical and economic aid, and for his part gave assurances of the American desire to continue assistance to Afghanistan 'in its task of strengthening its economic and social structure'. The joint communiqué issued at the end of the talks affirmed that the President and the King had 'agreed to work unstintingly and patiently toward the elimination of international frictions and tensions'.

It was, however, Karachi that provided probably the most difficult item in Mr Eisenhower's itinerary. Among subjects discussed by him with the Pakistani President, Marshal Ayub Khan, were the need for greater economic and military aid to Pakistan, Chinese incursions, Karachi's strained relations with Kabul, and Indo-Pakistan differences, particularly the Kashmir dispute, which, said Marshal Ayub, 'is the problem of problems'. He expressed the hope that Mr Eisenhower's visit to Delhi might help in the settlement of this twelve-year-old dispute.

The Pakistanis were disappointed that the American President did not display 'a more sympathetic attitude towards Pakistan' in regard to Kashmir, and that he showed no eagerness to play the role of a mediator. Mr Eisenhower's spokesman said, in reply to questions by Pakistani journalists, that the President was 'not on a negotiating trip' and was 'not going to tell Mr Nehru what to do about Kashmir or for that matter anything'. The communiqué issued after the talks between the two Presidents merely said that they had discussed 'relationships among nations of the area and the urgent desirability of finding solutions to the existing disputes'.

While Mr Eisenhower's goodwill tour of Pakistan was marked by evidence of Pakistan's preservation of British ceremonial and organization, the scenes in India provided an even greater mass demonstration of goodwill and from the official aspects recalled the splendour of Viceregal days; while the enthusiasm of the masses excelled the drama of the Bulganin–Khrushchev tour. In the words of the *New York Times*, the Indian visit was 'unquestionably a tremendous personal and propaganda triumph' for Mr Eisenhower. He, for his part, missed no single opportunity to win Indian public opinion: he paid tributes to Indians' achievements since independence, to the spiritual and moral heritage of Gandhi, and, above all, emphasized 'the common quest for peace' pursued by both India and his country.

Nevertheless, even such a personality as Eisenhower was not expected to persuade India to change her policies on basic issues.

For instance, Mr Nehru declared in Parliament, before Mr Eisenhower's arrival, that he was not going to ask for military help from the United States in India's dispute with China. On Kashmir, he said that he would not raise the question himself with the American President. Mr Eisenhower himself made it clear that he would not seek to persuade India to abandon her policy of non-alignment, though he emphasized in his speeches the efforts of his country and its allies to maintain freedom. As for economic aid, the Government of India issued a statement emphasizing that Mr Nehru had not asked for more as a consequence of the visit.

The effects of Mr Eisenhower's visit to India will thus be of a long-term nature, mainly in the direction of improving the atmosphere between the two countries and bringing about better understanding between them. As the correspondent of *The Times* observed, 'The visit marked an achievement rather than a beginning. It showed how public feeling in India towards the United States, which not long ago was predominantly hostile, has swung to enthusiastic friendship.' This change in the attitude of Indians towards the United States is so fundamental that it may have a salutary effect on public opinion in Asia, which has shown great signs of strain and nervousness since the Tibet crisis. And the fact that Mr Eisenhower talked the language which Asians understand so well was expressed in an Indian statesman's comment: 'Sometimes it is as if Nehru were talking, rather than Eisenhower.'

Agreement on Antarctica

THE Antarctic Treaty signed in Washington on 1 December is impressive not least by reason of the vast area it covers, approximately 6 million square miles, comprising all the area south of Latitude 60 degrees South, except the high seas. Twelve nations, seven of them claiming sectors of the territory and five with scientific interest in the area, have declared that the whole Antarctic region shall be used for exclusively peaceful purposes and for a continuation of the co-operation in scientific research begun during the International Geophysical Year.

Activity in Antarctica has increased enormously in the last decade, culminating in the International Geophysical Year of 1957–8. Interest in the last unexplored continent of the earth may arise from a natural sense of adventure in advancing into the unknown and from scientific inquiry, or it may be economic, though, apart from whaling and sealing, the value of the economic resources is doubt-

ful. On the other hand, there may be a strategic interest. South Africa, Australia, and New Zealand, as well as Argentina and Chile, are closely concerned with the possibility of Antarctica as a nuclear testing ground, as well as commanding a north-south air route and a southern sea route around the Americas. Mutually recognized political claims to sovereignty over sectors of the area running from the Pole to the coast in the pattern of slices of cake have been made in the past by five Powers, Great Britain with claims dating from 1908, New Zealand from 1923, France from 1924, Australia from 1933, and Norway from 1939. In addition, Argentina and Chile have overlapping claims against Great Britain and each other in the Falkland Islands Dependencies and the Palmer Peninsula, based on 'proximity' grounds, and backed by a strong emotional and national prestige appeal.

Discussions, begun at the suggestion of President Eisenhower, have been going on for the past fifteen months between these seven nations and five others with purely scientific and exploratory interests in the area, namely Belgium, Japan, South Africa, the U.S.S.R., and the U.S.A. South Africa, like Australia and New Zealand, has obvious proximity interests both from meteorological and possibly strategic points of view. The U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A., though making no formal claims to any Antarctic sector, have taken a large part in scientific exploration during the International Geophysical Year, and have both made it plain during the last decade that they recognize the claims of no other Powers and will accept no political settlement of Antarctica to which they are not parties.

The treaty signed by these twelve nations on 1 December establishes Antarctica as an area to be used exclusively for peaceful purposes, and for international co-operation in scientific investigation and in the preservation and conservation of living resources in the area. Nuclear explosions and the dumping of radioactive waste are prohibited, though in the event of the conclusion of international agreements concerning the use of nuclear energy, the rules established under such agreements shall apply to Antarctica. A mutual inspection system is set up to prevent any military activities, though military personnel and equipment may be used for peaceful scientific research in the continent. All territorial claims and disputes are suspended for the duration of the treaty, which is to run for thirty years; there is to be no renunciation of territorial claims in the area, but no acts may constitute a basis for asserting, supporting, or denying such claims, and no new claims may be made.

The treaty is a noteworthy achievement in international co-operation, if only by pointing the moral that agreement can be reached among Powers with widely differing policies in an area of possibly small economic and little known strategic value. Even so the agreement to co-operate freely in scientific research might perhaps be the forerunner of a similar agreement with regard to outer space. The shelving of territorial claims may help to solve by a process of inanition the conflict of claims between Great Britain, Argentina, and Chile, and may also meet the objection of the latter countries to the internationalization of an area which they claim to be within their sphere of influence. The area covered by the treaty does not, however, include the disputed Falkland Islands, and the high seas are specifically excluded. The inspection machinery set up to prevent any military activity is a new departure in international relations, though it would doubtless be over-sanguine to see in it a precedent for wider schemes connected with disarmament; each of the signatories to the treaty has the right to appoint observers from among its own nationals, with complete freedom of access at any time to any part of the area and to all stations, installations, and equipment, in order to carry out inspection, including aerial inspection. Complete exchange of scientific information, plans, personnel, observations, and results is to be guaranteed between all the signatory nations engaged in scientific research in Antarctica, as applied during the International Geophysical Year, and, despite opposition at first on the part of the U.S.S.R. on the ground of the exclusion of some Eastern European countries, it is stipulated that there shall be co-operation with the specialized agencies of the United Nations and other international organizations with special technical interest in the area.

A striking feature of the treaty is its stress on unanimity, a possible harking back to the original principles of the United Nations. There are to be regular meetings of representatives of the contracting nations to consult together on common matters concerned with the implementation of the treaty. The first of these is to take place in Canberra within two months of its coming into force, and measures to give effect to its principles are to be recommended to the respective Governments, if agreed by them all. Similarly, by unanimous agreement, modifications and amendments of the treaty can be put into effect during the thirty years laid down as its specific term, at the end of which time any of the contracting parties may demand a conference to review the whole treaty and modify it, sub-

ject to ratification by all signatories. The treaty itself is subject to ratification by all the signatory States, and thereafter shall be open for accession by any State which is a member of the United Nations or by any other State which may be invited to accede with the consent of all the contracting parties. Such newly acceding States may take part in the periodic consultations, so long as they demonstrate their interest in Antarctica by conducting substantial scientific research there.

The question of sanctions against any State breaking the provisions of the treaty is not specifically covered. Inspection reports from the observers are to be transmitted to the consultative committee, and disputes about the interpretation or application of the treaty are to be resolved by arbitration or mediation; legal disputes which cannot be resolved by negotiation are to be taken to the International Court of Justice.

Antarctica, though still a region of largely unknown potentialities with little consequence except in the sphere of meteorology and natural history, must now be regarded as of political importance in view of the widespread recent activities undertaken there by the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. In the light of this, the Washington agreement has considerable significance.

Federation in Central Africa

The 1960 Conference

FEDERAL constitutions are normally created when peoples with strong regional loyalties wish to co-operate to achieve important permanent aims. The powers needed for these aims become the responsibility of the federal government; the regional governments retain control over matters of special local interest. Federal constitutions are therefore more appropriate to countries where the main political division is regional. Normally they represent a bargain among the political leaders of the regions by which popular support is won for the federal government.

The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, established in 1953, does not fit this pattern. It is a federation of a nearly independent Southern Rhodesia with two British Protectorates, Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia. The main political division in the three territories is not regional but racial, and it cuts through all three territories. Nevertheless the Federation does rest upon a real political bargain, a bargain between the European political leaders in the two Rhodesias and the British Government acting as a trustee of the African population of the two Protectorates.

The local European leaders were primarily concerned with three things: to strengthen the economy of the whole area by bringing it under a unified economic policy of a single government, to limit the influence of the Colonial Office, and to secure dominant political power for the Europeans. The Federation was supported in Britain for different reasons. For some, no doubt, imperial arguments of securing control for people of British stock were decisive. But the debate over the Federation was never a straight imperial versus liberal contest. There were strong liberal arguments in favour of the Federation. It was presented and accepted as an essential encouragement to a liberal and humane pattern of race relations in Central Africa that would be acceptable to both Africans and Europeans. African political and traditional leaders in both Protectorates opposed the Federation strongly, arguing that it would mean political subjugation, not racial partnership, and that they would prefer to remain under direct British tutelage. But Britain exercised a tutor's right to judge what is in the best interests of her wards, and the Federation was carried through.

But why a federation? The economic advantage of closer co-operation could largely have been secured by a looser form of

association.[1] The political objective of local European control suggested a full amalgamation. The choice of a federal union was in fact a necessary political compromise which the Europeans conceded because the British Government was not prepared completely to transfer its responsibilities for the Africans of Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia. The Federation therefore rested upon a political bargain, a bargain not between the political leaders of the main communities but between the European leaders and the British Government.

Seen in this light, the division of powers in the Constitution begins to make sense. African, but not European, agriculture and education are territorial responsibilities. So too are African land rights, law and order, native courts, and local government. To assure the continuance of British responsibility over these, Royal assent is required for any constitutional amendment to which a territorial legislature objects and, for the first ten years of the Constitution, any amendment to it must be supported by each of the three territorial legislatures, as well as by two-thirds of the Federal House.

These federal arrangements were the main but not the only constitutional safeguards provided for African interests. An African Affairs Board was established with an independent membership to survey all proposed federal legislation and to report to the British Government any Bills which it felt were discriminatory against Africans. Bills thus reserved, and any electoral Bill, require a final Royal assent before becoming law. Britain also retains the right to legislate on any matter within the jurisdiction of the Federal or territorial Governments. The Preamble to the Constitution includes the explicit assurance that the consent of the majority of the inhabitants must be secured before the Federation can advance to Dominion status. Finally, the Constitution provides that a constitutional conference should be held from seven to nine years after the establishment of the Federation. It is this conference which is due in the autumn of 1960.

No one can predict what this conference will decide or what the preparatory Monckton Commission will recommend. But the following are some of the most important of the general developments since 1953 which both must consider.

[1] The collapse of the Central African Council in 1950 is evidence that such loose forms of association, in which no executive powers are conceded to the centre, are very difficult to run, especially if there are important differences of political policies between the co-operating territories.

The Ability to Rule. The Governments of the Federation have ɔved that they are able to govern, to maintain internal security, d to suppress possible opposition. Their self-confidence and rgaining power can therefore be expected to be high in 1960.

The Capacity to Develop. Substantial foreign investments have en attracted to the Federation and the economy has become ɪre diversified. The public finances of Southern Rhodesia, in rticular, but also of Nyasaland, have benefited from the financial angements since 1953. It is true that effective economic co-eration does not normally require a political federation. But the ntinuation of these advantages might now be threatened by any memberment of the Federation or by a major sharing of power th Africans. There are two unanswered economic questions lay. One is whether there would be serious economic conse-ences to any major increase in African political rights, whether, quote Lord Chandos (then Mr Oliver Lyttelton), 'if we gave m equal representation in the Federal Parliament we should npletely dry up the flow of overseas capital'.[1] The second ques-n is whether economic development will decline if a large jority of the population remains seriously disaffected. It is a jor part of the Central African dilemma that an affirmative swer is likely to be correct for both these questions and that their litical implications are contradictory.

The Constitutional Initiative of the Federal Government. The deral Government, rather than the British Government, has had initiative on constitutional questions since 1953. Many of the nstitutional safeguards have proved unimportant. No Federal islation has been disallowed by London. The British Parlia-nt has not exercised its constitutional right to legislate on mat-s affecting Central Africa, and in 1957 the Federal and British vernments agreed to a series of conventions which, *inter alia,* nmitted Britain to exercise this right only on the request of the deral Government. In Northern Rhodesia, still a British Pro-torate, the franchise which was introduced was similar to the uthern Rhodesian and Federal franchises. It is significantly less eral than those of other British territories such as Kenya and nganyika which have important minority problems. But the st striking evidence of the shift in the balance of political power m London to Salisbury was the refusal of the Secretary of State accept the advice of the African Affairs Board in 1956 that the

[1] Hansard, House of Commons, 18 June 1953, col. 1261.

Federal franchise was discriminatory and ought to be disallowed. This Board has been recomposed and has now a majority of United Party members. It is unlikely again to pass an independent adverse judgment upon any important Federal legislation. It is fair to conclude that British influence has been less than many had hoped and that the constitutional safeguards have been less significant than was expected.

Partnership and Consent. There has always been much confusion over the meaning of partnership. But since 1953 the meaning attached to it by the Governments in Central Africa has become clearer. This view seems to be that individual Africans ought to receive the same rights and privileges as Europeans once they have advanced to a standard of living and a level of education equal to that of the Europeans. These few Africans will be expected then to find their place within the existing economic and political structure rather than to lead a wider African protest against it. It is not anticipated for the foreseeable future that so many Africans will reach these standards as to jeopardize European leadership. The franchises introduced since 1953 support this interpretation of partnership. They each specify high income and educational qualifications which are within the range of almost all Europeans but beyond almost all Africans. They also provide special lower qualifications which will permit more Africans to vote, but in each case care is taken that these specially qualified voters will have only a limited influence. In the Southern Rhodesian franchise, for example, once the specially qualified voters number one-sixth of the total roll no further special voters will be enrolled. In the 1958 Federal elections, African voters were only 7 per cent of the Federal electorate.

The social meaning of partnership is also clearer. The Government has used its influence to remove some minor but racially irritating evidences of open discrimination. More remain, but the contrast between the official policies of the Governments of Central Africa and of South Africa is evident and important. However, the basic discriminatory laws on which rest the Europeans' economic and social life have not really been touched. Nor is it likely that any Government which depends electorally upon this minority could dismantle the framework of discrimination that exists over land, employment, urban residence, and the social services.

If Europeans look to South Africa and feel the contrast is encouraging, Africans look to British policy in East and West Africa

nd feel the contrast is depressing. The Government's view of artnership has not won and is not likely to win African support. very indication is that Africans will insist upon achieving in the oreseeable future the same measure of political power as Britain as conceded to Africans elsewhere.

The Polarization of Politics. Within the European community iere has been a gradual but definite stiffening of a resolve not to ose political control. The political fate of Mr Garfield Todd is one xample of this. Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia until 1958, Ir Todd acquired a reputation amongst Europeans as being too beral. He was manœuvred out of the Prime Ministership and nally out of the Cabinet. He and his supporters failed to unseat a ingle United Federal Party candidate in the 1958 elections in outhern Rhodesia. They then joined a liberal and multi-racial roup that had gathered about Sir John Moffat in Northern Rhodesia. But their Central Africa Party was able to win only three eats in the Northern Rhodesian election of March 1959, and these vere in constituencies which had substantial African majorities. n contrast to the electoral ineffectiveness of liberal Europeans mongst their own racial group are the notable successes of the Dominion Party, which expresses the fears and ambitions of the uropean minority more bluntly than does the United Federal arty. The Dominion Party campaigns for mass European immiration, for unquestioned European control, and, if necessary, for a ismemberment of the Federation, with Southern Rhodesia and ie wealth-producing areas of Northern Rhodesia forming a white Dominion and the remainder of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaind becoming an African State. Given the existing franchise, the Dominion Party is the only likely alternative to the governing arty in both the Federal and the Southern Rhodesian Parliaients. Indeed in Southern Rhodesia in 1958 the Dominion Party ctually won a greater number of votes than did the United ederal Party.

African political opinion is less well organized and less articulate ut its trend is equally clear. The experience of Federation has reatly accelerated and embittered African political development. n 1953 the Africans of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland had equested continued British protection and a gradual advance to elf-government. They had been willing to accept major special epresentation for the minority community. Since then hostility to ederation, at least with its present associations of white control,

has increased to the point of becoming a mass obsession, especiall in Nyasaland. Radical nationalism, aroused by the Federatio issue and stimulated by developments elsewhere in Africa, ha grown in influence. Leadership is passing into more extreme hand African faith in British protection has declined, and it is unlikel that African political leaders today would agree to a long period c British tutelage. Finally, some nationalists have begun to encour age or at least to permit intimidation, threats of violence, and th willingness if necessary to press opposition to Federation beyon the limits of constitutional protests.

By the beginning of 1959, African nationalism had come t appear to the Governments of Central Africa to be threatening th whole constitutional structure. The Federation had thus reached stage of political development which is only too familiar. The Con stitution no longer provided an adequate channel for the expressio or the achievement of nationalists' aims. Britain has faced suc crises in numerous other territories and in the process has de veloped the wisdom to compromise, the ability to induce com promise from others, and a constitutional inventiveness that hav in most cases succeeded in guiding these nationalist ambitions int constitutional channels. But this is never the only alternative Theoretically, at least, there is always the alternative of forceft supression. In Central Africa the two alternatives appeared to be and probably were, either to cause an important shift of con stitutional power to Africans or to use the police and the militar to break the strength of the nationalist congresses. There are man ways of viewing the events of March 1959, but one of the mos meaningful is to see them as marking the choice of this secon alternative by the Governments of Central Africa.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE OF 1960

The 1960 conference will be the last occasion on which Britai will be in a position to exert an important influence on Centra African constitutional developments. This is not to say that th Federation will be granted Dominion status in 1960. But it is likel that British influence will be further diminished and that from the on the interrelation of political forces within Central Africa wil shape its subsequent development. There is, however, no agree ment in Britain on how her influence should be used. Britisl opinion is perhaps even more divided today than it was in 1953 but the basic division is still the same. In 1960 the public debat

will range over a wide variety of specific problems. But there will be two fundamentally different viewpoints giving shape and meaning to these specific disputes. These underlying viewpoints can be summarized as follows.

The first holds that the British Government either ought to, or has no alternative but to, grant further constitutional concessions without requiring any substantial change in the franchises of Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia, or the Federal Government. The most frequently heard arguments for this view are as follows. A European-controlled Federal Government will be a surer ally of Britain than any African Government; foreign investment is more likely to continue if Central Africa remains under European rule, and such investment is essential if the area is to develop rapidly enough to provide for the growing demands of its expanding African population; this economic development is more important for Africans than political rights, and Africans, who cannot yet be expected to know their own interests, must be overruled if they do not recognize this; Africans are currently being misled by irresponsible extremists whom it would be disastrous to treat as responsible spokesmen. Responsible local Europeans are better able to judge the local situation and to plan for the future than any government in Whitehall with all its other more absorbing preoccupations.

The core of the alternative and critical view is the belief that the Federal Government ought to or must win African support for Federation—admittedly a most difficult thing to achieve in the circumstances—and that to that end the African share of political power should be substantially increased, the right of an eventual secession should be granted, and the emergency restrictions on African leaders lifted. For these propositions the following are the main arguments. It would be a breach of Britain's Protectorate obligations to transfer her responsibilities over the Africans of the two northern territories against their will to a government controlled by a white minority living in their midst; such a transfer would damage Britain's international reputation, her claim to leadership in the Commonwealth, and her relations with the Africans of other territories under her rule; it would not secure a stable ally or an economically progressive State for, in the long run, a minority of one in twenty cannot rule in defiance of the will of that majority; Africans will not and ought not to be expected to accept the minimal political rights that are now offered to them; their continued

repression will only increase the present bitterness and make final concessions harder to negotiate and more difficult to worl

Clearly these two approaches to Central African problems ar fundamental conflict. They disagree over the nature of Bri interests, over the character of local European rule in Cen Africa, over the strength, the permanence, and the legitimac Africans' aspirations eventually to govern countries in which t are so large a majority. Differences over issues as fundamenta these are unlikely to be resolved by the discussions of this year. ' Monckton Commission and the Constitutional Conference likely to avoid these wider issues and to concentrate their attent on specific constitutional questions. Yet it will be as difficul reach agreement on most of these. The following are three of more important specific constitutional questions that can expected to be the crucial ones on which the conference will tı

Safeguards. Sir Roy Welensky has already suggested ı Britain's Protectorate obligations in Central Africa can be f covered by constitutional safeguards and possibly treaty obl tions and need not be an obstacle to a programme for the e achievement of self-government. It is certain that critics will re this and argue that such safeguards will be of minor importa once the reality of power is securely held by the minority. T will urge that the Preamble precludes any such programme independence as long as African opposition is so strong and t before Africans can be expected to accept the Federation, Federal franchise must be much broader.

Constitutional Advance in Northern Rhodesia. Sir Roy Weler has dropped his insistence that the Federation should be grar Dominion status in 1960. His main intention now is to secure c stitutional advances in Northern Rhodesia and possibly Nyasal which will bring these two territories close to the status achie by Southern Rhodesia in 1923. If this is conceded in North Rhodesia without any change in the franchise, then the local Eı pean minority in Central Africa will have achieved a final and cisive transfer of power in its favour. It would control the le latures and Cabinets of three Governments in the Federation, Southern and Northern Rhodesian Governments and the Fed Government. Against this, any lingering powers of withholc Royal assent or reserving legislation would not be importan later granting of Dominion status would add little to the ac control and power over internal affairs which the Europ

olitical leaders would already be exercising. To see its significance ; to realize why this issue of Northern Rhodesia's franchise and er constitutional progress will be central in 1960. It will also pro- ide a test of Britain's intention and ability to keep her earlier romises to Africans. In 1953 the Secretary of State stated that the reamble ruled out any advance to Dominion status or to 'a status 'hich will end in Dominion status without the agreement of the ıajority of the inhabitants. I give a categorical assurance about ıat.'[1]

The Right of Secession. African leaders and liberal critics both ısist that this right must be given to Nyasaland and possibly to Iorthern Rhodesia, post-dated perhaps to operate only after 1965. .ny settlement in 1960 which does not concede this will be un- :ceptable to African opinion in the two Protectorates. Yet to con- :de it will threaten the whole constitutional structure. It is easy to :e why this issue will demonstrate in the clearest and sharpest ›rm the conflict between those who are willing to proceed in 'entral Africa in the face of African hostility and those who insist n first winning African co-operation.

R. C. PRATT

The Outer Seven

Buying Time in the European Trade Dispute

'HE Stockholm agreement setting up a European Free Trade ssociation has the effect of highlighting the economic conse- uences of a division in Western Europe. Though it enables seven ' the O.E.E.C. countries to go forward in reducing trade barriers ›r a limited proportion of their European trade with some benefit ı all, the scheme has little to commend it except as a step towards 'solving the trade dispute which is dividing Western Europe, and ıs as such that it must be judged.

The Stockholm agreement was initialed on 20 November 1959 y Great Britain, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Switzerland, ustria, and Portugal—seven countries drawn together by a com- ıon approach to the European trade problems which the abortive

[1] Hansard, House of Commons, 24 June 1953, col. 1969.

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all-West-European Free Trade Area negotiations had sought t solve. Barring unforeseen ratification difficulties, these seven coun tries will, on their own, begin on 1 July 1960 the process of dis mantling over a period of ten years barriers to trade in industri goods with each other until none remain.[1] As a result, the Europea Economic Community of the Six will be matched by a second grou of trading nations in Western Europe which, like the Six, will b committed to grant tariff and quota concessions to member coun tries without obligation to extend these to non-members, be the fellow Europeans or in the world at large. The Six, of course, go be yond this not only by defined plans for integration in other fields bu also by preparing for a common external tariff and commercia policy. In other words, as these two groups face each other, they ar each committed to grant exclusive concessions to fellow member but, in addition, the Six are preparing to alter, as to the rest of th world, the tariff wall of each of its members towards the Seven, whereas there is no matching commitment affecting imports by th Seven from the Six.

The first thing that strikes one about the new trade grouping i that from the economist's point of view it is an ill-balanced, artificia creation, as French commentators, such as, for example, the in tensely antagonistic Employers' Federation (*Patronat*), have no been slow to point out.[3] One country of the Seven—Great Britain— exceeds in importance all the others taken together, be it in tota population, in combined national income, or in total value of trade The group is geographically scattered, with Austria, Switzerland and Portugal trading far more with their respective neighbours thar with Britain or the Scandinavian countries. The total of manu factured goods imported by the members of the group derives to the extent of only about one-quarter from fellow members, as against one-half bought from the Six. On the export side, the three Scandinavian countries, closely interdependent and with consider able sales to Britain, are alone in relying more on markets in their own grouping than in the other. Moreover, in the 'Little' Free Trade Area limits are set to trade creation—and to a lesser extent also to trade diversion—by the fact that besides Britain, the giant

[1] *European Free Trade Association· Text of Convention and other Documents approved at Stockholm on 20 November 1959* (Cmnd. 906), London, H M S O

[2] In creating the common outer tariff, Benelux and Western Germany will have to raise duties charged to outsiders, and there will be a lowering in the case of the comparatively less valuable market comprised by France and Italy

[3] *The Times*, 15 October 1959.

among the Seven, only Austria has comparably high tariff protection, whereas the other members tend to have highly specialized industries and there is a wide range of goods not generally produced in these countries on which duties charged are nil or quite low.[1] This is simply a reflection of the fact that the Seven have come together not because of inherent economic merits of the scheme but because of a common approach to the situation created by the Six. It has the important consequence of ensuring against any possible danger that the scheme in itself may weaken the determination of the Seven to seek an understanding with the Six, let alone that it may tempt them to build an exclusive trading bloc.

Nevertheless the inherent economic advantage to its members of the association of the Seven—even measured against the prospects of the Economic Community—is not as empty of promise as might at first sight appear. The total population of about 88 million in the seven countries is not much more than half that of the Common Market countries, but on the average they have a higher living standard and their gross national product measures up to nearly two-thirds of that of the Six. They are also more dependent on trade than the Common Market countries considered as a group. The Outer Seven imported in 1958 manufactured goods to the value of £2,445 million, compared with combined imports of £2,870 million-worth into the Community of the Six. The respective share of the largest importer in each group was £734 million for Britain, and £848 million for Western Germany.

Individual industries, particularly in Britain and Sweden, include not a few which may expect to benefit from showing their paces in increased competition, whereas some others, such as British paper manufacturers, and watch and clock makers, have viewed the plan with apprehension. This bears witness to the fact that scope for improved and more rational use of resources does, in fact, exist. But clearly any such benefits cannot be compared with the gains in productivity that may be expected from the integration of the Six Common Market countries, provided that their purpose is not frustrated by market-sharing arrangements or other obstacles. However, if the scheme helps to acclimatize industry in the seven countries to the rigours of keener competition, one useful purpose will have been served.

[1] Denmark is a low-tariff country but in a special position, since, in the past, she has freely used quota restrictions to protect domestic industries. Portugal may be discounted, since, as a developing country, she will be allowed to spread the tariff-dismantling process over twenty years.

So much for trade creation, but the Stockholm agreement provides the means of diverting trade through offering tariff vantages in the markets of the Outer Seven to suppliers within preferential area to the exclusion of suppliers in the Econo Community of the Six. This does nothing to increase world trade amounts simply to meeting discrimination with discrimination. instance, the threat that British motor manufacturers will be gressively put at greater disadvantage in, say, Belgium, as comp with their German competitors, is countered by threatening a t disadvantage for German motor manufacturers in competition British suppliers in, say, Sweden. From the point of view of Outer Seven an opportunity is thus offered of compensation for clusion from trade concessions which the Six grant to each ot Over and above this, an economic incentive is also provided for Six to seek accommodation with the Outer Seven, which, hoped, will sooner or later change their intransigent attitude.

And, indeed, of the two groups, the Six have a greater stak the markets of the Seven relative to their total exports than Seven have in those of the Six. Nevertheless, there would not s to be much immediate prospect that this type of pressure succeed in reviving negotiations for an O.E.E.C.-wide multilat treaty of association, unless political conditions change. Wes Germany would inevitably be the key sufferer, but as the most portant trader of the Six, with competitive and expanding ex industries seeking outlets, with an export trade highly concentr in Western Europe and a larger market for her manufactures wi the Outer Seven than within the Six, she has all along hac economic incentive to favour a wider European Free Trade A Both German industrialists and Professor Erhard, the Ministe Economics, have been consistently pressing for this but—as British were rather late to realize—in Dr Adenauer's eyes the bu ing of a united six-nation community has always come first. It is attitude of France which is decisive today more than ever bef and, despite the striking success of her financial and economic form programme, the time for this hitherto highly protection minded and relatively self-sufficient country to feel concern export outlets is not yet in sight.

Forecasts of the probable impact on West European trade of formation of the two trade groupings involve intricate exerc which must take account of both trade creation through gen economic integration and trade diversion through margins of

ferences created by one group against the other in implementati
of the respective treaties. A tentative general assessment of this ir
pact was recently published by the Economic Commission f
Europe[1] which pointed out that Belgian exporters were likely to l
least affected, those of France and Italy somewhat more, wherea
at the other extreme, Western Germany, Great Britain, Austria, ar
Switzerland might be affected most. When comparing the pro
able effects on Western Germany and Britain, an examination
advantages and disadvantages to the two countries from tariff pr
ferences and economic integration in their respective grouping h
led to the somewhat surprising conclusion that 'the ultimate impa
on the exports of the two countries may not be very different.'[2]

But the E.C.E. report itself indicates that such forecasts, even
more thorough than the present one, are hazardous, since the tv
trading groups will operate in conditions subject to continuo
change whereas the secondary effects of their measures, on i
dividual countries' balances of payments for instance, are high
problematical. It might have been added that an all-importa
question mark is the way in which the Common Market will l
operated, whether it will live up to the promise of liberal policies ar
how successful its integration efforts will prove to be. The futu
external tariff policy of the individual 'Little' Free Trade Ar
members is another unknown quantity.

This much, then, can be tentatively said about the direct effect
the Stockholm agreement upon European trading prospects on t
assumption that accommodation between the two trading grou
does not materialize. The next, and one would hope more realist
question is whether the agreement has enhanced the chances
reaching an understanding which would eliminate discriminati
between the two groups.

Some of the anticipated advantages from this point of view follc
from what has already been said. Meeting discrimination with di
crimination is not likely, by itself, to break the deadlock, but
causes anxiety not only in Germany but also among France's oth
Common Market partners and may, in any case, enhance the ba
gaining position of the Outer Seven. In addition, the scheme offe
some compensation to the Outer Seven and thus makes it easier
exercise patience until a lasting solution can be found. It detra
from possible unco-ordinated bilateral bargains with the Comm

[1] E.C.E., *Economic Bulletin for Europe*, Vol. 11, No. 2, September 1959.
[2] *ibid.*, p. 13.

Market which the smaller among the Outer Seven would have to make from a weak position. In this way the opening for a multilateral solution is kept intact and a possible situation avoided which was recently likened by M. Sergent, the Secretary-General of the O.E.E.C., to a wheel with the Six forming the centre and the others the spokes—that is, linked with the Six but not with each other, thus losing the benefits of free access to each other's markets. At the same time, Britain's decision to link her fortunes with the Scandinavian countries, Austria, and Switzerland limits the conditions on which she can come to terms with the Six and would seem to place out of court the kind of close relationship with the Common Market canvassed by some sections of opinion in this country.[1]

Another kind of argument is that technically negotiations will be facilitated by the formation of the Outer Seven, since talks involving delegates from seventeen countries proved cumbersome. Some also believe that the Six would be more favourably inclined to the linking of the two groups, each retaining its own identity, than to the setting up of free trade area institutions which they tend to view as a threat to the pursuance of their own integration plans.

A scrutiny of the terms of the Stockholm agreement shows that, in so far as the removal of internal tariffs and quotas is concerned, the provisions are carefully synchronized with those of the Common Market treaty so that if a compromise is reached it will be simply a matter of extending the concessions from one group to the other.[2] But otherwise the provisions do not depart from the basic conceptions of the ill-fated Free Trade Area. Agriculture, for instance, is in principle excluded, though Danish interests have been accommodated through bilateral agreements with Britain and Sweden, granting tariff concessions on Danish bacon and other agricultural products—a step, incidentally, which doubtless turned the scale in Denmark in favour of joining the Outer Seven and thus created the pre-condition for its establishment.

One of the main stumbling blocks in the Free Trade Area negotiations had been disagreement on the methods or, indeed, the possibility of ensuring conditions of 'fair' competition in a trading system in which external tariff policy was allowed to be free. 'Origin'

[1] Political limitations are set by the 'neutrality' of Austria, Switzerland, and Sweden Possible harmonization of outer tariffs would be easier in the case of Britain, which has a tariff level rather similar to the proposed common tariff of the Six, than in the case of the low-tariff countries.

[2] The Free Trade Area Association provides for a 20 per cent tariff cut on 1 July 1960 to come level with the Common Market and a further eight cuts of 10 per cent. Rules for quota increases are also matched to those of the Six.

ules, it was argued, would not insure against the possibility of low-ariff countries enjoying an advantage in low-cost raw materials and emi-manufactures and in trade being 'deflected' to them. In the ;tockholm agreement 'origin' rules are applied in combination with rocedure for consultation and complaints. For the rest, there are ules of competition and escape clauses and, in general, a tendency o rely on solving problems as they arise. Hopes are being built on roving that a free trade area can work. But however successful the xperiment may be, one cannot doubt that, if desired, a case against he equal effectiveness of a wider free trade area could be made out. At all events, a year or two must pass before the new trade group an show its paces. Its institutional provisions are light: a Council f Ministers with unanimous vote where new obligations are con-erned, and voting by simple majority (not weighted, as in the in-titutions of the Six) on matters such as escape clauses and dealing vith complaints. The headquarters is planned to be with the).E E.C. in Paris to facilitate contact with the Six.

To sum up, the creation of the Outer Seven grouping does not ive anything away in advance in any bargaining involved in break-ng the present deadlock; it contains no feature that is likely to be lecisive in finally succeeding in breaking the deadlock; but it has reat advantages in giving time to seek a new approach.

But how will the passage of time affect the present issues? No con-lusive answer can be given. Uncertainty as to future trade relations etween the two trading groups is bound to have some unfavourable conomic effects. It is not that serious discrimination arises im-nediately, for the institution of the Common Market is but gradual nd the common external tariff is not due to make itself felt until 962 unless the six countries decide to follow French proposals. But long-term investment plans of business firms are bound to be nfluenced. However, these dangers can be exaggerated, since, if in lue course the Common Market is successfully reconciled with reer trade throughout Western Europe, economic expansion hould go far to counteract the initial maladjustments.

Another reason for haste is the vulnerable position in the interim eriod of the smaller countries who are heavily dependent on trade elations with the group of which they are not members. Austria is n outstanding example. But looked at in another way, the very xistence of close integration between the two groups surely offers onsiderable insurance that sheer economic pressure will bring ltimately workable conciliation arrangements. Already there are

signs that private business enterprise, which, inside the Commo Market, has eagerly grasped the new opportunities offered, ma play its part in keeping the door open between the two groups.

The arguments that speak for patience are related to the situatio inside the Common Market. The chance for the Common Market t develop genuine self-confidence, the consolidation of France' financial rehabilitation programme, the possibility in the future o less emphasis on political and more on economic integration, migh all, it is believed, enhance negotiation prospects. On the other side time is needed to show how the Outer Seven arrangements wil work.

The British Government's apparent view, in face of France' present intransigent attitude, that there is no point in restartin negotiations until there seems to be some chance of success, i reasonable enough provided this does not lead to complacency The reality of the present situation seems to be that the nationalis approach of the French and the federalist approach of the 'Euro peans' make common cause in insisting on the Common Market' absolute exclusiveness.

But the European trading problem must be seen against the worl background. The days of the post-war dollar gap are over and th present United States balance of payments problem calls for com mon European and international action. It also raises apprehensio about latent American protectionism and has made the American more wary of discrimination against their own export trade.

At the time of writing it is difficult to foresee the outcome o present cross-currents in diplomatic activity. This, in turn, wil affect both the immediate future and the conditions in whicl Western Europe's long-term dilemma will have to be solved. Tw policy trends inside the Common Market have been causing som concern. One, reflected in the 'Hallstein proposals', consists o pointed emphasis on treating non-members in Western Europe i exactly the same way as the United States and the rest of th G.A.T.T. signatories. The other is the probability of a speeding u of the Common Market time-table. Applied in conjunction, thes two lines of policy bring the prospect of significant discriminatio between the Six and the Seven nearer. But, in themselves, the need not destroy hope of agreement on common all-West-Euro pean action when, through limits to what can be done in the worl context, conciliation becomes imperative.

The present period of economic expansion in Western Europ

happily minimizes the dangers involved in leaving the basic issues in the European trade dispute temporarily unresolved. There are some in this country who put their faith in the cohesive force of common economic problems which affect all countries of Western Europe in their relations with the outside world. Be this as it may a lasting accord, when it comes, will probably have to be but part of a general reconciliation not only in the economic but also in the political and strategic fields. In the meantime, Western unity may best be served by a not too dogmatic approach to 'bridge building' and, whilst pursuing every possibility for negotiation, by keeping in sight a true perspective about trade advantages and disadvantages.

M. G.

Indian Reactions to the Chinese Border Incursions

THE crisis which arose in Tibet in March 1959 severely shook India's sense of security, and this was reflected in the comments of newspapers and Opposition political leaders. Writing as early as 22 March when the news of the Tibetan revolt had just begun to reach India, the *Hindu*, a leading newspaper of the south, referred in an editorial article to the grave implications for India's security of a Chinese advance in Tibet and observed: 'The Chinese cartographers still include certain parts of India in their maps and their soldiers have even occupied a little of Indian territory. We expect these matters to be settled without much fuss and, one hopes, to our satisfaction.'

The *Sunday Standard*, another English weekly newspaper published simultaneously from four centres in India, dwelt upon the fact that the developments in Tibet, coupled with the grant of military aid to Pakistan by the United States, had much disturbed Indian minds. The developments in Tibet had not only given a new insight into the mind and face of China, but also a new awareness of India's vulnerability. 'Our studiously cultivated pose of lofty detachment,' the newspaper wrote, 'has given way to something like panicky concern for our security, which was reflected in the recent

defence debate in Parliament. No longer were heard the usual demands for cuts in defence expenditure. On the contrary, M.P.s went to the length of questioning the wisdom of the economies voluntarily effected by the Defence Ministry.'[1] The general uneasiness about Chinese actions and intentions found expression in the speeches of prominent Indian personalities who participated in a discussion meeting in New Delhi on 17 April. 'If other people [i.e. the Chinese] think they should consolidate their control and military position in Tibet,' Dr H. N. Kunzru, the veteran public leader, declared, 'surely India has a right to think of her own future position *vis-à-vis* her north-eastern part.'[2] Other speakers at the meeting dwelt upon the 'profound implications' of the Tibetan developments for the entire Himalayan region of Ladakh, Bhutan, Sikkim, and the N.E.F.A. (the North-Eastern Frontier Agency of India, inhabited by the Nagas and other hill tribes south of the McMahon Line).

This reaction was instinctive, because the facts of Chinese border incursions and the differences between the Governments of India and China were not yet generally known. The Government of India was in possession of fuller facts and information, but was not ready to substantiate these fears of the public: it obviously hoped to avoid irritating the Chinese Government unduly over matters which till then were undoubtedly minor, and thereby destroying the chances of an amicable settlement of points under dispute. Yet the Government evidently felt sufficiently uneasy about the Chinese moves not to maintain complete silence as hitherto. 'I do not mean to say that our security is now challenged or in immediate danger,' the Indian Prime Minister, Mr Jawaharlal Nehru, said in Madras on 14 April, 'but we have to think of what might happen also in future.'[3]

During the following months the fears about Chinese intentions and the problems of maintaining India's territorial integrity from an attack from the north came up again and again in one form or other alike in Parliament,[4] in the press,[5] and in the speeches of

[1] *Sunday Standard* (Madras), 19 April 1959, editorial. See also commentary by B. G. Verghese, 'The National Scene', in the *Times of India* (Bombay), 19 April 1959.

[2] *The Statesman* (New Delhi), 18 April 1959.

[3] *Free Press Journal* (Bombay), 15 April 1959.

[4] Debates in the Lok Sabha (the Lower House) on 22 and 27 April, reported in *The Statesman*, 23 and 28 April 1959; and in the Rajya Sabha (Upper House) on 4 May, reported in *The Statesman*, 5 May 1959.

[5] Editorial articles in the *Amritbazar Patrika* (Calcutta—henceforth cited as *Patrika*), 23 April ('China and India'), *Delhi Hindusthan Standard* (New Delhi),

public leaders,[1] and Tibet also frequently came into prominence in these discussions and in the editorial articles of leading national dailies.[2] Despite all this uneasiness about developments in Tibet—which also had some direct repercussions adversely affecting the movement and trade interests of Indian citizens in Tibet[3]—public opinion was still unprepared for the greater shock, involving a considerable slice of Indian territory, which was soon to come.

THE BORDER INCIDENTS OF AUTUMN 1959

The first major indication of serious border trouble between India and China came in Mr Nehru's reply to an adjournment motion and a short-notice question in the Lok Sabha on 28 August. He then disclosed that a small Indian reconnaissance police party, consisting of an officer and five others, while proceeding towards the Khurnak Fort in Jammu and Kashmir in India had been apprehended by a stronger Chinese detachment on 28 July, some miles from the border inside Indian territory, and that the Chinese had established a camp at a place called Spanggur well within Indian territory. On a protest from the Government of India, the Chinese had released the captured Indians but had refused to vacate the territory, claiming it as part of China. No reply had been received to a subsequent Indian Note expressing surprise at this claim. He further disclosed that the Chinese had built a road from Gartok towards Yarkand, in Chinese Turkestan, which encroached upon a part of Indian territory in north-eastern Ladakh, and that

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21 July ('Say Out, Please'); *Pioneer* (Lucknow), 25 June 1959 ('Dalai Lama Speaks'). See also the report of the Staff Correspondent of the *Hindustan Times* (New Delhi), 15 May 1959.

[1] Deliberations before the All-India Tibet Convention held in Calcutta, 30 and 31 May 1959, reported in *Patrika*, 31 May, 1 June 1959, statement of Mr H V Kamath, leader of the Praja Socialist Party, to pressmen in Bhopal on 19 July (*Delhi Hindusthan Standard*, 20 July 1959)

[2] See, e.g., editorials in *Patrika*, 22 June ('Call to Conscience'), 8 August ('China and the Himalayas'), *The Statesman* (Calcutta and Delhi), 3 July ('In Exile'); *Hindustan Times*, 22 June ('The Dalai Lama Speaks'), 2 July ('Dalai Lama's Future'); *Indian Nation* (Patna), 23 June ('The Dalai Lama's Version'); *Hitavada* (Nagpur and Bhopal), 23 June ('Tibetan Problems'), 9 August ('Indo-Tibetan Trade'); *Pioneer* (Lucknow), 24 June, 9 August; *National Herald* (Lucknow), 30 June ('Tibet and U.N.'), 8 August ('Indo-Tibet Trade'); *Free Press Journal* (Bombay), 7 August ('Trade with Tibet'), 14 August ('Turning the Cheek?'); *Times of India* (Bombay), 3 July ('Tibetan Affairs'), 11 July 1959 ('Changes in Tibet').

[3] See statement by Mr Nehru in the Lok Sabha on 6 August on difficulties experienced in India's trade with Tibet (*Patrika*, 7 August 1959). On other difficulties experienced by Indian citizens in Tibet, see statement of the Deputy Minister for External Affairs in the Lok Sabha on 11 August (*Patrika*, 12 August 1959).

one of the two parties sent to reconnoitre the area about a year earlier had been arrested by the Chinese.

Mr Nehru then referred to the latest incidents, of 7 and 25 August. In the first instance an armed Chinese patrol, approximately 200 strong, had violated the Indian border at Khinzemane, north of Chuthangmu, in the Kameng Frontier Division in Assam in north-eastern India. When requested to withdraw, the Chinese had actually physically pushed back the Indian patrol party, which consisted of only about a dozen men. The Indians retook the post after the Chinese had vacated it. But the Chinese had again come back and had demanded that the Indian picket should immediately withdraw from the area, which the Indian policemen had refused to do. There had been no firing. In the other case, on 25 August a strong Chinese detachment had crossed into Indian territory in the Subansiri Frontier Division in that area of Assam at a place south of Migyitun and had opened fire. There had also been similar forcible occupation of Indian territory at Longju.

Mr Nehru said that there was absolutely no doubt about India's border with China, but as the border had not been physically demarcated along its entire length the Government of India was willing to discuss with China the question of minor adjustments here and there. 'But,' he added, 'from such information as we have received and which I have placed before the House, when their forces come, envelop our checkposts, and capture them after firing, it is not the normal peaceful way of approaching these questions [of border adjustments], even if there is a dispute. Therefore this matter becomes a much more serious one than some incidental or accidental border affray.'[1]

The Prime Minister's statement was flashed by all the newspapers in India on their first page and many gave an eight-column heading[2] describing China as aggressor. The statement was interpreted in Parliamentary circles as marking the end of an era of Sino-Indian friendship and the beginning of an era of controversy and strife.[3]

'A New Menace' was how the *Patrika* (29 August, editorial) characterized the Chinese border incursions. It drew attention to the Chinese plan for grabbing the territories of Nepal, Bhutan, and Sikkim and endorsed Mr Nehru's declaration re-confirming

[1] Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs: *Prime Minister on Sino-Indian Relations, Vol. I—in Parliament* (1959), p 95.
[2] See, for example, *Patrika*, 29 August 1959.
[3] *ibid* (report of its special representative at New Delhi).

the McMahon Line as the limit of India's north-eastern frontier and India's interest in the maintenance of the territorial integrity of Bhutan and Sikkim. Practically the entire press endorsed the Prime Minister's stand.[1] *The Statesman* in a leader on 30 August wrote: 'As is customary in disputes of this kind, the precise location and sequence of events can be deliberately blurred. But one fact is clear: the Chinese forces involved displayed a hostility that is at marked variance with their country's past protestations of friendship for India and was unexpected even in the coolness between the two capitals since the rape of Tibet.' The *Hindu* (1 September) commended the Prime Minister's 'sober presentation of facts', his 'dignified restraint in comment', and his 'evident anxiety to be fair to the other side', and it expressed the hope that 'the Chinese Government will soon realize the dangers inherent in the forward policy pursued by their military patrols on India's border'.

In response to demands from M.P.s a White Paper[2] was published early in September containing documents bearing upon Sino-Indian relations since 1954. It was disclosed that ever since 1954 there had been minor disputes on the border, arising from the absence of precise boundary demarcation at those points. It was further shown that, as early as 22 March 1959, Mr Nehru had written to Mr Chou En-lai about the withdrawal of Chinese forces from the parts of Indian territory upon which they had forcefully encroached, but after five months no reply had been received. Immediately after the publication of the White Paper, however, a reply came from Mr Chou En-lai.[3] It was from that letter that Indians first learnt that the Government of China held almost the entire length of the Sino-Indian boundary to be a disputed area. Not only that, but the Chinese Premier put all the blame for the border incidents upon India and accused her of aggressive actions against China. The Chinese Premier's letter was followed by the release of a 2,000-word official statement by the Hsinhua (official Chinese) News Agency which, among other things, accused India

[1] Cf editorials in the *Indian Nation*, 29 August ('China's Cold War'), *The Statesman* (Calcutta and Delhi), 30 August, *Hitavada*, 1 September ('Sino-Indian Border Relations'); *The Pioneer*, 2 September ('Knocking on the North'); and the *Hindu*, 1 September 1959 ('Border Troubles').

[2] Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs: *Notes, Memoranda and Letters exchanged and Agreements signed between the Governments of India and China 1954–1959*—White Paper No. 1 (New Delhi, 1959).

[3] Text in Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs: White Paper No. 2 of 1959, pp. 27–33.

of: (i) drawing her map in such a way as to cut 38,000 sq. km. deep into Chinese territory along the Sinkiang-Tibet-Ladakh border, (ii) invading several places which were claimed to be Chinese territory along the Tibet-Punjab-Uttar Pradesh frontier; and (iii) annexing 90,000 sq. miles of Chinese territory along the Assam-Tibet border.[1]

Rejecting these claims as 'fantastic and absurd', Mr Nehru said in the Lok Sabha on 12 September: 'When India referred to these [Chinese] maps in the past, she was told they were old maps and China would revise them.[2] That was a totally inadequate answer, though it was some kind of postponement of answer. But now the real thing is, this is more definite. They [the Chinese] hold by it [the Chinese map] when we do not exactly know where their line is. This kind of treatment or behaviour—that is, claiming a large tract of Indian territory as Chinese—does seem to me very improper for one nation to treat another, even much more so among nations which have been friendly.'[3] Mr Nehru met the points raised by Mr Chou in a further letter on 26 September.

There followed a temporary halt in Chinese forward movements until late in October, when India was shocked to learn of the attack on Indian patrol policemen on the Ladakh border by an armed Chinese detachment, resulting in the death of nine Indian policemen and injury to several others (the Chinese did not disclose the number of dead or injured, if any, on their side). The Government of India sent a strong protest Note demanding the immediate release of the captured Indians and evacuation of Indian territory.

The *Amritbazar Patrika* (25 October, editorial) characterized the episode as 'Stabbing while Smiling' (the reference was to Chou's friendly acknowledgement of Nehru's greetings, received shortly before, on China's National Day) and asked, 'Is it possible to treat such surprise attacks as a prelude to friendly negotiations?' The *Nagpur Times* (26 October, editorial) described the incident as 'the last straw for India's patience and neutrality': it exploded once for all 'the fondly nurtured fiction that China may be interested in settling the border dispute with India in any friendly spirit'.

A section of the press strongly criticized the Government of India's lack of firmness in dealing with the Chinese. 'The seventeen[4] policemen who laid their lives in the height of Ladakh,' the

[1] *Times of India*, 13 September 1959.

[2] Cf. Chinese Government Memorandum of 3 November 1958 (text in White Paper No. 1 of 1959, p. 47). [3] *Times of India*, 14 September 1959.

[4] The number was subsequently verified as nine.

Hindustan Times (26 October, editorial) wrote, 'are as much the victims of a policy which has wantonly neglected national interests as of Chinese expansionist adventures.' On the same day the *Indian Express*, another critic of Nehru's policies, wrote: 'Mr Nehru's habit of countering each new act of Chinese aggression with a Niagara of words has begun increasingly to dismay India's people and to embolden the Chinese.' There was no doubt about the nation's anger at this outrage.[1] Even the Communist Party of India condemned it.

The Government of India's second White Paper, published early in November,[2] containing the text of letters and Notes exchanged between the Governments of China and India on the border dispute since the end of August, disclosed a steady deterioration in their mutual relationships.

PARLIAMENTARY AND PARTY REACTIONS

The deterioration in relations between India and China has been frequently discussed in both Houses of Parliament during the past four months. There were many adjournment motions and anxious questions about the various border incidents. The Government was strongly criticized for its failure to keep the nation informed about the fact of Chinese incursions into Indian territory which had been going on ever since 1954. Mr Nehru in reply explained that he had thought it would be possible to arrive at a mutually satisfactory settlement without undue publicity. The Government's policy in relation to China came under fire from the Praja Socialist, Jan Sangh, and Swatantra Party members, who accused it of timidity and half-heartedness. India's advocacy in favour of a seat for China in the United Nations, and especially her opposition to discussion of the Tibetan question there, constituted particular targets of attack. Ironically enough, the Communists appeared to be the sole Opposition supporters of the Government.

All the political parties and groups—with the exception of the Communist Party of India and two small splinter groups in West Bengal known as the Socialist Unity Centre and the Forward Bloc Marxists—were unanimous in their denunciation of the Chinese

[1] Cf. editorials in *Delhi Hindusthan Standard*, 25 October ('Ladakh Outrage'); *Deccan Chronicle* (Secunderabad), 25 October ('Pig Hunting?'); *Anandabazar Patrika* (Calcutta—an influential Bengali daily), 25 October; *Hitavada*, 27 October 1959 ('Bellicose China').

[2] See above, p. 27.

actions. The Congress,[1] the Praja Socialist Party,[2] the Jan Sangh,[3] the newly founded Swatantra Party,[4] and the Revolutionary Socialist Party[5] all pledged support to the Government in its stand against Chinese encroachment. The general criticism of the Opposition parties, with the exception of the Communist Party, was that the Government was pursuing a policy of appeasement towards China.[6] The President of the Bengal Provincial Hindu Mahasabha declared that the 'continued insult' by China 'to the sense of our national prestige is a direct proof of failure of the foreign policy of the Nehru Government'.[7] The Praja Socialist Party and the Jan Sangh were most vocal in demanding a firmer policy towards China.

Even the Communist Party of India was forced to criticize China publicly. However, its ill-conceived policies made it the chief political casualty, and the Party found itself in the midst of the gravest internal crisis in its history. Its dilemma lay in the obvious difficulty of reconciling its much vaunted 'proletarian internationalism' (which, on the principle that a Socialist country can never be an aggressor, did not permit it to recognize aggression by a Communist country) with the political expediency of retaining the allegiance of the Indian masses, who had been profoundly shaken by what they regarded, rightly or wrongly, as perfidious behaviour on the part of the Chinese Government. Mr A. K. Gopalan, Deputy Leader of the Communist group in the Lok Sabha, told a public meeting in Gaya on 31 August—three days after the Prime Minister's authoritative announcement in Parliament—that 'the much publicized intrusion on India's border by China is nothing but a bogey by newspapers and a deep-rooted conspiracy by the Western imperialists and vested interests for whom Indo-China friendship is an eyesore.'[8] The Party thought

[1] See resolution adopted by the All-India Congress Committee at its Nagpur session (*Patrika*, 24 September 1959) Another resolution was adopted by the working committee of the Indian National Congress on 10 November (*Patrika*, 11 November 1959).

[2] Resolution adopted at the Silver Jubilee Conference of the party in Bombay on 5 November (*Hindu*, 7 November 1959)

[3] Resolution passed by the working committee of the All-India Jan Sangh on 20 September in New Delhi (*Statesman* (Calcutta), 21 September 1959)

[4] Cf. statement of Mr K. M. Munshi, the Swatantra Party leader, inaugurating the party's Convention in Punjab on 25 October (*Patrika*, 26 October 1959)

[5] Statement of Mr T K Chowdhury, General Secretary of the Revolutionary Socialist Party, in Calcutta on 30 August (*Patrika*, 31 August 1959)

[6] Acharya J. B. Kripalani called the policy 'Chamberlain-like' (*Times of India*, 7 September 1959).

[7] *Patrika*, 26 October 1959.

[8] *Patrika*, 2 September 1959.

that a revival of the slogan 'Hindi Chini Bhai-Bhai' ('Indians and Chinese are brothers') would remove all the difficulties.[1] Nevertheless the continued violation of Indian territory by Chinese armed forces opened the eyes of some leaders, including the veteran Mr S. A. Dange (whose sixtieth birthday was recently celebrated throughout the Communist world by the World Federation of Trade Unions) and Mr A. K. Gopalan. But the Party was not yet prepared to take a definite stand either for or against China; instead, its Central Executive, at its Calcutta meeting, adopted a resolution stating that neither the McMahon Line (claimed by India as her north-eastern boundary) nor the Chinese maps (which included within China a considerable area south of that line) should be taken as a pre-condition for starting negotiations towards a settlement of all outstanding issues between India and China. There was no condemnation of China.[2] This resolution was promptly greeted as 'positively dishonest and mischievous'.[3]

This double-talking resolution shattered the morale of many Communists, and the Maharashtra and Poona Units openly passed resolutions repudiating it. A meeting of the Party's policy-making National Council was convened to consider this cleavage. Under pressure from the general body of members the National Council substantially modified the Calcutta resolution, acknowledging the McMahon Line as the limit of India's north-eastern boundary and even endorsing the Government's stand with regard to Ladakh. The Party was not yet prepared to call China an aggressor (although it had earlier condemned the Chinese shooting in Ladakh), and it accused such parties as the Jan Sangh and the Swatantra Party, the leadership of the Praja Socialist Party, and some influential elements inside the Congress of launching a campaign of hatred against China and urged people to beware of 'the activities of such parties'.[4] This resolution, too, apparently failed to satisfy some of the leading Party members, whose feelings were reflected in the refusal of the Executive of the Maharashtra Communist Party Committee to endorse it.[5] But, at least on the surface,

[1] Statement of C.P.I. Secretariat (*Statesman* (Calcutta), 20 September 1959).
[2] For full text of the resolution see *Hindu* (Madras), 27 September 1959.
[3] Editorial in *Patrika*, 28 September 1959 ('Parting of Ways?'). See also Mahesh Chandra's 'Political Commentary' in *The Statesman*, 30 September 1959: 'Had the Communist Party tried to demonstrate its anti-national and un-Indian character it could not have done better than through the resolution which its Central Executive released at Calcutta last week.'
[4] For full text of the Meerut resolution see *Hindu*, 15 November 1959.
[5] *Free Press Journal*, 2 December 1959.

the Party fully upheld the policies of the Government of India, and even the most vocal among its pro-Chinese elements also endorsed Mr Nehru's letter of 16 November[1] to the Chinese Premier.[2] Many people, including the Congress Chief Minister of Orissa State, Dr H. K. Mahtab,[3] asked the Government to place a curb upon the Communist Party, but Mr Nehru declined to do so.[4]

THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA'S POSITION

The Government of India was at first inclined to dismiss the border incursions as a trifling matter arising out of a misunderstanding on the part of local Chinese troops. But the receipt of Premier Chou En-lai's letter of 8 September convinced the Government that China's differences with India were no simple matter. Yet even then it did not consider that China would resort to deliberate armed incursion into India's territory. Even as late as 21 October, Mr Nehru was telling pressmen in Calcutta that he did not think there was any 'major idea' behind the Chinese incursions. The news of the outrage in Ladakh, in which nine Indians had been taken completely by surprise and killed, inflamed public opinion in the country, and it was further stiffened by the Chinese replies to the Government of India's Note. The extent to which Mr Nehru's views about China had undergone a transformation since 21 October was shown by his remark at the convocation of the Dronacharya Sanatan Dharam College at Gurgaon, near Delhi, on 29 November, when he exhorted everyone to realize that 'these dangers are not only for the present, but may remain for many years to come. We have to face this challenge by increasing our strength.'[5]

The considered view of the Government of India towards China was outlined on 27 November in the Prime Minister's reply at the end of the Lok Sabha's three-day debate on the Sino-Indian border issue. Mr Nehru accused China of a 'breach of faith' against India, who had all along championed her cause. He emphasized that it was absurd for the Government of China to imagine that it could sit on or crush India, just as it was equally absurd for anyone in India to think he was going to sit on China. He thought that the prospects of a future where the two giant nations of Asia were constantly 'at each other's throat' was bad for

[1] See below, p. 34. [2] *Patrika*, 23 November 1959. [3] *ibid.*

[4] Reply to a question at monthly press conference in New Delhi, 3 December (*Statesman*, 4 December 1959).

[5] *Hindustan Times*, 30 November 1959.

the future, bad for China, and bad for India, or for Asia, and a war between them would be a great tragedy. The Government of India had realized, he said, even when it had recognized the Chinese Communist Government, 'that a strong China has been normally an expansionist China throughout history. That has been the case and we saw it and felt it.' The rapid rate of population growth in China faced the world with an explosive situation.

'People think,' Mr Nehru added, 'that in spite of all that has happened on our borders and elsewhere it has made no great difference. That is not correct. It has made a tremendous difference not only to the Government's present relations with China but also to what may happen in the future. That is something very obvious from the widespread and deep-seated reaction in India. There is no doubt about that... The reaction has been powerful, from children in a primary school to grown-up people. I have ventured sometimes to ask people to be calm. But I might tell you that I was proud of that reaction.' He asked everybody to realize the gravity of the situation created by China: 'If,' he said, 'unfortunately the situation worsens we shall have to become a nation in arms. Let there be no mistake. Every single activity and planning will have to be conditioned by the major fact that it is a struggle for life and death.'

He had earlier indicated that an attack on Bhutan and Sikkim would be considered an attack of China. Now he extended that protection to the Himalayan State of Nepal as well, with which India is associated by a treaty of friendship.[1]

'The Lead We Waited For' was the title of the editorial of 28 November in which the *Hindustan Times*, the influential daily in the nation's capital, greeted Mr Nehru's speech. 'The country has waited long enough for the kind of lead the Prime Minister gave in his reply to the debate on the Chinese threat on our northern borders. We now know where we stand and, rather more important, so do the Chinese.' And this paper, which had earlier criticized Mr Nehru's lenient policy towards China, added: 'We have been among those who have not appreciated Mr Nehru's patient handling of the situation, and we still claim that the Chinese did not deserve his infinite pains to understand them and to make them see reason. Nevertheless we are proud today that we have a Prime Minister in whom the people have so much basic trust that he can emerge from the cloud he has been under with his strength

[1] See *Patrika* and *Hindustan Times*, 28 November 1959.

unimpaired, his popularity undimmed, his leadership unchallenged.'

Commenting on the debate in Parliament, the *Amritbazar Patrika* (28 November) said that 'though the debate took party lines, can it be denied that the Prime Minister has emerged with his hands much more strengthened than before?'

The *Hindu* (29 November) referred to the 'triune note of unity, self-reliance, and determination' reflected in the speeches of members belonging to all parties and groups, which had revealed that they had really no quarrel with what the Prime Minister had characterized as the Government's basic policy—friendship with neighbouring States and non-alignment with any military bloc. 'Our Prime Minister has spoken for our people,' it said, and warned that 'China would be making a grave mistake if she believed that India was divided on any issue which affected her honour and integrity. Our country and our Parliament have witnessed such demonstrations of unity as should make her pause and ponder.'

Referring to Mr Nehru's speech as the enunciation of a 'Nehru Doctrine', the *Times of India* (1 December) said that the extension of the protective wing of India to prevent any aggression upon Nepal 'is nothing more than a recognition of physical imperatives and it was addressed as much to the people of India as to foreign Powers'.

The Government of India all along indicated its willingness to discuss with the Chinese Government all reasonable points about the border, but it understandably could not agree to give up a substantial portion of Indian territory which belonged to her historically, politically, and culturally, for no other reason than that the Chinese wanted that territory. Mr Chou, in a letter of 9 November, had suggested that both China and India should withdraw their forces twelve and a half miles on either side of the McMahon Line, and proposed a conference between himself and Mr Nehru to discuss the situation. Explaining India's stand, Mr Nehru in his reply of 16 November to Mr Chou said: 'I should like to repeat what I have said in a previous communication, that this entire frontier was a peaceful one for a long time and there was no conflict or trouble there. It is only recently that conflicts and difficulties have arisen in regard to the frontier. These difficulties have not arisen because of any action that we have taken. The cause of the recent troubles is action taken from your side of the frontier.' Expressing his desire for a peaceful settlement of the disputes, he stressed the

need to avoid border clashes and to adopt the necessary measure to that end. He pointed out that there was disagreement even abou the facts of possession, which made the observance of the *status qu* exceedingly difficult. But to avoid entanglement on the definitio of the *status quo* he suggested as an interim measure that in th Ladakh area the Government of India would withdraw all per sonnel to the west of the line which the Chinese Government ha shown as the international boundary in its 1956 maps, while th Chinese Government should withdraw its personnel to the eas of the international boundary which had been described by th Government of India in its earlier Notes and correspondence an shown in its official maps. He was willing to meet the Chines Premier, but certain preliminary steps had to be taken before suc a meeting could take place. Mr Chou En-lai's reply did not arriv till 18 December, and then proposed a meeting on 26 Decembe

It may be pointed out, in summing up, that never before in th past twelve years has the country been so angry and so united as i was against the offensive Chinese actions and pronouncement affecting India. People took the border incidents with China fa more seriously than they had the earlier incidents on the India Pakistan border which were undoubtedly of a far smaller magni tude and were in an altogether different category. The Chinese out rages caused some—though they were in a minority—even to sug gest a joint India-Pakistan defence arrangement against Chin but that suggestion was categorically rejected by the Governmen of India which reiterated its adherence to the policy of non involvement in bloc rivalries.

S. C. SARKER

Bulgaria's Economic Leap Year

WHEN at the end of 1958 Bulgaria embarked on her 'Great Lea Forward', observers in the West saw in the spectacular raising of he industrial and agricultural targets a sign that the Bulgarian Com munists were abandoning the Moscow road to follow Peking. Th announcement in December 1958 of the formation of the first Bul garian 'commune' at Botevgrad, despite its hasty withdrawal th next day as a 'gross mistake' for which the responsible editor woul

be punished, tended to confirm the impression that the visit of the Bulgarian Politbureau's grey eminence, Vulko Chervenkov, to China in the early autumn had inspired the Party leaders with missionary zeal to hasten Bulgaria's transition from socialism to Communism by applying Chinese shock methods to her retarded economy.

But although some features of the campaign for economic acceleration—such as the merging of co-operative farms into larger units incorporating local industry and the local trade network, the technique of the mobilization of the masses, the plan to shift women from homes to factories by relieving them of housework and child-care, the direction of white-collar workers, intellectuals, students, and schoolchildren to manual labour, and the adoption of the slogan 'great leap forward' itself—strongly resembled the Chinese pattern, there is no evidence whatsoever that Soviet ideological influence was on the wane in Sofia. Official pronouncements to the contrary were quite emphatic. The matter was settled conclusively when Chervenkov himself, in an article in the organ of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party, minimized the ideological importance of the Chinese communes, echoing the Soviet view that they were a form of socialist social organization and not a short-cut to Communism.[1]

That Soviet Russia remains a model for sedulous imitation in all fields of the nation's life, irrespective of the country's specific conditions and needs, was explicitly stated by the first secretary of the Central Committee, Todor Zhivkov. In his report to the third ordinary session of the Bulgarian National Assembly in March 1959, which endorsed his famous January proposals, or 'theses', for the economic leap, he said: 'Our socialist State, independently of the historic traditions and particularities of our country, will develop exactly along the road followed by the Soviet socialist State, according to the requirements of the basic laws for the development of the Soviet socialist State.'[2]

Indeed, the wholesale administrative and economic reorganization of the Bulgarian State machine which came into force in March 1959, the disbandment of the machine-tractor stations, the introduction of ambitious schemes for land reclamation, the strengthening of the trade unions as 'organizers and managers of socialist

[1] *Rabotnichesko Delo*, 15 January 1959. The Chinese themselves retreated on the ideological significance of the communes at the December 1958 Plenum of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party

[2] *Novo Vreme* (the Central Committee's theoretical organ), October 1959, p 21

ımpetition in industry', the revival of youth brigades as a labour serve, and the proposal for a revision of the Constitution on the ound that it no longer reflects correctly the conditions created by e victory of socialism in town and country, are exact replicas of e reforms championed by Mr Khrushchev in Soviet Russia. A ıaracteristic example of the indiscriminate emulation of Soviet actice is the recent law for the reorganization of education, which ms at obliterating the difference between intellectual and manual bour by turning schools into a training ground for industry and riculture. The decree on the development of education in Bulria, issued in July 1957, was scrapped barely eighteen months ter it came into force, in order to bring Bulgaria into line with hrushchev's November 1958 pronouncements on 'strengthening e ties between schools and life'. Ironically, the preamble to the 157 decree listed among past mistakes requiring reform that of 'the echanical transplanting of Soviet school experience'.[1]

Not only are the Bulgarian Communist leaders the model disples of the Soviet Union—a position which has made them highly ıpopular in other satellite countries—but theirs is also the most ıgmatic of all Soviet bloc parties. Bulgaria is probably the only untry in the Soviet orbit where portraits of Stalin are still disayed in Government buildings. Vulko Chervenkov, all-powerful alinist dictator of Bulgaria until March 1954, has suffered only partial eclipse. After Stalin's death he had to give up his post of st secretary of the Central Committee to Todor Zhivkov, but he tained the Premiership until the April 1956 plenary meeting of e Central Committee, which implemented the decisions of the wentieth Soviet Party Congress for the liquidation of the 'cult of rsonality'. Early in 1957 he was chosen to carry out the Party's pressive cultural policies against the 'revisionist' writers and inlectuals as Minister of Education and Culture, a post he held until e Seventh Congress of the Bulgarian Communist Party in June 58, when his mission was considered accomplished. As deputyemier and member of the Politbureau he still wields considerable wer behind the scenes. Chervenkov's successor, Todor Zhivkov, epresentative of the new type of Communist leader, the *apparatık*, who has come to the fore throughout the Soviet empire with e advent of 'collective leadership', owes his rise to the protection Chervenkov, with whom he appears to maintain a close alliance. ıere has thus been no basic change in the leadership of the Bul-

[1] *Izvestia na Presidiuma na Narodnoto Sobrame*, No. 59, 1957.

garian Communist Party since the death of Stalin. Even after Khrushchev's secret report at the Twentieth Soviet Congress, the Bulgarians showed extreme reluctance to join in the general denigration of Stalin. Bulgaria's Prime Minister, Anton Yugov, summed up the attitude of the leadership when he said in Moscow four months after the Hungarian rising: 'If they call us Stalinists because we are hard and irreconcilable against opportunism and revision, then we feel honoured in accepting such a reproach.'[1]

The Bulgarians seem to have the full backing of the Kremlin for their 'great leap forward'. At the Twenty-first Soviet Party Congress, at which Mr Khrushchev decreed that all countries in the socialist camp would enter the final stage of Communism more or less simultaneously, he went out of his way to justify 'leaps' from an ideological point of view as a means of shortening the distance between the advance-guard of Communism and more backward socialist countries.

The decision to accelerate the economic development of Bulgaria by stepping up the third Five-Year Plan, approved by the Seventh Party Congress in June 1958, was dictated by the need to synchronize planning with the Soviet Seven-Year Plan, which aims at overtaking the West in *per capita* production. At the November 1958 plenary session of the Central Committee, Zhivkov said: 'As a party which must help to bring about the triumph of Communism over world capitalism, we are obliged to contribute to the shortening of the time limits for overtaking capitalism and to win the battle against time.' In this race Bulgaria's role has been defined by Comecon (the Council for Mutual Economic Aid—the organization for East European economic collaboration) in accordance with long-term plans for economic integration, based on a division of labour between members of the East European bloc according to the natural resources of each country.

Agriculture and light industry, two branches which have been neglected by the Communists in the past, are now receiving special attention in an attempt to redress the balance of the national economy. This was badly upset by two Five-Year Plans, which, by their indiscriminate emphasis on heavy industry, violated common sense in the name of Marxist theory. This policy, which imposed great suffering on the population, has effectively changed the face of the country. In 1939 agriculture accounted for some 75 per cent, industry for some 25 per cent of the country's economy. After fifteen

[1] Radio Sofia, 18 February 1959.

years of Communism, that relation has been practically reversed in favour of industry. The annual average increase of industrial production in the years 1948–58 was about 16 per cent, while the average annual increase in agricultural production was only about 2·4 per cent. It is hardly surprising that in these conditions the country's rural production has been unable to satisfy the demands of industry for raw materials, to supply sufficient forage for livestock, or enough food for the growing population.

Investments for 1959 show a doubling of the previous year's allocation for agriculture, and a significant readjustment in the division between heavy and light industry in favour of the latter. The proportion of industry's total allocation given to heavy industry dropped from 85·1 per cent in 1958 to 69·5 per cent in 1959, while that for light industry jumped up from 14·9 per cent in 1958 to 30·5 per cent in 1959. However, only part of this money is being channelled into production of consumer goods for the home market, the bulk being intended for factories processing rural raw materials such as vegetables, fruit, sunflower, cotton, and tobacco for export.

In accordance with Comecon directives, the new plan aims at developing those branches of Bulgaria's economy for which there exist the most favourable natural conditions. But there is no evidence that the new trend in favour of agriculture and light industry means an abandonment of the policy of heavy industrial development, as some observers have inferred. In his speech of 28 October 1959 at the enlarged plenary meeting of the Central Committee which discussed problems of building, Zhivkov stressed the continued preponderance of heavy industry (metallurgy, engineering, heavy chemicals, electrification): of the total volume of capital investments for 1960–5, 14 per cent is earmarked for agriculture and 60 per cent for industry, of which about 78 per cent is for heavy industry.[1] This continued emphasis on industrialization, besides being in full accordance with Marxist-Leninist dogma, has a definite political purpose. Bulgaria is the show-window of Communism in the Balkans, and her industrialization must serve as a propaganda example for comparison with development in capitalist Greece and Turkey and revisionist Yugoslavia. Such a comparison was made by Khrushchev in person at the Seventh Congress of the Bulgarian Communist Party.[2]

Industry must now double its production by 1962, compared with the 62 per cent increase originally laid down in the third Five-

[1] *Rabotnichesko Delo*, 3 November 1959. [2] *Trud*, 4 June 1959.

Year Plan. The greater part of the increase is to come from a better utilization of existing production techniques and the streamlining of several works into amalgamated 'combines'. The managerial rights of the trade union committees within the enterprises have been enlarged with the object of eliminating waste and red tape. Labour norms have been raised and incentives in the form of bonuses introduced. The revival of Stakhanovism, or rather Gaganovism (the example now constantly held up to Bulgarian workers by press and radio is that of the Soviet shock-worker Valentina Gaganova) cannot be more popular with the hard-driven Bulgarian proletarians than the threat of labour direction hanging over their heads. At the plenary session of the Central Committee in November 1958 Zhivkov gave a warning that workers who would not 'march in step with the nation-wide movement for the fulfilment of the Five-Year Plan in three to four years' would be transferred to other 'suitable' jobs.

It is in the critical field of agriculture that the regime's targets are at their most utopian. Bulgaria, which before the war was mainly a country of small private landowners, ranks now as the second country in Europe after the Soviet Union in the collectivization of its agriculture. At the Seventh Party Congress in June 1958 it was announced that more than 92 per cent of the country's arable land was already in collective farms. The only difference between the Soviet kolkhozes and the Bulgarian collective farms is the nominal 'private' ownership of the contributed land in Bulgaria, expressed in the payment of a special land rent. This difference is rapidly disappearing, as the Bulgarian peasants are under increasing pressure to renounce 'voluntarily' their right to receive rent for the land they brought into the collectives. In a country where 80 per cent of the population derived its livelihood from the soil and nearly every peasant owned his own land, collectivization has been unpopular even among village Party members. In 1950 widespread discontent led to riots in several parts of the country.

The damage done to Bulgarian agriculture by the forced pace of collectivization was considerable. The failure to reach agricultural targets in three successive State plans (1947–8; 1949–53; 1953–7) led to the admission at the April 1956 plenary meeting of the Central Committee that agriculture had been affected adversely by certain Party policies which had deprived the peasants of material incentives. According to the directives of the Seventh Party Congress in June 1958, rural production was to be increased by 35 per cent over

the next five years. This was no mean target, but the ambitious planners of the 'great leap forward' have scrapped it and decreed that now agriculture is to double its production in one year and treble it by 1960. (In the State Plan for 1959, published in March, the agricultural target was somewhat reduced to a 73·9 per cent increase in the value of production over 1958 in terms of 1955 prices, but Government spokesmen continue to refer to the 'doubling' of rural production in 1959 as compared with the previous year.)[1]

Although the volume of capital investments allocated to agriculture and forestry for 1959 is nearly double that for 1958 (807·9 million leva as against 412 million in 1958), it seems totally inadequate for the planned increase of 73·9 per cent if one bears in mind that in the preceding decade the annual average increase in agricultural production was some 2·4 per cent.

In agriculture, as in industry, the Communist leadership clearly hopes to achieve its astronomical targets mainly by the exploitation of existing labour reserves and the improvement of production methods. The amalgamation of the collective farms is considered one of the chief means of tapping the 'hidden reserves' in the national economy. In four to five months the existing 3,452 collective farms were merged into 972 enlarged agricultural collectives.[2] These are shouldering a heavy programme of irrigation and land reclamation through terracing, drainage, and the filling-up of disused channels and dried-up rivers. Improved cultivation methods such as denser sowing and intensive use of fertilizers are expected to raise the average yields per decare[3] to the following: wheat 180 kg., maize 250 kg., sunflower 150 kg., cotton 110 kg., tobacco 85 kg., sugar beet 2,640 kg.

As an incentive to the peasants, the system of compulsory State deliveries was abandoned with a belated admission that it was 'unfair' to poorer farms. The establishment of unified State purchase prices for agricultural produce (roughly double the compulsory delivery prices) and a proposed new system of labour remuneration, calculated on the volume of net production and not on the basis of the 'trudoden' (working day) as hitherto, is meant to stimulate the peasant's interest in increasing output. Although the merger is benefiting poorer farms, which now share in the profits from the higher yields of the more productive larger collectives, it is pulling back the richer farms, which find themselves in much the same

[1] Cf. speech of Ivan Prumov, Minister of Agriculture and Forestry, in *Rabotnichesko Delo*, 26 November 1959. [2] *ibid.* [3] 1 decare = 0·205 acre.

position as the 'kulaks' at the beginning of land collectivization. The proposed introduction of a fixed minimum daily and eventually monthly wage, designed to stem the flight from the land and to alleviate widespread unemployment in the towns, will in fact hasten the transformation of the Bulgarian peasants, once the proud owners of their land, into a dispossessed agrarian proletariat.

Following the Soviet example, the machine-tractor stations were abolished throughout Bulgaria, and their equipment is being purchased by the amalgamated farms from their 'indivisible fund'. Although this move was popular, as the peasants resented the MTS both as instruments of Party control and because of the high payment in kind demanded for mechanical service, it is not without its irony if one remembers that Communist mechanization in Bulgaria began with the confiscation of agricultural machines from private and co-operative farmers. The disbandment of the MTS has not resulted in less political control in the rural sector, for the simple reason that most of the directors of the newly amalgamated collectives are former county Party secretaries who can be trusted to carry out the Party line. The continued existence of a free market on which the peasants are allowed to sell the produce from their private plots has given the regime cause to complain that the peasants abuse this outlet and sell on the free market before they have fulfilled their contracts with the State trading organizations—a practice blamed in part for the breakdown of the distribution system which is causing serious delays in the fulfilment of the Plan.

On 25 October 1959 the Bulgarian press and radio broadcast the announcement of the Central Statistical Department on the progress of the State Economic Plan for 1959. Before examining the results, a word of warning must be said about the nature of Communist statistics in general and Bulgarian statistics in particular. On the subject of their notorious inconsistency, vagueness, and unreliability one cannot do better than quote from an article which appeared in the November/December 1958 issue of the Bulgarian journal *Statistika*:

In the desire to make use of more statistical data, in many articles and reports, even in papers of various institutes, offices, manuals, and reference books, errors have been permitted both as to the authenticity of the data and as to the correct utilization of the material with the aid of which the confirmation or proof of one or another proposition was sought. On the one hand, even data published by the Central Statistical Department, or data found in available statistical papers, were not correctly used, while on the other hand data dealing with different periods which could not be

›mpared have been used; in other cases the economic content or mean-
ɪg of the data utilized has not been understood.

lthough the juggling of figures is a time-honoured stratagem of
'ommunist propaganda, there are signs that the Bulgarian regime
getting worried at the chaotic state of its statistics, incompatible
ıth an efficient accounting system. As for the foreign observer,
ho saw in the easing of statistical information after Stalin's death
welcome aid to research, he now finds himself wasting endless time
ι trying to read some sense into contradictory data reflecting as
ıuch muddle as evasiveness.

The official announcement stated that the overall plan for in-
ustrial production during the first nine months of 1959 was ful-
lled to 100·4 per cent, or by 25·1 per cent more than the pro-
uction during the same period in 1958. No absolute figures were
ven, but as the plan stipulated a 27·8 per cent increase as com-
ıred with 1958, it is difficult to see how the increase of 25·1 per
'nt can represent a plan fulfilment of 100·4 per cent. The progress
'port for the half-year published in July 1959, which was less
'ticent about quoting absolute figures, offers further evidence that
ıe target is not being reached. It was announced that during the
'st six months the plan had been fulfilled to 101·4 per cent and that
dustry had produced 3,290 million leva-worth more goods than
the first half of 1958. Unless a considerable acceleration took
ace in the second half of the year, the increase for twelve months
ıll thus be in the neighbourhood of 6,580 million leva, which falls
›nsiderably short of the 8,660 million leva target. That this
:celeration did not, in fact, take place is borne out by numerous
ticles in the press from which it appears that over half of the thirty
lministrative disticts, into which Bulgaria has been divided since
e decentralization reform of March 1959, did not fulfil their plans
r industrial expansion.[1] The canning, sugar, timber, and machine-
ıılding industries fared particularly badly. The failure of the can-
ng plants, wine cellars, factories for forage mixtures, and other
ıterprises of the food industry to expand sufficiently to absorb the
creased production in the rural sector has caused shocking waste.
housands of tons of tomatoes, pumpkins, apples, cherries, etc.
e decaying ungathered in the fields because the existing plants
nnot process them, nor is there room for them to be stored.[2]

High cost, low productivity, and poor quality remain the

[1] Cf. *Rabotnichesko Delo*, 6 November 1959; *Otechestven Front*, 30 October
59. [2] *Rabotnichesko Delo*, 26 and 28 June 1959.

characteristics of Bulgarian industrial production. At the enlarged Party plenum convened in October 1959 to discuss problems connected with building, Pencho Kubadinsky, secretary of the Central Committee, said that in Italy one plant with forty workers produced 20 million bricks, while in Bulgaria 400 workers were needed to turn out the same amount. He admitted that the 'Lenin' metallurgical plant, in which the Party has taken particular pride, is consistently supplying sub-standard production, and that some of the newly built cement plants are technically inferior to the 'Vulkan' cement factory built ten years ago.[1] Because of insufficient preliminary study of projects, many new plants can only work to half-capacity The bakery combine in Dimitrovo, for instance, is said to have been planned and built in such a place that it is impossible to use it.[2] Bad quality and poor planning have resulted in the collapse of a number of warehouses, part of the sheet-rolling section of the 'Lenin' plant, the ferro-concrete bridge on the extended Sofia-Mezdra railway line, and other structures.[3]

The progress figures for agriculture are even vaguer than those for industry. No figures for crop yields are given in the October announcement of the Central Statistical Department, though according to the Minister of Agriculture[4] the average yields obtained for wheat (117·7 kg. per decare) and sunflower (131 kg.) were records. Despite successes in the irrigation programme (the target of 2 million decares seems to have been achieved) there are sufficient references in official speeches to the unfortunate effect of 'drought' and other 'climatic calamities' to suggest that the regime is seeking an excuse for disappointing results. On the eve of the anniversary of the October Revolution a secretary of the Central Committee, Mitko Grigorov, said that 'in a series of collective farms and whole regions of the country, not affected by unfavourable atmospheric conditions, the slogan of the Party for doubling agricultural production is being successfully carried out.'[5] It looks as if many regions are not fulfilling the plan.

The critical situation in livestock breeding, which Zhivkov called 'the most lagging sector in our economy', continues to worry the regime, as it is one of the main reasons for the serious shortage of meat. It had its origin in the wholesale slaughter of animals which was the peasants' desperate answer to forced collectivization. Ironic-

[1] *ibid*, 27 October 1959. [2] *ibid*, 3 November 1959. [3] *ibid*.
[4] Quoted in *Rabotnichesko Delo*, 26 November 1959.
[5] Radio Sofia, 6 November 1959.

ally, the Government is now obliged to encourage limited private ownership in a belated recognition of its virtue as an incentive. In a recent speech at the meeting of directors of the amalgamated collective farms held in Sofia on 25 November, the Minister of Agriculture urged the management of collectives to give every possible encouragement to peasants to develop their private plots, especially with regard to increasing privately owned livestock.

It seems very unlikely that in the remaining three months of the year since the last progress report the Government will have been able to make good the gap between planned and actual production. When the time comes to estimate the final results of the drive in the countryside, it should also be borne in mind that 1958, a poor harvest year in which most crops failed to reach the 1957 level, provides the regime with a suitably low basis on which to calculate achievements for 1959.

The plan for domestic trade and retail goods turnover was also not fulfilled. Compared with the extremely low standard of living in 1952, the second Five-Year Plan marked a slight improvement which is likely to be maintained under the current plan with its shift towards light industry. Nevertheless, shortages, lack of choice, and poor quality continue to be typical characteristics of the home market. Nearly all goods for home consumption are made in Bulgaria, as the State cannot afford to spend foreign currency on them. Since even the best goods produced for export are frequently rejected by foreign countries because of their shoddiness,[1] it is easy to imagine that the home market is usually left with the unsellable stuff that even the consumer-goods-starved Bulgarians do not want.

The main reason for the chronic shortages in the shops is the bad distribution system. In his report at the Seventh Party Congress, Todor Zhivkov said: 'Very often in some trade enterprises, especially in the villages, there is a lack of certain indispensable food and industrial products, such as salt, petroleum, vegetable oil, meat and meat products, vegetables, fruit, cotton and wool fabrics—in short, goods which are produced in sufficient quantity and can be found in the warehouses of the industrial enterprises or the wholesale trade organizations.' Since the spring of 1959 an intensive campaign has been waged to ease the flow of trade between districts and improve the distribution of goods from district wholesale enterprises to local retail shops, but so far there has been little improvement. The

[1] Cf. speech of the Minister of Trade, Boris Taskov, at the Seventh Party Congress, in *Rabotnichesko Delo*, 7 June 1958.

decentralization of the trade network, which was to facilitate the buying up of agricultural produce from the collective farms, has failed to ensure a steady supply of food.

The most serious deficiency in the working of the 1959 Plan continues to be capital investment, which was fulfilled only to 75·8 per cent during the first nine months. This failure is all the more significant in the light of Todor Zhivkov's statement at the Seventh Party Congress: 'The development of heavy and light industry, transport, agriculture, and all other branches of the national economy depends on the volume and the trends of capital investment.'

As the failure to fulfil the Plan becomes more apparent, two courses of action are open to the Party: it can either intensify the search for scapegoats or else scale down its objectives as the Chinese have done. It is highly unlikely that it will follow the second course, as too much political prestige has been staked on the success of the great leap forward'. Since the abrupt dismissal of the Minister of Trade in March 1959, intended as a warning to all comrades who cast doubt on the Government's economic policy,[1] the Party has been at great pains to convince its rank and file of the 'realism' of its economic targets. Frequent references to doubts, obsolete ideas, prejudice, wavering, etc. suggest that Taskov was not alone in questioning the wisdom of the 'leap'. However, Moscow's full support for Bulgaria's economic acceleration has made any split within the Party unlikely. The latest Government changes,[2] including the division of the ill-starred Ministry of Foreign Trade into a Ministry for Home Trade and one for Foreign Trade, seem to have more economic than political significance.

The full-scale mobilization of education, science, literature, and the arts for what might be called the second phase of Bulgaria's evolution has brought to an end the period of relative relaxation, which made it possible for the intelligentsia openly to defy the regime's cultural tutelage. But although at its Seventh Congress the Party could claim that it had restored discipline on the intellectual front, the calm appears only surface-deep. Throughout 1959 there have been signs that the defiant mood of 1956 has by no means been eradicated. If it is true that the suppression of the Hungarian Revolution has damped the revisionist ardour of the Bulgarian intelligentsia, it is equally clear that intellectual opposition could quickly revive in a changed international climate.

LILIANA BRISBY

[1] Cf. *Novo Vreme*, June 1959. [2] *The Times*, 14 December 1959.

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Notes of the Month

Back to the Land in the U.S.S.R.

ON 14 January, before a meeting of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., Mr Khrushchev announced that the armed forces were to be reduced by 1,200,000 men. In the same speech the actual numbers in the armed forces were given for the first time, although previous reductions had also been widely publicized. According to Mr Khrushchev's statement, the army reached its highest peacetime establishment of 5,763,000 in 1955. In that year a cut of 650,000 men was announced, and further reductions followed in May 1956 (1,200,000) and in January 1958 (300,000). This reduction was completed by February 1959, leaving a strength of 3,613,000. (Mr Khrushchev's figures were slightly different; he gave a figure of 2,140,000 for total reductions since 1955, which leaves him with a present strength of 3,623,000 men, and future forces of 2,423,000.) The contemplated reduction is to take place in stages over the next one and a half to two years, and will affect primarily the air force and the surface navy; ultimately it is to save the country up to 17 milliard rubles.

Whether the manpower will in fact correspond to the figure given by Mr Khrushchev is not quite clear, since, in mentioning various possibilities of employment for the men to be demobilized, he said that 'some of the artillerymen and airmen will be used in new missile units.' The phrase may apply to a transfer of non-demobilized men, but remains ambiguous. A new feature is the proposed creation of a territorial army, whose members will receive their training outside working hours. No figures were given for this.

On the military side, the move is not surprising, and, as has been pointed out, can more legitimately be regarded as reorganization than as disarmament. It leaves the U.S.S.R. with by far the largest standing army in Europe, and the development of missiles means that its striking power will not be impaired. The propaganda value

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of the announcement needs no emphasis, especially in view of th proposed meeting of heads of Governments.

It is likely that the main reason for the reduction is to augmen the labour force, which requires expansion for a number of reasons The figure for school-leavers is now showing the effects of the fal in the wartime birth-rate, and the rate of entry into employmen will not revert to normal until 1962–3. The age-group 0–14, whicl stood at 54 million in 1955 and 1956, is expected to reach 66 millioı by 1962.

One unusual feature of the composition of the labour force is th disproportion between men and women, reflecting wartime losses The 1959 census showed that for the population above the age o 32 there were 166 women to 100 men, women are not well repre sented in the higher party and administrative occupations, and ı is likely that the senior personnel in the forces to be demobilize will be used to meet the need for responsible staff in various field of administration. A few days after Mr Khrushchev's speech Mar shal Malinovski, the Minister of Defence, said at a meeting o officers of the Moscow garrison that 'upwards of 250,000 offi cers, generals, and admirals will be discharged from the arme forces.'[1]

The 54·6 million employed persons (other than in collectiv farms) in 1958 are to be increased, according to the Seven-Yea Plan, to 66·5 million by 1965; this would imply that with the popu lation growth as projected from current statistics virtually the en tire increase would be absorbed outside the collective farms. Th planned increases by 1965 in the output of industry and agricul ture are given as 80 per cent for industry, and from 30 to 100 pe cent in different branches of agriculture (taking 1958 as the bas figure). This is to be attained by a rise in productivity ranging fror 45 to 50 per cent in industry and 60 to 65 per cent in State farms to 100 per cent in collective farms. At the same time hours o labour in industry are to be reduced to a seven-hour working da (six on Saturday), giving a working week of forty-one hours, th change to be completed by the end of 1960. Further reductions, to begin in 1964 and to bring the working week down to thirty-five hours, are promised.

The industrial expansion of previous years was made possible by a considerable influx of labour from the countryside. The pro portion of country to town population changed from 67:33 per

[1] *The Times*, 21 January 1960.

cent in 1939 to 52:48 per cent in 1959. This trend is probably coming to an end. The implementation of virgin land projects, and Mr Khrushchev's pledge to catch up with the U.S.A. in agricultural production per head of population, will require a vast labour force. Moreover, there have been numerous complaints in the Soviet press about a shortage of labour on the collective farms, as well as a number of references to ex-peasants returning to the countryside from the towns now that conditions in rural areas show a marked improvement. It has been announced on the Soviet radio that demobilized men who went into collective and State farms would enjoy special privileges in the matter of financial loans and training.

Although the prospect of a labour shortage should not be exaggerated, it is clear that the reduction in the personnel of the armed forces finds its place among the measures being taken in Moscow to facilitate the realization of the economic plan.

The Paris Economic Conferences of January 1960

THE ministerial meetings held in Paris in the second week of January have been occupied with problems of far-reaching importance not only for Western Europe, or even the Atlantic Alliance, but for the world at large. They are problems of political as much as economic significance and have two distinct aspects: the reconciliation of different approaches to the future shape of Western European relations, and the need for concerted policy adjustments by industrial countries to the changing world economic scene. The juxtaposition of these two aspects of future Western economic policies has come about through a significant new departure in American foreign economic policy, namely, the decision of the United States to offer Atlantic co-operation on an equal footing between their own country, the Canadians, and the Europeans. So far discussion has been confined to procedure.

The week began with ministerial meetings of each of the two trading groups which face each other in Western Europe:[1] the six European Economic Community, or Common Market, countries whose treaty has been in force since 1 January 1958, and the European Free Trade Area Association, or so-called Outer Seven, who were meeting for the first time since the conclusion of the Stockholm agreement which had meanwhile been signed by the partici-

[1] See 'The Outer Seven: Buying Time in the European Trade Dispute', in *The World Today*, January 1960.

pating Governments between 29 December and 4 January, and now awaits ratification.

The Atlantic conference, or Dillon committee, the result of American initiative, opened in the afternoon of the 12th and closed in the early hours of the 14th. Its composition and terms of reference had been laid down in the communiqué issued on 21 December after the Western summit meeting.[1] It was attended by Ministers from the United States and Canada and eleven European nations, five each from the Six and the Seven, plus Greece, making a total of thirteen countries,[2] together with representation from the Community of the Six. Incidentally, the absence of Professor Erhard from among the leaders of national delegations may not have been without political significance.

The task before the Dillon committee was to decide on means for examining three separate questions: commercial relations of the Six and the Outer Seven; ways of improving the effectiveness of assistance to under-developed countries through international co-ordination; and the creation of permanent consultative machinery with full United States participation to deal with 'major economic problems including the problem of development assistance',[3] a task which will determine the future fate of the O.E.E.C.

The initial proposals submitted by Mr Dillon, U.S. Under-Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, at the opening of the Atlantic conference were framed after preliminary discussions between United States and European statesmen, notably during Mr Dillon's own eight-day European tour from 7 to 14 December to London, Brussels, Bonn, and Paris. As will be seen, the proposals underwent changes in the course of debate which were symptomatic of persisting fundamental differences in approach. In essence, his suggestions were these: that senior officials of the twenty Governments who are members of or associated with the O.E.E.C. should consider the possible form for a new joint consultative body

[1] Text of communiqué, *New York Herald Tribune* (European edition), 22 December 1959.

[2] The participants from the European trading groups were: Belgium, France, Western Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands from the Six, i.e. excluding Luxembourg, Denmark, Great Britain, Portugal, Sweden, and Switzerland from the Seven, i.e. excluding Austria and Norway. The remaining O.E.E.C. countries not represented were Iceland, Ireland, Spain, and Turkey. Further, there are on the fringes Yugoslavia and Finland, the former associated with some aspects of the work of O.E.E.C., the latter having begun talks on possible association with the Outer Seven in Paris on 15 January 1960

[3] Opening statement by Mr Dillon on 12 January, official text, U.S. Information Service, London, 14 January 1960.

on the basis of working papers, including, perhaps, a draft charter, to be prepared by 'a group of three'; that machinery for co-ordination of aid to under-developed countries should come into operation at once pending the long-term organizational changes which, in view of the forthcoming Presidential election in the United States, could not become effective for at least eighteen months; and that, again pending the decision on a possible successor organization to O.E.E.C., the problem of European trade relations be discussed from time to time by the reconvened Dillon committee itself.

The resolutions finally passed by the thirteen-nation Dillon committee, and authorized by all twenty O.E.E.C. members and associates, on the morning of the 14th[1] brought agreement on the following procedural steps. (i) The long-term organizational question is to be studied by four, not three, representatives, who will be Government officials and not independent experts—a point contested during the discussion—from the United States, France, Great Britain, and Greece, and who will report on 19 April to a conference of the twenty Governments at official level to which the Common Market Commission will be invited. (ii) The problems of co-ordinating bilateral and multilateral development aid programmes are to be taken up by a group of eight countries, namely Belgium, Canada, France, Western Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Portugal, and the United States, together with a representative of the Six. They are to invite other capital exporting countries to participate, or to meet with them. One such would probably be Japan. Their first meeting is to be held in Washington at about the end of February. (iii) The hotly contested question of terms for discussing European trade relations ended with the rejection of the initial U.S. proposal to use the Dillon committee of thirteen as a forum. Instead, senior officials of the twenty O.E.E.C. members and associates will constitute themselves into a committee with the Common Market Commission in about four weeks' time to appoint working parties for the examination of outstanding trade problems, with priority conceded to the subject of relations between the two European trading groups. The Executive Secretary of the G.A.T.T. is to be invited to participate.

Behind these decisions and the debates preceding them lay the United States Government's newly felt concern for expansion of America's own export markets to assist in solving her present

[1] For texts see the *Board of Trade Journal*, 22 January 1960.

balance of payments problems, and its continued support, mainly for political reasons, of the integration efforts of the Six, as well as its anxiety to safeguard world trade expansion and increasing flow of capital to newly developing countries. As far as the Six are concerned, they were by all accounts content with the American approach, which fitted in well with the prevailing concepts as propounded by their Commission and proposed by M. Monnet's Action Committee for the United States of Europe. The Seven, for their part, feared that through preoccupation with global questions the European context would be lost sight of, to the detriment not only of themselves. Common to all was the welcome for the participation of the United States and Canada.

In the outcome, the meetings have provided an opening at least for talks on future trade relations within Western Europe. They have brought out into the open the O.E.E.C.'s plight through lack of support from among the Common Market members.[1] They hold out hope that constructive work may begin towards the rationalization of Western aid policies and techniques. They have reflected the need to take account of Western Europe's 'coming-of-age' as a post-war world economic force and have raised important world organizational issues which will require much discussion and thought

Arab Writers Look at Israel

A correspondent writes:

MR WEIGERT'S article, 'Arab Writers Look at Israel' (*The World Today*, December 1959, pp. 501–8), does less than justice to the complexity of its subject. Since the Palestine War of 1948, there has been an enormous output of books, pamphlets, and articles in Arabic, trying to explain why the Arabs lost the war and discussing present and future relations between Israel and her Arab neighbours. What is common to all this literature is the belief that the dispossession of the Arab community of Palestine was unjust, and also the fear of a possible Israeli expansion, but within this common framework there are many gradations of meaning and emphasis. No Arab writer suggests that the State of Israel should be recognized, but not all of them believe that it can or should be destroyed; no Arab writer would absolve the great Powers from responsibility for what happened in 1948, but the best

[1] The Council of O E E C at ministerial level met on the afternoon of 14 January for the first time since the breakdown of the European Free Trade Area negotiations in December 1958.

of them place their main emphasis rather on the internal weaknesses of Arab society which made the disaster possible. Mr Weigert misses these distinctions, and maintains that, with very few exceptions, Arab authors are concerned 'with fruitless efforts to justify past mistakes and whitewash the shortcomings of Arab leaders by the time-honoured method of defamation, bombast, and exaggeration'. This may be true of the ephemeral pamphlets sold in the streets of Cairo; but it is wholly untrue of serious, dignified works of self-criticism like Dr Costi Zuraik's *The Meaning of the Disaster* or Musa Alami's *The Lesson of Palestine.* Mr Weigert gives a description of these two books misleading alike in spirit and in detail. For example, he makes Dr Zuraik defame the Jews by calling them 'gangs of creatures'. But the phrase Zuraik uses can better be rendered as 'fragments of creation' (or, as the English translation[1] has it, 'remnants of mankind'); and it is used not to denigrate the Jews but to point the contrast between the compact Arab community and the Jewish community formed by groups of diverse origin, and so to pose in vivid terms the book's central problem—that of why, in spite of their natural advantages, the Arabs proved weaker than the Jews. A little later, he quotes Zuraik as writing: 'Hardly had the first gun been fired . . . when the Palestine people fled.' In fact, what Zuraik wrote was: '*It will be said that* . . . no sooner had the first bombs fallen than the Palestinian Arabs fled . . . *this sweeping accusation is ill-founded.*' (Our italics.) His meaning is therefore the opposite of that which Mr Weigert attributes to him.

Similarly, in the passage dealing with Musa Alami, Mr Weigert states that Alami's Development Project 'was, until it was burned down by angry mobs in the Jordan riots at the end of 1955, a unique example of an experiment to resettle Palestine Arab refugees'. This word 'until' implies that since the riots the project no longer exists, and what Mr Weigert clearly means is that Alami's plan of refugee settlement was destroyed by public anger; but in actual fact, although the project was damaged in 1955 it now continues on a larger scale. Alami is also described as a supporter of King Abdullah's 'Greater Syria' scheme, and as suggesting a union of Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon. In fact, in his book he suggested a union of the Fertile Crescent, that is to say, of Jordan Syria, and *Iraq*; Lebanon, although a part of the Fertile Crescent, should have a recognized special status.

[1] Beirut, Khayat, 1956.

Nasser's Daring Dream: The Aswan High Dam

AT the Egyptian Department of Antiquities in Cairo, this is a time of sorrow and feverish activity. Doomsday is near for one of the most imposing monuments ever built: the famous Rock Temple of Abu Simbel, from whose façade a group of colossal stone figures has been gazing across the desert since the days of the Nineteenth Dynasty, some 3,200 years ago.

A few years hence, the great temple, a Mecca of scholars and tourists through the ages, will lie submerged under the waters of a gigantic flood unleashed by man: the 105 million acre-feet[1] lake that will be formed by the Nile river between the town of Aswan and the Sudanese border after the High Dam, on which work officially began on 9 January, has been built.

To the Egyptologists, this means a major disaster. What the economists and technicians are hailing as the start of a great new era for Egypt may appear to them as the greatest sacrilege committed since Herostratos burned the Temple of Artemis at Ephesus. For, as the man-made lake rises, Abu Simbel will be gone for ever. No one could hope to move the sitting stone giants from their millennary pedestals. All that can be done—and is being done—by a devoted team of Egyptian and foreign scholars working at the Department's Centre of Documentation is to record for posterity every feature of the place. From photographic and handwritten copies of all inscriptions to detailed architectural plans and models, everything is to be preserved on paper and in replica. Even photogrammetric maps of the friezes and figures decorating the temple are being made, with contour lines down to half a millimetre apart that show every bump and scratch in the rock.

But what cannot be preserved, no matter how great the efforts of the Egyptologists, is the awe-inspiring effect of the grandiose monument on the viewer standing at the foot of it. For even a tall man, drawing himself up to his full height, can barely reach with his hands the toes of the stone giants.

This, then, is part of the toll Egypt—and mankind—must pay for the benefits that are expected to derive from the Aswan High Dam. Much more than the Temple of Abu Simbel will have to be sacrificed to the life-giving Moloch water. Some 80,000 people—

[1] 1 acre-foot = 1,233 cubic metres.

mostly Nubians—are now living in the area that will be inundated. Several hundred towns and villages, including the border station of Wadi Halfa with its airfield, will be drowned by the flood, but of course the inhabitants will be safe. As a matter of fact, the Cairo Government is doing everything in its power to make the huge job of resettlement as easy and humane as possible. Already 40,000 *feddans* (roughly equivalent to acres) of land have been set aside for the evacuees in other parts of Egypt (Kom Ombo, Esna, Radissieh, Dar el-Salam, and Bayadieh) where the climate and general living conditions are similar to those of Nubia.

The artificial lake that will be created by the dam is to be about 320 miles long and will reach deep down into the Sudan. It will be more than three times as large as the Hoover Dam's Lake Mead, hitherto considered the largest man-made body of water in the world. Other features of the venture are of proportionate dimensions. The High Dam—it is so called mainly to differentiate it from the existing older and lower Aswan Dam, although height is not really one of its predominant features—will be 3·1 miles long, with a thickness at the base of 4,276 feet. This will be more than twice the length of the old Aswan Dam, built by the British in 1902, which hitherto ranked as the longest structure of this kind.

At its highest point, in the central portion extending for about 1,970 feet, the Dam will rise to a towering 361 feet, equal to a 35-storey building. Here it will reach a total height of 643 feet above sea level. This is, however, less than half the height of the Hoover Dam which, with its 726 feet, will continue to be the tallest of the great dams of the world. (The Mauvoisan Dam in Switzerland, in the Canton of Valais, is even higher—787 feet—but otherwise of much more modest proportions.)

The High Dam will arise at a point about four miles upstream from the site of the present Aswan Dam. Here craggy cliffs rise steeply on both banks of the Nile river, which at this spot is 1,640 feet wide. For reasons of economy, the engineers in charge are planning to make the most of the natural features of this site. Instead of the usual solid concrete structure, they will make good use of the granite blocks obtained through excavation and the huge boulders that abound in the area, filling the gaps between them with sand, mud, silt, and concrete. Even so, the ten-year construction work will require tremendous quantities of building materials: an estimated 34,000 tons of steel and some 55 million

cubic yards of other materials; and 22·2 million tons of rock will have to be excavated.

Original blueprints for the mammoth undertaking were drafted by an international group of engineering concerns in which the two German firms Hochtief AG (Essen) and Bauunion (Dortmund) played a leading role. Among the many names associated with the scheme over the years, the British firm of Alexander Gibb and partners and an American, Professor Laurenzig Straub, played a prominent part.

Preparatory work began as early as the second half of 1952, after the revolutionary regime had come to power. However, it was not until after Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser had wrested control from General Mohammed Naguib, in 1954, that the 'full speed ahead' signal was given to the planners. After the preliminary research had been completed and evaluated, the international experts presented their final report to the Nasser Government on 4 December 1954. In it the experts reaffirmed their conviction that the project was feasible and selected the site where construction was to begin, about four miles south of the old Aswan Dam. They recommended, however, that a number of additional studies and experiments should be carried out prior to drafting the contracts for construction.

In particular, it was found necessary to test the geological formations of the Nile river bed, which is about 113 feet deep at this point, in order to determine whether it would be able to carry the tremendous weight of the High Dam. This part of the preparatory work was carried out by a team of German experts who laboured for many months, night and day, drilling test holes into the river bed. Other preliminary studies at the chosen site included experiments for the sedimentation of the soil, which were carried out by the German Johann Keller Company; experiments designed to determine and repair the effect of friction in the Nile bed south of the Dam, which were conducted under the supervision of Professor Straub; and hydraulic research on models supplied by the French company Sogoya, of Grenoble. The cost of this preliminary work was estimated at £E5 million, or about $14 million.

Under the original plan, drafted by the German and other Western experts, seven large diversion tunnels were to have been cut in the rock of the east bank of the Nile for the purpose of diverting the water flow during the construction period. The tunnels were designed to enable the passage of the natural river

supply during a high flood and also to control the flow of irrigation waters throughout the year.

It was in this respect that the most radical changes were introduced into the scheme after a Soviet commission of technical experts had taken over from the Western experts at the end of 1958 The Russians suggested that it would be much cheaper to divert the water around the dam by means of a canal about 1,900 yards long to be built on the west bank of the river than by blasting seven tunnels through granite. They estimated that nearly $17 million could be saved in this way on the cost of the first stage of construction. The Western group of experts had reservations about this new approach, but they were overruled by the economy-minded Egyptians. And the Russians, by that time, were holding the purse-strings of the venture. So, at the end of June 1959, the Cairo Government approved the changes proposed by the Russians.

How did it come about that this great international venture launched under Western auspices should eventually wind up as a virtual Soviet monopoly? Financing played a key role in this development; politics also played a part in it.

From the outset it was obvious that Egypt could never carry the financial burden of this mammoth undertaking all by herself. Building the High Dam alone would cost around $1,300 million, the experts calculated—a staggering sum for so poor a country as Egypt. And Nasser had more in mind than just building the dam and reservoir. The tremendous supply of water power that would become available had to be utilized; that meant constructing here one of the largest electric power plants on earth. In order to put all the cheap electricity thus generated to good use, a major industrial centre had to be created from scratch in this area, clustering around a large steel plant.

Then there was the need to provide housing for the 15,000 labourers and hundreds of technicians and engineers, as well as administrative and clerical staffs, to be employed in the venture. Moreover, this large new community, for the most part transplanted from other parts of the country, would require communal, social, and medical services, as well as a minimum of recreational facilities. That meant building schools, churches, mosques, hospitals, hotels, restaurants, and a cinema. At Aswan alone, 5,000 new and popularly priced apartments are to be built, according to present plans, and 3,000 more in the immediate vicinity of the building site. All this added up to a total bill of around $2,200 million.

But President Nasser was determined to build 'his' dam, one of the greatest in the world, that probably some day will bear his name, regardless of cost. His dominant motive, unquestionably, was the thought of the immense benefits that could be derived from the High Dam for the national economy, but he also had an eye on posterity, it may be assumed. How Nasser feels about this aspect of the matter appears in a much-quoted dictum of his own: 'For thousands of years the Great Pyramids of Egypt were foremost among the engineering marvels of the world. They ensured life after death to the Pharaohs. Tomorrow, the gigantic High Dam, more significant and seventeen times greater than the Pyramids, will provide a higher standard of living for all Egyptians.'[1]

This statement, incidentally, calls for some qualification. It does not mean that the High Dam is going to tower above the Great Pyramid (Cheops Pyramid) of Gizeh, which is—or rather was originally—482 feet high, and which even now, when its top has been somewhat eroded by time, weather, and spoliation, remains by far the taller monument of the two. What it does mean is that the combined weight of the building material to be used in construction of the Dam is equal to seventeen times the weight of the Cheops Pyramid.

Originally, the Cairo Government expected to provide from its own resources about $900 million of the $1,300 million cost of the High Dam proper, over the ten-year building period, leaving a minimum of $400 million to be borrowed abroad. Subsidiary projects, such as the electric power station and the steel plant to be constructed near the reservoir, were to be financed largely through credits to be extended by the foreign contractors or by their respective Governments.

A large foreign loan was needed, in particular, to get the entire project off the ground, for Egypt lacked the starting capital. To that end, approaches were made in 1954–5 to the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank) as well as to the Governments of the United States and Great Britain, among other countries. All expressed a willingness, in principle, to extend financial and technical assistance.

In mid-December 1955, the World Bank let it be known that it had agreed to loan Egypt up to $200 million for the Aswan Dam project, under certain conditions as to loan supervision. Another

[1] *The Egyptian Political and Economic Review* (Cairo), October 1958.

$200 million was to be provided simultaneously by individual Governments, including about $150 million from the United States and $14 million from Britain. A draft agreement between Egyptian representatives and the President of the World Bank, Mr Eugene Black, was signed on 9 February 1956.

In the following months, however, Washington and London were becoming increasingly impatient with Nasser's moves on the international chessboard. The State Department, in particular, was angered by what it considered Nasser's duplicity in making frequent overtures to the Soviet bloc while bargaining with the West for funds. On 19 July, the Department announced, with deliberate brusqueness, that the U.S. was no longer interested in helping to finance the High Dam. Britain and the World Bank followed suit. A week later, Nasser countered by proclaiming nationalization of the Suez Canal, ostensibly for the purpose of using its tolls to finance the High Dam scheme, and the great Suez crisis of 1956–7 was on. Almost on its heels there followed the Iraq crisis of July 1958, causing more bad blood between Nasser and the West.

During all those months, the High Dam project was virtually held in abeyance. It was not revived until the Kremlin, in September 1958, stepped into the vacuum left by the West. This is not the place to discuss the moot question whether Moscow at any time before the Suez crisis had made a definite offer to Cairo of financial or technical assistance in the Dam venture. Such an offer was definitely made, however, in the course of an official visit to Cairo, in the third week of September, by N. A. Muchitdinov, a Soviet Deputy Premier and high-ranking member of the Communist Party's Central Committee. The offer was immediately accepted by the Egyptians and a few days later Nasser's right-hand man, Field Marshal Abdel Hakim Amer, left for Moscow by way of Czechoslovakia to negotiate details of the deal.

On 23 October, four days after he had reached Moscow, Amer informed Nasser by a long-distance call from the Soviet capital that the Kremlin had agreed to grant credits of up to 400 million rubles ($100 million at the official rate) for the first stage of construction and to make available technicians, machinery, and materials for the building project. That same night, Mr Khrushchev formally announced the loan agreement at a Kremlin reception for Marshal Amer.

In mid-November, a delegation of Soviet experts, headed by

Peter Nikitine, vice-chairman of the Soviet State committee for economic relations with foreign countries, arrived in Egypt for an on-the-spot inspection of the proposed building site and for technical talks with the Egyptian High Dam Construction Committee. Following their visit, a formal Soviet-Arab aid agreement for construction of the first stage of the High Dam was signed on 27 December 1958.

By that time, however, the formerly cordial relations between Moscow and Cairo had cooled considerably, owing to the unexpected developments in Iraq. As the conflict between Nasser and Kassem reached the critical stage, in the spring of 1959, and while the Egyptian leader appeared to be carrying on an anti-Communist crusade of his own, a tension developed that also seemed to endanger the High Dam project anew. But the storm blew over, and in May technical talks on construction details were resumed. On 28 June, Nasser put his stamp of approval on the modifications proposed by the Russian experts, thereby giving the go-ahead signal for the construction which has now begun.[1]

Thus, barring unforeseen new events, the controversial High Dam will be built after all. That Egypt stands to reap great benefits from it can hardly be doubted.

In the first place, the High Dam, with its immense reservoir, will permit a continuous storage of Nile water—a near-revolutionary development in irrigation technique. In past years, the old Aswan Dam (whose height has been increased several times over the years, but cannot be raised farther than its present 174 feet) has served to equalize the supply of Nile water for irrigation purposes within a given 'water year', but its capacity was not large enough to store up one year's excess for use in a following year of deficit. The High Dam, by contrast, will do just that: it will permit the storing of all excess water over a number of years for use in any subsequent year or years when a critical decrease in the water volume of the river may occur.

Of all the great rivers of the world, the Nile is perhaps the most unpredictable and unreliable. The volume of water it carries from the monsoon-drenched highlands of central-east Africa to the

[1] During January 1960 President Nasser and Mr Khrushchev exchanged Notes establishing Russia's participation in the second stage of the construction of the Aswan Dam on the same lines as in the first stage (*The Times*, 19 January 1960) Russian proposals for extensive changes in the construction of the dam, resulting in possible lower costs and shorter construction time, virtually constitute a merging of the two stages of construction into one project, for which the Russians are reported to be advancing a further £80 to £90 million credit.

parched plains of Egypt varies enormously not only from one season to the next, but also from year to year.

As a result, Egypt's economy, over the centuries, has been afflicted by the biblical cycle of fat and lean years and has been exposed to devastating floods as well as drought and famine. In 1878–9, for instance, the swollen Nile threatened to submerge the entire country under a record water volume of 151,000 million cubic metres, while in 1913–14 the Nile's water volume barely reached 42,000 million cubic metres—far short of annual irrigation requirements, which at present are estimated at 52,000 million cubic metres for Egypt and 3,500 million for the Sudan. In the critical summer period (from February to July), when the river's water level is low, Egypt normally requires 22,000 million cubic metres for adequate irrigation, including 7,500 million drawn from present storage facilities. But in 1878 the Nile, in that period, carried an unexpectedly large water volume of 36,000 million cubic metres, while in 1914 its volume plunged down to the dangerously low figure of 7,000 million.

These alternating threats of flood and famine will be removed for ever, the experts hope, once the High Dam has been built. With the 'perennial irrigation' that will result (instead of the 'basin irrigation' now in use), the cultivated area of Egypt can be increased by more than 30 per cent. At present, 96·5 per cent of the country that looks so big on a map is sheer wasteland. Of Egypt's 386,100 square miles, only about 6 million acres are actually under cultivation, almost all in the Nile Valley and the Delta. That this small cultivated area could sustain Egypt's teeming population—at present 24 million—at all was due to the new irrigation methods introduced at the beginning of the century, when the old Aswan Dam was built by the British, which permit the harvesting of up to three crops a year. As an estimated 2 million more acres (including 700,000 in Upper Egypt) come under the plough, thanks to the High Dam, food and cotton will be more plentiful—unless, of course, the growth of population outruns the expansion of cultivated land.

The other great benefit that Egypt expects to draw from the High Dam is electrification, and in its wake industrialization of the country. Under the original plans, the tremendous water power generated by the Dam was to be harnessed by an underground plant with sixteen turbine units, of which eight were to be installed over the first ten years and the remaining eight in a succeed-

ten-year period. Each station would generate 130,000 kwh and
e a capacity of 10,000 million kwh per annum. Whether and to
ıt extent these designs have been changed by the Russian
erts is not known yet. But in any case ıt is certaın that huge
ntities of cheap electricity wıll become available. With an out-
of 10,000 mıllion kwh per year, the High Dam power plant
ıld produce, even ın the inıtial stage, eight times as much
ver as is being produced in all of Egypt today.
ı large portion of this electric power is to be carried by overland
ısmission lınes as far as Caıro, some 600 miles away. The cost to
sumers is expected to be only about one-sıxth or one-seventh
cent per kilowatt at Aswan and half a cent in Cairo.

JOACHIM JOESTEN

Western Germany Before the Summit

BETWEEN CONFERENCES

TH continued economic prosperıty, and with no internal
ıtıcal upheaval lıkely as long as Dr Konrad Adenauer remains
ıncellor, it is natural that West German attentıon should be
centrated mainly on foreign affaırs. (The unexpected flare-up
ıntı-Semitısm, ın its present crude phase, provides no real ex-
tıon, sınce it is the discredıt to the German name abroad that is
greatest worry among most polıticıans and people in Western
many.)

'oreıgn affaırs mean primarıly East–West relatıons and
ı.T.O., sınce these hold the key to the defence of what Western
many has already achieved, and to the possible realization of
ulfilled natıonal hopes. It was therefore not surprising that the
Parıs meetıngs—the N.A.T.O. Council and Western Summit
:tıngs—in December 1959 were given great prominence
rywhere, and that the first of the series of Summit Conferences
t June is eagerly, if anxiously, awaited.

'hancellor Adenauer, on his return from Paris, and more
:ntly in his speech to the West Berlin Parliament on 11 January,
ressed great satisfaction at the outcome of those meetings. He
ned convinced that the agenda for the coming Summit talks
more or less settled according to his own ideas, and was in

marked contrast with the trend of the discussion at the end of the Foreign Ministers' Conference in Geneva in July–August. The three Western Powers, Dr Adenauer confidently implied, were no longer, as in September, prepared to discuss the future of West Berlin in isolation, but only within the framework of the whole German question.

There was a time when the Chancellor maintained that the Berlin issue should be raised at any international conference with the Russians only after agreement had been reached on general, controlled disarmament. But today, even in Bonn, it is realized that international developments during the past twelve months have made this point unrealizable. The Chancellor's unconcealed annoyance at Mr Macmillan's visit to Moscow in April 1959 showed his fear that some change in the Anglo-American attitude to the U.S.S R. was on the way. This heralded a period of uncertainty and irritability for the Chancellor, which was to be intensified by the death of Mr John Foster Dulles, whom he often referred to as his 'great friend'. The Chancellor's present thinking began to take shape under the impact of the most recent Berlin crisis, and was further influenced by President Eisenhower's invitation to Mr Khrushchev to visit the U.S. in order to 'turn history away from war and towards peace'. The most detailed exposition of this new change was given in Secretary of State Christian A. Herter's speech of 16 November, before the Council for Foreign Trade in New York. In this speech, Mr Herter called for a policy of 'co-survival' between the two major social and political systems in the world today, in order to construct a new relationship which might prevent mutual destruction.

Dr Adenauer has never been much in favour of a policy of peaceful co-existence with the Soviet Union. For him, co-existence with the Soviet Union demands a policy of realism, which recognizes that the free world is in a life-and-death struggle with totalitarianism. The fact that Western solidarity has stood the test in Berlin gives ground for optimism, but is no guarantee of security in differences with the U.S.S.R. in the future.[1]

The swing round, in tactics if not in conviction, on the part of the Western allies was taken by many people in Bonn to mean that the Federal Republic's friends and allies were beginning to think

[1] 'The peaceful co-existence of people with totally different ideologies is an illusion which unfortunately is far too much accepted,' Dr Adenauer said in an interview in *Elsevier's Weekblad* (Amsterdam), 9 January 1960.

of the problems of Berlin, and of reunification, not only in terms of German aspirations but also in terms of the broader framework of East–West understanding, i.e. of a world peace based upon compromise.

The Chancellor's optimism about the Western Summit and N.A.T.O. meetings in Paris was not, however, shared by most of the West German press, especially after it had considered the results in the light of further information and interpretation from various reliable sources. Soon there were doubts as to what had actually been achieved in the French capital. Did the four Powers mean the same thing when they said they would stand fast on Berlin? Was the West more united or more disunited on Berlin than it had been a year earlier? The serious-minded press in Western Germany came to the conclusion that the really tough questions had not been settled in Paris, but had been relegated to the diplomats; and that no agreed policy on the approach to negotiations about the future of Berlin had actually been reached. 'The Western Summit meeting in Paris passed off so smoothly, and agreement was reached so quickly by the four Governments, that it almost gave rise to the suspicion that the heads of States fulfilled their tasks in Paris only on paper, and that the real decisions were postponed.'[1] Another newspaper[2] went so far as to write 'The fact that there is still no clarity about the West's position on Berlin causes some concern. Even if a common Western attitude is reached before the Summit meeting with Khrushchev, it is possible that differences among the Western Powers will reappear after a few days of negotiations with him.'

Dr Adenauer, however, in his Berlin speech of 11 January, assured his listeners that at any East–West conference 'the three Western Powers will explain with all clarity to Khrushchev that they have rights and duties in Berlin which cannot and must not be interfered with.' He also stressed that the legal status of Berlin must remain unaltered. In his view, any changes could only be for the worse and would mean capitulation to the U.S.S.R., since Mr Khrushchev had clearly shown his intention to be to bring first Berlin and then the whole of Germany under Communism.[3]

[1] *Suddeutsche Zeitung* (Munich), 21 December 1959.
[2] *Westdeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* (Essen), 21 December 1959
[3] In a television interview the same evening, Dr Adenauer stated that an unchanged 'legal status' for Berlin did not mean that everything should be left unchanged. There might be changes in the interests of Berlin and the Soviet zone, but the basis of the existing legal agreement must be untouched.

In connection with this question of Berlin's status, it is often felt that the Social Democrats of that city are unconsciously playing into the hands of the Communists when they demand 'legal integration of West Berlin in the Federal Republic'. For this would also automatically upset the four-Power status of the former capital. There is nothing that the Communists would be more delighted to see. A special legal position in Berlin is the strongest Western argument. This makes it possible, for example, that the Chancellor of the Federal Republic can be in West Berlin with the same legal right as the Premier of the D.D.R. in East Berlin.

The Paris conferences last December—especially the N.A.T.O. conference—also left much uneasiness because of the failure of the Western Powers to agree among themselves. The Federal Republic is particularly concerned because it fears the possibility of having to make its own decision as between its allies—between American-British and French opinions—on some vital issues. Hitherto, all that Western Germany had to do was to remain loyal to Europe and to N.A.T.O.

Franco-German close co-operation in these days is very largely based upon the friendship between General de Gaulle and Dr Adenauer. This is not to suggest that the German people are not anxious to live in accord with their Western neighbours; but most Germans feel that the Chancellor has gone much too far in his 'lonely decisions' in foreign policy, especially with regard to France. They feel it might have been better both for the Federal Republic and for the Western cause had Dr Adenauer been less pro-de Gaulle in recent years. The Germans generally find it difficult to see in the French President a strong friend of their country, when both he and his Prime Minister appear to go out of their way to pronounce on matters which may seem of little importance to the French but are of vital importance to the Germans, e.g. France's acceptance, at this present stage, of the Oder-Neisse line as the permanent eastern frontier of Germany.[1] This is interpreted here as an indication of French desire to lay the foundations for a renewal of the generations-old policy of the Quai d'Orsay to extend its influence in the Slav world, especially in Poland.

The Chancellor, to judge from the fact that he has not made a single comment on this statement about the Oder-Neisse line,

[1] Cf. statement in the National Assembly by M. Debré (*Le Monde*, 15 October 1959).

idently considered it less important than the political benefits to gained from continuing friendship with General de Gaulle. It however, evident that Dr Adenauer has been concerned about e possible adverse consequences of the French President's ultra-tionalistic views with regard to N.A.T.O. For this is the only al defence organization that the Federal Republic has today—e shield behind which German reconstruction has progressed so r, and behind which the *Bundeswehr* is being built up. The eak-up of N.A.T.O., even a threat of it, could have disastrous ects on Western Germany, especially if it meant the withdrawal U.S. forces from Europe. Dr Adenauer certainly does not wish have to make the choice between the U.S.A. and France; but ider existing conditions, in any serious clash of views between em, the Federal Republic would have to side with the U.S.A. Most Germans are sceptical about the kind of co-operation ich President de Gaulle envisages for Western Europe. They e it as an alliance of national States, with France in the leading le This, they feel, is not the supra-national solution which the unger German generation was urged to accept a few years ago! hat is prompting unrest in N.A.T.O. is that it is suffering from Gaulle's resistance to integration, and that a spirit of national-n is beginning to pervade the whole organization.'[1]

In many circles it is also felt that the strong support which the ancellor has given to the French standpoint in many important ues has prevented the Federal Republic from being able to use present economic and financial strength to act as a mediator, pecially between Britain and France. Outstanding among these ues is that of the Common Market and the Outer Seven. After visit to London in November 1959, the Chancellor declared it everything should be done to prevent a rift between these two ganizations, since this would have serious consequences for estern unity. Dr Adenauer certainly believes that anything ich divides Europe is bad, and anything which unites it is good. has, however, also made it plain that he regards almost as his e-work the establishment of a political 'Little Europe' out of e six States of the Common Market, and intends to pursue that al, even though it may mean serious misunderstandings with itain. The attitude adopted by the Federal Republic on this ue, despite the opposition of Professor Erhard, the Minister of onomics, and other economic and financial experts here, left no

Süddeutsche Zeitung, 20 December 1959.

doubt but that this country's foreign policy—like its home policy—is determined by one man, the Chancellor.

The Federal Republic will not be officially represented at the East–West Conference next June. Dr Adenauer has already announced this fact, and indicated the main reason. He does not want his country to occupy such a low position as it did at the Foreign Ministers' Conference last summer, when both German States sat at side tables. If the Federal Republic were to be given a higher position, then the D.D.R. would demand equal status and would naturally be sponsored in this by the U.S.S.R.

This will mean that the Federal Republic will look particularly to France to protect West German and Berlin interests, since France is regarded as Western Germany's most loyal ally, especially in its policy on Berlin.

Its absence from the actual Summit Conference does not, however, mean that the Federal Republic will be ignored by the three Western Powers, whenever its vital interests are involved. The Federal Republic will participate in the preliminary deliberations on the Western side. Its Ambassador in Washington, Professor Wilhelm Grewe, will sit on the preparatory committee which meets in the American capital. In Bonn, preparations will be supervised by Professor Karl Carstens, head of the Western Department in the German Foreign Office. He has been put in charge of the preparations, although it had been generally assumed that this task would have been taken over by Herr Georg Duckwitz, head of the Eastern Department.

Meanwhile, the U.S.S.R. continues its attacks upon the Federal Republic, and upon the Chancellor in particular. Soviet smiles and blandishments are for other countries, but not for West Germany. One of the sharpest attacks on Dr Adenauer was in Mr Khrushchev's speech in Budapest on the anniversary of the Hungarian revolution of 1956. The Soviet Premier had on 15 October 1959 sent a letter to Dr Adenauer which the latter, for some reason known only to himself, carefully guarded as a very special epistle But it was later published in the Moscow press.[1] In it, Mr Khrushchev repeats the request for an all-German peace treaty, and adds that there still remains a chance to replace the friction between Moscow and Bonn by confidence and co-operation. Deeds are a hundred times more convincing than mere slogans of peace, the letter states, and it demands that the Federal Republic renounce

[1] *Soviet News*, 21 December 1959.

nic weapons and disarm its fighting forces. (No reference is le to the D.D.R. forces.)

press campaign, in both the U.S.S.R. and the D.D.R., has n directed against the West German Social Democrat Party '.D.), especially because of recent changes in that party's ook with regard to national defence and Marxism.

THE NEW S.P.D. PROGRAMME

'hese changes are to be found in the S.P.D.'s new programme ch was accepted at a special conference of the party at Bad lesberg (13–15 November 1959), attended by delegates from arts of the Federal Republic and West Berlin.

n its determination to 'move with the times', and incidentally nlist new voters in the 1961 elections, the S.P.D. has made a natic break with its past. Its new programme, endorsed by to 16 votes, clarifies the party's attitude towards national nce and organized religion and abandons much of its Marxism. 'he vast majority of the delegates approved Party Chairman h Ollenhauer's comment, namely, that to demand that the tical programme of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels should the programme of the party today—in 1959—would be un-xist and would leave the Social Democrats politically power-. The party, he said, 'must translate the principles laid down in programme into the needs of practical politics for the years ad'.

'he new programme includes the following:[1]

) Re-emphasis upon the rejection of Communism, because it is tential enemy of democracy.

i) The S.P.D. must become a national party. Class warfare is nitely discarded.

ii) Nationalization as a solution of economic problems is re-'ed by the vaguer concept of 'public ownership'. This now ns to mean little more than what most liberal-minded people ywhere demand today, especially when combined with Herr nhauer's statement that the S.P.D. aims at creating a society hich there is the greatest possible freedom for the individual, security from restriction and threat. Freedom of choice in sumer goods and services, free choice of place of work, free iative for employers, and free competition are also mentioned in programme. Many speakers in the conference itself rejected the

[1] *Vorwärts*, 20 November 1959.

old type of nationalization with bureaucratic control, because they felt it must ultimately lead to the exercise of increased power by the State.

(iv) The S.P.D. openly supports national defence, for the first time. The party rejects the inclusion of the struggle against military conscription in its programme, though it continues to oppose conscription as long as Germany is divided. It was significant that Deputy-Chairman Herbert Wehner should have declared that acceptance of democracy assumed acceptance of national defence. Production and use of atomic weapons were also rejected. (Voting on military matters was 340 to 52.)

(v) The party's attitude towards the churches was clarified. The S.P.D., said Herr Ollenhauer, is a political party and does not claim to be either a *Weltanschauungspartei* (ideological party) or a substitute for any church.

In foreign policy, the new programme supports the strengthening and extension of the United Nations as a world organization for peace. The S.P.D. favours regional pacts within the United Nations as contributions to general disarmament and relaxation of tensions. A reunited Germany should join a European security system. The S.P.D. supports economic co-operation between all European States as well as solidarity with developing countries

The Bad Godesberg Conference marked a second stage in the process of re-thinking which began at Stuttgart two years before It follows the lines taken by other Socialist parties in European countries where material prosperity has caused the old-fashioned Marxist concepts to appear outmoded.

Critics of the S.P.D. maintain that this revision was long overdue. In the party itself, it is hoped that the new changes will help to increase its votes at the 1961 Federal election. In the past, the S.P.D. has never won more than 33 per cent of the total votes. As long as Dr Adenauer is Chancellor, however, not even the most optimistic member of the Opposition sees much chance of the S.P.D.'s coming to power in the Federal Republic.

J. EMLYN WILLIAMS

The Problem of Democracy in Vietnam

WHEN President Ngo Dinh Diem assumed power in the summer of 1954, conditions in South Vietnam were chaotic. Much of the countryside was still in the hands of the rebel politico-religious sects or controlled by the Viet Cong.[1] French colonial administrators and technicians were withdrawing, turning over their duties to inexperienced Vietnamese successors. War devastation was widespread and very heavy, and even the loyalty of the army was uncertain. To make a desperate situation even worse, some 800,000 destitute refugees, requiring immediate feeding and housing and eventual resettlement, arrived from the Communist North. The greatest danger of all lay in the Viet Cong presence. Numbers of the Viet Cong, who were stationed in all parts of South Vietnam when the fighting ended, were repatriated to the North, but many others were ordered by their Northern masters to remain in the South and to await further instructions. The duty of these people was to sabotage and subvert so as to make it impossible for any government to rule South Vietnam effectively. The only hope for South Vietnam's continuing existence appeared to lie in the formation of a strong central Government capable of imposing order, security, and effective authority upon the whole country.

Nevertheless, Ngo Dinh Diem, who had spent some years in America before his return, had already decided to turn South Vietnam into an American-style republic if this were possible. He ousted the former Emperor, Bao Dai, from his position as Quoc-Truong, or Head of State, by means of a popular referendum. His next major political move was to hold elections for a Constituent Assembly which would ratify a draft Constitution. When this Constitution had been ratified and adopted, the President transformed this Constituent Assembly into a National Assembly or parliament. Thus, by the end of 1956, South Vietnam had become the independent Republic of Vietnam with a democratic Constitution and a National Assembly.[2] Since then, elections for the second National Assembly were held on 30 August 1959, and that body is now in being. It would seem from this evidence that democracy is now firmly established in the Republic of Vietnam. Only by looking beyond the public acts and pronouncements, however, and by

[1] Viet Cong is the term used in this article to refer to the North Vietnamese Communists as well as their agents and supporters in South Vietnam.
[2] See 'Progress in the Republic of Vietnam', in *The World Today*, February 1959.

studying in detail the working of the government, can one form an accurate assessment of the regime.

There are certain minimum requirements for the successful working of a democracy in any country. The following must be numbered among these:

(i) An understanding of the concept of 'State' among the mass of the people, as well as feelings of membership of that State, loyalty towards it, and responsibility for its good government.
(ii) An awareness among the bulk of the electorate of the rights and duties of citizens, and also a certain minimum of political experience.
(iii) Freedom of political discussion and debate.
(iv) Freedom for all citizens to organize themselves into political parties.
(v) Freedom for all citizens to cast their votes as they wish.
(vi) Freedom of the press.

It will be useful to discover whether these prerequisites exist today in the Republic of Vietnam.

For the overwhelming majority of the Vietnamese, heirs to experience of a century of French colonial rule, the Government is a remote body which passes laws, collects taxes, demands labour corvées, takes away able-bodied men for military service, and generally enriches itself at the expense of the poor peasant. 'Government' is associated in the minds of the villagers with exactions, punishments, unpaid labour, and other unpleasant matters. These people are members of families and members of villages, and their loyalties to both are strong. But these loyalties do not extend beyond the village, nor has any past experience taught the peasants why they should. The idea that the peasants should assume any responsibility for the government themselves would be so alien to their thinking as to be comic. Educated Vietnamese are well aware of this, as many of their actions show, but it is still not appreciated by foreign observers of the Vietnamese scene. These peasants have never been aware of their rights as citizens for the simple reason that they have never enjoyed any such rights. The representative of the provincial administration has doubtless impressed upon them their duty to pay taxes and to perform public works without pay, but he has made no mention of any rights.

Such political parties as existed in Vietnam before the advent of independence were all clandestine, so that any political experience acquired from these by the Vietnamese peasants will have been of secret plotting for the overthrow of the Government. Since inde-

endence, they will probably have been subjected to attempted ommunist indoctrination by the Viet Cong, but this too will have ad an anti-Government slant. Since 1954, the peasants have been d on a diet of puerile, and frequently offensive, slogans by the linistry of Information. These serve, if indeed they serve any purose at all, to make the peasant distrust the Government of Ngo inh Diem. The peasants, for all their political naiveté, are far om foolish and they are not deceived by slogans alleging to be ue things which they know, from their own personal experience, be untrue. Any political experience among the peasantry, then, more likely to prove a liability than an asset to any Government.

There are, in the Republic of Vietnam, establishments euphe-ustically known as Political Re-education Camps. Each one of hese camps contains some thousands of detainees who have never iced a court trial and who have never received a fixed sentence. he declared purpose of the camps is to teach those favourably disosed towards Communism the errors and shortcomings of Comunist doctrine and practice. The writer has visited such camps nd talked with the guards and instructors there and, though not ermitted to question the detainees themselves, had long conversaions with former inmates who have now been released. The consensus of the opinions expressed by these people is that there are a umber of real Communists in the camps, but that the majority of he detainees are neither Communists nor pro-Communists. It is opularly believed that persons are placed in the camps because hey have been critical of the regime. Consequently, there is a reat reluctance among all sections of the Vietnamese people to peak critically of the Government in public or to persons whose *ona fides* is not known. Although there is some political discussion nd debate in Vietnam, particularly among educated Vietnamese, his is private, frightened, and carried on only between persons vell known to one another. Public discussion of political questions, uch as is known in the West, is entirely absent.

In theory, Vietnamese citizens are free to organize themselves nto political parties, but in practice they are not. A person or perons wishing to form a political party must first register this party vith the Government. All unregistered political parties are regardd as operating outside the law and their members are subject o severe punishments. 'What,' the reader may ask, 'is to prevent he would-be founders of political parties from registering these arties?' The simple fact that the Government will not register

political parties which it does not itself control. Dr Phan Quang Dan, the Opposition candidate who was elected to the National Assembly in the elections of 30 August 1959, told me of his experience. He wished to form a Free Democratic Party which would, he assured me, oppose Communism but would put forward criticisms of a number of Government policies. Dr Dan said that he had been trying to register his party for well over a year, but that his applications and reminders produced no reply or acknowledgements from the Government, and certainly no registration. Others who had tried to register political parties had had precisely the same experience. It is true that there are several political parties in being, but these are controlled by the Government.

The writer was fortunate in being able to witness in person the elections of 30 August 1959 and in seeing at first hand that the Vietnamese people were not free to vote as they wished. Here, once again, everything appeared to be in order to the superficial observer. Electoral lists were displayed and people were invited to ensure that their names were inscribed on them. Voting cards were then issued, and voting took place in the following way. On entering their polling stations, voters were given an envelope and a voting slip for each candidate. They went with these into a curtained booth, where they placed the slip for their selected candidate in the envelope and threw the rejected slips into a wastepaper basket. The sealed envelope was then placed in the ballot box. Nevertheless, in spite of all this seemingly democratic procedure, candidates who were not backed by the Government had little chance of being elected. There is no space here to describe in detail all of the methods employed by the Government to ensure electoral victory, but mention should be made of some of them. Most of the Opposition candidates were eliminated, before the election, for breaches of the electoral law. This, in practice, usually meant nothing graver than that they had obtained the wrong official stamp or the signature of the wrong official on their candidature papers. Such opponents of the Government as survived this first obstacle were charged in court with illegal procedures of one sort or another. I spent hours in the courts listening to the hearings of these cases, and the one feature common to all of them was the absence of any real proof of the allegations against the accused. This did not prevent them from being found guilty and, although the sentences were light and were usually suspended, the candidates discovered that they had been eliminated by the fact of having been found

guilty. Protests by foreign newspaper correspondents were successful in having the candidature of some restored, but this was of little avail. Dr Phan Quang Dan, who was elected by an enormous majority, found himself debarred from the National Assembly. Indeed, he was arrested as he mounted the steps of the Assembly building to claim his seat. Moreover, he is ineligible to contest the by-election.

Again, the electoral laws stated that soldiers would vote in whatever constituency they happened to find themselves on election day. There were large troop movements into Saigon just before the elections, since it was there that the danger of an Opposition victory was greatest. The soldiers were ordered to vote for the Government-sponsored candidate, and their voting was checked in the same way as that of the members of the National Revolutionary Movement. This National Revolutionary Movement is a Government-controlled political party, membership of which is virtually obligatory for all Vietnamese public servants, but it is not restricted to public servants. In many of the villages visited it was found that the pressures on villagers to join this party were very strong indeed. The following extract from Party Circular 338/VP-TU-M-TT of 10 August 1959, which was signed by the First Vice-Chairman of the party, Truong Vinh Le, speaks for itself:

> When Party members have voted for the Party candidate, they must tear in half the voting slips of the other candidates. They must then return one set of these torn halves to the Party branch offices, village offices, district offices, or provincial offices in order to facilitate control [over the voting].

In other words, all members of the party were obliged to vote for the party candidate and were not free to cast their votes as they pleased. Another interesting feature of this circular is that copies were sent to all Governors of Provinces 'for information'. The implications of this need no explanation.

Among other 'rigging' procedures, the most noteworthy was the failure to issue voting cards. Persons who complained that they had not received voting cards were given a polite explanation that this was due to a clerical oversight. The numbers of such people amounted to tens of thousands, and the election results—no less than three different 'official' sets of results were issued by the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Information[1]—all

[1] The explanation offered to me by highly placed Government officials was that 'certain elected candidates disclosed that they were not members of the

showed clearly that these undelivered voting cards were used by somebody, and that the persons using them all voted for the Government-sponsored candidates. There was, besides, much evidence of irregularities in the counting of the votes.

There is no press freedom in the Republic of Vietnam. Although there is no censorship of vernacular newspapers the press is rigidly controlled. Before the Government will grant permission for a newspaper to be published, it demands that one man should assume full responsibility for everything appearing in that paper This unfortunate is then liable to a prison sentence, fines, or other punishments if his newspaper publishes anything of which the Ministry of Information disapproves. Distribution of all papers is in the hands of the Thong-Nhat Agency, which was granted this monopoly by order of the Government. It is thus possible for the Government to prevent the distribution of any issue of any newspaper of which it disapproves. Moreover, daily sheets are sent by the Press Office of the Ministry of Information to all newspaper editors 'drawing attention' to certain items of news. These sheets expressly forbid the publication of certain pieces of news, order the publication of others, and indicate the type of comment which the editor should publish about stated news items. Foreign-language newspapers are subject to censorship. The English-language *Times of Viet Nam* was closed down for three days on 30 May 1959 for publishing an editorial, part of which had not been approved by the Censorship Board. A letter, 2943/BTT/B.C.I. dated 30 May 1959, from Mr Hoang Nguyen, the then Director of the Press Department of the Ministry of Information, threatened the Director of the Dong-Nam-A printing house, the printers of the *Times of Viet Nam:*

> The head of the printing house which prints a newspaper offending against the censorship laws is regarded as sharing in the guilt. He may be punished (by the temporary closure of his printing house) or he may be prosecuted under criminal law.

The Vietnamese press is, not surprisingly, docile, and such papers as are still published are never critical of the Government.

From all of this, it will be apparent that the conditions cited earlier as essential for the functioning of a democracy do not exist in the Republic of Vietnam. The Vietnamese Government cannot be held responsible for the political inexperience and backwardness

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parties under whose banner they had campaigned'. They had admitted their true allegiance only after election.

f the mass of the population. This is due to the conditions of life which have obtained in Vietnam for a very long time. It would also equire a very long time for the attitude of mind of all these people o be altered and for them to be rendered capable of playing a contructive role in the working of a democracy. The restriction of the reedom to engage in political discussion, to vote as one wishes, to orm political parties, to publish a free press, and the rest is a ositive and deliberate act of the Government; presumably, the Government has found that conditions in the country make such estrictions necessary. Numbers of foreign observers have noted his for themselves and have disapproved strongly of what they isually term 'the cynical hypocrisy of the Vietnamese Government' or some such phrase. The majority of foreign diplomatists whom one meets in Saigon are wont to complain about the absence f democracy and liberty in Vietnam. It is worth examining both riticisms in order to assess how valid they are.

Most of the criticism levelled at the Vietnamese Government by oreign observers is occasioned by the simple fact that this Government claims to be what it is not. It claims that it is a democratic Government of a democratic State and that it holds office by virtue f the mandate given by the people in free elections. This claim to e a democracy brings certain limited advantages in the sphere of ropaganda, and the Government presumably points to these as its ustification for making the claim. In the same way, Russia makes o allocation of funds in her Budget for an intelligence service and mits cries of horror annually at the wicked Americans when the United States Budget sets aside money for the Central Intelligence Agency. Presumably Russia considers it worth while to adopt this ttitude, but the propaganda advantage is severely limited because one but the most politically naïve will accept the implication that Russia herself has no intelligence service. In the case of Vietnam, he claim to be a democracy also entails grave disadvantages beause the outside world may well accept the claim as the truth. When it receives sufficient evidence that the claim is false, it will ccuse the Vietnamese rulers of deception and will view any further laims they may make with the gravest suspicion. In this way, the Vietnamese Government finds itself blamed for not being demoratic even though the conditions essential for the creation of a lemocracy do not exist in Vietnam. It invites this blame and critiism because of the claim which it itself makes.

In terms of achievement, the Government of President Ngo

Dinh Diem has been very successful. It has resisted attempts to overthrow it and is still in office; it has dealt most efficiently with the massive influx of refugees, nearly all of whom are now resettled in new villages; it has disbanded the politico-religious sects and has restored order, and a good measure of security, throughout the country. Such Viet Cong as are still active in the Republic of Vietnam are on the defensive and seem to be able to accomplish little more than the murder of some minor Government officials in remote regions. Fears of an imminent Communist takeover have receded into the background and most of the people are opposed to Communism. This latter phenomenon is the result of the appalling atrocities inflicted upon the people by the Communist authorities in North Vietnam rather than a direct consequence of the anti-Communist propaganda disseminated by the Ministry of Information. It must, nevertheless, be reckoned one of the successes of the Ngo Dinh Diem Government. This is far from being a full list, but it is, even so, a formidable record of successes. Due credit for this is not accorded by the outside world because of the absence of democracy in the country.

President Ngo Dinh Diem is a sincere admirer of democracy and would genuinely wish the Republic of Vietnam to be a democratic State. Nobody who has any acquaintance with the man can doubt this. But he is too intelligent a ruler to risk the collapse of his Government and the resultant relapse into chaos of the country. This is why the actions of his Government are sometimes found to be in conflict with the pronouncements of the President. He is ensnared in a trap of his own making and is often the object of criticism for not doing what it would be impossible to do in Vietnam and survive. It would be possible for him to declare a State of Emergency and to suspend the democratic Constitution. This action would be completely justified by the very real danger from Communism, but he prefers to maintain the façade of democracy. Consequently, he is judged by the standards of democracy and is found wanting.

The evidence presented in this article has led to two conclusions: (i) that democracy does not exist in the Republic of Vietnam today; and (ii) that the basic prerequisites, essential for the effective working of democracy, do not exist in the Republic of Vietnam today. The fact of the matter is that democracy is, at the present time, irrelevant in Vietnam. Her situation is fraught with difficulties. She is threatened by powerful Communist neighbours;

she is not economically viable; she is under-developed and lacks the money and the technicians to carry out agricultural and industrial development; she is administered by inexperienced administrators. These are but some of her difficulties. On the credit side of the ledger, she is receiving generous monetary and technical assistance from the United States, from the Colombo Plan countries, and from other sources. She has continuously to face and to overcome difficult practical problems. To evaluate the success or failure of the Vietnamese Government in terms of whether its actions are democratic or not would seem to be neither realistic nor helpful. Yet this is the yardstick which has been used, up to the present, by almost all observers of the Vietnamese scene. Two standards which would be very much more useful under the existing circumstances are practical achievement and human justice. These two standards would prove to be much more helpful in evaluating past actions and as a guide to the formulation of future policies.

Two different, but inter-related, kinds of problem confront the Vietnamese Government today. On the one hand, it must accomplish material progress, that is to say it must raise living standards, make the country economically self-supporting, build roads, bridges, hospitals, schools, and the rest. But it must also win the confidence and support of the people, for without the active and willing participation of the people in its undertakings it will not achieve ultimate success. Whether the form of this government is democratic, paternalistic, authoritarian, oligarchic, or what you will is irrelevant provided it is successful in both of these spheres. To date, it has succeeded well in the first but has made little progress in the second for the reasons stated.

P. J. Honey

A Free Trade Area in South America

A relatively unnoticed development is taking place among the southern and eastern countries of South America—economically the most important part of the region. This development, the beginnings of a free trade area, may turn out to be of major significance for these countries' development.

Talk of common markets, free trade areas, and economic integration is nothing new in Latin America: all the Latin American economists, and some of the politicians, are aware of the economic isolation that has always been characteristic of the republics, and some have been aware that this isolation has retarded development. The basic idea of seeking closer economic relations dates from about 1888, when the First International Conference of American States discussed the formation of a Customs union in the Western hemisphere.[1]

Since then, it must be admitted, remarkably little progress has been made. The theme has, however, been revived by the success of the European experiment, and there are now several variants under current discussion. The most ambitious and unrealistic thesis is a Pan-American common market to include all Latin America, the U.S.A., Canada, and presumably all the Antilles. It does not progress much, and owes its existence chiefly to a vague idea that association with the U.S.A. would bring certain benefits.

A more serious project that has been given extensive and earnest study by the Organization of American States and by the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America (E.C.L.A.) (in fact it seems to be Dr Raúl Prebisch's favourite theme these days) is the Latin American common market[2] embracing the twenty republics.

This is a possible ultimate goal; but practical people foresee a more workable idea in the formation of regional common markets or free trade areas. There are in fact three main regions where this is being studied:

1. *Central America.* The five member republics of the Organization of Central American States (ODECA) have made the most tangible progress towards a Customs union and a pooling of industries. Their task has been the easiest, as they are relatively small economies with a joint population of 10 million.

2. '*Gran Colombia*'. The original three, Colombia, Venezuela, and Ecuador, recognize the possibilities but have perhaps too many domestic problems at the moment to devote much time to economic integration. Their first attempt at economic co-

[1] Pan American Union, Washington D C., *Development of Regional Markets in Latin America* (Washington, November 1958)

[2] U N , Economic Commission for Latin America: *Economic Bulletin for Latin America*, Vol. IV, No. 1, March 1959—'Progress towards the Latin American Common Market', and 'Recommendations concerning the Structure and Basic Principles of the Latin American Common Market'.

operation was the formation after the war of the Gran Colombia merchant fleet, from which Venezuela subsequently withdrew.

3. *The Southern Seven.* This convenient designation of course includes Brazil. In this region, which contains about two-thirds of the population of Latin America and a much larger proportion of the wealth, the possibilities are really interesting.

It is evident that there are fundamentally different aims, as well as some in common, behind the efforts of, for example, the Central American group and the Southern Seven.

The Central American republics have much in common: their economies are very similar and in a roughly equal stage of development. They are not in any sense complementary economies and, if they wisely decide not to try to be competitive, their aim must be to pool their resources and unify the market. The trading of primary produce among the Central American republics can never be other than negligible since they produce the same commodities; but the development of regional industries—a scheme whereby a factory in one republic may freely market its products in the others—is an important step in industrial development and helps to overcome the principal objection of foreign investors that each of the republics is alone too small a market for any worth-while venture.

In the Southern Seven the circumstances are quite different. This group has for years accounted for 80 or 90 per cent of intra-Latin-American trade, and intra-Latin-American trade represents about 10 per cent of this group's total world trade.

The inducements to integration are more numerous and more powerful: not only does the Central American argument of the unified market for trade and investment apply, but it applies to a population of almost 106 million, including communities with higher *per capita* incomes than are common in Central America, for example.

The E.C.L.A. has devoted a great deal of work to the Southern Seven in the course of its promotion of the general theme of increasing trade within the region. There is no shortage of material published at intervals since 1948, when the problems that are so familiar today were beginning to appear.[1]

An awareness of each other's potentialities as suppliers and as

[1] E.C.L.A.: *Study of the Prospects of Inter-Latin-American Trade (Southern Zone of the Region)* (U.N. Department of Economic Affairs, New York, 1954), and *Study of Inter-Latin-American Trade*, ditto, 1957.

markets had of course existed among the Southern Seven for many years, but it was not until the disruption of classical multilateral trading brought about by the war that the individual countries of the group were to some extent forced into expanding trade with each other. The present attempts to form a free trade area are aimed at overcoming difficulties not so much in creating trade currents as in realizing the potential already there.

The economies of the Southern Seven are to a surprising degree complementary, and steadily becoming more so as old deficiencies are made good in one or another republic. As regards agriculture, the area stretches from the equator to the Antarctic and there is no agricultural product of major importance that is not produced or could not be produced in the region, from Amazon rubber—still the best—to Patagonian wool. An obvious but not unimportant example of interchange is the trade in fresh fruit between Argentina and Brazil. This very useful traffic has on various occasions been restricted and even interrupted by one or another of the administrative difficulties that have so retarded progress at different times

Besides the agricultural exchanges that are possible, there is the wealth of mineral output by Chile, Peru, and Bolivia that is tending to enter more into these countries' trade with their neighbours In the past there has been a limit to the amount of raw copper, lead, zinc, or tin that Argentina or Uruguay, for example, would accept in trade with West Coast countries in exchange for supplies of essential foods: their acceptance was limited by their own industrial limitations.

It is clearly through an enlargement of the internal trade of this region that the particular problems of Chile, Peru, and Bolivia in the matter of food supplies are likely to be solved and their potential contribution to the development of the region fully realized Brazil is also a food importer and a producer of commodities not obtainable elsewhere within the region of the Seven.

After the war, when the problems of development and trade balances began to become acute for the Southern Seven, all kinds of expedients appeared in their trade and payments policies. The essence of their problem was that their populations were growing (and still are) at a faster rate than their sales of primary commodities on world markets: consequently the home demand for manufactured goods exceeded the payments capacity earned by exports.

Two principal factors have in varying degrees accentuated the

imbalance brought about in this way. Inflation, accompanied by a shift in the distribution of wealth towards non-saving sectors of the population, generated an artificial but perfectly real demand for consumer goods that represented in many cases an extraordinary increase over previous levels. At the same time the earning capacity of the primary commodity producers has been severely curtailed by the fall in prices that occurred after the Korean war boom and which came just as many countries were gearing their economic expansion to higher export earnings.

Moreover, the process of industrialization, which has progressed farther in Argentina, Brazil, Chile (three of the seven), and Mexico than elsewhere in Latin America, and faster than anywhere in the world, has not only increased the demand for machinery and raw materials but has also distributed new purchasing power in the form of high industrial wages.

In these circumstances, balance-of-payment problems appeared soon after the war, and gained in magnitude with the collapse of commodity prices after Korea. In those countries where inflationary financing of industrial development had been allowed—notably in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile—exchange and trade restrictions were necessary to maintain something like a balanced payments position. Brazil was less successful than Argentina: balance-of-payments deficits had to be met in Brazil's case by borrowing abroad, while Argentina evolved an extremely complex and reasonably effective trade and exchange control system.

But whatever means were used to keep payments reasonably in balance, there was by no means enough exchange available for what were felt to be urgent needs, and it was during the period 1946 to 1954 that the bilateral trade agreement, usually with clearing account or compensation arrangements and mutual swing credit limits, was widely used as a means of enlarging a country's trading scope.

This development of the bilateral trade and payments agreement was led by Argentina. During her history as a republic Argentina appears to have signed about a hundred bilateral agreements, protocols, notes, and minutes with Latin American countries, of which forty were signed between 1946 and 1954. (This record is not up to date but it accounts for most of the bilateral agreements entered into by the Perón Government with other Latin American States.)

Many such agreements were signed by Argentina, Brazil,

Uruguay, and others with European countries, as a means of (
taining urgently needed supplies without actually having to]
for them, and in exchange disposing of surplus commodities. T
swing credit clause enabled the parties to avoid a suspension of t
exchange of goods because of one country being in debt to t
other, but in practice these swing credits served only to postpc
the breakdown of many agreements, for once the maximum of t
swing is reached the creditor country normally ceases to ship ur
some action is taken by the debtor. In the European context t
Latin Americans for the most part obtained what was possi
under the swing credit and left the agreement inoperative until t
debt could be paid. Such agreements were not always renew
on expiry, and at the moment there are very few in existence l
tween any of the Southern Seven and Western Europe, and vir
ally none is operative.

Within their own circle, however, the Southern Seven k
bilateral agreements going rather longer, since there was not t
same tendency for one party to get rapidly into debt with the oth
But the disadvantages were not long in appearing: although it
convenient to conduct trade without the use of hard currency wh
it is a case of obtaining needed products of known quality, it m
be irksome to be obliged to accept unwanted goods, at high c
perhaps, merely for the sake of disposing of a surplus that mig
otherwise have been sold for dollars. When large balances accum
late in one party's favour there are problems of settlement, sir
final payment in dollars is normally required.

By 1958 the many bilateral agreements in force among the me
bers of the southern group were in a highly tangled state and se
ing little purpose. There did not appear to be any one promin
creditor nor any single recalcitrant debtor. Attempts were made
Argentina, Brazil, and Chile to 'multilateralize' their various
lateral balances. In this they were endorsed and encouraged b
meeting of Central Bank representatives held in Rio de Jane
towards the end of 1958: at this meeting Dr Raúl Prebisch deliv
ed an impressively good address[1] in which he advocated the esta
lishment of a payments union as a prelude to the formation o
Common Market. When it is remembered that the European Pa
ments Union preceded the Economic Community by about th

[1] Published in *Revista del Banco de la República* (Bogotá), Vol. XXXI,]
374, and in *Revista del Banco de la República Oriental del Uruguay* (Montevid
Año 17, No. 68.

teen years there is clearly something to be said for the argument: without going outside the experience of the Southern Seven, it can be seen that it has most commonly been payments difficulties that have hampered trade.

Although Prebisch was speaking of the idea of a common market for the whole of Latin America his argument is no less applicable to the Southern Seven. There is, however, another school of thought which believes that the key to greater trade movements lies in the removal of tariff barriers and administrative restrictions—most of which are designed as protective measures. They should no longer be necessary, it is thought, once the area realizes its own unity. This may be true; but the protective restrictions applied by Governments are normally intended to fulfil a dual purpose: to protect the balance of payments as well as to shield local industry from outside competition: payments continue to appear as a dominant factor, whichever way the problem is approached.

In the event, Prebisch's thesis appears to be preferred. A draft treaty establishing a free trade area was signed last September by representatives of the Governments of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay. This was only a draft: amendments could be sent in until 15 January 1960 for consideration at a second meeting to be held in February. Meanwhile a second meeting of the Central Bank officials was in session in Montevideo from 11 January to continue work on the mechanism of the payments union.

The draft is partly inspired by the treaty of Rome that created the European Common Market or Economic Union, and it similarly calls for the gradual liberalization of commodities within the area, starting with essentials, which in this case are agricultural products. It incorporates a new idea in allowing for special concessions to member countries that are in a less advanced state of economic development, as a means of helping them out of their difficulties—Paraguay or Bolivia, for example.

The deliberations of the Central Bank representatives are not yet known, but it is very much to be hoped that they go somewhat beyond the mere routine of a multilateral payments mechanism. It may be wondered whether they will consider the unification, or at least the co-ordination, of monetary policy and of the practices followed by Central Banks in regulating exchange markets.

In other words a clash between cheap money and dear money

will have to be avoided, and the values in different places of products traded will have to be realistic and comparable. Fort ately there is a certain reserve of experience in these matt through the trade movement that already exists.

Rómulo Ferrero, the economist, of Lima, who was formerl little distrustful of the Common Market proposals, which feared might represent for Peru a curtailment of economic fr dom, now writes more enthusiastically of them but warns t absolute freedom of payment, both inside the group and outwa is essential. He is also opposed to any steep increase in Custc tariffs towards the rest of the world, lest the free trade mechan should become merely a protectionist device.[1]

There are other dangers to be guarded against: some conside tion must be given to the inherently disadvantageous positior the West Coast countries (including Bolivia) in their need to l food products with the earnings of minerals that they can sell o to countries with a certain degree of technical development. T trends may be expected as the result of the introduction of f trade area facilities: the already industrialized countries, Argent and Brazil, will find an increased market for their manufactu and will require larger quantities of base metals and other minerals; or the possibility of entering a wider market will courage the West Coast countries to establish fabricating indust that are complementary to, rather than competitive with, thos Argentina and Brazil.

A simple illustration comes to mind. The Huachipato steel in Chile produces sheets suitable for making tinplate; Bol produces tin ore; Argentina uses a vast quantity of cans in her h food-processing industry.

Chile also produces excellent newsprint and possesses tim resources sufficient to supply most of the paper requirements the Southern Seven. Capital is needed to enlarge the Bio- paper mill, and it should not be beyond the resources of, for ample, Argentine and Brazilian publishing interests to provide

Most important of all, perhaps, Argentina's incredibly succes petroleum development plans are expected to lead to a surp within a few years. Brazil at least will welcome supplies so clos hand.

It is of course feared that the liberalization of commodities ot

[1] Cf. article by Ferrero in the forthcoming *Supplement on South America* t published by *The Statist* (London) this spring.

than essentials and non-competitive products would cause alarming dislocations in the rather precarious industrial structure of the larger members of the group. Provided that social disturbances were avoided this might be beneficial. In many of the larger manufacturing industries there are foreign shareholders or parent companies which have subsidiaries in several Latin American countries. These would doubtless be willing to collaborate with the central authority (probably the E.C.L.A.) in reorganizing their plants to suit the new circumstances. Conducted gradually over the ten years foreseen in the draft treaty, no great harm would result; moreover, if there were any displaced labour that could be persuaded to return to the land, that too would do no harm.

A question that very naturally arises in the mind of the European observer is whether these probable changes in the structure of the trade of the Southern Seven will reduce their attractiveness as markets: whether, in fact, by co-ordinating their own resources better they will import less.

The theory behind the free trade area or common market idea is that it may help to solve the intractable problem of the stagnation of production and export earnings *per capita*, and thus increase the *per capita* income and importing capacity. The co-ordination of resources ought to reduce waste and uneconomic production and should lead eventually to the development of balanced economies in which agriculture is stimulated and made more efficient: moreover the composition of exports may change slightly in favour of commodities with a higher degree of processing. In other words, export earnings should increase as production costs decline in relation to other prices and volume increases in relation to employment.

In any event there will be an improved scope for the investment of industrial capital, as has been noticed in Europe, particularly when agreement on the free marketing of the products of such industries is reached among the Seven.

Without some such development as that foreseen, the long-term future of the Latin American countries—even the more prosperous ones—is not easy to forecast. As Prebisch and others have pointed out many times, the rate of demographic growth is such that primary commodity producers are increasingly unable to maintain a balanced payments position. Foreign capital has helped and will doubtless continue to do so, but the amounts that the developed countries of the northern hemisphere will be able to

make available—having regard to claims from other parts of t
world—will not alone solve Latin America's problems.

The common market plans will at least lead to greater efficiei
and better utilization of the area's resources, both human a
financial. The tendency should be for foreign trade to increase, a
other forms of business activity as well.

As regards transport, known to be deficient in the South
Seven, space does not permit any comment, but as a general p
cept it could be said that where there is a real demand, services v
appear. The physical barriers that have helped to maintain t
economic isolation of the republics, and even of regions witl
them, are already being overcome and will presumably lose i
portance altogether once the movement acquires real momentu
The need for capital for the development of transport services
general is tremendous.

Probably the Free Trade Area has to be taken seriously, at le
where the Southern Seven are concerned. Whether they and Gi
Colombia and Central America and Mexico, et cetera, ever join
to fulfil Raúl Prebisch's dreams, is more doubtful. However, t
movement is afoot, and the Latin Americans are nothing if i
dynamic.

DAVID HUELIN

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Notes of the Month

Aftermath in Algeria

IN the highly emotional broadcast which M. Paul Delouvrier, the Delegate General in Algiers, delivered at the height of the recent crisis he used the following words: 'I am speaking to all of you—to you, Ortiz and Lagaillarde, and to you, Sapin-Lignières [commanding the Territorials], and to all you who have shut yourselves up in the Faculty of Arts, as in another Alcazar at Toledo, and are ready to die. I proclaim aloud to the homeland my recognition of your courage, you who are her children. . . Thus, Ortiz, Lagaillarde, Sapin-Lignières, and all of you, success will be yours tomorrow—if you listen to me—success will be yours tomorrow.'[1] And the Delegate General went on to picture a future in which he and those whom he was addressing would walk together, hand in hand, to the Algiers War Memorial and lay upon it a wreath of flowers. It almost seemed as if he was trying to convince himself, as well as them, that General de Gaulle's policy was the best and only way to make and keep Algeria French. His complaisance with the dissidents was disowned by the authorities in Paris; and in Algiers Ortiz, Lagaillarde, and Sapin-Lignières were not persuaded. Nor, however, did they die; when they saw that the army was not going to be led to overthrow the regime by its own, or by their, doubts, they abandoned the struggle. Ortiz escaped and the other two were arrested. Government authority was thereby reasserted; but it does not follow that the army would be prepared to enforce against the settlers any policy which they decided was obviously not leading to Algeria's remaining French.

On the other hand, the shock to the Europeans of Algeria was great. For over a century their demonstrations had never failed to bring Government policy into line with their own wishes and so enable them to block any reform, such as the grant of the franchise to Muslims, which might result in the latters' exerting an effective say

[1] *Le Monde*, 30 January 1960.

in Algerian affairs. When they yielded in the matter of the fran
after 13 May 1958, it was, as M. Alain de Sérigny has explai
because they supposed that in a French community, united
Tamanrasset to Dunkirk, they would always have the voters o
mainland with them. The Algerian Muslims would thus be tu
into a perpetual minority just as the Irish members in the Br
Parliament were, for many decades after the integration of the
Parliament into that at Westminster. Things have not happ
like that. The Europeans of Algeria have already found thems
(as the Protestants of Ulster did when the Home Rule for Ire
Bill became law) disowned by the majority in the Parliament o
homeland. There may be another rising later, with a worthier
more determined leadership, but the faint-hearted are begin
to weigh the respective disadvantages of submission or depar
Among the Muslims the small minority completely committ
integration shares the disillusion of the European integration
But it has also become clear that those Muslim masses who con
to the powers-that-be prefer de Gaulle's policy to the prospe
integration. The Kasbah Muslims refused to move at the
appeal; and the Muslims of Mostaghanam plucked up coura
react with a hostile demonstration. The fact that in both cities s
boys (who often blurt out in public what their parents expre
private) uttered the cry of 'Algérie Arabe' shows that there is n
latent sympathy for the F.L.N.

All indications suggest that de Gaulle is now thinking along
similar to those which inspired the abortive *loi-cadre*—the div
of the country into Arab, Kabyle, European, and Mzabite
which may eventually be called on to vote, as separate units, f
against secession. Since nobody seems to favour such a division
project seems as little likely to prove viable as did similar pro
for Palestine.

The F.L.N. are the beneficiaries of all this. Their terms have
restated by Krim Belkasem with heightened emphasis. They
ready to negotiate a cease-fire, but only if three points of disag
ment can be settled: the terms of the cease-fire itself, the mear
which self-determination is to be realized, and the guarantee
the freedom of the referendum.[1] If this is unacceptable, then
can point out that four years of fighting produced the risin
13 May, the coming to power of General de Gaulle, and the
chise for Muslims. The next four months of fighting produce

[1] *Le Monde*, 13 February 1960.

Constantine plan; the following year, recognition of the principle that the future of Algeria must be decided by its inhabitants. Another few months, they may calculate, should do the rest. Nevertheless their losses and the appalling sufferings of their people make it very urgent for them to get negotiations going. French estimates recognize that over 100,000 Algerians have been killed in the fighting, apart from casualties in the bombing of villages and losses from terrorism. Muslim sources claim that the total losses are 500,000. A million peasants have been concentrated under the control of the French army; thousands of Algerians are under preventive arrest, and there are 250,000 refugees in Tunisia and Morocco. French claims of approaching victory are based mainly on a diminution of the killing of Muslims by Muslims—a phenomenon which is susceptible of various explanations. Casualties in the fighting are as heavy as they have ever been, with a rate of about 24,000 Muslims and 2,200 French per year, maintaining the proportion of between eight and ten to one which seems to have been almost unvarying for the last four years.

Attempts to Break the Disarmament Deadlock

ON 15 March the ten-nation Disarmament Committee set up by the United Nations last September at the suggestion of the Foreign Ministers' Conference is due to meet in Geneva. Such a committee, with East–West parity of representation, was proposed by the Foreign Ministers as a way to break the deadlock of the previous two years in disarmament negotiations. Russia walked out of the U.N. Disarmament Commission and the five-Power sub-committee in 1957 on the ground that the preponderance of Western representation in these bodies (four to one in the sub-committee) made it impossible for her to continue discussions. As a way round this difficulty the Disarmament Commission of the United Nations (which, as set up in 1952, consisted of the eleven members of the Security Council plus Canada) was enlarged in 1957 to include up to twenty-five members, many of them from the uncommitted countries; and in December 1958, again after further Russian complaints of Western weighting, the Commission was enlarged for a trial period of one year to include representatives of all the eighty-two member States of the United Nations. It was not expected that this body would deal with the actual disarmament negotiations; and in fact it has met only once, on 10 September 1959, to approve the Foreign Ministers' recommendation to set up the ten-nation committee.

The ten nations in question are the same as those which met in Geneva in 1958 to confer on measures for preventing surprise attack: from the West, Britain, France, the U.S.A., Canada, and Italy, and from the East, Russia, Poland, Rumania, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria. The committee will operate outside the United Nations though it will report its decisions to the Disarmament Commission. It will have referred to it all disarmament proposals now before the United Nations. The main Russian proposals are those contained in Mr Khrushchev's speech to the General Assembly on 18 September 1959, in which he proposed general and complete disarmament over a period of four years, to be supervised by international control, and five phases of partial disarmament if the West were not prepared for such thoroughgoing measures. The British proposals, put forward by Mr Selwyn Lloyd in the General Assembly on the previous day, were for phased disarmament in both nuclear and conventional arms. The five Western participants of the ten-nation committee are now working out in Washington joint Western proposals.

In addition the committee will consider the findings of the two special conferences which have met in Geneva since 1958. One, composed of representatives of the same ten Powers, has reached deadlock on the discussion of scientific methods to provide warning of surprise attack, since the Russians have insisted from the outset on the liquidation of bases on foreign territory and the banning of patrol flights by aircraft armed with nuclear weapons as essential preconditions of their agreement to any measures. The other, consisting of representatives of the three nuclear Powers, has been meeting since 31 October 1958 to try to solve the 'practical and political problems' of a control system for nuclear tests. Since this conference opened there have been, by unilateral decision, no nuclear tests by the three Powers. Experts produced in August 1958 an outline of a world-wide control plan with 180 control posts throughout the three territories, but no agreement has so far been reached. Russia objected to on-site inspections which she claimed were of potential espionage value. The conference has suggested a seven-nation Commission, on the same East–West parity basis and with a neutral chairman, to set up and operate the control; but Russia insists on the right to veto inspection flights and the siting of control posts, though in a proposal of 14 December 1959 she did agree to Western concepts of staffing control posts so long as only a very small quota of inspections was made.

reater difficulty now arises from U.S. doubts of the feasibility
detection of underground tests. The Berkner report of the
delegation, presented in early 1959 following an analysis of a
of underground explosions, showed there was considerable
lity in underground detection, especially with the 'large hole'
y that explosions in large specially constructed caverns can be
satisfactorily muffled. The Russians dispute the accuracy of
ican findings on these underground tests and claim that de-
n is good enough to make a comprehensive ban practicable.
1 February, however, the Americans produced their latest
sals for an immediate ban on all tests in the atmosphere, in
space, under water, and underground with a seismic magni-
reading of 4 75 or more (about 20 kilotons or more) but ex-
ig underground tests of smaller size. At the same time they
d Britain and Russia to co-operate in seismic research to
this threshold of underground tests.

e Russian delegation, who in any case accuse the Americans
iberately misinterpreting the seismic data, regard these pro-
as 'a backward step' in that they allow the resumption of small
ground tests; the Russians continue to urge a comprehen-
an on all tests. The American proposals do however concede
issian principle of a quota of on-site inspections, about twenty
, and on 16 February the Russian delegate followed this up
he submission of 'temporary simplified criteria' for initiating
e inspections of events suspected of being nuclear explosions.
the British view, it is considered impossible at this stage to
ish reasonably safe control of smaller underground tests with-
uch better instrumentation and more on-site inspection than
ussians are ever likely to allow. Further research, however,
vell lower the threshold of tests much more within the three
or so needed to establish the control system.

President Eisenhower's Last Year

WHEN finally the historians assess the Eisenhower career, the *an mirabilis* may well turn out to have been not the year beginning June 1944, during which the General won the hot war with G many, but the year ending in June 1960, during which the Pr dent relaxed the cold war with Russia. Mr Eisenhower himself certainly been devoting all his efforts to this end, ever since Dulles's death forced him to take over responsibility for the c duct of American foreign policy. That he did take this over, with energy and imagination, has confounded his critics, as has enthusiasm with which he has been received in his travels abro

These brought him last year to Britain, France, and Germa to India, and back by way of various Middle Eastern and Medit ranean capitals; now he is touring Latin America to show his nei bours in the countries where Communism is making its latest thr that they are not forgotten; then should come the Summit meet in Paris and, if all goes well at it, a trip round the world, stopping Russia to prove to people there that he is no ogre, and in Japan show that country that in American eyes it is now an accepted me ber of the international community. And in the intervals Eisenhower has been, and will be, receiving numerous Heads State from other countries. What he evidently hopes to achieve all this is a consolidation of the free world and an easing of tensi with Russia sufficient to allow more attention, and more money, be devoted to the development of backward countries in As Africa, and Latin America.

Thus in this, his last year of office—his successor will be augurated on 20 January 1961—President Eisenhower is maki peace his main, and almost his sole, concern. But politics being wl they are, he is also making it his Republican Party's great asset that is, unless he fails and the Summit negotiations break down tirely; but that seems unlikely, at least before 8 November, the d of the Presidential election. This puts the Democratic Oppositi in a difficult position. Since peace is overwhelmingly popular w the American people, the Democrats can hardly criticize the Pre dent for what he is doing, nor indeed would many of them wish do so. A few of the party's intellectuals, led by Mr Dean Aches President Truman's Secretary of State, argue that Mr Eisenhov is being led up the garden path by Mr Khrushchev, but this is nc line that appeals to the party's practising politicians.

Nor is President Eisenhower allowing the Democrats any share in his peace project; so far it has not approached the stage where Congressional action is required, and until this point is reached he refuses to have representatives of the Opposition with him at these international conferences, even though the Democrats control both Houses of Congress and are likely still to do so after next November's election. This rejection of the bipartisan principle which has been followed during all the key negotiations since the war may turn out to have been a mistake when, and if, the time comes for treaties to be approved by the legislature. This will hardly be, however, until after President Eisenhower has left office. But the fact that the responsibility will not be his much longer and that his successor may be a Democrat (which would mean that the Secretary of State and other top officials would also be Democrats new to office) is another reason why Mr Eisenhower might have been wiser to bring the Democrats into closer contact with his foreign policy. He seems to have forgotten that when he took over from the Democrats in 1953 both he and his Secretary of State, Mr Dulles, had already been involved for years in the conduct of American affairs abroad.

In one field which is closely related to foreign policy—the country's defence programme—the Democrats are free to attack the President and have been doing so for a long time. And his customary reply to their criticism—that he is better qualified by his military experience than is anyone else to judge whether the programme is adequate—is wearing a little thin under the repeated testimony from many of the chiefs of the armed forces that the United States is lagging dangerously far behind the Russians in the production and development of deterrent weapons and in the exploitation of outer space. As far as the President is concerned there is no race with the Russians in space and American efforts there are following a satisfactory scientific course. But this view is not shared by his propaganda officers, who feel that the poor showing of American rockets compared with the Russian ones has done great harm to the prestige of the United States, particularly in the uncommitted countries of Asia and Africa.

The President has now made a small concession to his critics on spending in space, stepping up his estimates of the funds which will be needed in the coming financial year, but so far he is refusing to do anything of the sort as regards defence spending. In his view the retaliatory power of the United States is, and will be, sufficient not only to survive any Soviet attack but also to deter any such attack. In

the latest Congressional hearings the main contention of those w
disagree with him has been that his judgment is based on a dou
ful and over-optimistic assessment of the intelligence reports
Russian strength and Russian intentions. The broader argum
against him is a repetition of last year's, that he is endangering
security of the United States for the sake of what his critics reg
as his obsession with balancing the national Budget.

This year, however, there is a new aspect even to this argume
By his insistence on holding defence spending to $41,000 milli
roughly the same amount as last year, and by his refusal to peri
more than a few token increases in other connections, apart fr
those which are automatic—additional interest payments on
national debt, more benefits for ex-servicemen, rising outlays
farm price supports, etc.—the President has produced a surplus
over $4,000 million in his estimates for the 1961 fiscal year; t
begins on 1 July and will not end until he has been out of office
over five months. If this surplus materializes, it will be the larg
since 1948 and contrasts with a deficit of over $12,000 million in t
year which ended last June. That was the result of the econor
recession in 1958, which drove down revenues from income ta
and drove up expenditures on welfare benefits and relief measu
The estimated surplus in 1961 is based on the mounting prosper
which the President's advisers expect throughout this yea
although some experts are beginning to doubt if the boom will l
so long—and which should mean, according to the calculations, t
revenues will go up to $84,000 million, of which $67,000 milli
will come from income taxes on individuals and corporations.

Such a surplus is very tempting, particularly in an election ye
to members of Congress, whatever their party, and much of t
spending side of the equation is dependent on Congress's holdi
appropriation Bills to the amounts which the President has
quested. With the much-publicized allegations of inadequacy
defence expenditures and with the widespread belief of liberals
both parties that the country should be spending more on social
velopment, particularly on education and slum clearance, there
great pressure for the surplus to be devoted to some or all of the
fields. And it will be surprising if there are not also suggestions
tax reductions although, oddly enough, so far these are not bei
talked of as much as might be expected in a year in which Congres
main concern is how to appeal to the voters. It must not be forgot
that all the House of Representatives and one-third of the Sen

has to be elected next November, as well as a President and Vice-President.

Mr Eisenhower himself, however, while holding out a prospect of the likelihood of tax reduction in his successor's first Budget, is determined that his own surplus shall be used to reduce the national debt, which now stands at around $285,000 million and costs nearly $10,000 million a year to service. This cost has been mounting steadily as interest charges have been pushed up by the determination of the Administration and of the Federal Reserve Board, the nearest American equivalent to a central bank, to hold inflation in check during the present boom by making it expensive to borrow money. This is the aspect of Republican policy which has been most criticized by the liberals in the Democratic Opposition, who claim that it has meant hardship for small business men and has held back the economic expansion of the country.

Their criticism crystallized last year in Congress's refusal to permit an increase in the out-dated limitation of 4¼ per cent on the interest which may be paid by the Government when it borrows money for periods of five years or longer. This rate is now quite unrealistic and the Government has therefore been able to borrow recently only in the short-term market, driving up rates there and distorting the whole pattern of interest charges. It is this, as much as the general policy of keeping credit tight, which is responsible for the difficulties of small business men, local governments, and house builders, and all the experts are agreed that a change is necessary. But for the Democrats themselves to legislate for an increase in interest rates would weaken their political case against the Administration's monetary policy, and for this reason Congress may again refuse to act.

This question of economic growth is almost as controversial as are the defence and space programmes, for here again it is argued that the United States is becoming a second-rate Power, falling dangerously far behind the Russians in the rate at which its standard of living is going up, and that it has been held back by Mr Eisenhower's insistence on a balanced Budget and by his exaggerated fears of inflation. This is a politically telling argument during a period of unemployment, since lagging growth means fewer jobs for an expanding population, but with the ending of the steel strike unemployment is falling and seems unlikely to be a major issue in this year's election campaign. And there is now almost universal agreement among the experts that, mainly as a result of techno-

logical advances, the rate of growth of the American economy
hardly fail to speed up substantially during the coming decade.

Mr Eisenhower's insistence on any surplus being used to re(
the national debt is to some extent inspired by the Administrati
concern at last year's deterioration in the American balance of ir
national payments. This account showed a deficit of about $4
million in 1959, caused mainly by a falling-off in exports which
now been checked. While there has never been evidence
genuine flight from the dollar, it is nevertheless true that for
banks and foreign officials have been suspicious of the soundne
an economy in which Government spending, the national debt,
price and wage levels were all going up continuously. The Un
States Treasury is known to have been much influenced by t
views and to be determined to remove any justification there ma
for them.

How Congress will react to all this between now and early J
when this year's session is expected to end, is very doubtful.
year the liberal Democrats were determined to push up spendin
housing, airports, roads, and other public works but were defe
almost all along the line by a revival of the conservative coalition
tween Republicans and southern Democrats and, more import
by the President's success in rallying public opinion behind
balanced Budget. Thus it proved impossible, except on one o
sion, to collect the two-thirds majorities in Congress neede
override his vetoes of Bills which he considered extravagant. B
may be more difficult for him to rally public opinion in support
potential reduction in the national debt, especially under the mo
ing pressures of the coming election and when he himself is goin
be out of Washington and preoccupied with other countries fo
much of the time. Indeed, one wonders whether from now on he
be taking any serious interest in the domestic affairs which l
never concerned him very much at any time.

The situation is complicated by the unusual fact that all
potential Presidential nominees are in the Senate—and are usi
as a ring in which to show their paces. Presidents have not o
come from there in the past; Mr Truman went to the White H
almost by accident, Mr Harding is not a very encouraging pr
dent. And to say that all the candidates are there today means wri
off Mr Adlai Stevenson on the Democratic side and Mr Ne
Rockefeller on the Republican. But for the time being at least,
Stevenson's refusal to do anything at all about the nomination (

though it is known that he would accept it if offered) and his departure to South America for two months are forcing even his most devoted adherents to give up hope; they are offering their services and their experience to other more active candidates.

Mr Rockefeller, after sounding out opinion all over the country, found the Republican Party organization so solidly behind the Vice-President, Mr Nixon, that he decided that he would do better to devote himself to his duties as Governor of New York State for the next few years and leave the Presidency alone for a time. But he still looks like a potential President and he is still criticizing Mr Nixon and the party regulars, at least indirectly. His departure from the contest has given the Democrats useful ammunition against the Republicans: that the rank and file is given no choice but has had a nominee foisted upon it by the hidebound old guard. On the other hand, now that Mr Nixon is practically sure of the nomination he is freer to say what he thinks and does not have to manœuvre for the support of groups in the party with whom he is not in sympathy. Already he is striking out on an increasingly liberal line of his own, often going farther than Mr Eisenhower in domestic matters.

For instance, it is widely believed that Mr Nixon inspired the new and constructive scheme for protecting the voting rights of Negroes in the South which has just been put forward by his great friend, the Attorney General, after Mr Eisenhower had shown every sign of wanting to keep out of the Congressional debate on this matter. Some legislation on civil rights is almost inevitable this year when both parties will shortly be competing for the Negro votes which can determine the outcome of the election in key Northern cities. That a Civil Rights Act was passed at all in 1957 was due to Mr Lyndon Johnson, the Southerner who manipulates the Democratic majority in the Senate so adroitly, and what happens this year also depends on him. And this year he is a candidate for the Democratic Presidential nomination, with his chance of getting it turning on his ability to gather support outside the South. He will have the votes of most, if not all, of the Southern delegates to the convention which meets in Los Angeles on 11 July. But these are not enough to give him anything approaching the 761 votes, a clear majority, which are needed for the nomination. To collect support elsewhere he must demonstrate that he is a liberal—as indeed he is, in many respects. What better way to do this than by forcing Southern Senators to accept an effective civil rights Bill? But there is always a possibility that it may be undermined in the House of Representatives.

The Democratic convention will never nominate a conserv: although it is unlikely to nominate an extreme liberal either. other middle-of-the-road possibility is Senator Stuart Symı of Missouri, who is famous for being all things to all men, wh from North or South, whether business men or trade unionist has pronounced views on nothing except the defence progra which he criticizes unceasingly from his advantageous pa President Truman's Secretary of State for Air. Both he and Johnson propose to conduct their campaigns for the nomin entirely from the Senate and from the speaker's chair at f raising dinners, refusing to enter any of the primary election these elections voters in sixteen states can either express preference among those of their party's potential nominees wh enter or elect delegates pledged to vote for one of these nomine the convention. Sometimes they can do both.

Candidates who enter these primaries run the risk of b knocked out of the Presidential race completely—as Se Humphrey will be if he is badly defeated in April in Wisco a state which is supposed to be especially favourable to him. Bu primaries also enable candidates to demonstrate that they popular appeal, particularly in parts of the country where the not known. The number of delegates chosen in primary elec is not enough to enable any candidate to obtain a majority of at the convention simply by entering these contests; but dele from other states are encouraged to pledge themselves to a cand who has shown by his success in primary elections that he potential winner.

That is why both Senator Kennedy and Senator Humphre taking the risk of entering primaries; each of them knows tha only hope of the nomination is to show the party officials that h the best chance of getting back the Presidency for the Democrat the moment Senator Kennedy is well ahead of the three—or fo Mr Stevenson is included—other possible Democratic nominee spite of the fact that he is a Roman Catholic; until this year— maybe still this year—this has in practice disqualified a man seeking the Presidency, although there is of course no legal hibition on this religion. But while Mr Kennedy has been org ing his campaign very cleverly his present favourable position s largely from the fact that he has been fighting longer and hard and spending more—than anyone else. From now on it wi more difficult for him to stay ahead.

Apart from Senator Humphrey, a real progressive, Mr Kennedy is the most liberal and the most intellectual of any of the Presidential candidates. But whoever wins the Democratic nomination, and whoever becomes the next President of the United States, whether it is a Democrat or, as at the moment seems most probable, the Republican Mr Nixon, it seems certain that 1961 will see practical results from the growing ferment of imaginative political and economic ideas in the United States. These are bubbling up everywhere, after the long inertia and self-satisfaction of the earlier Eisenhower years; they are especially prevalent in the evidence being given to the Joint Economic Committee and at other Congressional hearings, and in the reports of study groups such as those financed by the Rockefeller Brothers Fund. This spate of new thinking has been stimulated by dissatisfaction with America as it is today: with the failures in space exploration and the educational inadequacies which these have revealed; with the malpractices in the television and advertising industries and the moral slackness from which these spring; and with the economic deficiencies of the United States, its slums, its poverty, its depressed areas in the middle of the general and almost excessive prosperity.

NANCY BALFOUR

Nigeria on the Eve of Independence

WHEN Nigeria becomes independent in October of this year the population of Britain's colonies will be halved. At the same time the United Nations will acquire a new member, thirteenth in population among the nations of the world, fourth among those of the Commonwealth, and first by far of those of Africa. Ghana's independence led the way, and is of vast symbolic significance; but Nigeria's independence could shift the balance of forces in Africa—from Egypt and the North on the one hand and from South, Central, and East Africa on the other, to the African countries of the West where Guinea has already joined Ghana in independence, and where French Togoland and Mali will this year follow the former French Cameroons, which became independent on 1 January.

Nigeria's population of over 35 million could entitle her to speak for a continent. In a world where international affairs are often

spoken of in terms of continents, that should put her in a positioı great influence. Yet, ın spıte of the world-wide interest aroused Ghana's independence, Nigeria's significance is still imperfe(understood. Why?

First, Nigeria is so new. She is a British creation established o sixty years ago. Only recently have any substantial number of people begun to think of themselves as Nigerians rather tl Hausas, Yorubas, Ibos, or any other of the vast number of peoŗ enclosed within Nigeria's 'right-angled' borders, originally dra by Britain, France, and Germany. If Nigerians themselves dıd acclaim their country's significance, others, to whom Nıgerıa \ just another Brıtish colony, could not be expected to recognıze

But if most Nıgerians did not think of themselves as Nıgerıa their internal differences led to the natural assumption that country might not survive as a polıtıcal unit, and would after ın(pendence follow historical pulls. The Muslim provinces of the north have for centuries looked across the Sahara to North Afr and the Middle East, whıle the coastal peoples have had centurıe: contact wıth Christianıty and with European traders—a dıffereı which does not necessarily produce disunity in foreıgn polıcy l reflects real differences in outlook.

Yet the assumption that there are 'two Nigerias' is now most ır leading: and one of the great achievements of the last major C(stitutional Conference, in 1958, between representatıves of Nıge and the British Government was that it emphasized the change tl had come over Nıgerıa even between 1953 and 1958. In 1953 th(was talk, from Northern Nigerian leaders, of secession, and of ducing the central government to a mere agency. In 1958 all parı rivalled each other ın protesting devotion to a united and strc Nigeria; and they joined to produce a Constitution which ıts should be one of the main unifying forces ın independent Nıgeı Nor has anything happened since to show that Nigeria must sı up.

Another reason for the world's failure to recognize Nigeria's ı portance is economic. Nigeria is a very important producer groundnuts, palm produce, cocoa, cotton, tin, timber, banan and rubber; but her production is in no case decisive in wo markets, and Nigeria's income per head, some £25, is much lo\ than that of Ghana or the Congo. So Nigeria's vast political ı portance is not underlined by obvious economic importance (thou as a customer of the United Kingdom, Nigeria holds the place l

population suggests—last year she was the U.K.'s thirteenth most important customer, just as she is the world's thirteenth most populous country).

Another reason for Nigeria's failure to make her due mark on the world is the fact that when dealing with Nigeria foreigners have until recently really been dealing with the British—at any rate below Ministerial level. This situation has changed and is changing rapidly—the appointment of a most excellent Nigerian as Principal of the University College of Nigeria is one sign. But there is a serious shortage of Nigerians for top jobs in government, education, and business. Even the present vast system of training will have to be expanded if Nigeria is to be seen to be independent.

Mr Macmillan's recent visit, the appearance of Nigerian Ministers in splendid robes at international conferences all over the world, constant repetition of the list of African countries to become independent this year, and the calibre of Alhaji Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, who, as a result of the elections held last December, is known to be the man who is to lead Nigeria to independence—these have, to some extent, brought home to a wide circle the imminence and significance of Nigeria's independence. Nevertheless, there is still little realization of the importance of the country and of the part she might play in Africa and the world.

How is Nigeria preparing to play this part? And what are her prospects of unity? Since October 1958, when it was finally agreed that she was to become independent in 1960, the biggest issue facing her politicians—and this is true of any colony—has been in cold storage. So Nigeria's leaders have been able to prepare for independence in a peaceful atmosphere without having to waste their time or stoke up their tempers on controversies with the imperial Power. They have been able, for example, to prepare for representation abroad, and to face the financial implications of independence in a way not open to the leaders of Guinea and the Congo.

But have they also been able, during this breathing space, to prepare politically for independence? The Federal elections of December 1959, which were to produce the Government that is to lead Nigeria to independence, took place after a very long campaign, which produced much bitterness and even some bloodshed. But they resulted in a coalition Government between the governing parties of the Northern and Eastern Regions, with the governing party of the Western Region playing the part of an effective Opposition in the Federal House. The coalition is subject to obvious

stresses and may be difficult to keep together after independe
Nevertheless, it is important that Northern Nigeria's goveri
party is now completely committed to playing its full role in
Government of the Federation, for which it provides the Pr
Minister, while its alliance in the Government with one of the
main Southern parties means that Federal politics do not take
form of a North-South conflict.

Even if it is misleading to see Nigerian politics in terms of su
conflict, however, it is still possible to interpret Nigerian politic
a conflict between Regional, and even tribal, interests, rather t
as a conflict over policies and principles. It is true that the Ac
Group, now in Opposition, though its base is in the West
Region, has members in the Federal Parliament from all tl
Regions, while the N.C.N.C. (National Council of Nigeria and
Cameroons), the Southern party in Alhaji Sir Abubakar Taf
Balewa's Federal coalition, is allied to the Northern Opposi
party, N.E.P.U. (the Northern Elements' Progressive Union),
forms an effective opposition in Western Nigeria. Nevertheless,
election results showed that each of the three main parties is ba
on a 'core' area in one Region, while its opponents are able to m
significant headway only in the peripheral area of that Reg
(Since the Trust Territory of the Cameroons is to be separate
even if temporarily—from Nigeria on 1 October, it is omitted fi
the discussion.)

Although Nigeria's international boundaries are artificial, s
years of British rule, growth of a unified economy and nation-w
institutions, the spread of a transport network serving the wl
country, and wide use of the English language have made
frontiers surprisingly real to those enclosed within them. It is
internal boundaries dividing the country into Regions which ar
many ways less real and more controversial.

Though these boundaries were originally drawn only for
ministrative convenience, subsequent political development
produced a rigid federal system in which these Regions are 'stat
There must be considerable devolution in a country so big,
with such poor communications, as Nigeria, and 'residual pow
now reside in the Regions. The Federal Government is respons
for a fixed list of matters, while in some matters responsibilit
shared between the Federal and Regional Governments.
Federal sphere includes defence, external affairs, ultimate respo
bility for internal security, major economic developments, railw

airways, postal services, and communications. Social services, and matters such as local roads and agriculture, are, therefore, left to the Regional Governments. So for most Nigerians the Government which deals with matters affecting their daily lives most closely is their Regional Government. All three Regions are already 'self-governing' and have a full ministerial system with Houses of Assembly and Chiefs. The Governors are virtually figureheads. Thus, well before the Federal Government becomes independent, Nigerians are experiencing self-government in things affecting their daily lives.

Actual, or alleged, experience of the policies of Regional Governments produced a major controversy which clearly had to be settled before Federal independence. In each Region the 'core' area tends both to be the home of a tribe (though, for groups numbering many millions, 'nation' is a better word) greatly outnumbering the peripheral area with its multitude of smaller tribes, and to be richer than that area. So some leaders of the minority tribes in each Region began warning their people of the possibility of discrimination against them by the major tribes when Nigeria became entirely independent. In each Region a clearly defined movement arose demanding that the minority areas should be separated to form new regions (though the areas were never clearly defined).

Finally, in September 1957, the Secretary of State appointed a powerful Commission, under Sir Henry Willink, to examine this issue.

The report of the Willink Commission[1] is one of the most important documents in Nigerian history, and the Constitution agreed upon in October 1958, which is in most respects the Constitution for independent Nigeria, owes a great deal to it. The report was designed to meet the fears of the minorities, without creating new regions, and it ensured that Nigeria becomes independent with an 'entrenched' Federal system.

It was clear to the Commission that creation of new regions could only produce more problems than it solved. You cannot, in Nigeria, draw new regional boundaries, separating minorities from majorities in existing Regions, without creating new minorities—the Commission pointed out that if, for example, a new 'Mid-West' state were created within the Western Region, there would be 'dismay as well as rejoicing'. And though many minority leaders honestly

[1] *Report of the Commission appointed to enquire into the fears of minorities and the means of allaying them* (London, H.M.S.O., Cmnd. 505 of 1958).

believed that their areas were exploited for the benefit of
majority tribes, the Commission found that the opposite was of
true. In any case, any new region whose boundaries correspond
at all closely to an area where there was support for it could not sta
on its own feet. Instead, to meet the fears of the minorities—wh
the Commission admitted to be genuine, widespread, and not ba
less—their report recommended constitutional safeguards.

Recognizing that some minority areas were neglected—thou
this grievance was baseless in most areas—the Commission said
answer was not to separate these from Regions which could h
them, but to establish development authorities for them—
Niger Delta was the area suggested for one such authority, now
ing established, in which the Federal Government as well as t
Regional Governments will co-operate. The Commission also
commended that certain areas—Edo-speaking districts in West
Nigeria and Calabar province in the East—should be designat
'minority areas', with councils to report on their affairs to b
Federal and Regional legislatures.

To allay the specific fears of non-Muslims in the North
Region the Commission made recommendations about courts, th
also dealt with control of prisons, conduct of elections, and ma
other matters. Above all, there was a suggested list of 'fundamen
rights' to be included in the Constitution (ranging from the rig
to respect for private correspondence to the right to life itse
which has probably set a precedent for other colonial Constitution
Almost all the Willink Report's recommendations have been, or
being, included in the Nigerian Constitution.

The Commission declared that it is the individual who matte
not the group; they wanted to create conditions where it would
'votes that will win fair treatment for minorities'; so they did
accept the principle that a recognizable ethnic group must form
political unit, or for ever have a claim to its land. After indepe
dence, the Commission suggested, the Federal Governmen
prestige would grow, so that it could discharge the responsibility
arbitrator between Nigerians. Moreover—though not everybo
would agree—the Commission considered tribalism to be a dyi
force, which no Constitution should encourage.

The 1958 Constitutional Conference, in spite of strong minor
protests, finally agreed with the Commission. There is an arrang
ment under which new regions *can* be created: but this is so co
plicated that it makes certain that no snap decision can alter regio

boundaries, and it might prove difficult to make a change even when generally agreed to be desirable—though no Regional Government can now veto a change in its own Region. Any area for which a change is proposed would have to hold a referendum, and a two-thirds majority in the Federal legislature and a majority of Regional Houses would have to support the change—majorities which the present coalition Government is in a position to secure if it wished to risk its unity on anything so controversial. Any other amendment to the Constitution would require a two-thirds majority in the Federal legislature and support of a majority of Regional Houses, so that all the safeguards for minorities are 'entrenched'.

Control of the Federal Police Force, whose tribal composition is a constant concern of Nigerian politicians, will after independence be a key political issue. The 1958 Constitutional Conference, following the Minorities Commission's recommendations, agreed on arrangements which appeared to suit everybody—even those who feared, particularly in view of the danger of 'strong-arm' politics in Nigeria, that the Force might lose its independence to politicians. The Force is to be unified and independent, under the control, for administration, of a Police Council on which representatives of both Regional and Federal Governments sit, though ultimate responsibility lies with the Federal Government. For operational use the head of the force, the Inspector-General, is responsible, though, once again, the Federal Government is ultimately responsible. There is also a Police Service Commission to ensure that recruitment, appointment, promotion, transfers, and discipline are kept free of political control.

What of relations between Regional Governments and senior police officers in actual operations? Regional Commissioners in operational matters and tactical dispositions are now responsible to the Inspector-General; but in day-to-day disposition and operational control of the police in a Region, including tactical dispositions, the Regional Police Commissioner is expected to carry out the Regional Government's requirements, subject to overriding Federal authority. If the Commissioner is unable to meet its wishes the Regional Government can appeal to the Federal Government.

Obviously, relations between the Prime Ministers and Regional Premiers could create difficulties; but, as was the case with the Minorities Commission, one must assume that the first concern of Nigeria's leaders will be law and order. If it is not, they could bungle any arrangement.

In addition to the Nigeria Police there are Native Administrat police (in the North) and local government police (in the We since the Federal Government pays the Nigeria Police, any Reg which enlarges its own forces will have to meet the bill. The 1 Conference, however, decided that local forces should be gradu absorbed into the Nigeria Police—at present, perhaps, little m than a pious aspiration, but an important one in view of fears ab possible political use of these forces.

The 1958 Conference did not discuss local responsibility for and order—who, if anybody, replaces District Officers or th equivalent after independence, and to whom are the police to lo locally for guidance? But the Conference noted that Nigeria 'under-policed' and it is clear that the army, whose use after in pendence will be chiefly the Prime Minister's concern, will have important role in internal security in independent Nigeria. paper the Constitution of independent Nigeria will be the citize Magna Carta. There will be an independent non-political po force, a judiciary (including many Native Court judges) appoin by independent Judicial Service Commissions, civil servi with independent Public Service Commissions, right of app through to the Privy Council on all but minor matters, a libe citizenship law, and 'entrenched' provisions in the Constitut to fix the life of the legislature and regulate general elections, make compensation obligatory for property compulsorily acquir and to protect the offices of Director of Audit and Director of Pul Prosecutions.

Such a Constitution, indeed, or the courts which interpret might come to be considered the sovereign power in Nigeria, cause the process of amending will be so complex that only a pa with nation-wide power, of a kind which seems unlikely for ma years, or a very firm coalition, could use it. Indeed the only impo ant subject not included in the present Constitution, or decided the 1958 Conference, is appointment of Regional Governors a their status after independence. This will be one of the subjects discussion at next May's conference, the last between the U Government and Nigerian leaders on the transfer of British pow

Did the 1958 Conference tie things up too tightly? There 'saving clauses' to make many 'fundamental rights' inapplica except when the Government concerned agrees, and there are ot ways of making them meaningless. But lawyer-politicians mi constantly have recourse to the courts to challenge legislation

the ground that it infringes fundamental rights—for example, restrictions on freedom to propagate religious or political views can only be such as are 'reasonably justifiable in a democratic society'.

Did the Conference 'entrench' too many clauses? The Fiscal Commission, for example, whose chief concern was allocation of revenue between the Federal and Regional Governments, suggested that their recommendations, accepted by the Conference, should be reviewed after five years; but provisions for revenue allocation are now 'entrenched' in the Constitution, and it may be very difficult to modify them, even in the light of five years' experience. The same applies to division of the functions between the Federation and the Regions. Details of administrative practice are also involved, and lawyers could challenge certain minor measures on the ground that they involve constitutional amendment.

Yet the Constitution with which Nigeria becomes independent is not, as was that of Ghana and as will probably be that of the Congo, one hastily devised to meet an urgent situation. It has been most carefully worked out in full agreement between Nigerian leaders and the British Government in a series of Constitutional Conferences that actually began in 1953. While in Ghana 'entrenchment' has proved illusory in face of political aspirations, the Constitution with which Nigeria begins independence may serve her for many years.

DAVID WILLIAMS

Religion and Authority in Modern Burma

STUDENTS of Western politics too readily suppose that the bas
assumptions about life which govern political behaviour in oth
parts of the world are identical or similar to our own. This ca
easily lead to incorrect comparisons between apparently simil
situations arising out of different causes and to false expectations
similar results from apparently similar causes. Since religion is o
of the most immediately available products of a people's bas
assumptions about the meaning of life, it may be well to ask wheth
religions different from those we know well in the West play ar
part in shaping the political behaviour and attitudes of the natio
and cultures which profess them. Burma has just returned to pow
the 'Clean' wing of the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom Leag
(A.F.P.F.L.) led by U Nu and this party is committed to makı
Buddhism the official State religion of the country. We may he
then have a useful field of preliminary inquiry.

Since attaining her independence, Burma, perhaps more th
Ceylon, Thailand, or other neighbours, has consistently and in
sincerity offered her form of Buddhism as a way of life compatib
with the stated aims and ideals of the United Nations. She wou
claim that the saintly aura thrown over the Land of Gold by t
Sixth Buddhist Council of 1956 has enhanced the dignity
Theravāda, or Southern Buddhism, and reaffirmed, against certa
tides of scholarly opinion, this form's right to be considered as t
original and pure teaching of the Enlightened One. The student
politics, however, may well wonder how such a Way—can one,
the texts alone be studied, even call it a religion?—conforms wi
daily behaviour in a country whose history has always been so ve
turbulent. He must, then, first inquire into the precise nature of t
relations between 'Church' and 'State' in such a country; next in
concepts of leadership, authority, and power which play a part
determining the structure of government and the relations betwe
ruler and ruled. He may, from the first, be led to expect that the
are two alternative paths open to the successful Burman: one leadı
to retirement after acceptance of the doctrine of suffering a
impermanence inherent in the minutest details of daily life, t
other leading into the very thick of the battle. But he will th
wonder which of these paths is ultimately preferred and will have

inquire into what factors within, or perhaps outside of, Buddhism can be held to justify the second course of action.

Both in and out of Burma, the closest possible relation has always been said to exist between religion and culture, so close that to be a Burman is virtually to be a Buddhist and that, for most practical purposes, Buddhism has always been a State religion. From early times, the monkhood or *Sangha* has always been the institution which could most conveniently influence the policy of the autocratic kings: monks to whom even the king had to bow are known, in history, to have intervened on the side of the oppressed and to have diverted royalty from feats of arms to feats of architecture, scholarship, and husbandry; primarily a teacher, the Burmese monk, until British times, taught every male child in the kingdom between the ages of six and thirteen and advised him, as well as his wife, in all matters until his dying day.

At the same time, the monkhood has always been vulnerable in certain respects quite unknown to Western clergies. Burmese Buddhism, it must be clearly stressed, has no Church: each monastery is, in the last resort, an independent entity, and any association of monks or monasteries along sectarian or affinitive lines has always for various reasons—even under the rule of 'archbishops' in royal times—been very tenuous. Further, while lands were granted for the upkeep of famous pagodas, monasteries on the whole have always depended on donations from the faithful, either in the course of the daily round of food collecting or in gifts of one sort or another at public and private festivals. Thus no monastic 'treasure' could ever be consistently amassed against hard times by the order as a whole, even assuming that this had been permitted by the Book of Discipline. Leaving aside considerations from the higher doctrine of *Abhidhamma*—in which the constant effort to produce the volition to give is a protection against volitions of greed and hate and a necessary condition for the arising of a higher consciousness leading to deliverance—the necessity to keep the average donor happy in the broadest sense of the term cannot but have led to very conservative attitudes on the part of most members of the monkhood and to have favoured, under the old regime, a traditional rather than a progressive type of culture.

When the British abstained from backing the monks and when lay education gradually supplanted the monastic schools, the basic educational function of the monks was gravely undermined. In essence, the monkhood had never been a career—it can be and is

entered and left more or less at will; now the sole career-like elem
was gone, leaving only devotion. Ecclesiastical history is not rich
data on social class, but it may be that this gravely affected the
cruitment of ambitious well-born men: at any rate, the pres
monkhood comes largely from the villages, in contrast to the m
sophisticated origins of many military, professional, and, especial
administrative people. The role of the monks in the national
agitations of the 1930s can be seen as a last effort to retain their for
al educational influence over the people by associating themsel
with the dawn of a new independent history. At the same time
movement towards lay control of religious affairs, involving
times their political manipulation, criticized the monks for p
ticipating in politics, demanded their return to the higher spheres
devotional activity, and introduced selective criteria into the do
tion pattern (giving to 'good' monks only), whereas in the old d
the yellow robe received and not the man who wore it. The gr
respect which the Burmese still show to their monks can at any ti
isolate the latter from the worldly life, and the splendid individu
ism shown by some ecclesiastics has never been strong enough
break the control exercised by lay leaders in the absence of a
organized church.

It is a convention in Burmese history that the ruler should sh
his fitness to rule by, *inter alia*, being the protector and purifier
the religion. This theme runs from Anawratha's 'destruction' of t
Tantric '*Ari*' monks and his establishment of 'pure' *Theravā*
in the eleventh-century city of Pagan to the holding of the Six
Buddhist Council by the post-independence Government
Rangoon. That this protection and purification always to so
degree implies control was shown, in history, by royal selection
household tutors for the 'archbishoprics' and, in the late 1940s a
early 1950s, by the formation of a Ministry of Religious Affa
whose main aim was the purification of the monkhood through t
establishment of efficient ecclesiastical courts and a *Sangha* parl
ment. These measures are still uncompleted owing to the stro
opposition of monks to any form of registration, and the ecclesias
cal history of the last twelve years or so is largely to be understo
in terms of this conflict.

The rapidity with which monkish groups form and dissol
together with a confusing tendency to adopt similar or identi
names and to get along, in most cases, with the most rudimenta
forms of organization, makes it very hard for an observer to s

out this recent history. Broadly speaking there are two, sometimes conflicting, claims on the modern monk. The first is that of sect. Sects in Burma arise frequently as groups of students around a particularly gifted teacher, but, in most cases, they disintegrate at, or soon after, his death. Today something like two-thirds of the monks belong to the *Thudhamma* sect, the other two main sects being the *Shwegyin* and the *Dwaya*. For practical purposes, the two latter sects may be described as stricter disciplinarians than the rest; they attempt to keep to themselves and to stay outside all politics and governmental control. The *Shwegyin*, in particular, has the nearest thing to a church organization in the country. The other claim is that of political allegiance. This has become a little clearer with the split of the monolithic Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League (A.F.P.F.L.) into two parties, known as the 'Clean' and the 'Stable', in April 1958, and it is within *Thudhamma* that party allegiance seems most clearly marked. Roughly, this sect is divided into one small but highly organized group, with headquarters in Mandalay, which favours the Stable, and a majority group of a very heterogeneous nature which, more or less passively, favours the Clean. While the majority at first favoured the A.F.P.F.L.'s plans, they were thrown not so much into opposition as into passive resistance by the minority group's strong stand in favour of that policy

Further complications arose, in the matter of ecclesiastical courts, from the necessity to satisfy *Shwegyin* and *Dwaya* independence and, in this, the latter sects seem to have sided at times with the minority *Thudhamma* against the vested interests in the courts of the majority *Thudhamma* group. This first set of courts is now almost redundant, and the Amendment Act courts allow freer scope to individual monks in the choice of judges for the various parties involved. It is to be noted that the minority *Thudhamma* group, whose origins go back to nationalist times, does not call itself a sect and represents a new departure in Burmese ecclesiastical organization. But this very departure, in that the group is modelled somewhat along the lines of a political party, only serves to show that the *Sangha*, far from being a force on its own, has chosen to follow the major political divisions of lay activity. Thus, in the last resort, formal political control rests with the lay authorities whatever informal advice or even pressure—frequently involving anti-political sentiments—may be brought by individual monk advisers on their disciples and followers.

This trend has been strengthened by recent tendencies 'guided democracy' under the efficient Army government, intı duced in September 1958, with which, significantly enough, t minority *Thudhamma* group has had strong connections. In effe the Army has, in its own way, taken on the role of protector a purifier by replacing the previous Government's religious activ by its own. This has taken the form of a very active campaign for t defence of Buddhism against the menace of Communism whı stressed, at one and the same time, the old Government's laxity dealing with insurgents and the religious 'virtue' of the prese leaders. The fact that the internal Communist menace had nev been weaker than at the time of this campaign also shows, perha how strong the religious 'virtue' of the Clean party was held to l Whatever parties hold power in the future, one may venture guess that lay control of the monkhood will continue even while sanction will long be sought as part of the 'myth' of protection a purification.

We have now seen that a leader must preserve the appearance being a good Buddhist, and this he does, primarily, by obtaining t sanction of the highest type of person in the community: the mor It must be noted, in passing, that any suggestion of monastic d unity (real differences of doctrine amongst sects, party allegianc etc.) is strongly discountenanced. The leader himself, howev does not retire from the world. Recent observers in Burma, bc Burmese and foreign, have been struck by the survival there of c autocratic concepts of authority in which leadership is sought f its own sake, for the status, prestige, and favour-granting pow that it brings. It is very hard indeed to find any real difference domestic policy among the various political parties, and the co flicts which abound in Burmese politics are almost always of personal nature.

Psychologists have recently offered explanations of the Burme desire for 'individual autonomy' in terms of the insecurity abo social relations which they inherit from their childhood upbringır Political scientists have commented very acutely upon the tv alternating aspects of Burmese behaviour—gentleness and violen —and the reluctance of the Burmese to undertake responsibility ıf should lead them into the danger of provoking other people, wi consequent emphasis on intentions rather than deeds, the will power as a means of placing oneself above controversy and strugg and a rather authoritarian conservatism of outlook once an in

vidual has 'arrived'. Here we might ask whether any religious factors, foreign, one may be tempted to think, to Buddhism, influence the emergence of this fight for power. In this context, the theme of protection and purification must again be invoked as a pivotal one. For the fact is that danger to authority does not come so much from a 'church' but rather from certain tendencies in Burmese religion which favour the acquisition of power as a good, both spiritual and temporal. The very factors which make authority so desirable also constantly endanger it. The hallmark of a leader is his defence of something he cannot afford not to defend. This must be clarified with reference to some hitherto little-discussed aspects of Burmese religious life.

Previous attempts to define the nature of Burmese religion have been bedevilled by the use of two terms: 'animism' and 'Buddhism'. On the one hand, textual scholars saw Burmese religion as a 'pure' Buddhism hampered at every turn by animistic practices of partly local, partly Hindu origin. Missionaries and early ethnographers, in contact with village life, were tempted to reduce Buddhism's role in Burmese life to that of a mere gloss or veneer covering a host of primitive and, perhaps, not very wholesome practices. In effect, if only village and monastic life be studied, there appears to be an inexplicable gap between the worship of a host of varied spirits on the one hand and the practice of an austere, godless, self-renouncing philosophy or way of life on the other. Beyond recognizing that the 'animistic' aspects of some Buddhist rituals could be traced back, by comparison with the present Hill tribe customs of Northern Burma, to Burmese tribal origins, the early ethnographers were left with these two very different systems and no clear idea of their relation to Burmese life as a whole.

Now there is, in Burma, just under the surface of daily life, a whole world of attitudes and practices which fills that gap: the world of the *gaings*. The word *gaing* denotes an ecclesiastical sect, but, in common parlance, it designates a group of people—usually a teacher and his disciples—whose manipulation of various magical techniques associated with alchemy, *mantras*, medicine, and cabbalistic signs leads them to acquire, in step-by-step, hierarchical degrees, ever more refined states of material power over animate and inanimate nature and the supernatural. As with the *Sangha*, there is the greatest possible tenuousness in the history of particular *gaings*, but at any given moment there may be, throughout the country, both in town and village, a hundred or so of these groups,

some with memberships of thousands, including very many of tl leading politicians in the land.

As in all such matters, the difference between black and whi magic may depend on the position in the hierarchy of your differe interlocutors but, in spite of this, there is a generally recogniz hierarchy both of *gaing* and of powers, divided into three paths ways: lower, middle, and higher. The higher your informant is the hierarchy, the more likely he is to tell you that the following any path depends not so much on whether you are a good or b person as on how many rules of abstinence you feel yourself able undertake. While the relatively uninitiated are drowned in an oce of conflicts between various human beings and spirits all trying control each other (the world of animism), the initiated will, l more and more abstinences, climb towards the higher existence very long or even eternal life in which he may reach the highest gc of the *gaing* member: seeing and hearing the future Budd Maitreya and reaching *Nirvāna* by means of his sermons. While tl messianic Buddhism satisfies most of the high initiates, a few will further still and by yet further exertions will reach the world Buddhism proper where *Nirvāna* attained in this life or in on another few lives puts an end to all conflict and activity for ever.

When it is remembered that the ancient kings frequently assum themselves to be the future Buddha, the role of the leader final becomes clear: by protecting and purifying the religion while he in authority, he is in fact preparing his own coming into the highe state of all. Thus the old tradition whereby the 'great man' becan either a king or a Buddha here finds a resolution which allows temporal power as a preparation for spiritual dominion and, l the same token, allows us to place 'animism' and 'Buddhism' their right perspective as two poles of a continuum which is Burr ese religion. It remains perhaps to be added that the heavy supe natural penalties incurred by those who break their vows of absti ence act as a brake on the more immodest claims of honest peopl though they would not, of course, prevent the rise of a considerab number of charlatans.

While there is no exact correspondence between social class ar position in the hierarchy, it can be expected that the vast majori of the Burmese agricultural population will take a worm's-eye vie of the whole and be so blinded by the conflict at the base of tl pyramid that it will tend to worship the leader at its apex rather th try to emulate his achievements. Indeed, the political scienti

might say that, in a society where social class is so hard to define, the fight for power as a means of destroying status insecurity and rising above all conflicts is very clearly reflected in these religious attitudes. There is here, as in other aspects of Burmese life, a tendency to seek protective subservience to a master (a diluted form of power) if one cannot make the top grade for oneself. The remarkable fact is that there are still, all over Burma, future kings and messiahs (these notions are very mixed up at the popular level) with courts of attendants waiting upon them daily until such time as they will mount the throne of the Land of Gold on earth or in heaven (this again is never too clear) and shower blessings and gifts on their devotees. Some live in high rooms, surrounded by all the traditional regalia of Burmese royalty, watched over by a host of benevolent and malevolent spirits which they have brought to book, never touching the ground and, at all times, the subject of detailed and elaborate cults. While a great deal of this leads to nothing more than charities and good works—mainly the building of shrines and pagodas—it does at times dramatically impinge on practical politics. Seen in its correct perspective, the great Saya San rebellion in 1931 was a messianic movement of this nature. Beyond this, the whole ideology of the *gaings*, with its stress on control of power, permeates the life of all Burmese to some degree or other and countless soldiers, lawyers, civil servants, government officials, and business men model their lives and decisions on the teachings of their *gaing* masters, alive or . . . dead since, in matters of the spirit, the death of one body is hardly ever conclusive.

The casual observer will see none of this, for the Burmese have an unnecessary sense of shame in regard to possible Western accusations of superstition and impurity. The fact remains that Buddhism, as understood in the texts, is not so much the religion of Burma as the religion to which she aspires. Pure *Theravāda* is so difficult that only the very few can hope to follow it. For the mass of people for whom today alone counts, some form of a more practical religious behaviour is necessary. No amount of Burmese denial of *Mahāyāna* can hide the fact that the principles on which *Mahāyāna* are based survive in Burma today: perhaps the various forms of *Mahāyāna* and Tantrism, not so much destroyed by the old kings as relegated to jungle and forest, are the very ancestors of the present-day *gaings*.

Secrecy in the world of the *gaings* may well be preserved for the same reasons as it is preserved in the world of politics: the manipulation and withholding of political information which makes the

Burmese scene so opaque is a very strong means of keeping pow to oneself and avoiding the attacks of others. Yet, as in the *Sangh* where the claiming of any sort of spiritual power is a very delica matter indeed, there is some modesty in this secrecy: those wl wait for Maitreya are those who do not feel up to the prodigio efforts involved in obtaining *Nirvāna* in one life. Thus there is roo for something higher yet than anything the *gaing* can provide.

It remains to be asked why the sanction of the *Sangha*—a bo with so little formal power—is nevertheless so much valued Burmese society. As long as one remains in the world of the *gai* involvement in the world and rejection of the world are two sides one medal. But definitive retirement may win in the end and with Buddhism as the Burmese conceive it. The leader, thrown up o of conflict to his eminent position and constantly threatened l potentially stronger contenders, as in the days of the warri princes, must protect and purify Buddhism to justify his own ru and, let it be said, the rule of the Burmese over the 'pagans' ai 'animists' in their own midst. As protector of the religion he mu whatever the political realities may be, emulate the ancient go like kings in obtaining the sanction of the élite, the living symbols aspiration clothed in the yellow robe. If he wishes to go still furth on the path, he can, with honour, retire into that robe and devo himself, with added respect and prestige, to the attainment of t highest goal. He can also, in the same way, turn defeat into triump Here the respect which the Burmese pay to their monks comes in its own, for if it is true to say that the aim of the Burmese is some ki of unfettered power, placing him above all criticism and attack, cor bined with the highest honour, then, in the things which matt most, the monk is retained and strengthened in his position as t living symbol of that aim. In this society the worldly life is still pr foundly influenced by the ideals of those who have left it. The cu tom whereby all male children still spend some little time in t order, together with popular attitudes towards the monkhood—t *Sangha*, with the Law (*Dhamma*) and the Buddha, forms part the Three Jewels and Refuges—leaves us in no doubt as to where t highest values are thought to lie. For, when all is said and done, the remains a path to still the hearts of men as it has stilled them f ages in that turbulent country.

E. MICHAEL MENDELSON

Mr Macmillan in Africa

DURING January and February 1960 Mr Macmillan spent five days in Ghana (6–11 January), seven days in Nigeria (11–18 January), nine days in the Central African Federation (18–27 January), and ten days in the Union of South Africa (27 January–6 February). In each of the four regions he delivered a prepared speech on a public occasion and answered questions at a press conference. In Ghana he visited the Volta Development area in company with Dr Nkrumah, and was allowed the opportunity of a private conference with Opposition leaders. Meanwhile the populace showed little interest and much of the Ghanaian press was hostile. In the wider spaces of Nigeria Mr Macmillan visited the three regions as well as the central government; his public statements aroused world-wide interest Nigeria seems to have been the region in which he received the most cordial popular reception. From Lagos he went to Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia, and Nyasaland where, as was expected, his reception was mixed. There were reports of white truculence at Lusaka and, at Blantyre, an African crowd rioted in view of the building where Mr Macmillan was being welcomed as an official guest. In the two northern territories, but not in Southern Rhodesia, he met African nationalist leaders.

The rising public interest in his tour, not only in Africa but throughout the politically informed world, was focused upon the speech he was expected to make before a joint session of both Houses of the South African Parliament in the last days of his visit. He went first to Pretoria where he renewed the pledge given by earlier British Governments to the peoples of the High Commission Territories; then to Johannesburg where he met many persons representative of the nation's life, including European (but not African) liberals. On 4 February he made the speech at Cape Town which summed up his views upon the African problem in general. He left Cape Town by sea on 6 February.

The following extracts are taken from press reports of Mr Macmillan's public speeches and of the reactions to them.

At the State banquet in Ghana on 9 January Mr Macmillan spoke in general terms about 'the wind of change blowing through Africa'. 'We have been impressed,' he said, 'by the speed and efficiency with which your new nation-state is progressing. We—all of us in Britain—are delighted at the flourishing state of Ghana's economy and the prospects of further investment and development,' but capital, he

C

said, would flow to those countries which, in themselves, wer economically sound and to those countries creating confidence i their political efficiency and stability. 'How immensely valuable it i to have African states as members of the Commonwealth,' he con cluded. 'If we cannot co-operate, but sit down in opposite camp shouting slogans at each other, we shall all suffer grievous harm

Dr Nkrumah spoke with some show of moderation: 'We know he said, 'that some of the older nations were willing members c the Commonwealth and we appreciate the historic nature of tha institution. To us the Commonwealth is a modern, flexible, an adaptable institution.'

While stating plainly that his major preoccupation was to liber ate the African continent from colonialism he hoped that it would b possible 'to formulate policies and programmes within the Com monwealth context'. Commentators noted that a complimentar allusion to the Queen which appeared in the printed version of D Nkrumah's speech was omitted from the speech as delivered D Nkrumah later explained to the press that it had been omitted b error.[1]

At his press conference in Accra (10 January) Mr Macmillai assured questioners that the French atomic tests in the Sahara wer no threat to public health in Ghana, that the Prime Minister o Nigeria would not be invited to the Commonwealth Conference i May, that complete agreement had been reached with Dr Nkrumal on the next steps to be taken in the Volta Development scheme, anc that the constitutional changes proposed in Ghana need not raise Commonwealth difficulties.[2]

In Lagos, on 13 January, what was said by the Federal Prime Minister, Sir Abubakar Balewa, was even more significant than wha was said by Mr Macmillan. Twice in the day Sir Abubakar repu diated any suggestion that his country would adhere to any 'Unitec States of Africa'. Nigeria had no intention of giving up her promisec sovereign status and would take warning from countries where 'after a few years of parliamentary democracy there has been a com plete breakdown and power has been seized by one section of the community'. Mr Macmillan, in his speech before the Assembly, re ferred with pride to the work of Lord Lugard and the other pioneers He said that Britain 'was no longer a great colonial power but the senior member of a great commonwealth. As such she felt the pulse

[1] *Daily Telegraph*, 11 January 1960; *Sunday Times*, 10 January 1960.
[2] *Daily Telegraph*, 11 January 1960.

of Africa, Asia, the Antipodes, and America, and had close links with these parts of the world.'[1] At a press conference in the evening, when questioned about Central Africa, he gave a reply that was quoted, sometimes inaccurately, all over the world.

> The Government of the United Kingdom have made it clear—abundantly clear—that we will not remove the protection of the British Government to either of the northern territories—Northern Rhodesia or Nyasaland—until it is clear that the expressed wish of these peoples is to enter into a full and independent federation.[2]

On his last day in Nigeria, where the welcome had been warm, the *Lagos Times* fired a parting shot: 'Your government's policy in East, Central, and South Africa is wrong... Now you are off to the other Africa where Europeans and Africans are not allowed to dine, wine, and shake hands together.'[3]

In Salisbury on 19 January he was challenged by Sir Roy Welensky, who said: '... the terms of reference of the Monckton Commission were agreed to by our two Governments. They will be honoured to the full by the Federal Government [of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland]. Now it is alleged that the Prime Minister said while in Lagos that the people of the two northern protectorates... would have to decide whether or not they would stay in the Federation.' Mr Macmillan explained, in a speech, described by *The Times* (20 January) as a 'masterpiece of non-commitment', that his words at Lagos had been misquoted: he had merely repeated what he had said in the House of Commons on 22 July 1959.

At Lusaka, in Northern Rhodesia, Mr Macmillan conferred on 21 January with African members of the United National Independence Party, one of them newly released from detention. When speaking at a civic luncheon he appealed to Africans to give up the barren policy of non-co-operation and to Europeans 'to make the multi-racial society a success'. The Africans, however, made no move to withdraw their resolution to boycott the Monckton Commission, and the Mayor, in replying to the speech, used language which some critics regarded as discourteous. He complained of 'the plague of fact-finding tours culminating in the daddy of them all, the Monckton Commission'.[4]

The visit to Nyasaland (25–26 January), where a riot took place at Blantyre, produced no new statement of policy. Mr Macmillan re-

[1] *Guardian*, 14 January 1960.
[2] Verbatim report in *The Times*, 20 January 1960.
[3] Quoted in *Daily Telegraph*, 19 January 1960.
[4] *Daily Telegraph*, 22 January 1960

minded his hearers that 'advance must come in a peaceful way a
not by violence' and that 'we cannot live by eating votes or cons
tutions.'[1]

At Pretoria on 27 January he twice renewed the pledges given
the High Commission Territories of Bechuanaland, Basutolan
and Swaziland, first to a deputation of Bechuanas and later to
press conference, recalling the promise of Sir Winston Churchill
1950 'not to transfer these territories until their inhabitants ha
been consulted and until the United Kingdom has had an oppo
tunity of expressing its view'. On his way south from Johannesbu
he stopped for a few hours in Basutoland to confer with the leade
of a territory now taking the first steps in self-government. He ma
no public statement.

He arrived on 1 February at Cape Town where he was met
the Prime Minister, Dr Verwoerd. On 3 February he addressed
meeting of both Houses of Parliament. The reports of the speech
the London newspapers of 4 February 1960 vary a little in substanc

After some opening remarks of compliment and courtesy, M
Macmillan spoke of the immense material progress of South Afric
reminding his audience that 'much of it has been financed by Briti
capital'.

> According to a recent survey made by the Union Government, nea
> two-thirds of oversea investment outstanding in the Union at the end
> 1956 was British. . . We have developed trade between us to our com
> mon advantage, and our economies are now largely interdependent.
> We take a third of all your exports and we supply a third of all yo
> imports. . . Britain has always been your best customer and . . . we belie
> we can be your best partners too.

He then recalled South Africa's part in the World Wars a
alluded to her present co-operation with such bodies as the Unit
Nations Economic Commission for Africa. 'I understand and sym
pathize,' he said, with the 'deep preoccupation with what is happe
ing in the rest of the continent, with your interest in these even
and your anxiety about them. . . In the twentieth century . . .
have seen the awakening of consciousness in peoples who have
centuries lived in dependence on some other power. . . The mo
striking of all the impressions I have formed since I left London is
the strength of this African national consciousness.' He then r
peated the phrase he had used at Accra: 'The wind of change
blowing through the continent.'

[1] *The Times*, 27 January 1960.

Turning to world politics he described the three groups into which the world is divided.

As I see it, the great issue . . . is whether the uncommitted peoples of Asia and Africa will swing to the east or to the west [*sic*]. . . It is the basic principle for our modern Commonwealth that we respect each other's sovereignty in matters of internal policy. At the same time, we must recognize that, in this shrinking world in which we live today, the internal policies of one nation may have effects outside it. We may sometimes be tempted to say to each other, 'Mind your own business.' But in these days I would expand the old saying so that it runs, 'Mind your own business, but mind how it affects my business, too.' Let me be very frank with you, my friends. What Governments and Parliaments in the United Kingdom have done since the war in according independence to India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Malaya, and Ghana, and what they will do for Nigeria and the other countries now nearing independence—all this, though we take full and sole responsibility for it, we do in the belief that it is the only way to establish the future of the Commonwealth and of the free world on sound foundations.

. . . What we do today in West, Central, and East Africa becomes known to everyone in the Union, whatever his language, colour, or tradition. . . I am sure you will agree that in our own areas of responsibility we must each do what we think right. . .

In countries inhabited by several different races, it has been our aim to find the means by which the community can become more of a community, and fellowship can be fostered between its various parts. This problem is by no means confined to Africa, nor is it always the problem of the European minority.

He then spoke of Malaya as another type of multi-racial State, and quoted what Mr Selwyn Lloyd had said in the United Nations Assembly on 17 September 1959: 'Our policy is non-racial. We reject the idea of any inherent superiority of one race over another.'

I have thought you would wish me to state plainly and with full candour the policy for which we in Britain stand. . . As a fellow member of the Commonwealth, it is our earnest desire to give South Africa our support and encouragement but I hope you won't mind my saying frankly that there are some aspects of your policies which make it impossible for us to do this without being false to our own deep convictions about the political destinies of free men.

Mr Macmillan then turned aside to refer to his own Scottish and American ancestry. As a Scot he could claim family connection with a country where there had been eminent Scottish pioneers; as partly American he could appreciate the troubles of a population which 'like yours is a blend of many different strains'. He spoke on American isolationism, a policy which had been abandoned since 'no

country, not even the greatest, can live for itself alone.' At this poi
he boldly quoted Donne on isolation: 'Send not to ask for whom th
bell tolls It tolls for thee.' This passage in the speech, which un
expectedly received some faint applause, was not printed by *Th
Times* or by the *Guardian*.

'I think nothing but good,' he said, 'can come out of extendin
contacts between individuals, contacts in trade, and from the ex
change of visitors.' After a reference to Russia, he said:

> I certainly do not believe in refusing to trade with people just becau
> you dislike the way they manage their internal affairs at home. Boycot
> will never get you anywhere. Here I would like to say in parenthesis th
> I deprecate attempts which are being made in Britain today to organi
> a consumer boycott of South African goods. It has never been the practi
> of any Government in the United Kingdom, including a Labour Govern
> ment, to undertake or support campaigns of this kind designed to influ
> ence the internal policies of another Commonwealth country...
>
> These differences may be transitory .. Those of us who, by the gra
> of the electorate, are temporarily in charge of affairs in my country, ar
> in yours, have no right to sweep aside on this account the friendship th
> exists between our two countries ... in another fifty years we shall loo
> back on the differences that exist between us now as matters of historic
> interest.

The only part of his speech that was loudly applauded was h
rejection of the boycott.

In a short reply Dr Verwoerd contented himself with reciproca
ing his guest's offer of friendship and co-operation. 'We see ou
selves,' he said, 'as part of the Western World—a true white Sta
in Southern Africa, with a possibility of granting a full future to th
black man in our midst.'[1]

Mr Macmillan's speech was received with some degree of ap
proval by the responsible organs of the press in most countries M
Callaghan, speaking for the Labour Party in London, said 'M
Macmillan has made a momentous speech. He has done what w
asked him to do. He has brought encouragement to millions o
Africans and liberal Europeans.'[2] A defiant statement had alreac
been made by the Premier of Southern Rhodesia.[3] He did no
believe that, if the Governments of both northern territories we
operated on a nationalist basis by African nationalists, the Southe
Rhodesia electorate would consider remaining federated with th
two Governments. In South Africa a considered comment w

[1] *Guardian*, 4 February 1960.
[2] *Daily Herald*, 4 February 1960.
[3] *The Times*, 30 January 1960.

made by Mr Louw, the Minister for External Affairs: 'For the sake of Britain's foreign policy and her leading position among the N.A.T.O. Powers, the permanent white population of South Africa (and of the Federation and Kenya) must be handed over to black domination. The white men who have developed and built up these countries must abdicate... What would be the British attitude if 45 million of their 60 million [*sic*] population were Jamaican and West Indian negroes?'[1] In Paris, *Le Monde* (5 February 1960) remarked that Mr Macmillan's words 'coupent l'herbe sous le pied du Labour Party'.

C. E. CARRINGTON

The Hungarian Communist Party's Seventh Congress

'I REFUSE,' said the fortune-teller, gazing at her crystal ball, 'I refuse to tell your fortune.' Her client, pale and trembling, begged her to reveal the secret. 'What will happen to me? Am I going to die?' 'It is worse than that.' 'Am I going to perish in some terrible disaster?' 'It is worse still. Things will just stay as they are.'

This story perhaps reveals, better than any detailed analysis of the situation, the mood in Hungary today. But the people, frustrated, sceptical, and cynical, do not expect any change from the regime itself. Waiting for miracles, the Hungarian people remain unmoved by official events such as the recent Party Congress (held from 30 November to 6 December 1959), no matter how spectacularly it was prepared and carried out.

As was obviously intended, Mr Khrushchev's personal attendance at the Congress greatly enhanced its importance and the status of the Hungarian First Secretary, Janos Kádár. The occasion symbolized the Kremlin's confidence in the man who, for three years, has acted as Moscow's loyal trustee in consolidating Communist rule in the only satellite country whose population had dared to stage a nation-wide armed uprising against it. In order to obliterate this embarrassing page of Communist history, the keynote of the Congress was the indestructible unity between the Party and the

[1] *The Times*, 9 February 1960

masses. Carefully and consistently, the Congress was presented a national, not a Party, event. Preparatory propaganda, speeches the Congress, press comments, and official statements all laid emphasis on solidarity between the Party and the non-Party masse

Kádár, from the Congress platform, officially confirmed th known fact that Party membership was less than half the pre revolution figure: he gave the number as 402,456 (i.e. less than 4 per cent of the population), as against over a million in 1948. He an other speakers professed to consider this numerical loss as a qualita tive gain: the alleged 'one-ness' of the Party and the masses shoul it was claimed, compensate for the numerical disproportion be tween population and Party membership.

Some observers expected an announcement on the withdrawal Soviet troops from Hungary. In addition to a spectacular expressio of trust in the population, the Party, by this gesture, might have re moved one of the main causes of national bitterness at a compara tively small risk—for, in any case, Soviet troops would withdra only to neighbouring Soviet territory, ready to return if need be N such gesture was made. Instead, Kádár in his Congress report ex plained that Soviet troops were 'not stationed in Hungary f domestic political reasons, but exclusively for reasons connecte with international questions still unsolved.'[1] But, according to Western report, the three or four Soviet divisions stationed in Hun gary are 'deployed not as a field force but scattered in regiment and battalion penny packets... they are believed to be short of trans port, engineering, anti-tank and anti-aircraft equipment but to be to heavy in infantry and armour.'[2] And if, nevertheless, it is not in ternal security but the international situation and the Warsaw Pa versus N.A.T.O. balance that require the presence of Soviet troop in Hungary, it may be wondered why there are no Soviet troops i Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria which, unlike Hungary, have com mon borders with N.A.T.O. countries. The assumption that Sovi forces in Hungary are needed for internal security reasons was born out by Kádár's own words. In his winding-up speech at the Con gress, he posed the rhetorical question: 'Is it [the continue presence of Soviet troops], indeed, a great surprise?' and answere 'I think it did not even cause great surprise among our masses. Ou masses are familiar with our policy.'[3]

The endeavour of the regime to identify the Party with the masse

[1] *Nepszabadag*, 1 December 1959. [2] *Daily Telegraph*, 30 November 195
[3] *Nepszabadag*, 5 December 1959.

emerged as the first theme of the Congress; the second theme was the identification of the regime with the past. With deliberate emphasis, the Congress was described as the 'Seventh', ignoring the fact that it was the first Congress of a Party refounded in November 1956, after its predecessor had been destroyed by the uprising.[1] It was conceivable that the Congress would either announce some kind of truce with the nationalist elements (by declaring a general amnesty for those who were involved in the 1956 uprising) or that it would concede victory to the orthodox wing (by remaining silent about Rákosi's mistakes or by elevating some of his former followers to high Party posts). Neither of these things happened.

The attitude of the Congress towards the Revolution and its legacy of revisionism was hostile, bitter, and militant. When Szirmai, one of the leading ideologists, published his analytical summing-up of the Congress in the Party's theoretical journal, he declared that one of its main objectives was to nail the lid on the coffin of the 1956 uprising.[2] This was, both in tone and content, the *summa summarum* of utterances on the subject. The image of the Revolution was projected as a shameful, criminal affair. Those who had been misled might be forgiven, but, in Kádár's words, 'the punishment of the instigators, leaders, and organizers was still a necessity.'[3] In the light of cumulative indirect evidence, this punishment is not merely an abstract 'necessity' for the regime but current practice.

Apart from denigration of the past and vindictiveness towards those who had taken an active part in the events, some of the Congress speakers (notably Kádár and Khrushchev) revealed one or two details which had hitherto been missing from the historical picture of the Hungarian Revolution. It is now known that there were dissenters among the top leaders in the Kremlin when armed intervention was decided upon, and that Kádár, when he deserted the Imre Nagy Government, went to Soviet territory. Nevertheless, the picture remains sketchy for the historian, and the political analyst has to confine himself to the conclusion that the Congress

[1] The first Communist Party Congress in Hungary was held in 1946 But two older ancestors have now been designated: meetings of Hungarian Communists in 1925 in Vienna and in 1930 in Moscow. The Communist Party in Hungary was then illegal. Its semi-legal cover organization was the 'Socialist Labour Party' from which the present Party's name was borrowed In 1948 the Communist Party, after its merger with the Social Democratic Party, changed its name to the Hungarian Workers' Party, which held three Congresses, in 1948, 1951, and 1954.

[2] *Tarsadalmi Szemle*, December 1959.

[3] *Nepszabadag*, 1 December 1959

deliberately intensified the war-cry against the ghost of the Revolu
tion.

The other 'ghost'—Rákosi—was castigated in milder terms tha
the Revolution, but castigated he was. His merits were invoked—a
were Stalin's after the reaction against him was thought to hav
gone too far. But he 'had committed serious mistakes which under
mined the Party's directing role'. This means that, while there is n
relaxation, there is no *rapprochement* towards old-fashioned Stalin
ism.

The repudiation of revisionism and the milder rejection of dog
matism are both negative manifestations. What, then, is the positiv
ideological outcome? The trend can be best gauged by the speakers
references to the issue of the class struggle. The official material o
the Twentieth Soviet Party Congress, for example, revealed
'rightist' trend—that of comparative relaxation—in the speakers
attitude towards the class struggle. In the light of that Congres
Stalin was wrong in asserting that the class struggle grows sharper a
socialist construction progresses. The Hungarian Congress, in con
trast, widely echoed the 'leftist' thesis that 'class struggle does no
disappear under the dictatorship of the proletariat but merel
assumes new forms.'[1] Muennich, the Hungarian Premier, in hi
opening speech referred to 'circumstances of exceptionally acut
class struggle' and Khrushchev explained that in the epoch of build
ing Socialism 'class struggle can intensify in certain periods and ca
even assume an extremely sharp form'.[2]

The speech delivered by Kállai, the chief ideologist, also re
flected the opposite of what is usually regarded as a 'thaw' in th
cultural life of a Communist country. He complained that ideo
logical and cultural transformation was 'lagging behind' and de
clared: 'We must progress faster where the Socialist transformatio
of the thinking of the masses is concerned.'[3]

The ideological content of foreign policy references reflected a
even more marked 'leftist' tendency than Kállai's call for cultura
mobilization of the masses. The introductory notes to the 'Guidin
Principles' for the Congress, published two months before th
opening session, which were regarded as a keynote by the speakers
might well have been written by the late Andrei Zhdanov himsel
The growing forces of the peace camp were contrasted with the dis

[1] Khrushchev, quoting Lenin, at the Hungarian Congress (*Soviet New*
2 December 1959).

[2] *Soviet News*, 2 December 1959

[3] *Nepszabadag*, 3 December 1959.

integrating forces of imperialism in the old Cominform manner. The same document indulged in abuses of the 'colonial system of the imperialists' which 'oppresses the people and plunges them into misery'.[1] The speakers at the Congress went beyond such generalizations. In Kádár's presentation the relaxation in the international situation was due to the growth of the forces of the Soviet Union and the Socialist camp; and Khrushchev, speaking of the peace movement, said that the 'forces of imperialist reaction are doing their utmost to weaken it'.

The concept of peaceful coexistence was given a dialectical interpretation as a sharp ideological and political struggle. This was by no means a novelty. Kállai and other Congress speakers faithfully echoed an idea which Communist authorities, greater than themselves, had repeatedly expounded in the recent past. Khrushchev, in his famous *Foreign Affairs* article,[2] declared that 'the main thing is to keep to the positions of the ideological struggle,' and the Soviet spokesman L. Ilyichov went even further. He said that, in essence, coexistence signified a continuation of the class struggle but by peaceful means; that, in the sphere of ideology, there never could be peaceful coexistence between socialism and capitalism; that there was no contradiction in speaking of peaceful coexistence simultaneously with irreconcilable ideological struggle.[3] At the Hungarian Congress, Khrushchev's assurance to the delegates about nuclear warheads, whereby he could 'raze to the ground all potential enemies', as well as Kádár's conspicuously unfriendly references to Yugoslavia, seemed to forecast a period of increasing rigidity in Hungary.

This tendency has at least two explanations. One is directly related to the Hungarian Second Five-Year Plan and is, in accordance with its economic nature, based on facts. The other is political and, consequently, speculative in character.

The so-called 'fighting aim' of the Congress was, as many a speaker defined, the completion of the laying of the foundations of socialism and the speeding-up of its construction. Attention was focused on the completion of the socialist transformation of the countryside. In plain words this means forced collectivization of agriculture, a process which seemed to have lost momentum earlier last year. 'If we go on with small-scale farming,' the Party's daily

[1] *Népszabadság*, 29 September 1959.
[2] 'On Peaceful Coexistence' (*Foreign Affairs*, New York, October 1959).
[3] *World Marxist Review*, Vol II, 1959, No. 2.

journal declared before the Congress, 'we shall not even achieve increase of 15–16 per cent in agricultural production by 1965 The target of the Second Five-Year Plan is now twice as high. T new drive to force reluctant peasants into producers' co-operati had, as Kádár implied in his winding-up speech, already beg prior to the Congress and it would continue. Until recently near half of the arable land was still farmed by individual peasants. It obvious that the completion of agricultural collectivization cann be carried out without iron discipline in every sphere of public lif

As far as industrial production is concerned, the Second Fiv Year Plan envisages an increase of 65 per cent by the end of 1965 compared with 1958 standards. This rate of development does n seem excessively ambitious, considering previous achievements i Hungary herself and in other countries of planned economy. Th overall figure, however, is less revealing than figures within a fe branches of industry. To quote only a few examples, while the pro duction of food is to be raised only by 36–40 per cent and that textiles by 32 per cent, the planners want to double the produc tion of crude oil and treble the production of natural gas. Thes as well as other examples, indicate that heavy industry must expan at a faster rate than the production of consumer goods. Whi promising a 26–29 per cent rise in real wages, the economic repo to the Congress emphasized that, in the national income, the sha of accumulation must be increased to the detriment of the share consumption. In Hungary, however, the question of the standard living has broad political implications. After the uprising th economic rehabilitation of the country was a prime political nece sity for the Soviet Union and the Soviet bloc as a whole. Econom recovery and the improvement of living standards were bound have some pacifying effect. Some bread was successfully offered the people in compensation for loss of freedom. But now the situ tion is quite different. The regime is well entrenched and its pow consolidated. Should certain higher considerations compel th regime to break its promise of further improvement of the livin standards, it can well afford to resort to more repression so as quell dissatisfaction. The question is whether such higher con siderations are likely to force the regime to do so.

It appears that the interests of co-operation within the Council f Mutual Economic Aid (Comecon) might, sooner or later, compel th Hungarian regime to sacrifice the well-being of the consumer for th

[1] *Nepszabadag*, 5 October 1959.

sake of giving high priority to certain branches of industry which are interdependent upon those of other Comecon member countries. Jenoe Fock, the rapporteur of the economic plan at the Congress, made only vague references to the 'specialization of production' and 'co-ordination of production' within the framework of the Comecon. It is known, however, from other authoritative Communist sources that, apart from having to increase her bauxite shipments, Hungary's main part in the scheme is concentrated on aluminium plants, manufacture of instruments, telecommunication articles, high-voltage equipment, precision machine tools, and similar products. This, of course, affects the production plans of other Comecon members. The Hungarian Minister of Heavy Industry has announced, for example, that Czechoslovakia had discontinued her combine-tractor production while Hungary's combine output was to be trebled. Thus, the Hungarian planners cannot afford a failure in those spheres in which failure of the Hungarian plan might cause a chain reaction in the whole East European orbit.

These are the economic reasons on account of which the Congress was destined to forecast a trend of rigidity instead of relaxation. The political motives, however, are less conspicuous. How is one to account for the contradiction between, on the one hand, the apparent willingness of the Soviet Union to negotiate with the West and, on the other, the call for rigidity within the satellite orbit?

The precedent can be found not too far back in history. In 1955, while the Khrushchev-Bulganin duumvirate embarked on a policy of reducing international tension—the Austrian Treaty, the reconciliation with Yugoslavia, the visit to Britain, and so on—the East European orbit went through a period of relapse into Stalinism. In Hungary, the 'New Course' came to an end and Rákosi returned to full power. And now again, not only in Hungary but in Poland, too, the Camp David spirit seems to invoke a strange reflection of Stalin's ghost.

The contrast between the Soviet attitude to major political issues (such as disarmament, prohibition of atomic tests, etc.) and rigidity in the East European orbit appears to reflect two sides of the same coin. Behind this paradox lies what may be called the 'Hinterland Policy', which simply means that, whenever the Soviet Union shows willingness to negotiate, it wants to do so from a position of strength which implies safeguarding security in the East European empire.

Khrushchev, in his speech at the Hungarian Party Congress, said

that, in his view, those Western politicians who raised the questio of the East European bloc in general or of Hungary in particular di not themselves believe in the reasonableness of such proposals 'And,' he added, 'the sooner such leaders understand that they ar backing a dead horse, the sooner tension will be eliminated, and thi will help to improve mutual understanding and strengthen th cause of peace.'[1] His words, and the tenor and atmosphere of th Hungarian Party Congress as a whole, revealed the unlikelihoo that general relaxation in the international situation would eventu ally lead to relaxation of control in Eastern Europe.

PAUL KATONA

[1] *Soviet News*, 2 December 1959

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Notes of the Month

Factors Behind the Italian Government Crisis

ONE of the most interesting aspects of the political crisis in Italy which opened with the resignation of Signor Segni's Government on 24 February is the unexpected emergence of a primarily economic factor—the ownership of the electrical industry. This industry, a basic one in the country's economic development for the past fifty years, has from its inception been carried on by private financing. The question of its ownership was singled out and emphasized by the Socialist leader, Signor Nenni, in a statement of 12 March in which he reviewed the difficulties encountered in the formation of a new Government, which Signor Segni has once again been invited to undertake. The basic difficulty is, of course, for Signor Segni's Christian Democrat party to find sufficient outside support to ensure his Government a stable majority. By his cautious statements Signor Nenni implicitly assured Signor Segni at least of Socialist abstention in the vote of confidence on his new Government, provided the latter adopted a programme of nationalization for the electrical industry as part of its general line of social progress.

Until the post-war period, water power was responsible for virtually the whole of Italy's electricity; and demands for nationalization have been based on the consideration that Italy's inland waters are State property and that the system of granting concessions to private companies does not provide an adequate guarantee for the interests of the public. Today, when the private electricity companies have accumulated very considerable wealth as a result of efficient administration on a business basis, the political Left can point out that the private owners have acquired so much economic power that they have the State virtually at their mercy and are in a position to prevent any social reform that might restrict their earning capacity. The Communists and Socialists attribute to the electricity companies a large part of the alleged corruption indicted by the President of the Senate, Signor Merzagora, in his strong speech in Parliament on 25 February (he subsequently resigned as a gesture of protest).

The electricity companies, for their part, have always attacked all

forms of nationalization, whether direct (e.g. the railways) or indirect, as in the case of the natural-gas industry. The latter industry is carried on under the State-controlled organization known as E.N.I. (*Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi*), headed by Enrico Mattei, which obtained a monopoly for exploration, development, and distribution of natural gas in the Po valley. Its production, last year covering 11 per cent of all energy consumption, is steadily increasing, whereas that of hydro-electric power, responsible for some 40 per cent of consumption, is stationary, and no tangible increase for it can be foreseen on an economic basis, since all the suitable sites for the exploitation of water power have by now been utilized.

E.N.I., after twelve years of existence, constitutes an industrial empire which can rival in importance the erstwhile empire of the electricity companies; and the competition which exists in many important spheres between these two groups has become acute. The Edison Company and the other electrical companies belong to the General Confederation of Industry (resembling the F.B.I. in Britain) and, together with the Montecatini and Fiat concerns, virtually dominate it. E.N.I., on the other hand, as a State concern, enjoys a hitherto unassailable influence in the Government circles upon which in theory it depends.

Signor Nenni is directing his shafts against the private monopolies, but for reasons of political strategy he has left in peace the financial empire of E.N.I.—though the role of the latter, despite its nominal dependence on the State, is not very different from that of a privately owned monopoly. Given the political conditions now prevailing in Italy it is obvious that a victory for the nationalization of electricity might suffice to bring Nenni to the fore and give him a decisive influence in Parliament and on the actions of the executive power. He would then be in a position to evolve a political programme of his own, to modify decisively his party's relationship to the Communists, and even eventually, perhaps, to participate in the Government.

But this prospect cannot easily be realized, for the Christian Democrats are still the most important party in the country, and as such are bound to be the preponderating partner in any Government. Even if Signor Nenni were to confine his ambitions to nationalization of the electrical industry (and recent statements of his aims also include the extension of regional autonomy and the abolition of subsidies to private—Catholic—schools), that aim in

elf has too strong a political flavour not to create the most lively ctions within the right wing of the Christian Democrat party. d a split in that party would nullify the value of the parliamentary pport that Signor Nenni's party could offer. Moreover, the cialists themselves are still much divided on the subject of sup- rt for any predominantly Christian Democrat Government. xious though they are to emerge from the political isolation ich their close association with the Communists has till recently posed, many of them are nevertheless still extremely chary of barking on that more explicit weakening of the Communist- cialist link which the Christian Democrats would be likely to quire of them.

posals for a Republic in Ghana

ON 7 March 1960, just three years after independence, the vernment of Ghana issued a White Paper[1] containing 'Proposals a Republican Constitution'. They are to be presented 'for the nsideration of the people of Ghana and the National Assembly, ing as a Constituent Assembly'; and the Government asks the ople 'to adopt the principles . . . and to endorse the draft' of the posed Constitution. If the Assembly first approves the pro- dure (as it is likely to do since the Government is supported by a ge majority) 'the people will be asked, in a plebiscite to be held tween 19 and 26 April 1960, whether they approve the main pro- ions of the draft.' When this approval is given, the Assembly 'will arly be in duty bound to enact a constitution along the lines of that proved by the people'. There is thus every probability that a publican Constitution, substantially as set forth in the draft, will ortly be adopted. 'The Government will not consider itself und to introduce into the Constituent Assembly a Constitution l which follows word for word the attached draft.'

The principles to be adopted are:

That Ghana should be a sovereign unitary Republic with power to surrender any part of her sovereignty to a Union of African States.

That the Head of State and holder of the executive power should be an elected President responsible to the people.

That Parliament should be the Sovereign legislature and should consist of the President and the National Assembly, and that the President should have a power to veto legislation and to dissolve Parliament.

That a President should be elected whenever there is a general elec-

[1] Ghana *Government Proposals for a Republican Constitution*, Accra, 7 March 0. (W.P. No. 1/60.)

tion by a method which insures that he will normally be the leader of the party which is successful in the General Election.

5. That there should be a Cabinet appointed by the President from among Members of Parliament to assist the President in the exercise of his executive functions.
6. That the system of Courts and the security of tenure of Judges should continue on present lines.
7. That the control of the armed forces and the civil service should be vested in the President.

Ghana will thus cease to be a parliamentary State and will become a presidential State in which the head of the executive will command the powers of an American President together with the powers of a British Prime Minister. In the first instance the President will be named, according to Clause 11 of the Constitution, and there can be little doubt what name will be inserted in the blank space. At future elections candidates will be required to declare the name of their candidate for the Presidency and will not be permitted to withdraw their support to this candidate after election. The President will thus be the person named by the majority of those who are 'subsequently returned as Members of Parliament' and, since he will have an unlimited power to dissolve Parliament, his influence over the legislature will be firmly based. With 'control of the armed forces and the civil service' and with authority to appoint the Chief Justice and the Supreme Court Judges (under Clause 44 of the Draft) the concentration of power in the President's hands is complete.

The draft Constitution is short and simple; it begins with a declaration that power derives from the people 'without distinction of sex, race, tribe, religion, or political belief'. The Presidential oath, set forth in Clause 14, obliges the President to preserve certain fundamental liberties, and guarantees among other things that 'chieftaincy in Ghana should be preserved'. By what are described as 'entrenched clauses' every important section of the Constitution includes a provision that 'the power to repeal or alter this article is reserved to the people'; the method of amendment being simply 'a referendum ordered by the President'. The draft Constitution contains no allusion to the Crown or to the Commonwealth, though, in the explanatory memorandum, mention is made that 'the appeal to the Privy Council in the United Kingdom will be discontinued.' The memorandum also includes the following paragraph:

Membership of the Commonwealth

No provision is included in the draft Constitution in regard to Mem-

up of the Commonwealth. It is, however, the intention of the Prime
ster to attend the Conference of Commonwealth Prime Ministers to
ld in London on the 3rd May, 1960. On that occasion the Prime
ster will tell the other Commonwealth Prime Ministers of the result
Plebiscite and, if the people vote in favour of the draft Constitution,
nform them that Ghana will become a Republic but would wish to
in within the Commonwealth.

dictional Changes in Kuwait

IE announcement by the Foreign Secretary in the House of
mons on 15 February that, under a new agreement between the
r of Kuwait and Her Majesty's Government, the Shaikhdom
d become fully responsible for jurisdiction over all persons in
erritory marks a significant step in the national status of this
l but extremely prosperous Shaikhdom.

iwait's treaty relations with the British Government date from
irn of the century when the famous Shaikh Mubarak al Sabah,
ig Turkish designs to annex his territory, requested British
ction. Under an agreement in 1899 Shaikh Mubarak under-
not to receive representatives of other Powers nor to cede any
of his territory without the consent of Britain; subsequently,
14, Britain formally recognized the Shaikhdom of Kuwait as
dependent Government under her protection. In the course of
arly years of this century Britain, by mutual agreement with
haikh of Kuwait, undertook various responsibilities, including
andling of the Shaikhdom's foreign affairs, postal and tele-
iic communications, and jurisdiction over foreigners residing
e territory. At the same time great care was taken to avoid
erence with the traditional independence of the Shaikhdom,
i had not, however, at that time the resources to handle its own
gn affairs or the judicial machinery to deal with cases arising
g the Europeans and other foreign residents. The jurisdiction
e Shaikh's court was, therefore, confined to Kuwait subjects
iationals of other Muslim states, while Europeans and other
gners came under the British court in the Political Agency
i administered enactments of the Governor-General of India
uncil and of the Governor of Bombay in Council, made applic-
by order in Council of His Majesty. This arrangement worked
atisfactorily during the period of Kuwait's growth and gradual
opment from patriarchal rule to a modern State. With the
ization of Government departments during the past ten years
he employment of experts in all branches of administration,

combined with the growth of self-confidence and experience, Kuwait has shown an increasing tendency to stand on her own feet.

In 1957 the Ruler was ceded jurisdiction over certain extra groups of foreigners previously under the Political Agent's jurisdiction, including Arabs from British Colonial and Protected Territories and Indonesians.

In the course of 1959 the Ruler engaged the well-known Egyptian jurist, Abdul Razzaq Sanhoury (who was responsible for drafting modern legal codes for Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia), to draft new laws and advise on the setting-up of courts competent to administer them. The laws drafted so far include decrees governing the regulation of labour, traffic, marine affairs, and the registration of aliens.

With the enactment of these laws and the great progress made recently in the administrative field, agreement has been reached between the Ruler and the U.K. Government that the time has come for Kuwait to take over full responsibility in the judicial sphere.

The agreement announced on 15 February simultaneously by the U.K. Government in London and the Ruler in Kuwait provides for the change-over to start on 25 February with the transfer of jurisdiction over persons previously under the Political Agent's jurisdiction in cases under the draft laws as they become enacted. It is expected that the process will be completed in about eighteen months.

It is not enough to have a body of laws without suitable courts to administer them, and it is understood that good progress has been made towards setting up the new courts required. A law to regulate the judicial system was enacted at the end of December 1959 providing for two main courts, a General Court and a High Court of Appeal, to be set up in Kuwait. The General Court will consist of four divisions, (*a*) Personal Status, (*b*) Civil, (*c*) Commercial, and (*d*) Criminal. As there are not enough qualified lawyers among the Kuwaitis it will be necessary to employ judges and court officials from other Arab countries for some time. As many as twelve judges may be required and it may be expected that at least half will come from the United Arab Republic, since their professional class is the largest, although Lebanon, Jordan, and Iraq are not excluded as possible sources.

Recent reports from Kuwait indicate that Britain's foresight in initiating this important advance towards the attainment of full independence in Kuwait has been warmly welcomed by all sections of the community and by Arab opinion in general.

Strategic Factors and the Summit

T is not easy for a layman to judge what influence the strategic ıctors which underlie the present balance of power between the oviet Union and the Western Powers will have upon the tenor and utcome of the meeting that is planned between Mr Khrushchev, resident Eisenhower, President de Gaulle, and Mr Macmillan in aris on 16 May. Changes in the military strength, actual or potenal, of different groups of Powers have always had a profound inuence upon diplomacy. But most of the 'summit' meetings of hisory—Vienna, Versailles, or Potsdam—have occurred after a great ssize of arms, and have been summoned to ratify or modify the hanges that it has registered. Some, like Munich, have been conerned with the effort to find other means to adjust a strategic quation that had become patently unbalanced. But there are few recedents for a meeting of statesmen that is convened merely for eneral discussion of the future without any dramatic darkening of he international horizon or change in the declared intentions of one f the parties. It is therefore difficult to be sure to what extent calcuitions of the actual military strength of either side, as they exist ow and will develop in the near future, are going to have a direct earing on the trend of these four men's conversation, or of its outome.

All that one can say with certainty is that strategic calculations vill be not very far below the surface of the minds of these four men. Ostensibly they want to probe each other's intentions and attitudes owards the great questions of the day—disarmament, the underdeveloped countries, Germany, or even China. But their advisers vill not let them forget that the other man's intentions are linked to is military capabilities, and that his views of what is possible by vay of international compromise will be closely related to what he ould do if events took a darker turn—that is, the damage he could o or could sustain in the event of general war. There is no need to all a summit meeting to discuss cultural exchanges: it is war and umours of war that set the agenda, whether that ugly word is poken or not.

The first point to note is that the agenda that the shadow of war ays down this year is infinitely more complicated than that of the ast summit meeting in 1955. At that meeting, the principal probem to be confronted was a relatively simple one—that the Soviet Jnion had acquired the full paraphernalia (as it existed then) of a

nuclear Power, that she must be accepted as such, and that consequently, in President Eisenhower's somewhat shallow phrase, 'there is no alternative to peace'. Though her power to inflict damage on the United States was open to question, she undoubtedly had a sufficiency of nuclear weapons and manned bombers to inflict crippling damage within 1,500 miles of the borders of the Soviet bloc, which meant the whole of Western Europe. And this implied that the Western attempt to contain her ambitions primarily by the threat of nuclear weapons was in need of drastic modification. The necessity for accepting the idea of 'co-existence' could no longer be ignored.

Five years later the problem is very different. It is not merely that the military strength of the Soviet Union has been augmented and diversified—so also has that of the United States. It is that both sides are in the grip of an accelerating technological revolution, symbolized by the advent of the missile, the space vehicle, and the nuclear submarine, which—if human reason does not prevail—may create such a dangerous and edgy world as, at worst, to nullify all hopes of 'peaceful co-existence', and, at best, to petrify the normal processes of change and evolution in international affairs. The situation is made none the easier by the fact that neither side can accurately determine at this point in time—the spring of 1960—what effect these technological changes are ultimately going to have upon their relative positions.

To draw up a catalogue of the military hardware and the number of troops which each side possesses would get us little further forward in any attempt to assess the bearing of strategic factors upon the summit meeting. The sounder method is to look at the developing forms of strength on each side, to see the conditions under which the leaders on both sides envisage using them, and thus the general attitude of diffidence or confidence which they confer upon them.

The most startling development of what may be called the inter-summit years is, of course, the development of the long-distance missile, and the lead in the actual production and siting of these weapons which the Soviet Union has gained over the United States. How large this lead is, no one exactly knows. A year ago it was officially estimated in Washington that the Soviet Union would have a three-to-one superiority between 1961 and 1963, or some 600 inter-continental ballistic missiles to the United States' 200. These estimates have now been officially scaled down, and the best current guess is that the Soviet Union might have 150 operational ICBMs

) the Americans' 50 during the first half of next year, with the gap ither narrowing or widening thereafter according to the amount of ioney and resources each side devotes to this aspect of the arms ice.

The missile gap is a reality, and not a particularly surprising one ı view of the fact that Russia started work on long-distance missiles early ten years before the United States under a very highly integrated system of research and development for the whole of their ocket programme, military and civil. Nor can it be closed in the ext three years. But it does not mean that Russia has the United tates at her mercy. For the United States is still a very strong air ower in the traditional sense. Russia herself is an air Power in that ie has a force of some 500 first-class manned bombers, together ith a larger number of obsolescent ones. But her main effort in cent years has gone into the missile. The United States, by comarison, still has a front-line bomber force of about 1,700 aircraft, ach capable of carrying a multi-megaton bomb. In a period of tenon 1,250 of these can be dispersed on forty bases around the perihery of the Soviet Union, while 450 of them could reach almost ny part of the Soviet bloc from bases in the United States itself.

Nor is this the only form of deterrent strength of which the West isposes. The United States will by 1963 have a fleet of eight nuclear ibmarines each equipped with sixteen *Polaris* 1,500-mile missiles, weapon that can strike from an unknown, and therefore indestructible, base. In addition, the United States has two powerful fleets— ı the Mediterranean and in the Pacific—with aircraft which can eliver nuclear weapons over a limited radius, together with a strong orce of fighter-bombers in Western Europe, and will soon have bout a hundred medium-range missiles in England and the lediterranean which can reach most of Western Russia.

The Western leaders can, therefore, step up to the summit with easonable confidence, in the knowledge that though there is a issile gap there is not a demonstrable 'deterrent gap', and that the alance of power at the highest level has not shifted—as yet— ramatically in Russia's favour. Indeed, some American experts have onvinced themselves that the Russians have made a serious mistake in going into what Mr Khrushchev called 'serial production' f ICBMs as early as 1956–8, and that the Americans, by taking their rogramme more slowly, may be producing more accurate and deendable weapons, incorporating improvements in design, guidance, and fuels as they come along. Certainly there is some evidence

to suggest that the Russians have slowed down their programme—Mr Khrushchev, for instance, has been notably less boastful about it in the last twelve months—for this very reason. However, it is a dangerous thing to underestimate Soviet technical progress, and the recent tests in the Pacific seemed to show a remarkable standard of accuracy. But as the position stands today, the Soviet Union does not possess the strength in missiles to challenge the United States, even if she wished to, without invoking a quite unacceptable degree of damage to herself. Even if it were theoretically possible to launch a missile at every American bomber, missile, or carrier base simultaneously, the hope of destroying them all simultaneously is non-existent.

The real concern of the Western Governments is somewhat different. Briefly, it can be stated as follows. During the 1950s the major strategic advantage lay with the United States: in the first half of that decade the U.S.A. possessed the bombs and the aircraft to annihilate the Soviet Union, and even in the second half of the decade, when the Soviet bomber force could threaten the United States, the advantage in terms of warning time and dispersal of bases still lay with the latter. Yet during those years it proved impossible to apply this Western position of strength to furthering fruitful negotiations on the great issues which divide the two blocs. Now, if the Soviet Union is placing as much emphasis on missiles as Mr Khrushchev—particularly in his speech to the Praesidium in January—suggests, a number of advantages which the Soviet Union possesses will tell more and more heavily in her favour. The first is her integrated space and missile programme, which might enable her to widen the missile gap if she chose. It is a striking fact that the time taken for research, development, and production on Soviet missile projects has been seven years to the Americans' ten. If this were to happen during the early 1960s—if, say, each American retaliatory base in the United States or overseas were covered by five or six Soviet missiles—it would rapidly render the American and British manned bomber forces obsolete, or else force on both countries a very costly and indeed provocative system of airborne alert, since the manned bomber is hopelessly vulnerable on the ground. It would negative the strength of the United States in carrierborne aircraft, and render virtually useless those medium-range missiles which are sited above ground in Europe.

In the second place, if the Soviet–N.A.T.O. equation comes to rest on the missile versus the manned bomber, the disparity of in-

telligence information will tell heavily in Russia's favour. The exact location of every Western base is public knowledge, while we have only a general knowledge of where the Soviet bases are located, and we are never likely to know more precisely where they are without a system of agreed inspection. This means that every Western base must be much more highly protected or more mobile than its Soviet counterpart, and protection in the form of underground bases is a desperately expensive business. (It costs $47 million to build the hard sites for ten *Atlas* ICBMs.) When it is possible to mount long-range missiles on mobile bases, railways, cars, barges, or ships, the fact that the Soviet Union is a controlled economy will make it much simpler in Russia than in the busy commercial arteries of the West. Finally, the Soviet population has been much more thoroughly drilled in civil defence measures than any N.A.T.O. country, thus giving its leaders the confidence that their country could emerge from a nuclear exchange with a higher rate of survival than the United States or Western Europe.

Before trying to see what this possible shift in the strategic balance means in terms of the preoccupations of the statesmen at the summit it is as well to take a closer look at two areas. The first is Europe. No one on the Western side will be under any illusion that the cut, announced on 14 January 1960, of 1,200,000 men in the Soviet armed forces is likely to lead to a weaker Soviet Army. From the speeches that were then made by the Soviet military leaders to the Supreme Soviet it is clear that it is the Navy and the Air Force—presumably the crews and maintenance staff of manned bombers and surface ships—which will bear the brunt of the reduction. While it may be necessary to revise our standard calculation of a Soviet Army of 175 divisions, there is as yet no evidence to show that there will be any reduction in the eighty divisions that could be deployed against Western Europe, twenty of which are in Eastern Germany. The Soviet Army is probably the best equipped in the world and is supported by a very strong tactical air force. The Soviet Union remains what it has been for ten years or more, the strongest land power—in terms of men and firepower combined—in the world.

Against this force, the N.A.T.O. shield still numbers only some twenty divisions, which will rise to twenty-six by 1963. Equally important, the reserves available to the Soviet Union for possible deployment outside Central Europe remain very strong. As compared with four divisions in the American strategic reserve, the

equivalent of one in Britain, and none in France, Russia has some ten air-transportable divisions.

Over and above this stands the Soviet missile threat to Europe. How many medium-range missiles she has is a matter of conjecture but about a hundred sites have been identified—in the Baltic, around the White Sea, in the Thuringia Forest in Eastern Germany, in the Southern Ukraine, and the Carpathians. And Mr Khrushchev has gone out of his way to impress on every Western visitor his power to inflict overwhelming damage on the countries of Western Europe. It is this Soviet medium-range missile threat which has already forced a change in Britain's defence policy, with the virtual abandonment of the *Bluestreak* static missile as too vulnerable, and the search for a mobile base for our missile deterrent either in an aircraft or at sea. There is no doubt that Mr Khrushchev still feels that he has a strategic dominance over Western Europe, and this is clearly the basis of his judgment, repeated several times in his Praesidium speech, that only countries with large land areas could survive a nuclear exchange. The means to checkmate Soviet superiority in medium-range missiles, either by the creation of a centralized N.A.T.O. force or some other way, has not yet been found, and a greater disparity therefore exists in the local strategic balance within Europe.

Finally, there is the question of sea power. The Soviet Union has only recently become a maritime Power, of a very specialized kind—in submarines alone. Mr Khrushchev has probably cut back the old Soviet submarine programme which amassed the enormous fleet of 460 front-line craft. But he has again declared his confidence in the submarine, and the Soviet Union has developed two types of submarine-based missile (though inferior in performance to *Polaris*). She is thought to be only some eighteen months behind the United States in the development of nuclear submarines to carry them, and she has twelve hydrographic ships at sea all over the world mapping the ocean bed. Partly, of course, this submarine programme is an additional reinsurance for her land-based deterrent, but it seems to be more than that. It is Russia's bid to become a world Power in the sense that the old maritime nations have always been world Powers, able to exert her influence in the Southern as well as the Northern Hemisphere, and in areas of the world which have hitherto been immune from direct diplomatic or military pressure on her part.

These strategic factors would seem to point to a number of in-

fluences that will bear upon the minds of the men at the summit. In the first place, the Western leaders will not be going, in any sense, cap in hand, as Mr Chamberlain went to Munich, in the knowledge that their potential adversary is stronger than they and intends to use that strength. Indeed, they will go in the same spirit of inquiry that animates the rest of us, to discover why the Soviet Union is laying so much emphasis on offensive weapons at a time when Mr Khrushchev's statements, and his obvious interests, point in the direction of peace. But they will go with the uneasy feeling that the strategic balance over the next few years is at best equivocal, and that time is no longer necessarily an ally of the West. This should give a sense of urgency to their planning and confabulations which was notably lacking in 1955. They will also go in the knowledge that their strength is much less flexible.

In the second place, they should without too much difficulty be able to establish agreement with Mr Khrushchev that, in the long run, time is on nobody's side. For it does not take very much imagination to accept the fact that the missile is fundamentally destructive of international confidence, by reason of its accuracy, its ease of concealment, its range, and, above all, of its speed. Where the bomber reduced warning of attack from weeks to hours, the missile reduces it to minutes. The Soviet strategists are every bit as much preoccupied with the danger of surprise attack as are the American, and both fear that any move on their part will invoke the danger of 'pre-emptive' attack by the other. But the more energy that both sides put into the development of a stable strategic balance by building invulnerable missile systems—in hard sites, on mobile platforms, or underwater—the harder it will be to devise any international system of control and inspection.

Nor is this the only area of common interest. The expense of a missile strategy is something which no responsible national leaders can face with equanimity. Given the other demands on their resources, the welfare of their own economies, the welfare of the under-developed countries, and the needs of conventional forces to give flexibility to their defence policies, the costs of modern nuclear weapons systems are already enormous and could easily double even their present figure in ten years, while at the same time gravely distorting the domestic economies of the countries concerned.

There is also the question of China, which is potentially the common adversary of both the Soviet Union and the Western Powers. And there is an overriding common interest in preventing the

spread of nuclear weapon capabilities to smaller and less responsible allies of each side.

In the third place, in so far as the conversations at the summit reflect strategic factors, they will tend to be a game of bezique rather than of bridge, despite the vigour and articulation of Mr Macmillan and President de Gaulle. For the cost and complexity of modern strategic weapons systems is willy-nilly creating a bi-polar world The new direction of British defence policy, with its implied acceptance of the fact that it is impossible for Britain to develop a credible nuclear weapon system on her own, is a symptom of bi-polarity—as France will shortly find out when she starts to work out the cost of a delivery system for her atom bomb.

But, on the other hand, it seems likely that one of the keenest anxieties on the part of Mr Khrushchev will be to explore how firmly based the solidarity of the West still is. If he divines that there is a fundamental division of views, or even a clash of personalities, among the Western leaders, then he would be less than human if he did not exploit his still great tactical advantages in Europe to make confusion worse confounded. By the same token, he would be a bold man if he gave strong impetus towards an agreement on disarmament unless he were certain that he were dealing with a united West. If indeed the world is now bi-polarized, he will want to make very certain that any agreement he might reach with the United States, she in turn will be able to persuade her allies to accept. In just the same way, the Western leaders will be probing to discover just how much real influence the Soviet Union has with China.

A curious inverse law seems to govern negotiations with the Soviet Union. During the years when she was most vulnerable, when her existence depended entirely upon the forbearance of the United States—the years that lay between 1948 and 1954—her leaders were at their most truculent, her diplomats at their most obdurate. In the years since 1954, as she has become a world Power, there have been signs and gestures of increasing reasonableness in her dealings with the West. In May, Mr Khrushchev goes to the summit not merely as the leader of a great Power but of a highly successful world Power. He will go as a confident man, but also as desperately worried a man as the three statesmen he will confront—and worried by exactly the same things, the cost of armaments, the danger of surprise attack or accidental war, the irresponsibility of allies. De Tocqueville once pointed out that 'Two M.P.s, one of whom is Radical, have more in common than two Radicals, one of

hom is an M.P.' Is it too much to expect that four holders of
iclear-headed missiles, one of whom is a Communist, will find
ore in common than two Communists, one of whom has a nuclear
issile?

ALASTAIR BUCHAN

Soviet Agriculture

A Weak Link in Economic Development

THE OCCASION

'HEN the harvest is in and counted every Soviet collective farm
olds an annual general meeting to discuss results and share out its
sposable surplus. Khrushchev seems to have instituted an annual
neral meeting at the national level: there was one in December
158, another in December 1959, and he expects to continue the
nes this year. Leading figures from every profession concerned—
irty and Government officials, growers, dairymen and stock-
eeders, scientists and engineers—meet to discuss agricultural
ogress and prospects. What is apportioned amongst them is
aise, blame, and advice, and Khrushchev holds the scales.

Formally, these meetings are plenary meetings of the Central
ommittee of the Communist Party. But very many of the partici-
ints are neither members of the Central Committee nor people of
iy political standing, and some are not even Party members.
lembers of the Central Committee not professionally concerned
ith agriculture do not speak. There is little direct discussion, ex-
pt for exploratory dialogues between speakers and Khrushchev,
the chair. The great figures on these occasions, wildly applauded
id enthusiastically mentioned by speaker after speaker, are the
cord-breakers. Last December an oblast[1] Party secretary was
nong them—Larionov of Ryazan—but they are for the most part
illed farmworkers, like pig-man Chizh from the Lvov area, or
ie girl tractor-driver Akhunova from Uzbekistan.

Khrushchev dominates the proceedings: commending and re-
iking, calling for applause, interrupting to underline important
iints, worming the plain facts out of a prevaricator, teasing one

[1] The oblast and the rayon (mentioned below) are both administrative sub-
visions of the U.S.S.R.

speaker with another's successes. . . The 'Plenum' has something of the atmosphere of a school prize-giving, dominated by a shrewd, forceful, and wayward headmaster. When agriculture is the subject, Khrushchev displays all his old virtuosity. There is the same grasp of detail, the same rough humour, the same delight in scoring off other speakers, even when he obviously knows his remark to be trivial or unfair.

Speaker after speaker eulogized Khrushchev. He was the tireless fighter for peace, the unwavering Leninist, the great son of the heroic working class, the initiator of all agricultural successes, the supreme expert whose opportune visit sets farm or rayon on the path to plenty, the 'incarnation of the people's wisdom, knowledge of life, and supreme diligence'. If he enjoys flattery he is not dazzled by it. His eye for reality is clearly as uncomfortably sharp as ever.

CAMPAIGN FEVER

Drought in many parts of the country and an organizational breakdown in the new lands of Kazakhstan made 1959 a somewhat unsatisfactory year for Khrushchev. To put a good face on it, his statisticians pointed out that grain production was above the average of the last five years. The fairly impressive increase in output of livestock products was described by Khrushchev himself as good but not good enough. Sugar-beet production was higher than most Western experts would have thought likely a few years ago The outstanding success was that of the cotton-growing republics, which brought in an all-time record harvest.

It is doubtful whether perusal of the Plenum's proceedings and the report published shortly afterwards on annual plan fulfilment would make possible a reliable estimate of agricultural prospects for the next few years. Some key figures will be found at the end of this article. But at this stage some account of the mood of Soviet agriculture, of its current problems and the measures intended to solve them, may be no less useful than economic speculation.

We can reasonably say that proclaimed agricultural targets seem very high, judged by the recent rate of progress, impressive though this is in some sectors. This is a point which many Soviet experts would concede—though not without a dig at wishful Western sceptics incapable of learning from their past miscalculations. With an eye to sceptics nearer home, speakers at the Plenum said that their 'obligations' were high, but 'possible'. They then,

s often as not, listed conditions of success which will fairly certainly not be satisfied: for instance, the supply of machinery in uantities which industry admittedly cannot produce.

Soviet agriculture is in the grip of an unusually severe bout of ampaign fever. The objectives set in the Seven-Year Plan have ecome nothing more than prepared positions to fall back on in ase of defeat. The question to which every region and every farm n the country must now find a satisfactory answer is how much nore it will produce than the Plan demands, and how much more uickly. Inevitably, these informal plans, known as 'socialist bligations', tend to be inflated. Khrushchev himself called for a ealistic approach, and mentioned officials who had taken on excessive obligations in spite of his own attempts to dissuade them. But local officials and farm managers find themselves in a characteristic Soviet predicament. 'Realism' is only too likely to be condemned as slackness or lack of imagination. Besides, central uthorities base their estimates of what is realistic on the most avourable assumptions about weather (although of course bad veather can have a cumulatively retarding effect on agricultural erformance), on generalizations from results obtained by exceptionally well-found or well-managed farms, and on optimistic orecasts of the average results to be expected from improved upplies and techniques.

Campaign fever accounts for a lot of the relative failures which hostile' foreign commentators seize upon. But it is doubtful whether we should regard official unrealism as dishonest or altogether foolish. Extravagant demands from above, sometimes urely tongue-in-cheek, are met with extravagant promises from elow, made with fingers crossed. But the Government presumbly hopes that those who set themselves impossible tasks will train every muscle to reduce the margin of failure, and so by easonable standards achieve a considerable success; and those who nake the promises presumably hope that their extravagant obligations' will at least elicit the maximum aid from above—ometimes perhaps at the expense of their less ambitious neighbours.

Ryazan oblast's much trumpeted success in increasing output of neat 3·8 times in a year—an effort which all producers are urged o emulate—supplies a good example of the disingenuous calculaions on which campaign planning is based. Little is known about he way in which Ryazan accomplished its feat—two important

questions are how much of the increase should be put down to purchases of stock from outside and what special assistance the State gave. But the essential point is well known: that Ryazan started with few animals to the acre and a very favourable fodder situation. This is not to say that hard work and managerial skill did not play a big part in the oblast's achievement, nor that it cannot maintain its momentum for a while. There is no reason why Ryazan should not become a model meat-and-dairy farming area. But to taunt other areas which did not start with the same statistical advantage—often because they had built up their herds more successfully in earlier years—with failure to keep abreast of Ryazan is obviously disingenuous. It becomes merely comic when Khrushchev teases Podgorny (Secretary of the Party's Central Committee in the Ukraine) because the Ukraine as a whole is advancing more slowly than Ryazan. Quite apart from the obvious considerations against comparing a smallish oblast with a very large and climatically varied republic, Khrushchev knows, no one better, that the ratio of stock to fodder has been fairly high in the Ukraine for some time past, that it produces a quarter of all meat sold to the State, and that its production figure is still better than that of Ryazan (54 centners of meat per 100 hectares as against 53). But here, perhaps, we see the point of Khrushchev's 'unfairness'. The lesson for Podgorny is that he must keep ahead of Ryazan in output per hectare, and perhaps establish a record-breaking oblast of his own (Stalino seems a possible choice, to judge from recent figures).

We find another interesting example of campaign logic in the constant emphasis on the 'spottiness' of agricultural performance—i.e. the disparities, often striking, between farms with similar soils and climate. Almost invariably, the only explanation given is the varying quality of management. Certainly, this is the deciding factor where all other things are equal. But for many of the black spots on the agricultural map all other things are not equal There are great differences between neighbouring farms in the size of capital funds, level of mechanization, and composition of the labour force. This, after all, is one of the reasons for the continuing process of amalgamation: to spread resources more evenly. It is obviously unreasonable to expect from under-privileged farms results like those of their luckier neighbours. But the intrinsically unfair comparison is put to a perfectly sensible use: that of making the existing average output the minimum of the future.

THE LAND

Extend or intensify? Khrushchev's answer to this old question is, characteristically, 'extend *and* intensify'.

The new lands of Kazakhstan failed in 1959 to fulfil not only their socialist obligations but even their basic plan for deliveries to the State. The failure, according to Khrushchev, was due in large measure to shortage of machinery in working order at the crucial sowing and harvest times: 18,000 tractors took no part in the sowing and 32,000 combines, as well as much other machinery, were idle during the harvest period. In spite of delays in sowing, a good crop had ripened, said Khrushchev, but some of it was still standing when the snows came. On 1 November 1,618,000 hectares were still awaiting the harvesters. Inadequate storage and transport facilities aggravated the situation. Khrushchev's displeasure fell upon the First Secretary of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan, Belyaev, a pioneer of the virgin lands scheme, who was demoted shortly after the Plenum. Khrushchev told the Plenum how he had asked Belyaev, at the height of the season, what he needed to complete the harvest on time and had received the answer: 'Nothing is needed; we have received everything; it will all be done.' There is a touch of pathos in this stoical signal from a general soon to be dismissed for losing a hopeless battle. For the trouble in Kazakhstan is precisely this: that the virgin lands are cultivated not by a stable farming population but by a bivouacked army, weakened by a steady leakage of deserters, and demoralized by hard living conditions and the unequal struggle to protect their exposed equipment against the harsh climate. The annual offensive demands desperate efforts of improvization. Indeed, Khrushchev is prepared to consider such emergency measures as flying in 30,000 or 50,000 combine operators from the Ukraine and the North Caucasus. Even when the grain is gathered, it is not easy to carry it beyond reach of bad weather. Construction of covered bunkers, granaries, and elevators lags far behind grain production—so that the existing inadequate network of grain-stores suffers, in Belyaev's words, from 'grain phobia'.

Harvest difficulties apart, Kazakhstan's average yield is low: 6 centners per hectare for five of the last ten years, according to Belyaev. (The Ukraine obtained an average yield for the republic of 15·7 centners per hectare in 1959, not a particularly good year.) To reach its 1965 target, Kazakhstan must increase its average yield by 3·5–4 centners per hectare.

In spite of Kazakhstan's present difficulties, 4–5 million hectares of new land are to be opened up in the republic in the next five years. This is part of a general plan to expand the sown area in all parts of the country. The RSFSR (Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic) is to plough up 8 or 9 million hectares, mainly along the Volga, in the Urals, Siberia, and the far East. (Khrushchev once more showed special interest in the 600,000 hectares of 'unused' land in the Amur region, which he says could give good soya harvests like the neighbouring Chinese areas.) Belorussia will greatly increase the area sown to grain by clearing scrub and draining marshes. Each of the Central Asian republics has its virgin lands plan. Even in Georgia 200,000 hectares of the Colchis depression, famous in ancient times as a producer of poisonous herbs, is to be drained for the cultivation of tea, bay leaf, essential oil plants, etc.

At the same time, established farmland is to be more intensively worked. An important step, with unpredictable consequences, is the abandonment from now on of bare fallow in all except very droughty places. It is probably true, as Khrushchev said, that a lot of it is neither bare nor fallow—i.e., that it is temporarily uncultivated, weed-choked land, so that uninterrupted cropping may result in little additional damage to the soil. The land 'set free' is to be sown to maize, which, perhaps surprisingly, is said to be a good nurse crop for other cereals, and more sensibly pulses, lupins In some areas two crops a year are to be taken. The crop structure is also to be simplified, and low-yielding crops, like oats, will be replaced largely by maize. From such measures the RSFSR, for instance, expects a bigger increase in the grain and fodder crop than from its 8 or 9 million hectares of new land and 3 million hectares of reclaimed land. Some people evidently have doubts about the wisdom of these measures: Polyansky, Chairman of the RSFSR Council of Ministers, referred to prejudices in favour of bare fallow and many-field rotation. But the authorities do not regard the new system as experimental. Every farm is to receive in the next year or two a finalized cultivation scheme, giving details of the rotations and techniques best suited to its circumstances.

Maize, the 'queen of the fields' as it is now called, occupies roughly one-ninth of the total sown area, and will continue its triumphal progress. Many speakers praised Khrushchev for his initiative and persistence in popularizing this 'decisive' contributor to the fodder base which will, it is hoped, enable the Soviet Union

to surpass the United States in output of meat and milk per caput. The Soviet Union laid down 150,000 tons of silage in 1959 (as against 32,000 in 1953); 114,000 tons of it were maize silage (of which there was practically none in 1953). On the average, every cow was provided with ten tons of 'succulent feed' for the winter, which should mean a valuable reduction in winter losses. Khrushchev insists that it is possible to grow maize in all agricultural areas: even where it does not ripen, the cobs at the half-ripe 'milky-waxy' stage and the 'green bulk' provide more fodder units to the hectare than any other crop. So in the next few years the RSFSR will expand the area under maize from about 13 to about 20 million hectares, and the Ukraine from 7·7 to 9 or 10 million hectares.

In the short run, maize has certainly played a big part in boosting Soviet meat and milk production. But it is not at all certain that green maize for silage, in areas where the cobs seldom or never ripen, will always be regarded as a worth-while crop, and there is little doubt that an unrelieved diet of maize silage is unhealthy for cows. There are still officials and farmers who 'underestimate' maize, according to the final communiqué put out by the Plenum. In many places maize is sown late, and sparsely. Sometimes, of course, the farmers are not interested in maize because they have few animals, and they will have few animals, under present conditions, until they get interested in maize. But there are also respectable reasons for local prejudices against maize. It sometimes, for instance, prevents expansion of the area sown to a traditionally favoured crop, so that the Ukrainians can increase their winter wheat crop, and the Belorussians their potato crop, only by raising yields, not by increasing acreage.

FERTILIZER AND MACHINERY

Heavier cropping will further sharpen the already acute need for more fertilizer and more machines. 1959 seems to have been a year of anxious debate and hard decisions on this chronic problem. Some important speakers at the Plenum, echoing an earlier suggestion from Khrushchev, recommended that, since funds available within the Seven-Year Plan period for constructing fertilizer plant were in any case inadequate, they should be largely diverted to other purposes, and particularly to the manufacture of a nitrogenous supplement to the diet of livestock. Since the herds were rapidly expanding, fuller use of manure, in combination where possible with peat, would compensate for the missing

mineral fertilizer. Polyansky calculated that the RSFSR could count on 350 or 400 million tons of organic fertilizer a year—the equivalent of 14 million tons of mineral fertilizer, which it would take twenty factories, each costing 350 million rubles, to produce. Podgorny had worked out a similar sum for the Ukraine, and effected an anticipatory paper economy of nine factories each costing 250 million rubles. Farms must build sumps next to cattle-sheds to conserve manure, and should if possible use peat as a footing for stalled cattle. These do-it-yourself schemes, excellent in theory, in practice relieve the State by putting a heavier burden on the farms. In Soviet conditions many of them will certainly scamp their new obligations. And in any case the State cannot safely continue to delay expansion of the fertilizer industry.

The agricultural machinery industry, large though its output is, does not satisfy its customers either quantitatively or qualitatively. Podgorny complained that the Ukraine had received half the new tractors it needed in 1959, and would fare no better in 1960. The plight of the Ukraine is probably exceptional. The republic was highly favoured in the past, and Gosplan likes to assume, as Podgorny said, that it is now fully equipped. But there were complaints of serious shortages, and of the industry's tardiness in producing efficient machines to perform various extremely laborious operations, from all parts of the country.

The industry's problems are undoubtedly aggravated by neglect and carelessness on the part of operators and mechanics, and by inadequate maintenance facilities. One expert mentioned that machines are frequently left in a dirty condition and, complete with belts, chains, and accumulators, out in the open. Failure to house machinery properly and to carry out minor repairs, which contributed to the situation in Kazakhstan last year, is likely to create a crisis in any year and in any part of the country, especially at sowing time. Various speakers referred to the fuller use of machinery since its transfer from the MTS (Machine Tractor Stations) to the farms, but it seems likely that the machines are worked harder and maintained even less efficiently than before. The RTS (repair and supply depots left behind after the dissolution of the MTS) seem to satisfy no one, and statements at the Plenum indicated that they will shortly lose their supply function to the normal rural trade network, and that all but the largest will be subordinated to single farms or groups of farms.

Output of tractors and some other machines dropped in 1959,

while the industry was preparing to put improved models into production. The designers are busy working out a complex of machines covering the full cycle of operations for each crop and each agricultural zone. This ambitious programme, and retooling to produce lighter and faster variants of machines now in use, may in the short run somewhat aggravate a situation in which, as the Director of the Rostov Agricultural Machinery Plant said (with a confirmatory interjection from Khrushchev), industry cannot supply all the machines which the Ministry of Agriculture demands. But Zasyadko, a Vice-Chairman of the Council of Ministers, is already looking ahead to a time when production of spare parts on the present scale will be thought unprofitable and machines will not be refitted but written off and replaced.

STOCK

The Soviet Union already claims two victories over the United States—in gross milk production and production of butter per head of population. (No mention of course is made of the importance of vegetable fats in the American diet.) The RSFSR has set itself the task of overtaking the U.S.A. in meat production by 1965, and the Ukraine plans to do so by 1963. The country as a whole produced 8,600,000 tons of meat in 1959. According to Khrushchev, another 12–13 million tons a year is needed if the country is to overtake America.

Good progress has been made in raising milk yields, and Khrushchev said that the main task now was to increase the size of the herds. At present 'many collective and State farms have from four to six cows per 100 hectares. There are farms with ten to twelve cows per 100 hectares, and we praise them for it. And where there are twenty cows per 100 hectares of farmland the managers of such farms are treated as heroes.' The objective, said Khrushchev, must be twenty-five, and that would probably be too few.

Stock-farmers could obviously concentrate with advantage on increasing average weights rather than numbers. There are many complaints that lean stock is delivered to the slaughter-houses. Apart from shortage of fodder and ill-balanced diets, inadequate slaughter facilities contribute to this situation; animals are left on the farm for the lean winter-months after they have reached slaughter-weight, or else they are moved long distances, often on the hoof. As well as setting up more slaughter-houses the Government is to organize special fattening depots (sometimes they will

be State farms and sometimes, apparently, subsidiaries of the procurement agencies, attached to sugar refineries and other plant with edible waste) as intermediaries between collective farm or private plot and slaughter-house.

Close attention was given at the Plenum to production costs, especially in the stock-farming sector. A particularly successful farm was able to report that it had produced meat, milk, eggs, etc at about half the State purchase price for each of them. But for many farms the difference between production costs and purchase price is apparently so small as to be disincentive. It was recommended that the ratio between prices for crops and those for livestock products should be revised to stimulate interest in dairy and stock farming.

THE PEASANTS

Study of the Plenum suggests that the collective farmers, though not in their present numbers, have an assured future as regularly and reasonably well-paid farm-labourers; but that their brief heyday as prosperous *peasants* is almost over.

A few years ago the conversion of collective into State farms would have been a happy release for many peasants. But since 1954 they have grown steadily more prosperous: their dues fell, prices for their produce rose, and the financially strengthened farms, in many cases for the first time, were able to pay a worth-while wage for their labour. The Government has now decided to check the growth of peasant incomes (in some areas, said Khrushchev, peasants earned more than workers, although the working class is the leading class in a socialist society) and to make farms re-invest a higher proportion of their profits instead of inflating labour-day payments.

On the suggestion of several speakers at the Plenum, the Government will revise prices for various agricultural products with a view to reducing them. It is intended to bring purchase prices for kolkhoz produce close to the lower prices paid to State farms, although the kolkhoz carries its investment burden on its own shoulders.

Payment for labour in the communal sector of the kolkhoz varies greatly from region to region and from farm to farm, as Khrushchev recognized. He mentioned earnings of 50 rubles a labour-day in the rich coastal strip of Georgia; 30 rubles a labour-day seems to be quite common in the cotton republics (but there,

of course, peasants have to buy much of their food). Pig-man Chizh, from the Lvov area, makes 2,000 rubles a month, and volunteered to accept a lower piece-rate. In the RSFSR payments of 25-30 rubles a labour-day were reported (though they are probably not very common), and some peasants, according to Polyansky, had been getting 1,500 rubles a month as well as the proceeds from their private plots. In the Ukraine, however, peasant incomes have not increased at all in the past three years; and in Belorussia farm incomes are still so low that the republic cannot yet think of increasing deductions to capital.

The substitution of a regular monthly wage in money for labour-day payments in money and kind helps to stabilize the kolkhoz wage-bill, and is probably welcomed by many peasants. So far only a small proportion of farms have gone over to this system. The Soviet leaders are now thinking of introducing not only a maximum but also, at long last, a minimum agricultural wage. These measures are linked with the simultaneous reduction of the peasant's private holding and his activity on the free market.

Deductions from farm income to capital are to increase as rapidly as possible. The present level of deductions is 30 per cent in Uzbekistan, about 24 or 25 per cent in Ukraine and the RSFSR, 23 per cent even in poorer Belorussia, and as much as 35 per cent on rich farms scattered throughout the country. The kolkhoz now, of course, has to buy and pay for the maintenance of all agricultural machinery, and bears the costs of the large new rural building programmes, as well as, in some parts of the country, of ambitious irrigation or amelioration projects. To control capital investment in the countryside the Government has agreed to the suggestion made in many quarters that kolkhoz unions should be set up. Each kolkhoz union will co-ordinate the investment policies of kolkhozy within its area. It will dispose of a fund derived probably from a fixed percentage deduction from the income of each member farm, for investment in projects of common interest—for instance, in the construction of rural power stations, in irrigation works, in building food-processing plant, in establishing maintenance centres for machinery, and so on. It is also suggested that the kolkhoz unions should take charge of kolkhoz social insurance arrangements—at present chaotic—and the fund to guarantee minimum wages, when this is introduced.

Obviously, the establishment of kolkhoz unions represents an important stage on the way towards the merging of State and co-

operative property. It is therefore less significant than it would have been some years back that the Government does not intend in the immediate future to increase the number of State farms, except in special circumstances: where new land is being opened up, for growing specialized crops (especially potatoes and vegetables near big industrial towns), or to combine in economically viable units weak collective farms and weak Repair Technical Stations.

H. T. WILLETTS

Latin America: A Problem for the West

BEFORE President Eisenhower made his ten-day tour of South America towards the end of February, only two United States Presidents had ever visited that part of the world. Mr Hoover, before he took office, travelled through Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Equador, and Uruguay. It was he who coined the phrase 'good neighbours', a phrase which was to be taken up years later by President Franklin Roosevelt who, after he was elected for the second time, visited Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay. Both these visits, particularly Mr Roosevelt's, were a splendid success. Spokesmen for Mr Eisenhower have described his visit too as 'an unqualified success'. But the South America which President Eisenhower found was a radically changed place from what it was when his predecessors were mobbed and the principles of Pan-Americanism were being held up to the world as something in the nature of an indissoluble commonwealth. The biggest change President Eisenhower found was not so much in the material progress which many of these countries have made even in the past twenty years as in the mentality of the people. Pan-Americanism has lost much of its meaning, and this is a tragic state of affairs, not only for the United States and for the twenty Latin American republics, but for the Western Powers generally.

Before President Eisenhower set off on his goodwill tour which was to take him to Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay, he announced that the object of this visit was to dispel the misunderstandings and ill-feeling which have corroded relations between the United States and almost all of her southern neighbours. Anti-Americanism of one degree or another exists everywhere from

Mexico to Argentina. Cuba is the extreme case, but hers is not the most serious aspect of Washington's Latin American problem. President Eisenhower's receptions in Argentina and Brazil, for instance, reflected in their own way just how deep the problem is. In Argentina he was received, by the people at least, almost with apathy, and this is ironic because the United States is largely responsible for financing Argentina's economic recovery efforts after the dissipations of the Perón regime. But ordinary Argentines are bitter because the United States made this aid conditional on the Frondizi Government's instituting a stiff austerity programme, designed by the International Monetary Fund, which has made the cost of living rocket and affected the lives of the mass of the people in other ways. It has also stoked resentment against the Frondizi Government and made its task all the harder. The Argentines' outlook is simple enough. They feel that the United States could have afforded to help them financially without imposing such stiff terms, and these feelings are providing mounds of ammunition for agitators, from Communists to *Peronistas*. The fact that austerity is perhaps the best medicine in the long run for Argentina's economic ills leaves the man-in-the-street, far more engrossed in his mounting grocer's bills, cold.

The Brazilian Government last year refused United States aid on these terms, on the argument that the risks of political and social unrest which it entailed were too unreasonable to be accepted. But the Brazilians are one of the more demonstrative and holiday-minded peoples of Latin America, and they gave Mr Eisenhower a rapturous reception. Nevertheless, even before he left Brazil, public jubilation over the visit was being dampened by suggestions that President Eisenhower's real object was to gain Brazil's support in case the State Department decided on a 'get-tough' policy towards Cuba. In exchange, Brazil was to receive American financial aid, including loans for the State oil monopoly: this is something that the United States had always resisted, on the ground that there was enough private American capital available if only Brazil would modify some of her nationalistic attitudes. It was also suggested that the United States might be prepared to give Brazil and other Latin American sugar producers a greater share of American sugar import quotas, but at Cuba's expense. Such suggestions may have been far-fetched, but the fact that they were believed merely showed how deep is the feeling of mistrust and misunderstanding of Washington's Latin American policies.

While President Eisenhower was in Brazil his warm assurances of American co-operation and understanding of Latin American problems seem to have built up in ordinary Brazilian minds, at least, far greater hopes of a radical change in Washington's economic aid policies than the President had perhaps intended. A few days after he left, the murmurs of disillusionment were already being voiced by the press. President Eisenhower's visit, it was implied, was merely another gesture in an attempt to retain Latin American loyalties by smiles and handshakes, and nothing more.

The change in Latin American mentality and the feeling against the United States are developments which President Eisenhower himself has more than once indicated that he does not fully appreciate. It is perhaps understandable, for this process of change has taken place with characteristic New World speed. American public opinion on the whole is far better informed on Latin American affairs than, for instance, British opinion; nevertheless, the stunned reaction in the United States to events in Cuba and Panama, for example, would seem to evince a lack of awareness of what has been happening in the Latin American mind. The violent outbursts against Mr Nixon in Venezuela and Peru in 1958 were another deep shock, and there was a tendency then, as there has been since, in dissecting the reasons for other anti-American outbursts, to put them all down to the instigation of a minority of agitators and Communists. Certainly Communists and nationalists have fanned the anti-American fires in Latin America, but they have not always started them.

What are the roots of anti-American feeling in Latin America today? Some go very deep. They are the rancours, particularly in Central America, against United States economic and even military intervention in the fairly recent past. There are also equally bitter feelings that since the war, when these countries were trying to stamp out the military and other oligarchies that had ruled them for generations, as for example in Venezuela and particularly in Cuba, the United States tended to coddle dictatorships on a commercial reasoning that it was easier and cheaper to do business with and get concessions from a *caudillo* than it was to deal with new and touchy democracies who had to take public opinion into account

But a much newer root of Latin American rancour, and it is not only against the United States, is that the loyalty of these countries to the Western community of nations is taken for granted. They argue that while the United States expects them to shape their

foreign policy to Washington's pattern and to eschew even trade relations with Russia on the ground of hemisphere security, Washington has done very little to help them to overcome political agitation and even Communism within their own borders, which stems from their under-development. These countries, with a population growth today greater than that of Asia, are having to face some mounting problems; and the biggest is poverty. It is estimated that of Latin America's almost 200 million inhabitants, only about half earn a living wage. A set of figures which still makes Latin Americans choke demonstrates the fact that, since the war, of the $31,500 million which the United States has granted in direct aid to Europe and the under-developed countries, Latin America's share was less than 2 per cent. Admittedly, Latin Americans have received considerable sums from the Export and Import Bank and around $25,000 million in private investment. But they resent it when this is referred to in terms of bounty; they regard it as strictly business. Export and Import Bank credit must all be spent in the United States on goods that could be bought more cheaply elsewhere but for the lack of credit. Latin Americans also contend that American private investment, backed by the State Department, seeks to play a sinister role in their domestic affairs, as, for example, in Guatemala and Cuba.

The economies of certain Central American Republics are virtually written up in the books of one American company. Latin Americans feel, too, that the United States, with her import quotas and price regulation for Latin American basic exports such as coffee and minerals, can change the colour of their economies from black to red almost overnight. These are harsh judgments at the least, but the inescapable fact is that a very great many Latin Americans believe them to be true, and they are the pegs now on which Russia and even China are hanging their propaganda posters. Local Communists and other opportunists have certainly fanned the smouldering fires of anti-American feeling. But even Latin Americans themselves perhaps are not fully aware of the extent to which Russia and the Soviet bloc generally are being encouraged to take advantage of these pinpoints of fire.

Russia's approach to Latin America is simple enough. She is offering to trade, even in terms of barter, and is showing in other ways an apparently greater understanding of these countries' problems and their anxiety and need to develop than the Western Powers are doing. Communist China's overtures, which are among

the most remarkable developments in the past few years, are only subtle because of the apparent lack of subtlety. China and the Latin American countries have a great deal in common, so Chinese propaganda gently points out. They are all under-developed countries, all anxious to improve the lot of the masses, which can only be done by greater industrialization and less dependence on the 'whims and price manipulations' of traditional Western markets. Latin American industrialization, according to the Russian and particularly the Chinese whispering campaign, is something which the United States and the industrial Powers of Western Europe do not want to see happen unless they can control it. This is precisely the problem which China has had to face, so Peking whispers on, and to prove just how they have faced this challenge the Chinese Government over the past two years has invited scores of Latin Americans, and not necessarily of the left wing, to come to China and see for themselves. Many of these visitors have come back with picture postcard images of Communism and realize it. Nevertheless, what a great many of them say and write when they are back in their own countries shows that they have been impressed, even though grudgingly at times, with what they have seen. Only a very short time ago a Chinese, to a Latin American, was very much a creature from another planet and it is a jolting experience to hear a Brazilian or a Cuban remark conversationally that, after all, they do have a great deal in common with the Chinese. In some respects, Chinese propaganda has been even more successful than Russian efforts

But how does a Latin American of Western European origin, of Catholic upbringing and who was horrified by Hungary, reconcile his conscience when talking about the necessity and the desirability of closer relations with Russia, for example? In the first place, for Latin Americans, who tend to think very much more of the present and the future, Hungary happened a long time ago. Secondly, as people like Cubans, Chileans, and Brazilians, who have all entered into trade agreements with Russia, argue, you do not have to be a Communist to do business with Communists. All Latin America is in an anguish to progress and if Russia appears willing to offer them the means to do so—and it must be assumed that Russia has learnt some lessons from past mistakes elsewhere in the world—she is not going to be turned down out of hand now as she might have been, and in fact was, only a few years ago by a country like Brazil, for instance, who had always heeded American exhortations to 'keep away from Russia'. The likelihood that Latin American trade

nissions to Moscow may soon be followed by diplomatic ones is ccepted with a shrug as inevitable.

What President Eisenhower and Mr Herter found in South merica was a new spirit of unity which is a very recent developnent indeed. Ten years ago a Brazilian and a Chilean regarded hemselves as poles apart geographically and mentally. Both would ave been supremely unconcerned if what is happening today in uba had happened then. Vast distances and the lack of transport ave always been the barriers between these people. The aeroplane as brought them much closer together but mentally too they are eginning to think of themselves as a people and to take an interest n each other's affairs, for they have come to the conclusion at last hat their strength obviously lies in their standing together. The ecent Central and South American Common Market schemes and lans for air unions are all expressions of this.

From an international political point of view it could be said that n a sense the Latin Americans are the largest bloc of uncommitted eople in the world. They also represent twenty votes in the United Nations, and while the Latin American bloc has hitherto tended to ide with the United States and the Western allies in any major issue, oday Latin Americans are showing a growing degree of neutralism. During President Eisenhower's visit to Brazil, President Kubitsheck, for instance, in referring to the 'conflict for influence' beween the two major power blocs in the world, implied unmisakably that Latin Americans were feeling more and more aloof bout this struggle. This is not, perhaps, strictly true, for Latin mericans, by their heritage and upbringing, tend to think of themelves as essentially part of the Western world. But here again the rouble is that they feel the United States, in particular, tends to egard this allegiance as a duty.

In the past few years more of these countries, even including Mexico, have been looking towards Europe for investment and echnical assistance in an effort to lessen their dependence on the United States, with which they are becoming increasingly impatient. Last year Cuba, for instance, made a concerted effort to trengthen her ties with Britain; and in fact in the year since the Fidel Castro Government took over Anglo-Cuban trade has almost doubled. But Britain's refusal, towards the end of last year, to sell to the Cubans fifteen jet aircraft which, they maintained, they needed for defence and would, in fact, exchange for piston-engined Sea Furies which Britain sold to the Batista regime, has changed Cuban

outlook towards this country. And it was not only Cubans who shook their heads sadly at what seemed to be the British Government's subservience to the State Department. While a great many thinking Latin Americans are often discomfitted by Dr Castro's persistent outbursts against the United States, many more feel that American interests which prospered under the Batista regime would like to see the Castro Government crash. Deep down inside they also believe that this is something that the State Department would like to see too.

Political aspects apart, the problem of financing and providing the technical aid for the prodigious pace of Latin American development is one which even the United States could not now shoulder alone. These are problems for the Western Powers if the Latin American countries, perhaps without fully realizing what is happening, are not to find themselves being drawn into the Soviet orbit. And Russia, with her offers to barter the tools of development which Latin Americans cannot always afford to buy, for goods which they cannot sell in the West, is already getting her foot in the door. There are Latin Americans who would like to see Britain, for instance, take up at least part of the role she once played in helping to lay the foundations of these countries' political and economic future. (The Cubans had evidently hoped that Britain might exercise her good offices in the nature of a mediator between them and the United States.) It is obviously a tall order for Britain; yet, is it too tall?

While the British Government is clearly anxious to see closer trade ties with that part of the world, British interests still tend to regard Latin Americans as irresponsible peoples ruled by inept governments. Yet a closer look at the achievements of countries such as, for instance, Brazil, Venezuela, Argentina, Mexico, Peru, and Chile, which are the scene of some of the most imaginative development undertakings in the world, makes nonsense of such judgments. The Germans and the French hold no such misconceptions While they are building up stakes in the future of this New World, Britain is often lagging behind: thus Latin Americans have begun to feel that it is not that she is no longer interested in them but that she cannot now face the competition. Britain today provides about 5 per cent of what Latin America buys abroad. As an investor she is virtually at the bottom of the list. A Soviet trade drive could damage British interests far more than it would those of, for instance, the Germans.

Latin America has experienced a series of transitions, from the

Mexican revolution of 1910 to the spread of democracy in the immediate post-war years. Today this vast area is going through yet another transition. Many of these countries have reached a stage in their development where they cannot possibly afford to turn back; for if they did, by reason of their fast-growing populations alone, the result would be a social upheaval bigger perhaps than even in Africa. Many of them could become economic slums and their peoples fully appreciate this. That is the reason for what may often seem their extravagant anguish for progress. If they cannot get from the West the means to develop and improve the lot of the awakening masses, they will seek it in the East. For Latin America, too, the past decade has been an era of change. The next decade will be one of even greater changes; and what these will be, will depend very much on how the West looks at Latin America's problems and aspirations today.

ANDREW MARSHALL

Literary and Artistic Life in the U.S.S.R.

DESPITE the rigid doctrinal attitudes adopted at the last Soviet Writers' Congress in May 1959 and the firm if smiling warnings of Mr Khrushchev, literary life in the U.S.S.R. shows signs of an animation which does not always respect the rules dear to the orthodox. It is true that Konstantin Fedin himself, who has replaced the ultra-rigid Surkov as head of the Soviet Writers' Union, strives to give to literary life that margin of freedom without which it would run the risk of falling into the dreary tedium of Zhdanovism which nobody wants.

Fedin is anything but a dogmatist. It is worth recalling that he began his literary career under the aegis of Gorki, as a member of the circle of the Serapion brothers who before the Revolution grouped around them the writers and poets of the neo-romantic trend. Even after he joined the Communist Party he retained a certain independence of outlook and an undeniable feeling for open-mindedness in literary and artistic matters. His great novels, *Cities and Years*, *The Brothers*, and *The Rape of Europe*, deal in a way that commands respect with the situation and role of intellectuals in Soviet society. At present he is working on the last volume of a tri-

logy in which he pursues the different stages of the troubled life of a young intellectual revolutionary between 1910 and 1939. Is this a veiled reply to *Doctor Zhivago*? Perhaps. Fedin behaved with noticeable discretion at the time of the campaign against Pasternak. Persecution is not his trade. If he had been listened to, *Doctor Zhivago*—which now has a clandestine circulation of hundreds in Moscow and Leningrad—would have been published long ago. Fedin has never disguised his opinion that in literature the writer's own gifts matter much more than his ideological convictions.

EHRENBURG, THE CHAMPION OF LIBERALISM

That opinion, however, is not yet generally admitted in literary criticism or by the censorship. It is at the centre of the discussions which, to judge from the press, are going on in literary circles, among publishers, and in the universities. Of late the 'liberals'[1] have gained a little ground everywhere. It may seem surprising that one of the most resolute champions of intellectual liberalism is none other than Ilya Ehrenburg, who is most familiar to Western circles as the ambassador of Soviet official culture abroad. Ehrenburg today seems to have rediscovered the youthful and romantic inspiration of his early years. A recent article of his, about a far from conformist poet, Maria Svetaeva, aroused a positive uproar among the 'dogmatists'. In it Ehrenburg went so far as to speak of 'the magical nature of art', an expression incompatible with the vocabulary of socialist realism, miles away from any magic or irrationality.

In this same article Ehrenburg praised the genre of the 'confession' which has had so fine a tradition in Russian literature. In analysing Svetaeva's work, he declared that 'a true poet, by the very virtue of his inspiration, can manage to surmount the fact that he may be out of tune with his age; he can overcome his isolation and, carried along by the enchantment of his art, create a visionary poetry.'

This homage to the irrational in art earned Ehrenburg some sharp reproofs from Professor Mechenko, who, in a recent lecture to university historians, sociologists, and writers, compared him, *horribile dictu*, with Pasternak. Mechenko made Ehrenburg responsible for the current spirit of revolt in certain student circles.

[1] This is my name for them: they themselves reject any description which might suggest that they were in any way organized, and confine themselves to claiming a certain degree of autonomy in relation to artistic expression and the search for new forms.

Students, encouraged by Ehrenburg's ideas, have had the daring to defend the thesis that 'the more a poet stands aside from the realities of his epoch, the more likely he will be to express the essence of that epoch.' Which is tantamount to saying that Pasternak, despite his isolation, or even because of it, is more representative of present-day Russia than, say, Gladkov or Kochetov, and constitutes the most complete denial of that 'engagement' which the Party demands of writers.

The 'dogmatists', too, continue to harass Ehrenburg. On a tone of accusation another defender of orthodoxy, Madame Serebrovskaya, denounced him for having, in his *Thaw*, 'initiated the line which culminated in Dudintsev's novel' and triggered off the artistic revolt which we shall describe later.[1]

Nevertheless it seems that Ehrenburg does not let himself be intimidated by these concerted attacks. He behaves as if his ambition was to compete for the favour of the young with Pasternak —who has not the possibility of making himself heard. A long study of Ehrenburg's on Chekhov, published in *Novy Mir* (1959, Nos. 5 and 6), added fuel to the fire, and his 'Verdicts on Literature', published in the *Literaturnaya Gazeta* (9 June 1959), is regarded by the young as a manifesto of literary revival.

Ehrenburg is not the only one. Other writers, and by no means minor ones, are taking up a position in favour of the autonomy of literature and against the dictatorship of the censor. Even the cautious Simonov has expressed the view that socialist realism, rightly understood, need not necessarily exclude a certain modernity of style. A. Tvardovski, who, after being evicted in 1954, has recently regained his post as chief editor of *Novy Mir*, inveighs against those who 'in the name of the progressive character of literature favour a colourless and monotonous production and attach more importance to an author's political or ideological opinions than to the artistic quality of his work'.

ADVANCE OF NEO-REALISM AT THE EXPENSE OF HEROIC ART

Parallel with the press campaign of the 'liberals' a new trend is developing which might be described as neo-realist. A group of gifted young writers has decided to break with the hidebound, rhetorical style of the Stalinist era and to tackle contemporary subjects with an anti-conventional bias which, to all appearances, derives its inspiration from Italian neo-realism. One of the leaders

[1] *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, 6 October 1959.

of this new school is V. Nekrasov, author of *In the Trenches of Stalingrad*, a sober novel shorn of ideological flourishes, and one of the best-sellers of recent years. In an article called 'Sublime Words and Simple Words', published in *The Art of the Cinema* (1959, No. 5), Nekrasov breaks a lance in defence of a new approach, simple, modest, and comprehensive, towards 'life as it is'. At the same time he condemns in violent terms the false pathos of the painter Dovchenko, hitherto the idol of Soviet academic circles, whose 'sublime' works delight the bureaucrats whom he complacently portrays as 'supermen'. Nekrasov also strongly advocates —after a visit to Italy which made a great impression on him—the establishment of more lively cultural exchanges with the West.

It is noticeable that neo-realism has made its mark especially in the sphere of war literature which is having a great vogue at present in the Soviet Union. One of the novels typical of this trend, *A Single Inch of Earth*, by G. Baklanov, a friend of Nekrasov, has provoked passionate debates. Some greeted it with enthusiasm: 'At last here is something new about war, something that breathes of life', and the public followed them, while others—the envious—accused Baklanov of being a follower of Remarque and a 'naturalist' who, instead of portraying the soldiers fighting in the trenches as the incarnation of Soviet steadfastness, describes their weaknesses in the face of the horrors and cruelty of battle.[1]

THE VORONIN AFFAIR

The debate for or against heroic literature, for or against the 'poeticization of daily life' (which, according to Madame Trifonova, is in the best tradition of Russian literature), was still in progress when the Voronin affair broke out. A young Leningrad writer, Serge Voronin, published in *Neva*, the periodical he edits (Leningrad is always to the fore in these matters), a long story called 'Return to the Country'. To the great scandalization of the 'dogmatists', Voronin had chosen as his hero a soldier of the ill-fated Vlassov army, and he showed such understanding, pity, and sympathy in his portrayal of this man who had forfeited his heritage that the critics could not get over it. Here we see resurrected from the very foundations of the Russian soul that spirit of 'universal forgiveness' so dear to Tolstoi: 'man is fallible, God alone has a right to judge.' 'The way in which Voronin attacks his subject,' wrote the usually liberal Smirnov, editor-in-chief of the *Litera-*

[1] *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, 23 July 1959.

turnaya Gazeta, 'amounts to a moral rehabilitation of treason. . . Voronin, perhaps unconsciously, has taken as his target one of the most sacred and unassailable principles of our Party and our people: steadfastness in battle against the enemy, absolute intransigeance in the face of every kind of degradation and above all of the lowest form of degradation, treason towards the fatherland and towards our noble cause, the cause of Communism. This is a bad work, a harmful work that Voronin has produced and published in the review he edits.'

Doubtless nothing was further from Voronin's mind than to write an apologia for high treason. His soldier of the Vlassov army is at bottom just a poor chap who had got himself enlisted, like so many other peasants, through weakness and ignorance, yielding to the promise of freedom held out before his eyes. Thousands of men like this from the Vlassov army, recaptured by the authorities, have recently been amnestied in the U.S.S.R. after spending many years on forced labour. Individually they may be treated with indulgence. But it is still forbidden to show compassion publicly at the Calvary of these unfortunates.

KOCHETOV AND THE OTHER DOGMATISTS

Voronin's story marks the furthest limit to which Soviet neo-realism can go without provoking the authorities. For the time being, this school—which has won undoubted favour with the public—does not claim exclusiveness for itself; its mouthpieces, for example L. Lazarev and Tvardovski, content themselves with asserting the legitimacy of their trend within the framework (or on the fringes) of socialist realism; they proclaim, with the Georgian critic Markvelashvili, the 'pluralism' of literary schools of thought. And they profit by the tacit support of all those writers who seem to have agreed to abstain from public debate but who are working in the same direction—among them, to mention only some names known outside the borders of Russia, Vera Panova, Aliger, Ovechkin, Kazakevich, Kaverin, Paustovski, V. Grosman, the populists Yuri Kazakov and Nikitin, etc.

As for the 'dogmatists', they have been deprived of their leader through the death of their best-known representative, Fedor Gladkov, author of *Cement*. A young 'ultra', Kochetov, has carried on where he left off by publishing a *roman à clé*, *The Brothers Yershov*, an insidious denunciation of intellectual circles in Moscow which Kochetov accuses of revisionism and worse.

The 'dogmatists' certainly strive to make up for the talent they lack by adopting a polemical tone of extreme violence. Here, for example, is an attack recently launched by Kochetov in the review *Life and Letters* against Nekrasov and his school: "There are among us people who think that, in order to re-establish unity in our literature, it suffices for the one side to trust in the sincerity of the other, while the latter shamelessly attacks everything good that our literature has produced in the service of the Party and the popular cause, and makes it a point of honour and emulation to minimize the greatness of the past and the present, to discredit our heroes, and to put the *petit bourgeois* on a pedestal.'

True, none of the well-known writers support Kochetov's campaign. But he still has many friends among the press and also among university professors. The tactics of the 'conservatives' consist in making their adversaries as suspect as possible in the eyes of the Party leaders. Thus one of them, the critic Arkhipov, deplores with crocodile tears the fact that 'unhealthy tendencies, of definitely revisionist inspiration, are beginning to show themselves in Soviet literature. . . Abusing the indulgence of the leaders [an allusion to Khrushchev] certain writers are attempting to attack the very foundations of Soviet literature.' But a recent unsigned editorial in the *Literaturnaya Gazeta* (probably by Smirnov), while taking no part in the neo-realism debate, has ridiculed the way in which Kochetov and his friends go about attacking those whose only crime is a failure to appreciate them as authors. It seems that the day of gratuitous denunciation is over in the U.S.S.R.

The 'dogmatists' continually attack George Lukacs, whose 'revisionist' ideas on aesthetics had found a wide public in the U.S.S.R. They are especially critical of the old philosopher—who now lives in Budapest in almost complete isolation—for having questioned the meaning of the theses on 'Party Literature' formulated by Lenin in 1905. According to Lukacs, the ideological prerequisite advanced by Lenin concerned only propaganda literature published by the Party press, and not literary life as a whole. This is an essential point which is completely justified, but it filled with horror the censors whose whole life is based on a cold war against every sort of originality. But it is worth noting that Lukacs' thesis had found defenders even among the ranks of the contributors to the Moscow review *Problems of Philosophy* (1956, No. 5).

Another heretic who is frequently under attack is the Yugoslav critic J. Vidmar, whose recent study on 'Lenin's Relations with Tolstoi' was greedily devoured in student circles. Following up Lukacs' analysis, Vidmar shows that Lenin was not at all dogmatic in matters of art, and what interested him in literature was the writer's breadth of vision and creative inspiration, not his political opinions.

THE POLISH 'TROJAN HORSE'

The revolt against conformity has affected artistic as well as literary life. And if, on the plane of literature, the influence of the Hungarian Lukacs and the Yugoslav Vidmar has helped to introduce a breath of fresh air into the Soviet scene, in the sphere of the arts it is the Poles who have assumed the role of initiators.

At the exhibition of Polish contemporary art, organized in the spring of last year as part of a general exhibition from the twelve countries of the Soviet bloc, the greater part of the painting and sculpture was non-figurative and bore the clear stamp of Paris; and this gave rise to a sort of 'battle of Hernani' which ended with a definite advantage to the modernists. A large number, perhaps the majority, of the young Soviet artists recognized in the works of Cubis, Eibisch, and Marczynski the image of what they had been dreaming about: a break with photographic representation, daring in the search for something new, and a confident approach to the world of form.

The public pounced upon the catalogue of the Polish exhibition, especially because of the preface by Professor J. Starzynski, who gave a lucid and unprovocative exposition of the non-conformist point of view which predominates among the artists of his country.

It was, in particular, Starzynski's allusions to the 'Western' character of Polish art that provoked the most violent reaction among the dogmatist artists and critics. On 26 March 1959, in a public lecture on the twelve-country exhibition, the Bulgarians Obretenov and Zontchev opened fire. They were followed by the Czechs, the Rumanians, and others. On this occasion the most eminent of the Soviet artists, Johanson, Serov, and Gerasimov, doubtless to avoid contravening the laws of hospitality, spoke with moderation; they merely politely reproached the Poles for having 'fallen abruptly from one excess into another'. But two months later, the review *Iskusstvo* (Art) condemned the 'Polish way' as 'a dangerous deviation from socialist art. . . Whatever may be said

about the "Polish" and "realist" character of this art, nothing will make us forget that abstract art is essentially cosmopolitan, the art of decadence and imperialism.'

THE YOUNG TURKS OF SOVIET ART

But it was too late. Encouraged by their Polish colleagues, the young Russian artists are discovering with wonder and amazement their own modernist traditions, hitherto suppressed by the Stalinists. They now hark back to the 'Knave of Diamonds' circle (1910–26), which included among its members Konchalovski, Machkov, and Kuprin, followers of Cézanne and Matisse; to the 'formalists' of the *Mir Izkusstva* (World of Art) group which continued to exist till 1924; to the tradition of the great Malevich. The fifth Exhibition of young Soviet artists, held last August, provided irrefutable proof of the existence of a strong 'modernist', abstract, and surrealist trend in Soviet art. This trend was represented by the works of Michael Kuznetsov, a follower of Malevich, of Alimov, Kupriachin, and the Uzbek Bulatov who applies the methods of icon-painting to modern themes.

It was in vain that the President of the Fine Arts Academy, Johanson, who directs the art section of the review *Sovetskaya Kultura*, protested against 'this intrusion of the cosmopolitan and anti-Soviet spirit'. Well-known writers such as Yuri Nagibin espoused the cause of the Young Turks. 'President Johanson has no right, in this debate on the modern style, to make use of the vocabulary of the inquisition or of litigation,' wrote Nagibin in the *Literaturnaya Gazeta* (8 October 1959). It became apparent that young revolutionary artists were enjoying the support of several academicians, including Professors Mochalski and Sokolov-Skali. Even the official review of the Moscow Artists' Union, *Moskovski Khudoznik*, adopted a friendly attitude towards the innovators. And the failure of an exhibition of the arch-conformist sculptor Vuchetich demonstrated that a large part of the intellectual élite was turning away from the insipid, artificially monumental art which had prevailed in Stalin's day.

'Socialist realism' was beaten. It was with some bitterness that a reporter of the *Literaturnaya Gazeta* (25 August 1959), attached to the defunct style in art, spoke of the reaction of the young (whom he described as teddy-boys) to the work of the old sculptor Vuchetich. Here are some impressions gleaned by this reporter in the exhibition gallery: 'Just think of all the marble that's been wasted

on this rubbish! Goodness, how fed-up one is with so-called heroic art!. . . See how far behind the West we are. There, artists broke long ago with primitive naturalism and bourgeois realism. They have shaken off the yoke of slavish imitation of outward reality and are carving out the way towards the world of true inner meaning. Whereas we, we're just marking time. An absolutely lamentable exhibition—quite inconceivable in the West. It's just old-fashioned.'. . . 'You see, art has entered a new phase: the breaking-up of forms. We don't need all those factory chimneys and landscapes and photographic portraits any more.'

Indignant at the sacrilegious views and the 'nihilism' of these young people, the reporter deplored that 'there was no one, not a single artist or anyone with militant convictions, to take up the cudgels and defend socialist realism.' 'It was in that exhibition gallery,' he wrote, 'that I understood the mistake we have made in neglecting the aesthetics aspect—above all now when we are opening our doors to art from the capitalist countries. Certainly, we are glad about these exchanges that are going on. But people should know that we do not always share the ideas that are brought to us. And we must teach our young people to distinguish between what is good and what is bad.'

The new head of the department for cultural relations with foreign countries, Yuri Zhukov, also recently expressed his anxiety at seeing introduced into Russia, under the impetus of coexistence, the 'Trojan Horse' of Western culture. But how are the authorities to set about combating this passion for modern art which is typical of the young today, from whom the very existence of the Impressionists and Cubists has been kept hidden? Perhaps the leaders will realize that the 'permanent revolution' in the sphere of the arts in no way threatens the foundations of Soviet society which is now consolidated, and will adopt a tolerant attitude.

François Fejtö

The United Nations Economic Commission for Africa

The Tangier Meeting

THE movement towards independence in Africa has lent new mean
ing to regional co-operation for the advancement of this continen
It is early yet to see along which paths this co-operation will mainl
develop, but one new instrument that may offer increasing scope i
the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa. Launche
by a General Assembly resolution which had been sponsored b
Ghana and the Sudan, the U.N.E.C.A., the fourth U.N. Region
Commission, held its first session in Addis Ababa from 29 Decembe
1958 to 6 January 1959 and concluded its second session in Tangie
early in February 1960.

This latest session, little noticed by the Western press, was at
tended by some 300 delegates and observers. The delegates, mostl
of ministerial rank, represented ten independent African States[1] an
six European countries with responsibilities in Africa,[2] all of thei
members of the Commission. Delegates were present also fro
eleven associate members, dependent territories which include
Nigeria, Somalia, and the Belgian Congo, all three of whom wi
achieve independence this year and will then become full membe
of the Commission. Observers were present from thirteen nor
African countries, including Canada, Brazil, India, Japan, th
U.S.A., and the U.S.S.R. In addition eight Specialized Agencies
the United Nations, such as the World Bank and the Food and Agr
culture Organization, were represented, as well as twelve inte
national non-governmental organizations.

The cold war was refreshingly absent, despite the U.S.S.
observer's reference to colonialism as having been relegated to 'th
dirty and stinking rubbish heap of history', which found little ech
As one African delegate remarked, 'He has been badly advised. W
shall not build our future on bitterness.'

An interesting feature was the presence of the South Africa
delegation which attended for the first time, mixed on equal term
with their black colleagues, and was obviously favourably impresse
by the quality of their debating. The South African contributio

[1] Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Libya, Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia, Uni of South Africa, United Arab Republic.

[2] Belgium, France, Italy, Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom.

was in the spirit of a member of an all-African team, expressing 'keen solidarity in Africa's economic struggle' and firmly identifying South Africa with Africa's fortunes.

Most of the delegations were worried about the possible consequences to their trade of the preferences given under the European Common Market treaty to those African countries now associated with the Six. The damage, as the Ghana delegate said, to the trade of those left outside was at present only potential, but a threat existed. Under the Common Market treaty, for example, a common outer tariff of 9 per cent on cocoa was envisaged, but the cocoa exports of the associated dependencies could enter the six Common Market countries duty free. The Liberian delegate expressed the view that the effect of the European Common Market on Africa would be trade-diverting rather than trade-creating. The French, on the other hand, thought that the increase in trade between the Six and the associated African territories would result in a general improvement, and they stressed the need for close working relationships between the Common Market and E.C.A. Mr John Profumo, for the United Kingdom, stated Britain's anxiety on this subject and thought that G.A.T.T., the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, was the right forum for dealing with it. The outcome was a resolution requesting the Executive Secretary to undertake broad studies of the effects of economic groupings in Europe upon African trade and development, to recommend measures to offset any prejudicial effects, and to convene in 1960 a committee of the Commission to examine these studies.

Other dangers threatening Africa discussed by the Commission[1] were that food production was increasing more slowly than population (thus reducing the available supply *per capita*), and the growing use in the industrial countries of synthetic substitutes for many of the raw materials exported by Africa. Owing to the latter trend, a 75 per cent increase in industrial production in the developed Western countries would require an increase of only 30 per cent in raw material imports. On the other hand, import demands in African countries were rising faster than the growth of domestic production. In order to avoid balance-of-payments difficulties it might seem, therefore, that countries dependent upon exports of primary commodities were for ever condemned to develop at a

[1] Much of the discussion of long-term trends was based on the findings of the U.N. *Economic Survey of Africa since 1950* (New York, 1959). This Report was prepared by the U.N. Department of Social and Economic Affairs at the request of E.C.A.

slower rate than the industrial countries, thus steadily widening the already vast gap between the two groups. Africa's present weakness could be summed up in the fact that the prices of both her exports and her imports were determined outside Africa.

South Africa, pointing out that in 1958 her export earnings had fallen by 12 per cent as the result of the decline in prices, urged Africans to process as much as possible of their products prior to exporting, thus adding labour value to that of the raw materials. The need for African countries to diversify their economies was repeatedly emphasized, though the immense difficulties of doing this owing to shortage of capital and trained manpower, were recognized. Libya and other delegations called for joint African marketing arrangements and for the development of intra-African trade in order to stimulate industrialization, alleviate balance-of-payments difficulties, and reduce dependence on the outside world.

A resolution was adopted requesting the Executive Secretary to make a survey of the present state and potentialities of intra African trade and industry and the measures necessary to stimulate both. He was also asked to assist in preparing a conference of African business men, to be held in 1961, to consider ways in which private enterprise could promote the expansion of trade among African countries. It is expected that the conference will also discuss the possibility of establishing an African Development Bank

A point repeatedly emphasized by the Africans was their preference to receive aid under multilateral arrangements rather than bilaterally. The Tunisian delegate echoed the general feeling when he said that bilateral aid was incompatible with full independence. Yet at present by far the greater proportion of aid in the form of grants loans, and the provision of personnel is received under bilateral arrangements. The advantages of multilateral aid were that the initiative in selecting the fields in which aid was received rested with the recipient country and was not influenced by the political or other preferences of the provider. Through multilateral aid a wider variety of sources of equipment, experts, and training facilities was at the disposal of recipients. Also, conditions to ensure the efficient utilization of aid, which would be regarded as 'strings' if bilaterally imposed, were readily accepted from the United Nations and its Specialized Agencies.

Mr Profumo announced the increase in Britain's contribution to the U.N. Special Fund from \$1 million in 1959 to \$5 million in 1960; also that Britain intended to contribute £50 million to the

International Development Association when formed. But at the end of a string of figures showing increases in British grants and loans to less developed countries he warned the Commission that they 'should use statistics as a drunkard uses a lamp-post—more for support than for illumination'.

A resolution co-sponsored by seven African countries was adopted expressing the view that the Commission should play an important role in the consideration of any new proposals that may be made for multilateral economic and financial assistance to Africa, and voicing the hope that any new multilateral machinery for the implementation of such proposals would consult and collaborate closely with the E.C.A. and its secretariat in the co-ordination of aid. The French delegate, stating that this resolution was one of the most important the Commission had been asked to discuss, wanted the priority in the operative paragraph to be reversed, and the Executive Secretary to be requested to ensure close contact with any new machinery that might be established. France abstained on the vote, as did Britain, the latter on the ground that the resolution might be interpreted as restricting the methods and channels of aid and as involving the acceptance of an obligation. South Africa, Portugal, and Spain likewise abstained, but the other member countries were unanimous in their support. The Liberian delegate said that the resolution was intended to ensure that E.C.A. would not be by-passed in any new international aid programme.

A resolution submitted by the United Kingdom and Ghana was unanimously adopted supporting proposals made by the Community Development Workshop at Addis Ababa several months earlier. These included a recommendation that a Committee on Community Development be established to assess progress and work out the E.C.A. programme of work in this field for the following years. Britain expressed readiness to join this Committee. The discussion showed that it was generally recognized that the development programmes of governments can succeed only if they are able to enlist the active co-operation of their peoples. The Gezira scheme was instanced by the Sudan delegate as proof of the value of community development. Other questions discussed ranged over a wide field including surveys of resources, locust control, economic and statistical training for Africans, and the co-operative movement.

In short, the session has demonstrated that enthusiasm exists among Africans for the E.C.A., which they seem anxious should not

be by-passed or rivalled by any other organization for aiding Africa. On the question of where to meet in the future the Tunisian delegate said: 'Our Commission is young and beautiful. We must show it around a bit, taking care not to arouse jealousy.'

GORDON EVANS

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The Statutory Background of Apartheid

A Chronological Survey of South African Legislation

THE racial problem in the Union of South Africa is an old one and stems from the days when the Dutch farmers, advancing into the interior, were forced to wage constant warfare against Bantu tribes. From the inception of the Union in 1909 the Government pursued a more or less definite policy of racial segregation, but since the Nationalist Party came into power in 1948 this policy has been developed into a deliberate implementation of 'apartheid', of 'separate racial development'. The economic development of the country has brought about some measure of racial integration, but more often than not with disadvantage to the underprivileged, with overcrowding in slum areas in the towns, the disruption of African family life, the desertion of the reserves by the menfolk in an effort to find better paid work, and so on.

The Report in 1956 of the Tomlinson Commission,[1] set up in 1951 to investigate the socio-economic development of Native areas, recommended total 'separate development' and produced a blueprint for the policy. It urged the adoption of a comprehensive long-term plan for the rehabilitation of the Bantu areas and the diversification of their economy. These Bantu areas, comprising the 'scheduled' areas laid down in the Native Land Act of 1913,[2] the land 'released' to Africans between 1913 and 1936, and the land acquired since 1936 by the Native Trust and Land Act of that year,[3] were estimated at the end of 1958 to be equivalent to only about 11·9 per cent of the total area of the Union. The Commission recommended that the Bantu must be given security of land tenure based on private ownership in both rural and urban areas; a fully

[1] Only a very limited number of copies of the main report, which ran to seventeen volumes, were issued in roneoed form The Commission prepared a summary, U.G 61/1955 See also D. Hobart Houghton · *The Tomlinson Report, A Summary of the Findings and Recommendations in the Tomlinson Commission Report* ohannesburg, S. African Institute of Race Relations, 1956, 4s. 6d. (S.A)

[2] See below, p. 188. [3] See below, *ibid*.

diversified economy with the establishment of a true Bantu farm-
ing class and with large-scale urban development within Bant
areas must be the aim. For the first ten-year period an expenditur
of approximately £104 million was suggested, and it was est
mated that the Bantu areas when fully developed would then b
able to carry 8–10 million people. In 1956 the Government de
cided that only African entrepreneurs would be allowed to set u
manufacturing concerns within the reserves, but that white in
dustrialists would be actively encouraged to establish themselve
on the borders of these areas.

The *Bantu Investment Corporation Act*, No. 34 of 1959, provide
that a corporate body known as the Bantu Investment Corporatio
of South Africa Ltd would be set up to promote and encourag
the economic development of the Bantu areas. The share capita
was to be £500,000, with the South Africa Native Trust as the sol
shareholder. This is a small first step in implementation of th
Tomlinson Report. In any case even if all the Commission'
recommendations were to be implemented the plan would stil
leave slightly more Africans than Whites in the European area
and therefore the racial problem would remain.

RACIAL CLASSIFICATION

The population of the Union is divided into four main groups
Europeans, Asiatics, persons of mixed blood or Coloureds, an
Natives or 'pure-blooded individuals of the Bantu race' None o
these four classifications forms a uniform ethnic group. The Euro
peans have two different origins, those speaking Afrikaans, th
descendants of the early Dutch settlers, and the more recen
English-speaking immigrants. The Asiatics are mainly Indian
imported as labourers towards the end of the nineteenth century
acute labour shortages in the Transvaal mines at the turn of th
century led to the importation of Chinese labourers, but most c
these were repatriated in 1910. The Coloureds, mainly in the Cap
Province, have assimilated a great deal of European culture, i
1946, 89 per cent were found to have Afrikaans as their hom
language, while most of the rest spoke English, and according to th
1936 census 92 per cent of them were Christian. Natives are divide
into eight main groups, Xhosa and Zulu being predominant. Suc
an ethnic mixture produces great difficulties of classification for th
purpose of racial segregation as followed by the Nationalist Govern
ment.

1950.—*Population Registration Act, No. 30.* Every South African to be registered as a White, Coloured, or Native, and every Coloured Person or Native classified according to the ethnic group to which he belongs. Amended by Act No. 71 of 1956 whereby appeal against classification must be made within thirty days and be supported by affidavits.

POLITICAL RIGHTS

Before the Union each of the four provinces had its own electoral system; in the Transvaal and Orange Free State the franchise was restricted to Whites, and in Natal Acts of 1883 and 1896 disfranchised all Natives and Asiatics. Only in the Cape of Good Hope were the qualifications for voters the same for all; and these franchise rights for non-Europeans in the Cape were safeguarded in the South Africa Act of 1909 by what came to be called 'the entrenched clause', whereby the Union Parliament, though possessing the right to prescribe by law the qualifications necessary for the franchise, was subject to the proviso that no such law could disqualify, by reason of his race or colour, any existing or future voter in the Cape of Good Hope, unless the Bill be passed by a two-thirds majority of both Houses. It was, however, laid down in the Act that only Europeans could be elected to Parliament, and by law or convention non-Europeans are excluded from the office of Governor-General, from the Cabinet, and from all higher posts in the public service. In effect no non-European is ever put by the State in authority over a European.

In the 1920s there were many attempts among the Europeans to remove the Cape Natives from the common roll of electors; and the grant of the franchise in 1930 to European women and in 1931 to all Europeans without qualification reduced considerably the proportionate influence of the Native vote.

1936.—*Representation of Natives Act, No. 12*, passed by the Hertzog-Smuts Coalition Government. All Natives of the Union were given the right to elect through native electoral colleges four Senators, one for the Transkeian Territories (the largest single area occupied only by Bantus), one for the rest of the Cape Province, one for Natal, and one for Transvaal and Orange Free State combined. The Natives of the Cape were removed from the common electoral roll and, on a separate native roll, were given the right to elect three Representatives to the House of Assembly. All these Senators and Representatives were to be 'of European descent'. The Act also created a Natives' Representative Council with consultative and advisory functions, the majority of its twenty-two members being non-Europeans. (This Council adjourned *sine die* in August 1946 as a protest against what it termed the Government's failure to meet Native needs.)

1946.—*Asiatic Land Tenure and Indian Representation Act, No. 24.* Provision was made for Indian representation on a communal basis, male Indians over twenty-one and with certain minor property qualifications (mainly in Natal and the Transvaal) being represented by two Senators and three members of the House of Assembly (all European) and two Indian members in the Natal Provincial Council. (This Act was boycotted by the Indian community, who insisted on being admitted to the common roll, and was repealed in 1948.)

1951.—*Separate Representation of Voters Act, No. 46*, passed by the Malan Government. This Act aimed to place the Cape Coloureds on a separate roll and allow them to vote for four special European Representatives to the House of Assembly and two to the Cape Provincial Council, not necessarily Europeans. A Board of Coloured Affairs was established with three nominated non-European members from Natal, the Orange Free State, and Transvaal, and eight elected non-European members, two from each of the four Cape Electoral Divisions established for the election of the Representatives in the House of Assembly. This Board was to have an advisory function on matters affecting the non-European population.

The Act was passed in the Union Parliament by a simple majority in each House and was immediately challenged in the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court as not having been passed in accordance with the provisions of the 'entrenched clause' of the South Africa Act, namely by a two-thirds majority of both Houses. The Supreme Court held the Act invalid, despite the Government's claim that the High Court of Parliament had power to override the decisions of the Appellate Division; in the general election of 1953 the previous electoral rules obtained in Cape Province. A *South Africa Act Amendment Bill* was submitted by the Malan Government to the new Parliament, both Houses sitting in joint session, but failed to secure a two-thirds majority.

The *Appellate Division Quorum Act*, passed in 1955, increased the quorum of judges from four to eleven when the validity of an Act of Parliament was in question. New judges were appointed. In the same year, the *Senate Act* increased the number of Senators from forty-eight to eighty-nine with the aim of ensuring the necessary two-thirds majority.

The *South Africa Act Amendment Act*, No. 9 of 1956, enforced the Separate Representation of Voters Act of 1951, removed the 'entrenched clause', and declared that no court of law should be competent to inquire into or pronounce upon the validity of any Act of Parliament, except Acts dealing with the two official languages or those amending the Constitution. The Opposition's application for orders declaring invalid the Senate Act and the South Africa Act

Amendment Act was dismissed by the Supreme Court and by a 10 to 1 judgement in the Appeal Court.

The *Separate Representation of Voters Amendment Act*, No. 30 of 1956, amended the 1951 Act to stipulate that all Representatives elected by the Coloured voters of the Cape must be White and created a Council for Coloured Affairs with a majority of nominated members.

1950.—*Suppression of Communism Act, No. 44*, amended 1951. It embodied a very broad definition of Communism, and although it applied to Whites and non-Whites it has discriminated most against the European members of Parliament who represent Native interests, and against non-European leaders who can be charged with 'bringing about political, industrial, social or economic change by the promotion of disturbance or disorder etc.'

1951.—*Bantu Authorities Act, No. 68.* Abolished the Natives' Representative Council established by the 1936 Act and empowered the Governor-General to convene a conference of Native chiefs, who are themselves Government servants, to ascertain the feelings of the Native population. It reorganized local authorities in the Native areas by establishing tribal, regional, and territorial councils with advisory functions and authority to make representations to the Minister of Native Affairs.

1953 —*Public Safety Act, No. 3*, and *Criminal Law Amendment Act, No. 8*, militated particularly against campaigns of resistance to discriminatory laws and followed on the 1952 campaign of 'defiance of unjust laws'.

—*Government Notice No. 2017* prohibited meetings of more than ten Africans without permission of the Minister of Native Affairs.

1958.—*Proclamation No. 67* banned the African National Congress or any other organization 'detrimental to the peace, order, and good government' of Africans on any Trust land or in any scheduled or released area.

1959.—*Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act, No. 46.* Aimed 'to preserve separate white and African Communities'. The Secretary for Bantu Administration and Development wrote in an article in March 1959 'the maintenance of white political supremacy over the country as a whole is a *sine qua non* for racial peace and economic prosperity in South Africa'.[1]

The Act abolished the Parliamentary representation of Africans by repealing the Representation of Natives Act of 1936, though the Native representatives are to retain their seats until the expiry of their term in June 1960.

Eight national Bantu units are recognized and five Commissioners-General are to be appointed by the Governor-General to represent the Government in the areas of these national units and to guide the Bantu

[1] *Optima*, quarterly, published by the Anglo-American Corporation of South Africa Ltd, Johannesburg.

authorities. A system of tribal and, in the Transkei, district authorities under local chiefs, regional authorities, and eight territorial authorities is to be established by the Governor-General;[1] all enactments of these authorities are to be subject to the approval of the Governor-General and the Minister of Bantu Affairs. The territorial authorities may, in consultation with the Minister, nominate African representatives to act as 'ambassadors' in urban areas.

1959.—*Native Affairs Act, No. 55* consolidated laws providing for the establishment of the Native Affairs Commission and of local councils, which were retained by the Africans in many districts in preference to the Bantu authorities.

1960, April.—*Unlawful Organizations Act.* 8 April, Proclamation issued banning the African National Congress and the Pan-Africanist Congress for one year.

FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT AND RIGHTS OF SETTLEMENT

Before the Union was established all four Provinces had extensive legislative provisions, mainly to control vagrancy and to prevent an uncontrolled flow of casual labour, particularly into urban areas These laws, in so far as they concern the Natives, come under the general heading of 'Pass Laws' and cover a large number of documents such as service contracts for workers in mines and factories, as laid down by the *Native Labour Regulation Act*, No. 15 of 1911, and tax receipts under the *Natives Taxation and Development Act*, No. 41 of 1925. The Native Laws Commission of 1946–8 defined a 'Pass' from the point of view of a Native as a document which is carried only by people of a particular race, which is connected with restriction of freedom of movement, and which must be carried at all times as it must be produced on demand for the police or other officials. The Pass Laws are extremely complicated and it was stated by a Native Representative in Parliament during the debate on the Natives (Abolition of Passes) Act in 1952 that one person out of ten went to prison for some period every year, in most cases for Pass Law offences.

1927.—*Native Administration Act, No. 38,* empowered the Governor-General to create and define by Proclamation pass areas within which Natives would be required to carry passes and to prescribe regulations for the control and prohibition of Natives' movements in such areas.

1932.—*Native Service Contract Act, No. 24,* prevented the employment of a Native not in possession of certain identification documents.

1945.—*Natives (Urban Areas) Consolidated Act,* combining legislation dating back to 1923. Amending Acts were passed in 1946, 1947, 1952,

[1] By 30 September 1959 one territorial authority, twenty-three regional authorities, twenty-six district authorities (in the Transkei), and 349 tribal authorities had been set up and sixteen local councils retained.

1953, 1955, 1956, and 1957. These Acts give wide powers to magistrates, Native Commissioners, and local authorities to regulate and prohibit the movement, residence, and employment of Natives in or near urban areas. A Native entering a proclaimed area is forced to obtain permission to be there, and this can be refused if there is a surplus of Native labour in the area, or if he fails to show that he has complied with the pass regulations, or if his documents show that he is domiciled on land outside a location and has not been released by his previous employer. Any native who is questioned in respect of these regulations is presumed to have contravened them until the contrary is proved.

1951.—*Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act*, aimed to prevent insanitary overcrowding.

1952.—*Native Laws Amendment Act, No. 54*, empowered local authorities to arrest without warrant Natives in urban areas suspected of being 'idle, dissolute or disorderly' and to send them to farms or to work colonies, set up under the *Work Colonies Act* 1949, for periods of up to two years. Also empowered the Governor-General, whenever he deems it expedient in the general public interest, to order a tribe or an African to remove from any part of the Union and not to return without the written permission of the Secretary for Native Affairs. *Inter alia*, the Act amended Section 10 of the 1945 Natives (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act so that no Native may remain for more than seventy-two hours in an urban or proclaimed area without special permission, except in the case of the wife, unmarried daughter, or minor son of an African exempted from the provision. Exemption is granted to any African born and continuously resident in the area, or who has worked continuously in such area for one employer for not less than ten years, or has lawfully resided in such area for not less than fifteen years, has committed no criminal offence, and is not employed outside the area. No native seeking employment in an urban area can be given permission to work there unless he has been permitted to do so by the labour bureau in his home magistracy, and the labour bureaux in both town and rural areas have wide powers to refuse permission to enter urban areas and, by removing alternative opportunities, to draft Natives into farm labour.

1952.—*Natives (Abolition of Passes and Co-ordination of Documents) Act, No. 67*, abolished a number of passes and replaced them by 'reference books'. These reference books do not replace the numerous documents required for seeking employment in urban areas and for curfew regulations and they must also be produced on demand. The *Native Laws Further Amendment Act*, No. 79 of 1957, required all Africans, male and female, over sixteen years of age in specified areas to carry these reference books and prohibited their employment without these books. The practice has grown up of offering offenders against this law employment in non-prescribed areas, particularly on farms, as an alternative to prosecution.

1955.—*Natives (Urban Areas) Amendment Act, No. 16*, aimed at eliminating 'locations in the sky' by prohibiting the residence of more than five Africans in any building in a proclaimed area, such Natives being forced to live in locations or Native hostels. This tightened the

restrictions on African domestic servants working for private householders, who are forced to live on the residential premises where they are employed in order to secure exemption. The Act also provided that no African women servants could in future have their children living with them unless permission was granted by the local authority.

1956.—Amendment empowered local authorities to remove any African legally resident and employed in an urban area, if they considered his presence detrimental to the maintenance of peace and order.

1957.—Amendment prohibited any Natives, except those employed as domestic servants or owning property valued at £75 or over, from living in an urban area elsewhere than in a Native location, village, or hostel. The same Act empowered the Native Commissioner or any magistrate to remove Africans from urban areas at three days' notice, without a court order, thus 'doing away with the need to resort to costly civil process'.

1956.—*Natives (Prohibition of Interdicts) Act, No. 64*, suspended the right of Africans to apply to the Supreme Court for an interim interdict against a summary removal, ejectment, or arrest.

1957.—*Native Laws Amendment Act, No. 36*, prohibited, unless with the approval of the Minister, the attendance of Natives at churches within an urban area outside a Native residential area, if their presence 'causes a nuisance to residents in the vicinity'. In the original Bill the presence of 'a Native' prohibited the activities of the church in a White area, but this 'church clause' evoked such opposition that it was redrafted. Schools, hospitals, and clubs established after 1938 and social functions in urban areas outside Native residential areas are similarly prohibited from admitting Natives.

PROPERTY RIGHTS

Before the Union there were many restrictions on the ownership of land and immovable property by non-Whites, particularly in the Orange Free State and Transvaal.

1913.—*Native Land Act, No. 27*, prohibited Natives from purchasing, leasing, or acquiring land outside 'scheduled native areas'.

1936.—*Native Trust and Land Act, No. 18*, set up the South African Native Trust, responsible *inter alia* for the management of land within the scheduled Native areas. About one-third of the Native population live in these areas, covering 10 per cent of the area of the Union. The Trust was authorized to purchase land up to 13 per cent of the total Union area

1945.—*Natives (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act, No. 25*, prohibited Natives from acquiring land within an urban area from any person other than a Native, except with the approval of the Governor-General.

1946.—*Asiatic Land Tenure and Indian Representation Act, No. 28*, restricted the property rights of Indians in Natal.

1950.—*Group Areas Act, No. 41*, amended and finally issued as *Group Areas Consolidated Act*, No. 77 of 1957, aimed to segregate different racial groups into different areas and, on grounds of race alone, to restrict their ownership of property and rights of residence and of carry-

ing on business. Powers were given to the Governor-General, the Minister of the Interior, and by delegation to the Chairman of the Group Areas Board to proclaim such group areas, though it was laid down that after 1965 resolutions of both Houses of Parliament would be required to proclaim new areas. One aim of the Act is to efface 'black spots' in areas mainly inhabited by Europeans and 'white spots' in predominantly non-European areas.

1954.—*Native Trust and Land Amendment Act, No. 18*, aimed to evict Natives from farms outside the reserves, where they were unregistered squatters, and make their labour available to European farmers.

—*Native Resettlement Act, No. 19*, to implement the Group Areas Act in Johannesburg through a Native Resettlement Board, empowered to remove, at a month's notice, Natives in the suburbs of Sophiatown, Martindale, Newclare, and Pageview and other areas to property or land for building elsewhere but not necessarily with corresponding freehold rights.

1957.—*Group Areas Amendment Act, No. 57*, prohibited not only occupation but also presence of Africans in premises, such as places of entertainment, in areas proclaimed white

—*Proclamation No. 236* empowered the Minister of Native Affairs to cancel the right of occupation of any African of land owned by the African Trust and to order him and his family to remove. *Proclamation No 259* prohibited Africans not already lawfully resident from taking up residence on Trust or tribally owned land or other land in the scheduled areas without the written permission of the Native Commissioner. (Influx control was thus extended to African rural areas as well as towns and European farms.)

LABOUR

Native labour is affected by the 'pass laws', the Native Labour Regulation Act, and the Natives (Urban Areas) and Group Areas Acts, as well as by the following legislation.

1911.—*Mines and Works Act, No. 12*, prohibited the employment of Natives as skilled workers in the mines.

1937.—*Industrial Conciliation Act, No. 36*, explicitly excluded all pass-bearing Natives from the machinery of industrial conciliation.

1951.—*Native Building Workers Act, No. 27*, prohibited employment in urban areas of Natives as skilled workers. Amended in 1959 to extend the definition of an urban area.

1953.—*Native Labour (Settlement of Disputes) Act, No. 48*, redefined the term 'employee' to exclude all Africans, for whom strikes were prohibited. African trade unions were denied official recognition and new negotiating machinery was devised with a Central Native Labour Council (all-White).

1956.—*Industrial Conciliation Act, No. 28*, empowered the Minister to reserve certain classes of work for certain racial groups. Separate trade unions were set up for White and Coloured workers and no further 'mixed' unions were to be registered. Amended by Act No. 41 of 1959,

prohibiting Africans from representing employees on industrial councils or in industrial disputes.

1957.—*Nursing Act, No. 69*, introduced racial discrimination into the training and employment of nurses.

Wages.—Ever since the passing of the *Wage Act* of 1925 the principle prevailed that there should be no discrimination on the ground of race or colour in the fixing of wages.

1957.—*Wage Act, No. 5*, a supplementary measure to the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1956, applied to all trades and professions except farm workers, domestic servants, and State employees, three of the main fields of African employment.

EDUCATION

Under the South Africa Act of 1909 education and public health were made Provincial matters. Before the Union, education for non-Whites was largely in mission schools; there was always strict segregation in the Transvaal and Orange Free State and this policy has spread throughout the Union. Primary education, compulsory for Whites only, has always been inadequate for non-Europeans, with a severe shortage of buildings, teachers, and equipment, and these disadvantages are even greater in secondary education, especially as Native families usually cannot afford to send their children to secondary schools which are often far from home, even though the education is free.

1953.—*Bantu Education Act, No. 47*, and Amendment Acts No. 36 of 1956 and No. 33 of 1959 introduced an important change in educational policy. They transferred Bantu education (excluding higher and special education but including teacher training) from the Provincial authorities to the Union Department of Native Affairs, and required the registration of all Bantu schools—community schools established by the Bantu authorities, Native councils, tribes, or communities, the Government Bantu Schools, and the State-aided Bantu schools, including mission schools. No Bantu school may be maintained unregistered, and all Bantu schools now come under the direct control of the Department of Native Affairs, the Minister having the power to withdraw, suspend, or reduce financial help at his discretion. The registration of schools may be refused at the absolute discretion of the Minister.

In moving the Bill the Minister stated: 'Education must train and teach people in accordance with their opportunities in life, according to the sphere in which they live. . . Native education should be controlled in such a way that it should be in accord with the policy of the State. . . Good racial relations cannot exist when the education is given under the control of people who create wrong expectations on the part of the Native himself.'[1]

[1] *Journal of the Parliaments of the Empire*, 1953, pp. 3575 ff.

1959.—*Extension of University Education Act, No. 45*, provided for the establishment under the Department of Native Affairs of university colleges for non-Whites, and prohibited the attendance of non-Whites at the hitherto 'open' universities, unless with the Minister's written consent.
—*University College of Fort Hare Transfer Act, No. 64*, transferred the College to the control of the Minister of Bantu Education and prohibited the admission of White, Coloured, or Asian students. The admission of Africans may be limited to one or more ethnic groups.

CRIMINAL LAW

It is a criminal offence for a Native not only to fail to possess a 'pass' or refuse to show it on demand but also to fail to carry it on his person. Similarly, a breach of the Native Labour Regulation Act is a criminal offence, and the breach of a civil contract by an African is punishable by a fine of £10 or two months' imprisonment.

1953.—*Criminal Law Amendment Act* imposing penalties of up to £300 or three years' imprisonment for committing an offence 'by way of protest against any law or in support of any campaign for the repeal or modification of a law'.
1955.—*Criminal Procedure Act, No. 56*, provided *inter alia* that the Minister of Justice may override a request for a jury where any of the accused are of a different racial group from the victim. It also extensively widened the authorization of the issue of search warrants; the ability to proceed in certain cases without warrant if 'the internal security of the Union or the maintenance of law and order' are likely to be endangered; and the power to kill in the pursuance of police duties.
1956.—*Native Administration Amendment Act, No. 42*, proclaimed the Governor-General Supreme Chief of 'all Natives in any part of the Union' and therefore able to rule them by Proclamation.
—*Riotous Assemblies Act, No. 17*, authorized banishment from any area of any person promoting feelings of hostility between the Europeans and other races. (Covers any agitation for reform.)
1958.—*Government Notice, No. 804*, gave wide authority to the police and authorized European employees of local authorities to search without warrant, at all reasonable hours of the day and night, any premises in an urban area suspected of illegally harbouring an African or in which Kaffir beer is presumed to be manufactured.

SOCIAL RIGHTS

1949.—*Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act, No. 55.* (Before the Union, mixed marriages were prohibited only in the Transvaal.)
1950.—*Immorality (Amendment) Act, No. 21*, prohibited carnal intercourse between Europeans and Natives.
Liquor Act, No. 30 of 1928, as amended by Act No. 14 of 1951, prohibited the supply of alcoholic drink to Natives.

This does not cover Kaffir beer, the distribution of which local

authorities control by regulating home manufacture, by licensing its sale, or by municipal monopoly. The prohibition of home manufacture has led to an illicit traffic in large towns, such as Johannesburg, carried on by 'shebeen queens', and the searching of premises in the locations by the police for stocks of illicitly manufactured alcoholic beverages is one of the greatest Native grievances. The mass arrests resulting from this practice and from the 'pass laws' have given rise to more racial antagonism than many of the more fundamental *apartheid* measures which the majority of Natives are too ignorant to understand.

USE OF PUBLIC SERVICES

Up to 1948 differences of treatment in public services were largely regulated by bye-laws and customary practice.

1949.—*Railways and Harbours Regulations, Control, and Management Amendment Act, No. 49*, enabled the administration to reserve railway premises and trains, or portions thereof, for the exclusive use of particular races, provided that equal facilities were available for all races.
1952.—*Native Services Levy Act* provided for a levy of up to 6d. a week from every African employee for a fund subsidizing African transport services. (Important as African townships are gradually being moved away from industrial and business centres.)
1953.—*Reservation of Separate Amenities Act, No. 49*. Public premises, amenities, or vehicles, or portions thereof, may be reserved for the exclusive use of particular races, and it is laid down that these separate amenities need not be 'substantially similar to or of the same character, standard, extent, or quality' as 'those set aside for the other race'. (This crystallized the traditional policy of social separation.)
1955.—*Motor Carrier Transport Amendment Act, No. 44*, and Act No. 42 of 1959 imposed *apartheid* in trolley buses, tramways, and taxi services
1960.—*Factory Amendment Act* requiring separate amenities in factories not only for Whites and non-Europeans, as provided in the Factory Acts, but for all four racial groups.
—*Separate Amenities Amendment Act* enforcing segregation in the sea up to three-mile limit.

SOCIAL SECURITY

1941.—*Workmen's Compensation Act, No. 30*, as amended by Act No 27 of 1945 and Act No. 36 of 1949. Schedule of benefits varies according to race, and payment for Natives is much below that for Europeans. As compensation for total permanent disablement, pensions are paid to Europeans and lump sums to Natives. The 1941 Act did not include workers in agriculture or mining or domestic servants (all mainly Native forms of employment), but the Amending Act of 1945 rectified this.
1944.—*Old Age Pensions*, originally available only for Europeans and Coloured, extended to Indians and Natives though at lower rates.

1946.—*Unemployment Insurance Act, No. 53*, as amended in 1949, excludes from benefit Natives earning £182 or less a year and 'seasonal workers' in employment specified by the Minister.

TAXATION

Before the Union, Natives in the four Provinces were subject to certain special taxes. Under Law No. 22 of 1895 of the Transvaal, Natives crossing the frontier were required to pay a tax of one shilling, and another law of the same year established a poll tax of £2 per year on every male adult Native and an annual tax of ten shillings on every straw hut or house lived in by a Native.

1925.—*Native Taxation and Development Act, No. 41*, as amended in 1939, obliged all adult male Natives in the Union to pay a general tax of £1 a year and a local tax of ten shillings on every hut occupied by a Native in a location.

1958.—*Natives Taxation and Development Act, No. 38*, increased the general tax from £1 to thirty-five shillings and increasing amounts for men earning over £180 per annum. Women were for the first time made liable to the general tax.

IMMIGRATION

Before the Union, the four Provinces had extensive legislation concerning immigration and entry of non-Europeans. The most important laws were that of 1892, to 'Provide against the Influx of Asiatics into the Orange Free State', under which no Asiatic might settle there for more than two months without the State President's permission—granted only if the would-be settler undertook not to carry on trade or agriculture—and the Transvaal Act (No. 36 of 1908), also legislating against an Asiatic influx.

1913.—*Immigrants Regulation Act, No. 22*, expressly maintained the above-mentioned legislation, and restricted not only immigration but also movement between Provinces on the part of Asiatics, especially Indians.

1937.—*Aliens Act, No. 1*, stipulated that permits for permanent residence in the Union might be given only on the recommendation of the Immigrants Selection Board, which was to refuse permission unless the applicant were 'likely to become regularly assimilated with the European inhabitants of the Union . . . within a reasonable period after his entry into the Union'.

1953.—The *Immigrants Regulation Act* (1913) was amended to prohibit the entry of wives of Indians domiciled in the Union if the marriage were contracted outside the Union, or of children of Indians born outside the Union.

The foreign Native from Rhodesia or Portuguese East Africa,

and from the Protectorates of Bechuanaland, Basutoland, and Swaziland, even if he has a valid immigration permit, is subject to 'pass law' restrictions.

MARGARET CORNELL

Fresh Light on the Soviet Population

Results of the 1959 Census

THE publication on 4 February 1960 of a fresh instalment of the results of the Soviet census of population, which was held in January 1959, clears up a number of important and, up to now, puzzling questions. The first instalment of these results, which appeared in May of last year, provided information mainly about the distribution of population by towns and regions. To this is now added information about numbers of males and females, about death-rates in particular age groups, about the numerical strength and distribution of nationalities, and about educational qualifications

The first census of the Soviet era was held in 1926, when the disturbances of the war and the civil war were past and those to be awakened by collectivization were yet to come. It recorded a population of 147 million. The next was held in 1937, but the results were suppressed, presumably because they had not come up to expectations. The fact that this was done may cast some doubt on the validity of the results of the census held two years later, in 1939, which recorded a population of 170·6 million within the then boundaries of the U.S.S.R. For want of any alternative this figure must, however, be accepted as a basis for comparison with later totals.

If there were any important inaccuracies in these results they have been obscured for ever by the titanic events of the following decade. In September 1939 the U.S.S.R. absorbed the eastern part of Poland, in 1940 the three Baltic republics, certain parts of Finland, and Bessarabia. In June 1941, when Germany attacked, began the terrible ordeal which killed millions of Soviet citizens and uprooted millions of others. By the end of the war, the Soviet Union had not only recovered its maximum pre-war extent but had been extended further into East Prussia and pre-war Czechoslovakia

The opportunity of holding a fresh census ten years after that of 939 was allowed to pass. It was clearly not to be expected that, at a ıme when most other information was blacked out, information rould be provided about the most vital of the nation's resources. Vhether any census would have been held so long as Stalin re- ıained alive appears doubtful. The decision to hold a fresh census ı 1959 was another illustration of the new Government's desire, lready manifest in other fields, to equip itself with comprehensive ıformation. The date was separated from that of the previous cen- us by a multiple of ten years. It also fitted in conveniently with the lecision to supersede the Sixth Five-Year Plan (which was to run rom 1956 to 1960) by a Seven-Year Plan lasting from 1959 to 1965, s information gathered in the census could be used in drawing up he new plan.

Nevertheless, the Soviet authorities must have had quite a close dea of the size of the population, although perhaps not of its de- ailed composition and attainments. This is shown by the fact that hey published in 1956 a statistical handbook[1] which, for the first ıme since before the war, contained an estimate of the size of the ›opulation. When the first results of the census of 1959 were pub- ıshed, it was found that this estimate of 200·2 million (applying o April 1956) must have been within 1 per cent of the true figure. t was, however, considerably smaller than the estimates of most Vestern observers, and it became apparent that the total had been ept secret perhaps precisely for that reason. As for the census, it ecorded a population, as at January 1959, of 208,826,000, which epresents an increase of about 9½ per cent above the 1939 total vithin the same boundaries.

In earlier statements put out since the war, only the size of the ncreases above unknown base levels had been made known, e.g. ccording to Khrushchev the Soviet population increased by 16·3 nillion during the five years prior to 1956, while according to other ıewspaper sources the average yearly increase over the period 948–58 was over 3 million. Apparently, therefore, if these esti- nates were as accurate as the census itself presumably was, the ›opulation in 1948 must have been less than 175 million. According o the statistical handbooks, the population in 1940 within the same ›oundaries was 191·7 million, but this, too, represented only an

[1] Central Statistical Administration, *Narodnoe Khozyaistvo SSSR: Stati- hesky Sbornik* ('The National Economy of the U.S.S.R.: A Statistical Hand- ook'), Moscow, 1956. See 'A Soviet "Statistical Event"', in *The World oday*, November 1956

estimate, as no census of the populations contained in the annexed areas had been taken. There is therefore room for error at both ends, but *prima facie* the population was diminished by 17 million or more between 1940 and 1948. On the assumption (which, however, is not confirmed by any official statement) that the population increased between 1945 and 1948, there must have been a larger decline between 1940 and 1945. As, but for the war, the population ought to have grown during the period, the total deficiency of population was considerably greater than the difference between the 1940 and 1945 totals. Provided, of course, that these figures are accurate, the conclusion is inescapable that Soviet war losses were fantastically large.

From 1957 onwards, birth-rates and death-rates (going back to 1950) also began to be published. When, in 1957, it was announced that the death-rate in the previous year had been 7·7 per 1,000 of the population, it became clear that not only the death-rate but, to a lesser degree, the birth-rate must have declined considerably as compared with before the war. Moreover, the relationship between these rates fitted in with the proclaimed annual increases of the order of 3–3½ million persons.

The reported decline in the death-rate was abrupt. In 1926 it had been 20·3 per 1,000, in 1940 it was 18·3, and in 1954 only 8·9. In the Tatar Autonomous Republic it went down from 26·4 per 1,000 in 1940 to 10·2 in 1950: a bigger reduction than England and Wales has achieved during the past hundred years. As no statistics of incidence of illness, such as would lend verisimilitude to these proclaimed reductions, were published, some foreign observers were sceptical. Medical and health standards had admittedly risen as compared with before the war, notably because antibiotics had been introduced. But this did not explain how the U.S.S.R. could do better than Western Europe, which had benefited similarly, and anyone who was acquainted with Holland or Denmark as well as with the U.S.S.R. drew the line at believing that the U.S.S.R. had achieved, within comparable sections of the population, mortality rates which were as low as theirs.

It was suggested that there might be a simple explanation of this paradox, namely, that the age-structure or sex-structure, or both, of the Soviet population was particularly conducive towards a low mortality rate per 1,000 of the population. According to this theory, the fact that information about the death-rates of particular age groups was concealed (other than the infant mortality rate, which

revealed a striking improvement) indicated that the missing quantities presented a much less favourable picture.

Until recently this argument could not be substantiated statistically, but the figures of death-rates of particular age groups which have now been published do confirm its general correctness. Whereas the death-rate claimed for 1958—7·2 per 1,000—is about 40 per cent below the U.K. figure, in most age groups the Soviet death-rate is substantially higher than the comparable U.K. figure. For example, up to four years old the Soviet rate is 11·8 per 1,000, the U.K. rate 5·1 for females and 6·5 for males; for the twenty to twenty-four age group the Soviet rate is 1·8, the U.K. rate about 0·8. At the same time, the figures show that death-rates in the U.S.S.R. have declined very considerably since 1938–9, particularly among the youngest age groupings where the reduction is about sixfold.

A year ago it was disclosed that the population consisted of 94 million males and as many as 114·8 million females; up to the age of thirty-two, however, the numbers of men and women were equal. The latest figures confirm—as already seemed likely—that above the age of thirty-two there are about five women to every three men: an extraordinarily high ratio. (A similar preponderance of women is found in Britain only among people aged seventy or more.) Over the age of fifty-five the Soviet ratio is nearly two women to every man. Since in the U.S.S.R., as elsewhere, women tend to live longer than men, the preponderance of women also helps to keep down the death-rate.

This disproportion between the sexes results in a marriage market which above the age of thirty-two is heavily weighted in favour of men. Among men aged thirty-five to fifty-four, only four in every hundred are unmarried (in the U.S.A. the number is sixteen). Above the age of sixteen, 695 men in every 1,000 are married, whereas for women the proportion is only 522 in every 1,000. This monstrous surplus of women has succeeded in increasing the proportion of married men, as compared with 1939, by five in every 1,000. The divorce rate is low: one in fifteen marriages ends in the divorce court, as compared with one in thirteen in England and one in four in the U.S.A. Perhaps one explanation is that there are fewer unattached men to be cited as co-respondents, another that, with such a shortage of alternatives, fewer women would risk accusing their husbands of infidelity.

At first sight it appears that this unbalance of males and females

may help to explain a rather moderate decline in the birth-rate, from 31·7 per 1,000 in 1940 (it had been 44·0 in 1926) to a post-1950 average of about 26·0. However, not only are there more married couples now than twenty years ago (43½ million as against 38·3 million), but there are even slightly more married couples per 1,000 of the population (207 as against 201). Moreover, the majority should be young couples, for the marriage rate (which is also measured per 1,000 of the population) is unusually high. According to the census it is now more than 12, whereas in the U.S.A. it is 8·3 and in Britain 7·6.

If now more marriages are being contracted, and more have remained in existence, the explanation of the lower birth-rate must be that families are smaller. Certain results of sample surveys of the composition of workers' and collective farmers' families, which were published in 1956, already pointed to the same conclusion These showed that whereas in 1940 a worker's family as covered by the survey contained on average 46·5 per cent of workers and pensioners and 53·5 per cent of non-workers and students receiving stipends, in 1956 the corresponding proportions were 52 8 and 47·2 per cent. A much greater change occurred among collective farmers' families covered by the survey: in 1940 these contained on average 54·8 per cent of persons aged over fifteen and 45·2 per cent aged under fifteen, while in 1956 the corresponding proportions were 67·3 and 32·7 per cent. Presumably these families were chosen because, among other things, their family status was typical

How large is the average Soviet family? The census says nothing directly about this; indeed the word 'family' does not appear in the published results. Information about the family structure of the population will perhaps be included among the items of information which are to be published later. In the meantime, a few clues can be gathered.

The simplest clue is to be found in the ratio of the birth-rate to the marriage rate when both are calculated per 1,000 of the population. This, of course, does not give one the 'average family', nor even the average size of families being produced by couples married during a particular year. However, it would give the 'average family' if it were compiled over a sufficiently long period. In practice, the ratio can be calculated for the U.S.S.R. only for individual years (from 1956 onwards). These proportions are meaningful only if some assumption can be made about trends in family sizes. We have already deduced that as compared with before the war the

average size of family has decreased. If this is so, then the average family is likely to exceed the ratio of the birth-rate to the marriage rate which, in 1957, was 2·06. (The corresponding ratio for the United Kingdom in the same year was 2·12.)

Other, casual, press references suggest that the average Soviet family may now contain little more than two children. For example, during the Sixth Five-Year Plan 'approximately 18 million persons or about 4½ million families' were scheduled to move into new living quarters in towns and workers' settlements. The average family being catered for would apparently consist of about four persons, of whom two might be children (though, in fact, a Russian grandmother very often stays with the family). Presumably they would be average town workers' families as these 18 million people would comprise nearly one-tenth of the entire population. As for country families, as already noted, these included a much smaller proportion of young people in 1956 than in 1940, but probably they tend to be larger than town families, as is the case all over the world. On the other hand, there are now—as compared with before the war—fewer rural families relative to urban families.

The Soviet people are not so sophisticated as the British, and a much larger proportion of them still live in rural areas, so that it appears rather remarkable if Soviet families are, if anything, slightly smaller than British ones. This is not what one would expect from the fact that the Soviet population is increasing three and a half times as fast as our own (in 1957 the natural increase of the Soviet population was at a rate of 1¾ per cent, that of the population of the United Kingdom only ½ per cent). Yet there is no deception. This high rate of growth is mainly due, so far as the birth-rate is concerned, to the high marriage rate, and so far as the death-rate is concerned, to the high proportion of the population which belongs to the younger age groups.

On reflection, it is scarcely surprising that Soviet families should not be large. One feature of Soviet life which every visitor notices is the high proportion of women who go out to work and who are, consequently, debarred from looking after children during the day. Another is the housing problem created by the migration into the towns of country families who, on taking up urban life, will probably prefer to have smaller families and will more easily find the means to practise family planning. A third is the extent of internal migration, which may separate men and women and in any case must make it particularly inconvenient to bring up a large family.

The extent of internal migration into different regions, and the numbers of the various nationalities, are described in considerable detail in the census report.

As compared with 1939, the most notable feature of internal migration is the growth of towns. A total of 321 are listed, of which all except eight have increased in size since 1939. These eight, all of which belong to Europe, are: Leningrad, Vitebsk, Smolensk, Konstantinovka, Kremenchug, Berdichev, Kerch, and Novorossisk War damage has obviously been an important reason for the contraction of most of these towns, while the inclusion of both Kerch and Novorossisk, on opposite sides of the entrance to the Azov Sea, suggests that coastwise traffic in this area has declined Among the remainder, all of which have expanded, twelve towns have grown up from nothing since 1939, while a further eighty-three have at least doubled. These include five republican capitals (Minsk, Yerevan, Alma Ata, Stalinabad, and Frunze) and many other lesser administrative centres, and several scores of other industrial towns, among which coal-mining centres make up the largest identifiable group. These fast-growing towns are scattered all over the U.S.S.R., but a particularly large proportion of them are located among or east of the Urals.

Accompanying the growth of towns, there has been a shift of population from rural to urban areas. In this case, however, the main contribution has come from the agricultural regions of European Russia. Since 1956, in the R.S.F.S R., out of seventy listed main divisions, the rural population decreased in sixty-one and increased or remained stationary in only nine. Including also subdivisions, these nine comprised one territory (the Maritime), four autonomous republics (the Kabardino-Balkar, North Osetin, Kalmyk, and Checheno-Ingush), two autonomous *oblasts* (a less important division: the Tuvinsk and Karachayevo-Cherkessk), four ordinary *oblasts* (the Astrakhan, Voronezh, Kalinin, and Leningrad—also possibly Stalingrad *oblast* which was recently enlarged by the addition of a part of Balashov *oblast*), and areas occupied by the Evenk, Chukotsk, and Yamalo-Nenetsk nationalities. Except for the four ordinary *oblasts*, which are distributed north-west and south-east of Moscow, all these areas are in mountainous or very remote parts where little industrialization has so far taken place. It is probably for this reason, rather than because of any inherent unsuitability in taking up industrial employment, that the minor nationalities living in these areas have evidently not shared in the

ndespread tendency to forsake the countryside for the towns. The rural population also increased everywhere in Turkmenia, nd almost everywhere in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, and the itest information reveals that there has been considerable migra-ion of Great Russians into these republics. With the exception of Kazakhstan—where many have settled on the land in connection nith Khrushchev's virgin lands scheme—the majority of immi-rants have probably taken jobs in industry, i.e. the incoming Russians have probably secured a proportion of the town jobs, while he indigenous population has thickened in the countryside. The ame may be the case in Azerbaijan, where the rural population de-lined between 1939 and 1956 but increased subsequently. In sunny Moldavia the rural population was actually larger in 1959 than in 939, but this exception relates to a republic where agricultural onditions are more favourable and more specialized than is the ase in most parts of European Russia. Almost universally in Euro-ean Russia—and everywhere in the Ukraine and in Belorussia—he peasants have shown their preference for town life by quitting he countryside.

The extensive migration of Great Russians is one of the features rought out by the latest information Admittedly, the picture which emerges is incomplete, as no information has been provided bout the migration of nationalities within the R S.F.S.R. The total olume of migration of nationalities must therefore exceed what is eported. However, even this reveals a considerable movement. One s not surprised to find that the nationality which has given its name o a particular republic still as a rule comprises a majority of the opulation of the republic, and Great Russians in fact make up 3 2 per cent of the population of the R S.F.S.R. In no other re-ublic except Armenia, where the proportion of Armenians is 8 per cent, does the indigenous nationality make up such a high roportion. This proportion is lowest in Kazakhstan, where Great Russians now form much the biggest single element in the popula-ion (43·1 per cent), in Kirghizia, and in Tajikistan. Four million Russians now live in Kazakhstan, over 1 million in Uzbekistan, and ver 500,000 in each of three other republics: Kirghizia, Latvia, nd Azerbaijan. Nearly 7½ million live in the Ukraine, mainly, no oubt, in the towns.

With the exception of the Armenians and the Jews—the latter n particular are spread about almost everywhere—the smaller ationalities, such as Georgians, Latvians, Lithuanians, and

Estonians, appear to have remained to a greater extent in their native republics. However, the published statistics do not provide complete information on this very important point. For example, out of a listed total of 2,326,000 Lithuanians in the U.S.S.R. as a whole, the census lists only 2,151,000 in Lithuania and 32,000 in Latvia, which leaves 143,000 unaccounted for. By comparison, only 95,000 out of 2,268,000 Jews are unaccounted for, and only 19,000 out of 1,397,000 Tajiks. The statistical coverage of the republics is also uneven: thus the R.S.F.S.R. is about 99 per cent covered, but Kazakhstan only about 88 per cent. In the U.S.S.R. as a whole, most nationalities have increased, but some have diminished, the Jews by a quarter, the Mordvinians, and the Kalmyks.

It is probably due to the combined effect of migration and of differential birth- and death-rates (e.g. in Kirghizia a very high rate of natural increase had already been reported) that the populations of the Asian and of certain Caucasian republics revealed the highest rate of growth. As compared with the estimate of the population as at April 1956, the biggest proportionate increases have occurred in Armenia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kirghizia, and Kazakhstan In European Russia, on the other hand, increases have been smaller

The Soviet population emerges as polyglot indeed. Seventy-two major nationalities are listed, not counting the different subdivisions of Daghestan nationalities and the 'Peoples of the North', and varying, but on the whole high, proportions of all of these 'consider language of given nationality to be their native language' It is not surprising that the number who profess Russian should be nearly 9 per cent greater than the number of Russians themselves, perhaps a little surprising that the excess is not greater. Scattered here and there among the multitudes of obscure Asian nationalities are not a few European nationalities, including even Italian, French, and Spanish, but apparently there are not enough British to be worth mentioning.

The census deals, finally, with the educational qualifications and achievements of the Soviet people.

Since 1939 the number of people with higher education has increased from 1,177,000 to 3,778,000, while the number with secondary education has increased from 14,689,000 to 54,930,000. Thus, during the past twenty years the number of persons who have had some secondary or higher education has more than trebled. The great majority of these have had an 'incomplete secondary' education (lasting seven to ten years), and except among individuals who

ve had a 'complete higher' education there are now a larger mber of educated women than of men. (War-time losses must be e of the main reasons for this.)

Other tables illustrate the distribution of educational qualifica-ns among the republics, and as between town and country. In ite of considerable advances since 1939, the countryside is still t the place where a well-educated person would prefer to live: by nparison with the towns one would have only one chance in five meeting a stranger who had had a 'complete higher' education, d one chance in two of meeting one who had had 'secondary or omplete secondary' education. By comparison with 1897, how-r, a veritable educational revolution has taken place in the intryside, marked, among other things, by the attainment of a el of literacy little short of the very high level of the towns.

There are still quite wide variations in the educational qualifica-ns of the populations of the various republics. Estonia and tvia, which, judging by the proportion of people with a higher or condary or incomplete' education, were among the most highly icated republics in 1939 (when, incidentally, these republics d not yet become part of the U.S.S.R.), remain near the lead. ey are now surpassed only by Georgia, which holds a decisive d in the proportion of its citizens who have had a higher educa-n. Other particularly well-educated republics are Armenia and Ukraine, while Lithuania and Moldavia (which were not ourably placed in 1939) tie for the position of dunce. Their large al populations presumably reduce the average standard of quali-itions in these republics. Curiously, in spite of the concentration educated people in Moscow and Leningrad, the R.S.F.S.R. does emerge as one of the most highly educated republics, perhaps cause it contains so many diverse nationalities.

Again by comparison with 1939, the number of students at her schools, as a proportion of the total population, has more n doubled, while the number of students at specialized secondary ools has risen by one-third. There are said to be nearly four times many students in Soviet higher educational institutions as in tain, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, and Italy put ether. Although the recent educational reform showed that by means all was well in the Soviet educational world, the sheer nerical strength of Russia's student battalions commands ention and respect.

R.-K.

Present-Day Peru

The Economic Situation and the Coming Presidential Election

PERU is divided into three sharply contrasted regions. The smallest but most important of these is the coastal lowland, a thin strip from ten to forty miles wide wedged between the sea and the maritime *cordillera* of the Andes. This area's climate is dominated by the cold Humboldt Current and its accompanying blanket of cool air, temperatures are mild, relatively unchanging, and there is little or no rain all the year round. Ninety per cent of the region is bleak, sterile desert; the other 10 per cent, along the fifty or more small rivers coming down from the mountains, is splendidly fertile under irrigation, and produces export surpluses of sugar and cotton. Substantially all of Peru's petroleum comes from the far northern desert, or from offshore wells. Guano, an extraordinarily rich natural fertilizer, is annually collected from rocky headlands and islands to the south. Lima, the capital, with more than a million people, is located in one of the fertile river valleys near the sea.

Highland Peru, larger and with a majority of the population, plays a smaller role in the nation's economy. Except for the huge foreign-owned open-pit copper mines at Cerro de Pasco and Toquepala, there is little development and little connection with the rest of the world. Most of the Indian inhabitants of the region, scattered in Andean valleys, have not changed their way of life since the Conquest; they scratch out a bare existence from their fields of corn, wheat, and potatoes, and their flocks of sheep, llamas, and alpacas, and hardly enter the money economy at all.

The third and least important region is the *tierra caliente*, the tropical rain forest east of the Andes, inhabited only by scattered primitive tribes. The area experienced a brief boom shortly before the first World War, when the price of natural rubber reached $3 a pound; competition from Asian plantation rubber and, later, synthetics has caused the region to revert to jungle.

Like other South American countries, Peru is heavily dependent on foreign trade; she is more fortunate than most in having a variety of commodities to export rather than just one or two. Sugar and high-quality long-staple cotton head the list; frozen and canned fish and fishmeal have become important items in the last few years. Petroleum and its derivatives have been significant, but

nual production has been static at about 18 million barrels for ne years, and home consumption is rising. The remaining exrts are metallic minerals: large amounts of lead, copper, and ic, and smaller shipments of silver, gold, and vanadium.

During the second World War foreign investors and Peruvian pitalists and landowners prospered as a result of satisfactory ces and stable demand for all these products. But little or no nefits trickled down to the overwhelming majority of Indians d *mestizos* at the bottom of the social pyramid. Most of the good mland was in the hands of 'La Llamada', a derisive nickname the so-called aristocracy of a few hundred families of pure anish blood; these wealthy landowners lived in Lima, or abroad, d took no interest in the welfare of their *peones*. The oil-fields and lead, zinc, and copper mines were foreign-owned, and any exnsion of facilities was financed out of profits. Political uncertains and the instability of the *sol* encouraged Peruvian and foreign pitalists alike to invest their surplus abroad; despite its backrdness and poverty-stricken economy, Peru was actually exrting capital.

At the end of the war, the APRA, the long-outlawed left-wing rty of Indians, *mestizos*, mulattoes, and young intellectuals, ne to power as part of a new democratic coalition. The APRA merican Popular Revolutionary Alliance), founded in 1923, took programme from the successful Mexican revolution: labour and ial security legislation, land reform, and heavy taxation or expriation of foreign mining concessions. After suffering exile, l, torture, and death for most of two decades, the *Apristas* were no mood to be gentle with their enemies; strong-arm squads ministered beatings to political opponents, and were blamed for murder of two conservative newspaper publishers. There was eries of politically inspired strikes; exports dropped, and the exange rate fell drastically. After the failure of an APRA-inspired volt in the port city of Callao in 1948 General Manuel A. Odría zed dictatorial power with a bloodless coup, and kept it for the xt eight years.

The Odría dictatorship was an unusual one. He jailed some *rista* leaders, and hounded others out of the country (the imsonment of APRA's founder, Haya de la Torre, in the Colomin Embassy in Lima for six years was an international *cause ébre*), but in Peru there was none of the demagogy, mob violence, d police brutality that marked the contemporary dictatorships in

Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela. A calm, unostentatious, professional soldier, General Odría quietly introduced a series of valuable social reforms. He built elementary schools in the Indian villages of the highlands, and provided teachers who gave instructions in Quechua, the native language. He won labour union support by permitting moderate pay rises and providing hospital insurance and pensions. He freed foreign investment and trade of all encumbrances, and attracted new capital to Peruvian mining and manufacturing. Finally, to the astonishment of almost everyone, he permitted a free and honest election in 1956, left the country before the ballots were counted, and permitted his chosen successor to be defeated.

The succeeding regime of conservative President Manuel Prado has been singularly unfortunate in economic matters. At about the same time that General Odría went into voluntary exile in the United States, world prices for Peru's principal exports went into a long-term decline. Sugar has dropped from 5¢ a pound in 1956 to less than 3¢ in 1959; in the same period zinc declined from 13¢ to 10¢; copper from 41¢ to 30¢; lead from 15¢ to 11¢. At the same time the essentials that Peru must import—foodstuffs, medicine, machinery, mining and farm equipment—increased in price.

The United States, which had been extremely friendly to the Odría regime (he was given Government loans, surplus foodstuffs, two submarines, three destroyers, and the Legion of Merit), appeared to the Peruvians to be downright hostile to the democratic Government that succeeded him. Yielding to small but politically powerful pressure groups, President Eisenhower took a series of steps that seriously damaged the Peruvian economy. The United States refused to sponsor or join commodity stabilization agreements on anything but wheat and sugar; and Peru's share of the United States sugar market has remained very low. In July 1957, in order to protect high-cost domestic crude-oil producers, the United States put into effect a programme of 'voluntary' import quotas; these were made mandatory in March 1959. In mid-1958, the suspended duty of 1·7¢ per pound on copper was restored, and later the same year new import quotas on lead and zinc were imposed. At the same time, surplus cotton held by the United States under the farm price support laws was dumped abroad with a subsidy of 8¢ a pound, taking away traditional Peruvian markets. American fishing interests continued to violate Peruvian coastal waters, and tried, unsuccessfully, to get a pro-

hibitive tariff placed on Peruvian tuna. Measures such as these had the appearance of a thoughtless and unjust commercial warfare waged by a very powerful nation against a very weak one and were no doubt a main cause for the stones, saliva, and insults showered on Vice-President Nixon when he visited Lima in 1958.

Even the elements seemed hostile to President Prado. For two years the rains failed in the highland valleys of southern Peru; crops withered, hundreds of thousands of cattle had to be slaughtered, and nearly 1 million subsistence farmers had to be rescued from famine. Shortly afterwards, the Humboldt Current mysteriously moved out to sea, taking with it the marine life that thrives in its cold waters; half the adult guano-producing birds died, 3 million fledgelings were found dead, and millions of eggs rotted away unhatched. The production of guano was cut in half; the Government had to ration farmers, and raised the price to sugar cane, cotton, and coffee producers from $18 to $80 a ton, thus increasing the cost of production of these crops at the very time that all three of them were menaced by falling world prices and United States import quotas. Last January, as a finishing blow, one of the severest earthquakes in many years struck Arequipa, Peru's second largest city, causing heavy loss of life and very large property damage.

These repeated economic, political, and climatological blows brought the under-developed Peruvian economy to the edge of disaster. Foreign exchange reserves dropped from $41 million in December 1956 to $10 million in December 1957, and to an actual deficit the next year. The foreign trade deficit steadily widened; the national Budget deficit amounted to 880 million *soles* in 1958 and 1,000 million *soles* in 1959. Inflation, which Peru had avoided while the currencies of her neighbours came crashing down, finally overtook the *sol*, which fell from 19 to the dollar in 1957 to 31 to the dollar in June 1959. Next month, in desperation, President Prado dismissed his Finance Minister and called in Pedro Beltrán, a wealthy banker, plantation-owner, and editor of Peru's most important newspaper, *La Prensa*, and gave him full powers over the economic life of the nation.

Señor Beltrán speedily put into effect an austerity programme inspired by the ideas of Professor Ludwig Erhard in Germany. (It is worth noting that Venezuela's Betancourt, Colombia's Lleras Camargo, and Argentina's Alsogaray have also sought the advice of the architect of the 'German Miracle'.) Increased tariffs on non-

essential imports, quotas, and credit restrictions cut imports 17 per cent for the full year 1959; exports were up by 4 per c Aided by a small recovery in commodity prices, Peru turne trade deficit of $60 million in 1958 into a slight surplus last y Beltrán increased the Government's income without raising ta by tightening up collection procedures; the big corporations h been put on a pay-as-you-go basis, and are now required to disputed items first and submit a claim for repayment later. S sidies on various consumer goods have been eliminated, controls the price of petroleum products have been scrapped, and a v generous new Industrial Promotion law provides special tax emptions and duty-free imports to new investments. The Gove ment's improved cash position has permitted advance repaym of an International Monetary Fund loan, and the *sol* has recove to 27·5 to the dollar, and remained steady. The 1960 Bud deficit will be only 100 million *soles*, 2 per cent of the Budget, stead of 21 per cent in 1959. The nation's immediate finan problems have apparently been solved.

The long-term picture also looks moderately promising T brightest spot is in the fishing industry; the annual catch, wh placed Peru twenty-sixth among the nations of the world in 19 has suddenly surged up to sixth place, and to first place in fishn exports; these were 28,000 tons in 1956, 80,000 tons in 19 115,000 tons in 1958, and 209,000 tons last year Dozens modern, 130-foot metal ships, and several new, complet mechanized drying, freezing, and canning plants will further crease production of this valuable export item.

A larger project—it is, in fact, the biggest private construct job ever undertaken in Peru—is the open-pit copper mine Toquepala, 11,000 feet up in the Andes. Geological surveys m before the second World War had revealed the existence of a body of low-grade copper ore—1·1 per cent metallic content– an utterly isolated region of southern Peru, but it was not th thought feasible to exploit it. Technological improvements sin that time, and the favourable long-term outlook for copper, led the formation of a consortium of American firms, backed by Export-Import Bank loan. At a cost of $250 million, a 71-km. r and a 131-mile railroad have been built to link the mine up w the nearest port at Ilo, a 40-km. pipeline to the nearest wa supply has been constructed, and 130 million tons of overbur has been removed from the ore body; work began in April 19

and the first shipment of 750 tons of copper left Ilo last December. The new mine's rated output of 150,000 tons per year (4 per cent of current world output) will prove an important foreign exchange earner.

A number of less spectacular but still important new investments are also in progress for this year, and will further diversify the economy. The Government-allowed increase in petroleum prices has stimulated new exploratory drilling, especially along the south coast and in the Amazon region, where there are no producing wells, but promising geological formations. The output of iron ore at Acari is scheduled to rise 50 per cent, to 1½ million tons, this year, and to 3 million tons later on. A considerable amount of new rolling stock is on order for the nation's railways, and a United States grant of $9 million is paying for a paved highway through the Andes to the Amazon port of Pucallpa. A 120,000-kw electric power plant is nearing completion in the Urubamba valley, below the famous Inca ruins of Macchu Picchu; it will make possible the electrification of dozens of little villages, and perhaps the coming of a few light industries. Permits under the new Industrial Promotion law have been issued to two British firms for the construction of a bagasse plant in the north, and to other firms planning to manufacture synthetic fertilizers, bricks, household appliances, nitroglycerine, mine equipment, clothing, nylon, and the first automobiles ever assembled in Peru.

Despite all these encouraging signs of revived industry, Peru's future is far from clear. For one thing, a considerable amount of economic growth will be required simply to keep up with the growing population, whose increase is only now beginning to reflect modern sanitary standards and medical advances. The population shot up from 7·7 million in 1945 to 10·4 million (est.) last year, and keeps on growing at the rate of more than 3 per cent per annum. The growth of the cities, and especially of Lima, which has more than doubled in the last dozen years, is even faster, as the bitterly poor Indians keep spilling down the mountains. The slums on the other side of the River Rimac, across from the Lima that the tourists see, are as bad as any in the continent—ten and twelve people living in a single room, endemic tuberculosis and venereal disease, and a daily diet of 1,200–1,500 calories, barely above the starvation level. The housing situation is desperate and is getting worse, and the Government is just holding its own in the campaign against illiteracy; an official report says that 52 per cent of the

nation's adults cannot read or write, and the true figure is pro ably somewhat higher.

An additional burden on the economy is the needlessly lar standing Army and the large sums spent on military equipmer Peru's old border disputes with Chile and Ecuador have nev been settled definitively, and the political influence of the arm forces in all three nations is such that they command a substant part of the national Budget, about 25 per cent in each country. La November, in response to an overture from Chilean Preside Alessandri, President Prado expressed himself in favour of a di armament conference that would end the 'fruitless and burde some' arms race; but his sincerity was called into question whe two weeks later, he announced the purchase of two six-inch-g British cruisers, the *Ceylon* and the *Newfoundland* (now *Almiran Grau* and *Coronel Bolognesi*), for the Peruvian Navy. Peru is st paying for the squadron of Canberra bombers purchased fro Britain some time ago and for the modern, snorkel-equipped sul marines ordered from the United States by Odría. Latin Amer cans themselves are convinced that such expensive purchases a foolish and unnecessary, but have so far seen no way to check ther

It may indeed be questioned whether, under Peru's prese social and economic system of rule by the Army, the Church, an 'La Llamada', any real benefits can be brought to the depress masses. Uruguay and Costa Rica are the only Latin Americ nations where social reforms have been brought about peaceful and democratically; everywhere else the ruling classes have r fused to yield their privileges except in the face of revolution. Pe is almost unique among the nations of the world in never havi experienced a social upheaval; she is like France before 1789, ar there are no immediate signs of any assault upon the Bastille. B the same conditions that led to the MNR (Movimiento Nacionalis Revolucionario) revolution in Bolivia, and to *Peronismo* in Arge tina, are present in Peru—an over-specialized and under-develop export economy, an oligarchy of landowners and army officers, growing number of city workers living in abject misery, and a sul stantial body of impoverished farmers living outside the mon economy altogether. Sooner or later the Peruvian ruling class must come to grips with these problems, or see themselves swe out of power by force.

The present Government, directed by able but conservati bankers, has no intention of undertaking any basic reforms. Prac

and Beltrán are satisfied with having eliminated the trade deficit, steadied the *sol*, and encouraged foreign capital investment; as representatives of the wealthy landowning classes, they are naturally opposed to any programme of agrarian reform. The APRA, after three decades of agitation and struggle, has lost sight of its original goals, and now co-operates with the oligarchy in return for diplomatic posts for its leaders. The party has lost much of its former hold on the Indian masses and the intellectuals, and is badly split by a revolt of the younger members against the old leadership. In Peru, as elsewhere in Latin America, personalities are far more important than party machinery; under the Constitution, Prado cannot be a candidate again in 1962, and neither Beltrán nor the *Aprista* leaders have any large following.

One of the two leading candidates for the Presidency is General Odría, who has been living quietly in Washington, D.C., for the past three years. Unlike other exiled dictators, the general can return to his homeland any time he wishes; he has shrewdly remained away in order to give the appearance of being outside of politics. His followers in Peru have kept their organization, and have plenty of money with which to finance newspapers, party meetings, and the like; in recent interviews the general has made it clear that he is willing to return and be a candidate again 'if the people want me'. There is a good deal of genuine popular sentiment for him; should he win a democratic election, he would probably continue the moderate reform programme that he initiated in 1948–56; but there is always the danger of his growing impatient with the 'excesses' of democracy and clamping down dictatorial rule once more.

The other principal candidate is Fernando Belaúnde Terry, head of the National Architecture College and founder of the Popular Action party. Barred from running for President in 1956 by Odría's National Election Board, he led a protest march to the Governmental palace; some of his followers were shot down, but his candidacy was allowed. He campaigned vigorously, travelling even to the small Indian villages in the sierra, had the APRA not joined forces with Prado he probably would have won. Handicapped though he was by lack of funds and of an organized party, he carried every one of the large cities.

Belaúnde, himself a professional architect specializing in workers' housing, has gathered around him a group of young university graduates who have helped him to work out a long-range plan for

the economic development of Peru. Its major points, as explained in his recent book, *La Conquista del Perú por los Peruanos*,[1] are a revival of the old Incaic system of food storehouses, decentralization through the granting of new powers and State aid to provincial governments, closer control and supervision of bank credits (and a reduction of the current rate of 8 per cent on demand deposits), and a comprehensive system of roads to link up isolated communities in the *sierra* and the Amazon valleys Belaúnde and his followers are young men, idealists, with no practical experience in governing, but their programme of Popular Action seems plausible and well thought out, in the tradition of Uruguay's moderate and very successful Colorado Party. Belaúnde, whether or not he wins the Presidency two years from now, seems likely to play a key role in Peruvian politics for a long time to come.

SAMUEL SHAPIRO

[1] 2nd ed , Lima, 1959.

The Elections in Kerala

THE BACKGROUND

KERALA is the smallest among the states of India. It represents the merger of the two ex-princely states of Travancore and Cochin and the Malabar district and part of the South Kanara district which formerly belonged to the state of Madras. During the twelve years since India's independence this state has had three spells of Presidential rule and four general elections, the last in February 1960 The first popular Ministry in Travancore was formed in 1948 by the Congress party under the leadership of Mr Pattam Thanu Pillai When Travancore was merged with Cochin in June 1949 the Congress continued to conduct the Government though under different leadership. The strength of the different political parties in the Legislature was as follows: Congress 44, Communists and allies 32, Socialists (later PSP) 12, other parties 9, and Independents 11

After the general election of 1952 the Congress succeeded in forming a Government, which however fell on a vote of no-confidence in September 1953. The Legislature was dissolved and the state came under the direct rule of the President of India until a

fresh election was held in February 1954. In that election no party obtained an absolute majority of seats and the Praja Socialist Party (PSP), though securing only 19 of the 117 seats, formed a minority Government under the leadership of Mr Pattam Thanu Pillai, who in the meantime had joined the PSP, with the support of the Congress party. This Government also fell on a vote of no-confidence in February 1955 and a new Government was formed by the Congress party under the leadership of Mr Panampilli Govinda Menon. It also fell on a vote of no-confidence in March 1956 and there followed a second term of Presidential rule.

In November 1956 the states of the Indian Union were reorganized on a linguistic basis and some portion of Madras state was given to Kerala in exchange for some *Talukas* from the Trivandrum district. Consequently the number of representatives in the Kerala state Legislature was increased to 125. In the general election of 1957 the Communists emerged as the strongest political force, having secured 65 seats including 5 Independents. A Communist-led Ministry, installed on 5 April 1957, remained in office until it was replaced by Presidential rule on 31 July 1959. This time, however, Presidential rule intervened not after a vote of no-confidence but because of the virtual paralysis of the governmental machinery through a mass movement. This third spell of rule by Presidential decree lasted for 205 days until the formation of a new Congress–Praja Socialist coalition ministry on 22 February 1960, headed by the PSP leader Mr Pattam Thanu Pillai.

THE POLITICAL PARTIES

Triple Alliance

The President of India's proclamation of 31 July 1959 dissolving the Communist Ministry and the Legislature and taking over the government of Kerala stated that a general election for a new Legislative Assembly would be held 'as soon as possible'. Once the election date was fixed for 2 February 1960 political elements in Kerala began their manœuvres and counter-manœuvres. As the downfall of the Communist Ministry had been brought about by an anti-Communist mass movement conducted jointly by almost all the political parties except the Communist Party of India (CPI), there was naturally a move towards putting up a joint fight against the Communists. The formation of the Congress/Praja Socialist Party/Muslim League electoral alliance (Triple Alliance) to fight the election was announced in Ernakulam on 11 September 1959 by Mr Lal

Bahadur Shastri, who had been deputed by the President of the Indian National Congress to advise the Kerala Pradesh Congress on electoral arrangements. He disclosed that the Alliance would present a united front against the Communists and that the parties would conduct a joint election campaign. On the basis agreed upon for the allocation of seats, the PSP and the Muslim League were originally allotted 35 and 12 seats respectively. The remaining 79 seats were to be distributed between the Congress and other non-Communist parties, such as the Revolutionary Socialist Party (RSP) and the Kerala Socialist Party (KSP).

Eventually, however, both the RSP and the KSP were left out of the Alliance. The RSP wanted to contest 10 seats but the Congress and the other two parties in the Alliance were prepared to allocate it only 8 seats (6 sacrificed by the Congress and 2 by the PSP). The RSP therefore decided to hold aloof from the Alliance and to contest 20 seats as an independent political party (it eventually put up only 18 candidates).

The Congress and PSP issued a joint statement on 24 November announcing that 'total agreement' had been reached between them on the strategy of organizing the election and establishing the necessary liaison for effective co-operation. 'Democracy, after a period of instability, has found a strong anchorage in Kerala,' the statement said.[1] On the breakdown of the talks with the RSP it said: 'We regret that the RSP has not responded to our appeal to share a new vision and participate in a common adventure. We have no quarrel with them. We hope the pressure of public opinion will ultimately bring them close to democratic forces.' The demands of the RSP, it added, were 'peremptory and excessive'.

The strength of the KSP was dwindling and it was never seriously regarded as a contending political force. The Progressive Communist Party, formed on 30 October 1959 by a group of ex-Communists, was also far from being an influential force. The ultimate allocation of seats within the Alliance was as follows: Congress 81 (two further seats having been renounced by the PSP), PSP 33, and the ML 12. The Congress officially put up eighty candidates and supported one Independent candidate.

Though the parties in the Alliance conducted a joint election campaign they issued separate election manifestoes. The Congress manifesto promised to honour and respect the unity of the people, which had emerged out of the 'ordeal of fire, blood, and tears' during

[1] *Times of India* (Bombay), 25 November 1959.

ie twenty-eight months of Communist rule, and to usher in a stable
lministration for peace and prosperity. To return the Commu-
ists to power, the manifesto said, 'will be to hamper the planned
evelopment of the country through peaceful and democratic
ieans'. Their defeat was indispensable. On the economic front the
ongress promised nationalization of private forests, which the
ommunists had originally decided upon but had subsequently
)andoned, and the gradual taking over of all private road transport
)utes, implementation of the party's land reform policies and the
ctension of co-operative farming, a 'big and bold' third five-year
lan with a greater share in Central Government schemes, and an
idustrial truce benefiting both the industrialists and the workers.
'he Congress further promised a reform of the Education Act and
ules (which had been the immediate cause of the Communists'
ownfall) and the restoration of the civil service (which, it held, had
een subverted by the Communist Government) as a 'strong, inde-
endent and fearless unit' of the democratic system.[1]

The Praja Socialist Party's manifesto, issued on 16 December
)59, stated that the party would 'widen and deepen the democratic
nity' and 'translate it into honest and efficient government on the
'inciples and practices of democracy'. Communism, 'which in
)wer in Kerala became a menace to freedom and to justice, be-
)mes the more sinister in the context of Communist China's inva-
on of India and equivocation indulged in by the Communist Party
India'. Indicting Communist rule in Kerala, the manifesto point-
l out that during the sixteen months preceding the fall of the Gov-
nment the price of rice had risen by more than 75 per cent, un-
nployment had increased from 1·5 million to 1·9 million, bonuses
id dwindled, the state's finances had been wrecked, and taxes to
e tune of Rs. 40 million had been imposed on the poor and middle
asses; corruption had multiplied, and the rule of law had been set
naught, the Communist Party being equated with the state. The
irty's thirteen-point programme agreed in many respects with that
the Congress. It registered its general support for the Agrarian
elations Bill introduced by the Communist Ministry, with amend-
ents in certain respects, and it called for the implementation of
e provisions of the Education Act which were beneficial to teach-
s and non-teaching staff but which the Communist Ministry had
iled to carry out, and for the extension of the scope of co-opera-
'es, import of food and its subsidized sale and the gradual estab-

[1] *Hindu* (Madras), 17 December 1959.

lishment of a grain bank to meet sudden food shortages, greater Central Government industrial investment in Kerala, industrial truce on the basis of justice and rising standards of life for labour, and protection of rights of linguistic and communal minorities.[1]

The Muslim League manifesto was openly communal, demanding many safeguards and amenities exclusively for the Muslims, though in several other respects it more or less resembled the programmes of other parties in the Alliance.[2] The main unifying factor was, of course, its fanatical anti-Communism. There was a strong undercurrent of criticism in the Congress ranks at the formation of the electoral alliance with an openly communal body such as the Muslim League; but eventually the League was admitted.

How did the Alliance conduct its electioneering campaign? According to a press report of 14 January from Trivandrum, although in many constituencies individual candidates asked for votes for themselves and their parties, common posters and appeals were used to seek votes for the Alliance. 'Campaign cars and other vehicles always fly Congress, PSP, and Muslim League flags together on their bonnets. The election offices are called united election offices and they display all the three flags everywhere. District Committees and leaders of the parties arrange common campaign meetings and demonstrations Leaders of one party address the election meetings of a candidate belonging to another political party.'[3] It can be said with truth that such united campaigning on the part of members belonging to different political parties had never before been witnessed in Kerala or in any other part of India during the post-independence period.

The Non-Aligned Parties

Though not participating in the anti-Communist Alliance, the RSP was avowedly more anti-Communist than anti-Alliance. On 3 January Mr Sreekantan Nair, the RSP leader, declared at a public meeting in Quillon that his party had decided to withdraw its candidates from four constituencies to facilitate the success of non-Communist candidates there.[4] In its election manifesto of that date the RSP pledged itself to strive for the establishment of a 'toiling people's democracy' in Kerala which would be based on the sanction and organized strength of the workers, peasants, impoverished middle classes, and progressive intelligentsia. Its members, if elect-

[1] *Hindu* (Madras), 19 December 1959. [2] *ibid.*
[3] *Times of India* (Bombay), 15 January 1960. [4] *ibid*, 6 January 1960

ed, would function as a non-Communist and progressive Opposition in the Legislature.[1]

Ultimately four political parties remained outside the anti-Communist Alliance. They were, besides the RSP, the Bharatiya Jan Sangh, the Indian Socialist Party, and the Kerala Socialist Party.

The Communist Party

The Central Executive Committee of the Communist Party of India (CPI) passed a resolution on 8 August 1959 describing the promulgation of the President's rule as a 'partisan and deliberate act' The leadership later sobered down somewhat and adopted a resolution on 19 October to the effect that there had been 'mistakes, weaknesses, and omissions' on the part of the Communist Ministry, though it maintained that the defects were attributable to 'inexperience as well as negligence'. There were only two paths before the people of Kerala, the resolution said: 'either to support the Communist Party and thus defend the real interests of the country and the people, or to endanger the true interests of the country and the people for political and governmental instability' by supporting an anti-Communist platform. The Communist Party was vehemently opposed to holding the elections early in February 1960.[2]

The Communist election manifesto called upon the people of Kerala to vote the CPI back to power and thereby provide a clear condemnation of the Union Government's actions leading to the dismissal of the Ministry and also of the activities of the non-Communist parties in Kerala. The party would strive towards 'carrying forward the task of building a new and prosperous Kerala', and would press for the acceptance by the Central Government of a Rs 2,500-million third five-year plan for Kerala, 75 per cent of which should be financed by aid from the Central Government.[3]

At a six-day conference held at Trichur, which ended on 29 November 1959, the Kerala state unit of the CPI decided to contest all the 126 seats of the Legislative Assembly. The original plan was to put up 40 independent and 86 official party candidates. But ultimately the party put up 103 official candidates and 23 independents, 9 of whom adopted the Communist Party's election symbol. All the eleven members of the dismissed Communist Cabinet were nominated to contest the election, though one or two (the former

[1] *ibid*, 4 January 1960.

[2] *ibid*, 5 November 1959 (Resolution of the Kerala State Council of the CPI on 3 November), *ibid.*, 18 December 1959.

[3] *Hindu*, 19 December 1959. See also *Times of India*, 18 December 1959.

Education Minister, Mr Joseph Mundassery, for example) were averse to standing.[1]

Inaugurating the party's election campaign at a meeting in Ernakulam on 5 January, Mr P. Ramamurthy, member of the CPI Central Executive Committee, said that it was a sorry spectacle to see the Congress aligning itself with communal forces. It was ironical that to fight the Communists Mr Nehru's own party had to enter into an alliance with the Muslim League which Mr Nehru himself had described as 'a dead horse and a relic of the past' and which had been discredited even in Pakistan.[2] The state Council of the Kerala Communist Party in a statement on 14 January charged the Triple Alliance with displaying 'fascist tendencies under the leadership of the Congress'. It further accused the Alliance parties of having violated the spirit and letter of the understanding for maintaining peaceful conditions which had been reached between the political parties and the Adviser to the Governor of Kerala. The party made a special appeal to the linguistic minorities, particularly the Tamils.

CONDUCT OF THE ELECTION

There were 114 constituencies, including twelve with two members, thus making a total of 126 seats. The electorate numbered 8·1 million, as compared with 7·6 million in the 1957 election.

The Communists and the Triple Alliance each had about 400,000 workers in the field Each party set up district election offices to guide the work of the constituency offices, which generally had some 2,000 to 3,000 workers at their disposal. These workers were organized into sector or *panchayat* committees, ward committees, and polling booth committees. On both sides more stress was laid on door-to-door canvassing than on big public meetings and processions. Each side spent about Rs. 12 million on the campaign. The Government of India allocated Rs. 1·5 million towards the organization of the election.

There were about 8,700 polling stations, roughly one for every 900 voters, each station being manned by five persons—the presiding officer, three polling officers, and a polling assistant. Adequate police arrangements were made to protect the polling booths and the Chief Election Commissioner secured the assistance of nearly 4,000

[1] *Statesman* (Calcutta), 2 December 1959.
[2] This criticism was upheld, if indirectly, by Mr Nehru himself in his monthly press conference in New Delhi on 24 February 1960.

policemen from the neighbouring states of Madras, Mysore, and Andhra to assist the local police, who numbered more than 17,000.

With a view to ensuring an orderly and peaceful election, the Kerala Administration had suggested that the parties should adopt the following 'useful six-point convention': (i) parties should inform the police in advance of their processions and meetings; (ii) while there would be no interference from the police, parties should be prepared to receive 'advice' from the police for the readjustment of their programmes where rival meetings and demonstrations were proposed to be held at places close to each other; (iii) parties should advise their followers to attend meetings without arms of any kind; (iv) processions should not interfere with traffic; (v) the parties should refrain from hoisting flags on public property, or on private properties should their owners object, or within fifty yards of the flags of another party; and (vi) restraint should be observed in writing slogans and posting placards in public places, and no party should allow its supporters to tamper with its rivals' slogans.[1]

Despite these precautions, there were four murders in the campaign months of December to January, and ninety-two incidents during January in which the number of accused was 371. Fifteen of these incidents were of a serious nature involving more than a minor injury.[2] In this connection it may be recalled that an earlier appeal by the Governor of Kerala suggesting that the parties should sign a joint appeal against political violence had been turned down by all the parties except the Communist Party of India.[3]

All parties called upon the services of their most prominent leaders in fighting the election. The Prime Minister, Mr Jawaharlal Nehru, and the newly elected President of the Indian National Congress, Mr N. Sanjiva Reddy, the Defence Minister, Mr V. K. Krishna Menon, the Union Finance Minister, Mr Morarji Desai, and Mr U. N. Dhebar, a former Congress president, were among the national leaders who participated in the campaign on behalf of the Congress and the Triple Alliance. The Prime Minister severely castigated the Indian Communists, but warned Congress workers not to link Chinese aggression against Indian territory with international Communism. The Praja Socialist Party enlisted the support of the national chairman, Mr Asoka Mehta, and Acharya J. B. Kripalani. The Communist Party's election campaign was conducted by its Acting General Secretary, Mr M. N. Govindan Nair, and

[1] *Times of India*, 5 January 1960. [2] *ibid.*, 31 January 1960.
[3] *ibid.*, 4 September 1959

Mr E. M. S. Namboodiripad, an all-India leader who had been Chief Minister in the Kerala Ministry. As both of these men happened to come from Kerala, other nationally famous leaders such as Mr S. A. Dange, leader of the Communist group in Parliament, Mr Ramamurthi, and Professor Hiren Mukherji, deputy leader of the Communist group in the *Lok Sabha* (Lower House), were also requisitioned by the Kerala unit. Replying to Mr Nehru's charges against the Communist Party, Mr Dange said in a mass meeting in Ernakulam on 22 January that Mr Nehru represented the 'pathos' of Indian politics. He had gone to Kerala to preach principles to the Communist Party after having given up his own principle in relation to the PSP and the Muslim League for the sake of an electoral alliance against the Communist Party.

The Alliance advanced anti-Communist slogans specifically mentioning some of the actions of the dissolved Ministry, such as the Education Bill curtailing the freedom of Catholics and Nairs in the management of educational institutions. The Catholic Church and the Muslim Mullahs exhorted their followers to vote against the Communists on religious grounds. Chinese incursions on the borders of India were also exploited by the anti-Communists. The Communists were obviously on the defensive on all these matters Indeed this election was fought primarily as a struggle of anti-Communists versus Communists, whereas in previous elections the main issue was between anti-Congress elements and the Congress.

Polling in all the 114 constituencies was completed in one day (1 February) and not staggered over a week or more, as in the past But the most significant innovation was the marking system of voting. Previously, except in one or two by-elections in urban areas, the voter was given a numbered ballot paper bearing the names and symbols of the contesting candidates which he put into the appropriate ballot box (there being one box for each candidate). Under the marking system there is only a single ballot box. The voter marks in ink on his ballot paper the name or symbol of the candidate of his choice, folds it, and puts it into the ballot box in the presence of the polling staff.

The marking system presupposes a greater degree of intelligence, if not actual literacy, on the part of the voters. Though Kerala has the highest percentage of literacy in India by no means all the voters could be considered literate. If the number of votes invalidated is any indication, then the voters must be regarded as having acquitted themselves quite well: there were 89,364 invalid votes (a little over

1 per cent of the total) as against 47,000 (0·81 per cent) in 1957. The relative and absolute increases in the number of wasted votes were far smaller than the relative and absolute increases in the number of votes polled. In February 1960, 84·3 per cent of the electorate voted, as against 66 per cent in 1957. The corresponding absolute numbers were 8·1 million and 5·8 million respectively.

Indeed another distinctive if not unexpected feature was the unusually heavy poll. 'To one who witnessed a few earlier elections in the State,' wrote a newspaperman on the eve of the election, 'the current one strikes as extraordinary in many ways and certainly unprecedented in its impact. The war of the slogans shouted and written upon all conceivable places like public roads, public and private compounds, walls, culverts, and the like by rival party workers is only matched by the battle of the flags of the different parties, one vying with another to fly a little higher.'[1] The average poll was about 85 per cent—only a little short of the national record of 88 per cent polled in Travancore-Cochin in 1954.[2]

Women played a considerable part. The special correspondent of the *Hindu* (29 January 1960) wrote after his tour of Kerala: 'Tremendous work is being put forth by the workers of both sides (i.e. Communists and anti-Communists) and thousands are in the field working round the clock. A sizeable number of women workers are also doing active electioneering work.' The women's votes were a decisive factor. Nearly 4 million women voted and in many booths they outnumbered the male voters.

THE RESULTS

The results showed a crushing defeat for the Communists so far as the securing of seats was concerned. The Triple Alliance obtained 76 6 per cent of the seats and 43·37 per cent of the total number of votes polled, while the Communist Party and its allies, though securing 43·33 per cent of the votes, won only a little over 23 per cent of the seats.

The 126 seats had been contested by 312 candidates. In 78 constituencies there was a straight fight between the Communist Party and the Alliance, as against only 23 straight contests in 1957. In all except one constituency (Koothuparamba, where the Communist Party had no candidate of its own but supported the nominee of the

[1] *Hindu* (Madras), 27 January 1960

[2] *Times of India* (Bombay), 4 February 1960 (dispatch from Trivandrum); *Hindu*, 7 February 1960

Indian Socialist Party) the two blocs had their rival candidates. Tl Alliance won 58 of the straight contests and the CPI 22. In 42 co stituencies there were 3 contestants: of these the Alliance won : and the Communists 8. In each of the remaining 6 constituenci there were 4 or more candidates, and of these the Alliance secured

Fifty-one candidates failed to obtain one-sixth of the votes ar so lost their deposits. Fourteen of them belonged to the KSP, 14 the RSP, 3 to the Jan Sangh, and 3 to the Socialist Party of India Mr Lohia, while 17 were Independents. No Congress, Communis PSP, or Muslim League candidate lost his deposit.

One hundred and six members of the dissolved Assembly co tested the elections, of whom 71 (35 Congress, 9 PSP, 6 ML, 1 Communists, 2 Communist-supported Independents, and 1 ur attached Independent) were successful. Thirty-five persons we unseated, of whom 31 were Communists, 2 Communist-supporte Independents, and 2 Congressmen. Among the defeated were 7 the 11 members of the dissolved Communist Ministry. Among th successful candidates 7 were women (1 more than in the last Assem bly) and 12 belonged to the Scheduled Castes (3 less than in th dissolved Assembly).

The polarization of the political elements, with a consequent re duction in the number of contestants, resulted in a larger numb of decisive results than before. In the 1957 election only 61 of th successful candidates obtained more than 50 per cent of the tot votes polled in their respective constituencies; the correspondin number this year is 107.

The eight parties contesting the election included all the fou national parties—the Indian National Congress, the Communi Party of India, the Praja Socialist Party, and the Bharatiya Ja Sangh—and three purely local ones, the Muslim League, th Revolutionary Socialist Party, and the Kerala Socialist Party. Th eighth party, the Indian Socialist Party, led by the erstwhile PS leader Dr Ram Manohar Lohia, is an all-India party but is not offi cially recognized as such and has only a very small following. Th RSP obtained only one seat and the other three minor parties non The following table summarizes the results.

From these results it is obvious that the forceful political ele ments in Kerala are grouped around four parties—three of the national (Congress, Communist, and Praja Socialist) and one loca (Muslim League). The other two local parties (RSP and KSI which had commanded some influence earlier have been complete

KERALA LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS 1960

Party	Seats contested	Seats won	Votes Polled
Indian National Congress	80 (124)[1]	63 (43)	2,791,294 (2,209,251)
Communist Party of India	102 (101)	26 (60)	2,975,259 (2,059,547)
Praja Socialist Party	33 (64)	20 (9)	1,146,029 (628,261)
Bharatiya Jan Sangh	3	Nil	5,277
Muslim League	12 (17)	11 (8)	399,925 (270,470)
Revolutionary Socialist Party	18 (27)	1 (0)	106,137 (188,443)
Kerala Socialist Party	14	Nil	5,938
Socialist Party of India	4	Nil	21,297
Communist-sponsored Independents	23 } (55)	3 } (5)	574,877 } (625,602)
Independents	19 }	2 }	77,725 }

[1] 1957 results in brackets.

eclipsed. All the KSP and Jan Sangh candidates and 14 of the 18 RSP candidates lost their deposits.

The Communists contested more seats than in 1957 and obtained more votes (both relatively and in absolute numbers) but fewer seats. The Congress contested a far smaller number of seats but obtained more votes (in absolute numbers, though their popularity relative to other political parties showed a decline from 1957). The Muslim League also put up fewer candidates, obtained 129,000 more votes (the relative popularity showing no marked change), and gained three seats more than in 1967. The RSP contested fewer seats and obtained fewer votes but won one seat (in 1957 it had none). There were fewer Independent candidates in the field; they obtained more votes and retained five seats as before; but whereas in the previous Assembly all five were supported by, and supporters of, the Communist Party, there are now only three such Independent candidates, the other two supporting the anti-Communist Alliance.

The Kerala State Council of the Communist Party of India met on 5 February at Ernakulam for a preliminary review of the results of the election. The Committee stated that the party had emerged 'stronger than before and remains the first party of the people' in the state. It had failed to secure the expected number of seats but with its allied Independents had registered an advance of 3·8 per cent in their poll, as against an increase of less than 1 per cent for the Triple Alliance. The Secretariat of the Party's National Council, meeting in New Delhi on the same day, passed a resolution which repeated similar sentiments, stating that the results of the poll clearly showed that the policies and principles of the Communist Party, which it had sought to carry out when in control of the Government, had won more support among the people than before.[1] Three days

[1] *Times of India*, 6 February 1960.

later, however, the Executive Committee of the Kerala State Party Council adopted a resolution admitting that it was 'useless trying to ignore the gravity or minimize the seriousness of the defeat'.[1]

The Kerala Pradesh Congress Committee adopted a resolution on 7 February thanking the people of Kerala, the other parties in the Alliance, and the other organizations for their co-operation in achieving a great victory in the elections. Its President, Mr R Sanker, told pressmen that the Committee generally favoured some form of 'joint Government of the Alliance and not an exclusively Congress Government'.[2] The Central Congress Parliamentary Board, meeting in New Delhi on 9 February, also agreed that unity among the three parties forming the Alliance should be maintained and strengthened by the formation of 'some sort of a joint ministry of the State'.[3] In its view, however, a Congressman should head the coalition Ministry (the State Unit of the Congress Party had earlier indicated its willingness to accept Mr Thanu Pillai, of the PSP, as the Chief Minister), which should preferably be limited to the Congress and the PSP. The third party of the Alliance—the Muslim League—might be offered the Speakership of the Assembly.[4]

The Muslim League, however, wanted to have at least one member in the Ministry, and this demand was strongly supported by the PSP; but the Congress High Command vehemently opposed this suggestion. Meanwhile on 14 February, after much internal wrangling, Mr R Sanker was elected leader of the Congress Legislature Party in Kerala.[5]

The Executive Committee of the Praja Socialist Party, meeting in New Delhi, adopted a resolution on 9 February hailing the victory of the anti-Communist Alliance, and appointed a five-man Committee headed by its National Chairman to deal with post-election developments in Kerala, including the party's participation in a coalition Ministry.[6] The party's chief concern was to secure a Muslim League member in the proposed Cabinet, to which the Congress was opposed.

The Congress–PSP talks for a coalition Ministry nearly foundered over this fundamental divergence. As a final concession, the Congress President told the Chairman of the PSP that should the PSP refuse to join a coalition with Congress, the latter would be prepared to give full support to the PSP if it decided to form a minis-

[1] *Times of India*, 10 February 1960. [2] *ibid.*, 8 February 1960.
[3] *ibid.*, 10 February 1960. [4] *ibid*, 11 February 1960.
[5] *ibid*, 15 February 1960 [6] *ibid*, 10 February 1960.

try by itself or in coalition with the Muslim League.[1] Explaining the Congress opposition to the latter's inclusion, Mr Nehru stated at his monthly press conference in New Delhi on 24 February that the Muslim League's election manifesto had contained references which were highly objectionable.[2] Eventually, however, a Congress–PSP coalition Ministry was sworn in on 22 February, headed by Mr Thanu Pillai of the PSP. It consisted of eight Congress and three PSP members, including the Chief Minister. A member of the Muslim League was duly elected Speaker of the Legislative Assembly.

S. C. SARKER

[1] *ibid*, 19 February 1960 [2] *Hindu* (Madras), 25 February 1960.

CORRIGENDUM

In the article on 'Literary and Artistic Life in the U.S.S.R.' in *The World Today*, April 1960, on p. 170, line 8, Dovchenko was incorrectly described as a painter. The reference is in fact to the well-known film-producer Alexander Dovchenko.

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Notes of the Month

The Summit and the 'Uncommitted' World: First Reactions

THE first reactions of statesmen and newspapers in uncommitted countries of Asia to the collapse of the Summit meeting have—perhaps in the nature of things—shown more objectivity and attempt at perspective than much of the overheated comment in Western and Communist quarters. The complex apportionment of responsibility for the Paris breakdown which historians will probably make is perhaps foreshadowed by the fact that some usually pro-Western Asian newspapers have been critical of the United States. Thus the *Times of India*, which is unsympathetic to Communism, actually placed responsibility for the Summit breakdown on America. It was perhaps natural, said the newspaper, that Washington should try to brazen out the spy-plane incident, but surely not to the extent of announcing that aerial espionage is an integral part of American policy. Mr Nehru's remarks in Cairo (which he visited on his way back from the Commonwealth Conference) were a kind of corollary to that comment, expressing neatly the view that it had been provocation by the Americans, followed by lack of restraint on the part of the Russians, which had ended the Summit hopes in Paris. 'No good can result,' said the Indian Prime Minister, 'from angry approaches to difficult problems even though the anger may be justified.' And he added that another attempt should be made some time in better circumstances.

Another and perhaps more characteristic 'uncommitted' Indian reaction to the Paris débâcle was to blame the Big Four Powers collectively for the failure of the Summit, while urging that it was time other countries had a greater voice in settling the critical issues on which war or peace may depend. Thus the *Hindustan Standard* said that the failure of the Summit showed that the Big Four were in no form to decide the fate of the world. The unreality of the Big Brother attitude had been exposed and the World Brotherhood must be called into consultation. 'After all it is humanity that stands to live or perish, and not the two colossi alone,' said the Indian

newspaper. The independent *Hindustan Times* wrote that the issu which made the Summit necessary had not been the private concei of the Big Powers and added: 'It may be that the time has come f the smaller powers to take a hand in the solution of problems which the Big Four can bring neither wise statesmanship nor e lightened self-interest.'

The present juncture is undeniably one in which the voice of tl 'positive neutralists' is bound to be listened to with interest—if on because of the failure of the attempts hitherto made by the 'con mitted' Powers On 17 May Marshal Tito expressed ideas remarl ably similar to those put forward by the Indian newspapers quote above. The Yugoslav President declared, in a statement to tl Tanyug agency, that the flight of the American aircraft over tl Soviet Union and the attempts to justify it had deserved the sharpe condemnation. But, said President Tito, the issues that had arise between the U S.A. and the Soviet Union should not be a prete for disputes of such scope. The policy 'from positions of strengtl had proved to be more harmful and dangerous than it had ev been before. 'However,' added the Yugoslav President, 'I do n think that what is now occurring will have such tragic cons quences; common sense will have to prevail.' Tito thought that tl United Nations Organization would again have to act in some wa He could not believe that a majority could be found in the Unite Nations to support the continuance of the policy and atmosphere the cold war. The matters in question did not concern merely tw or four Powers, but directly or by their implications they concerne every other country.

The first reaction to the Summit failure from another 'uncon mitted' Asian country, Indonesia, was a statement by the Actin Foreign Minister, Dr Leimena, who—thinking apparently alor the same lines as President Tito—said that new efforts should b made to eliminate the present obstacles in the way of a world peac and should be directed towards finding 'a new forum which woul be more representative'. The Indonesian Minister said he had i mind the convening of a Summit meeting 'under the roof of th United Nations', and that the question of the representation of th Afro-Asian Powers at such a Summit should be seriously considere by the Colombo Powers (India, Pakistan, Burma, Ceylon, and In donesia). Indonesian newspapers have expressed varying views o the Paris failure. Perhaps most interesting was that of the Sociali paper *Pedoman*, which anticipated unfavourable domestic cons

quences for Indonesia because of a possible 'toughening up' by the Indonesian Communist Party. 'The Paris failure,' said *Pedoman*, 'is likely to cause the cold war to be resumed more vehemently. The consequences would be felt by other countries including Indonesia.' Khrushchev's obstinacy might result in adjustment accordingly by Communists throughout the world. *Pedoman* advised Indonesian democrats to be on the alert.

Changes in the Moscow Hierarchy

IT is impossible to say, at this point of time, whether the changes of personnel in Moscow announced on 5 May have any relation to or bearing on the attitude adopted by Mr Khrushchev in Paris. What the reduction in the size of the Secretariat (from eight to five) does suggest is a further concentration of power reflecting the reconsolidation of the bloc after the upheavals of 1956. But even apart from this, the changes represent a major reshuffle in both Party and Government. The last such reshuffle occurred in October 1957, after the banishment of the 'anti-Party group' consisting of Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich, and Shepilov, and the demotion of Marshal Zhukov, when the Presidium was enlarged to fifteen members plus nine candidates, these including all eight members of the Party Secretariat and eight regional Party Secretaries.

There is nothing surprising in Marshal Voroshilov's departure, but there is in the choice of his successor, considering that the Presidency of the Supreme Soviet is usually regarded as a more or less honorary post bestowed as an award for a long life of loyal service. Mr Brezhnev was elected to the Party Central Committee at its Nineteenth Congress in 1952, and re-elected at the Twentieth in 1956, when he became a member of the Secretariat and a candidate member of the Presidium, becoming a full member a year later. He is in his middle fifties and trained as an engineer; during the war he served in the army political department, and later became Party Secretary in Kazakhstan.

The removal of Belayev from the Presidium follows the outspoken criticism by Mr Khrushchev in December 1959 of mismanagement in the new agricultural areas of Kazakhstan. Belayev, elected to the Central Committee in 1952 and to candidature in the Presidium in July 1955, was awarded the Order of Lenin for his work in connection with the development of the virgin lands, and on the fall of Molotov and the rest became a full Presidium member. Late in 1957 he was appointed secretary of the Kazakhstan Party

committee, from which post he was removed after Khrushchev's attack.

Kirichenko's rise to prominence was through the Ukrainian Party, where he was known as one of Khrushchev's closest associates. He was elected to the Presidium in July 1955 and appointed to the Secretariat in December 1957. He was awarded the Order of Lenin three times, the Order of the Red Flag twice, and the Kutuzov and other medals. He loses both his membership of the Presidium and his post as Party Secretary. Four others—Aristov, Ignatov, Pospelov, and Madame Furtseva—were removed from the Secretariat but retain their other posts in the Party and Government hierarchy.

Frol Kozlov became a candidate member of the Presidium in February 1957, and a full member a few months later. Shortly afterwards he became Chairman of the R.S.F.S.R. Council of Ministers and surrendered the post when he was appointed first deputy chairman of the U.S S.R. Council of Ministers in April 1958 Now that Kozlov becomes Party Secretary, this post has been given to Kosygin, formerly Chairman of the State Planning Committee N. Podgorny and D. Polyanski are promoted from candidates to full members of the Presidium.

The Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference

THE beginning of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' meeting in London was overshadowed by events in South Africa, the end by the breakdown of the Summit talks. (The Conference itself lasted from 3 to 13 May, but some of the delegates stayed on for a few days.) For a short time, between 6 and 12 May, the Prime Ministers had the headlines, and what they said, individually, outside the formal meetings—which, of course were private—may prove more important than what was released in the communiqué. What is crystal clear is the value attached to Commonwealth status by the newer Asian and African members. The Prime Ministers of Malaya and Ghana, and Senator Cooray, the Minister of Justice from Ceylon, if not the dominant figures inside, at least made the largest impression outside the Conference; it was their contributions to the discussion, revealed unofficially rather than officially, that the press recorded with the greater emphasis. On the other hand, Mr Eric Louw, deputizing for Dr Verwoerd, made no visible impression on public opinion. Neither the ill-mannered abuse to which he was occasionally exposed nor the blandishments of appeasers seemed to

have any effect. He came, he stated the case for his party in the familiar terms, he had nothing new to say, and he departed unmoved. Critics in London noted with surprise that the almost universal opposition to the views he expressed seemed not to have penetrated his complacency.

The least conspicuous part of the work of the Conference may yet prove to be the most valuable. 'The Commonwealth Ministers,' says the final communiqué,[1] 'discussed the problems of Africa, the Middle East, the Far East, and South-East Asia. They recognized that economic and social progress are essential for political stability. They welcomed the continuing contribution which mutual assistance under the Colombo Plan affords . . . and they agreed that elsewhere . . the best hope of peace, stability, and political freedom lies in practical international co-operation of this kind.' The adjectives in this carefully worded statement are worth noticing. On the development of trade, relations with other economic groups were mentioned also in significant terms. It was noted that 'economic expansion has been greater in the industrialized than in the primary producing countries.' 'The Ministers . . . expressed concern at the prospect of any economic division in Europe and . . . hope that . . . the countries (of Europe) . . . would follow trade policies in accordance with the principles of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs '

In a later paragraph plans for 'co-operative action among members of the Commonwealth in assisting economic development' were referred to the new Commonwealth Economic Consultative Council, as were the efforts which should be made 'to foster and encourage exchanges . . . between Commonwealth countries of persons with specialized skills'. This part of the communiqué implies the unobtrusive growth of economic and technical co-operation in activities which are none the less important because they do not draw publicity.

What was new in the Conference was the insistence by some members upon the discussion of constitutional issues. The demand for a Commonwealth Tribunal to replace the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council has been made before. What is now remarkable is that it should have been brought forward by a learned jurist from Ceylon; the opposition, according to press reports, came from Canada. No mention of this proposal was made in the final communiqué. Was the Conference to discuss the *apartheid* policy of

[1] *The Times*, 14 May 1960.

South Africa? It was Malaya that forced the issue and, again accor ing to press reports, it was the Malayan Prime Minister who refus to meet Mr Louw at informal discussions. But the dominant issu was the future membership of the Commonwealth. 'The Ministe reviewed the constitutional development of the Commonwealt with particular reference to the future of the smaller depende territories. They agreed that a detailed study of this subject shoul be made for consideration by Commonwealth Governments.' may be noted that Dr Nkrumah was reported[1] as having di sociated himself (in a speech at the Central Hall, Westminste from any responsibility for the smaller colonies. That Ghana he self should retain Commonwealth membership after becoming republic was accepted by the other members, but as a particular ca after consideration on its merits, not in accordance with a gener principle. With regard to South Africa, the Ministers took notic of the forthcoming referendum on the republican issue, and de clared: 'In the event of South Africa deciding to become a republ and if the desire was subsequently expressed to remain a member the Commonwealth, the Meeting suggested that the South Africa Government should then ask for the consent of the other Com monwealth Governments.' In this passage it is the adverbs that wi repay study.

[1] *The Times*, 14 May 1960

Crisis in South Africa

THE significance of the events which began with the shootings at Sharpeville on 21 March and ended abruptly with the attempted shooting of Dr Verwoerd on 9 April need not be laboured. Six months ago it might have seemed necessary to justify an opinion that South Africa was on the brink of catastrophe. Today few are likely to quarrel with such a verdict. But there are many who do not yet—or, if they are South Africans, dare not yet—face the appalling possibilities of such a catastrophe.

Let me quote the opinion of a man whose views were always listened to with respect in the past.

> If ever there was a community which was called upon by the world situation to be cautious, fair, and human, to think on fundamental lines, it is South Africa. . . We do not want this little experiment [of White civilization] in South Africa to fail because of our short-sightedness. This little community deserves something better than to be wiped out in the march of world events. That is possible if the Europeans do not rise to the mission that is theirs on the Dark Continent.

That was General Smuts in 1949, speaking shortly before his death Whatever his failures and his weaknesses, General Smuts always had a deep feeling for history. He never believed that the European society would survive in South Africa because of some divine will. He knew that human survival was the business of human beings. Even before Africa had entered into its cataclysmic changes he sensed the possibility that the European experiment might perish unless its leaders behaved cautiously, fairly, and humanly

What is at stake in South Africa today is the future not only of 3 million White people but of 11 million non-Whites as well. The real danger is that, unless some way is found out of the impasse in which South Africa now finds herself, a situation will develop that will make the country unfit for many years for either Europeans or Africans to live there with any prospect of security, let alone contentment. Samson did not survive his triumph. And it is the image of Samson that continuously presses itself on the mind.

General Smuts ventured another prophecy. Africa, he said, would become the cockpit of inter-racial conflict; a conflict that might decide the future of the Commonwealth of Nations. If there were few who were prepared to take his view seriously ten years ago, there are many more who will value his judgment today.

SOME BASIC REALITIES

In the present situation in Africa it is perhaps natural that peo in Britain should seek to find evidence of statesmanship and wisd among the English-speaking South Africans, the majority of wh are supporters of the United Party. There is the hope that, if only Afrikaner nationalists could be defeated, a new United Pa Government, or a coalition of forces with strong United Pa leanings, would be able to find a peaceful solution to the inter-rac conflicts that lie at the heart of South African politics. This is illusion.

For three centuries White South Africans have been united one issue: the maintenance of White supremacy. They are the fenders of the *status quo*, and no change of government will alter invincible determination of the majority of Whites—whet English-speaking or Afrikaans-speaking—to maintain their premacy. It is no good blinking the fact that 95 per cent of all Wh South Africans are still deeply committed to this policy of Wh supremacy. The central dilemma of contemporary South Afric politics is that no political party which advocates a multi-rac society within which political rights will be accorded to Afric has the slightest chance of securing an electoral victory. Neit Sharpeville nor Mr Macmillan's historic speech at Capetown 3 February has altered that awkward fact.

There is only one conclusion to be drawn from this. It is that Afrikaner nationalists' programme still appeals to the majority the voters. There is no political opposition among the Whites wh can hope to outvote the Nationalists in an election fought purely domestic issues Thus it would seem that until and unless some n element is introduced into the South African political situation Afrikaners will continue to hold the whip hand. Anybody who p his faith to a victory of the English-speaking forces and their all among the Afrikaners is suffering from an illusion. The Uni Party can only win if there is a split in Afrikanerdom. This pos bility will be considered later on.

The *status quo* remains strongly entrenched. The forces rang against it—that is, the non-Whites and the dissident 5 per cent Whites—are capable of challenging it, but they are incapable overthrowing it. We are thus presented with a situation of arres political development: the defenders of the *status quo* are unable make it work, and its opponents are unable to destroy it. In a se it suggests a situation in which the counter-revolution is entrench

in power. But the phrase 'counter-revolution' has to be used with caution and with considerable qualification, because there is, as yet, no real revolutionary force in South Africa. On the face of it that might seem to be a remarkable statement. But it is nevertheless true.

African political leadership, as represented by the African National Congress, has never sought to destroy the White society. Its aim has always been to reform it. The most militant of Congressmen has never cried for the white man to be driven into the sea. His demands have always been that Africans should be admitted into the White society so that they could share in its opportunities. The best parallel that comes to mind is the role of the Negroes in the United States; they, too, have persistently campaigned for the right to be regarded as Americans, as joint inheritors of the American way of life.

The African National Congress stands, and has always stood, for a multi-racial society; for a sharing of the equity, and not for its nationalization. It has been the failure of the Whites to admit those knocking at its door, and the failure of the Congressmen to achieve success for their reformist policies, that has recently led to the emergence of the Pan-Africanist Congress, so that now, for the first time in South African history, we are confronted with the beginnings of what might be called a revolutionary force. But even the Pan-Africanists, for all that they claim, are not free from reformist tendencies. How is this phenomenon to be explained?

It is really quite simple. Three centuries of white civilization, or culture, or call it what you will, has deeply impregnated the mass of Africans. Their capacity to oppose the white man physically was destroyed finally at Blood River in 1838. For more than a hundred years the Africans have been drawn into the Western world—through schools and churches, through industry and mines, even through the farms. Barbarism has long since perished; only its ghost remains to haunt the white man. Today in South Africa we have a broad base of Africans nurtured on Western ideas; the base is as broad as any to be found anywhere in Africa. The Africans in South Africa are, in a sense, the prisoners of Western society, shackled by its attractions and its potential opportunities. Until now the condition of most Africans has led to frustration and engendered a sense of grievance; it did not breed bitterness. But that bitterness is now beginning to grow. And that is the new factor with which White South Africans will have to reckon increasingly the longer the *status quo* is maintained.

In brief, what confronts us in South Africa is a society which become increasingly multi-racial. It is multi-racial in almost e respect except in its political institutions, and in the artif erection of social barriers. The aim and purpose of *apartheid* been to reverse this historical growth of multi-racialism, an set up in its place a series of racial societies. But the process tow integration has already gone so far that it has been impossible t apart that which history has joined together.

The essential weakness of *apartheid* is that it is an anti-histo movement; its danger is that it may have succeeded in creatir new historical force—a race-conscious Black nationalism wh drawing its inspiration and support from the vast African hinterl and from a colour-conscious world, may prove greater than the r conscious White nationalism If this process continues much fur we might yet live to see the day against which General Sn warned—the elimination of the White experiment in South Af

THE SITUATION AFTER SHARPEVILLE

The present writer arrived in Vereeniging, the setting of Sha ville, a few days after the shootings of 21 March. The Africans v still staying away from work, though some risked the anger of majority to come to their employment. They did not go home a dark. They said they needed the money to feed their families, they were afraid of losing their jobs or running foul of the These are three elements that go a long way to explain why it i difficult for urban Africans to maintain effective strike action any length of time. They must either work or starve, obey, or ac the sanctions of the administration which can deprive them of t work and of their right to live in an urban society. The sanct are enormous; they carry the full weight of massive Governn retribution as well as stringent economic penalties. Africans sought to avoid these political and economic sanctions had to the risk of another sanction: the pressure of their own commu with the well-known feature of intimidation—a characteristic o societies, not only of Africans.

Europeans in Vereeniging reacted in two ways to the shootin Sharpeville. There were those who frankly thought it was a us lesson. They favoured more tough action of the same kind. Ne theless, they were alarmed by what had happened. The best in of this alarm is to be found in the sale of guns: within a few day Sharpeville every gunsmith in South Africa was completely clea

out. Gunsmiths had what business men call 'a killing'. Trade had never been better. South Africans reputedly have the highest gun ratio per head of population in the world—White South Africans, that is, since no non-White may legally own a weapon. After Sharpeville that ratio was quickly increased.

I stood in the gunshops and listened to the conversations. 'If the Kaffirs won't come to work, there is only one thing to do—shoot them.' 'It's either them or us—well, I say it must be them.' I asked: 'All 11 million of them?' And the answer was: 'If necessary, yes.' Later, in Bloemfontein, a farmer showed me his gnarled knuckles: 'I broke every one of them on Kaffirs; that's the only way to treat them, man.' 'Where,' I asked him, 'has it got you?' 'Man,' he said, 'they are more ***beneuk***—stubborn—than ever. But there is no other way.'

These remarks are, of course, by no means typical of all White South Africans. Their leaders took a wholly different view. Dr Verwoerd himself went out of his way to deprecate this type of thinking in a speech he made near Sharpeville. The majority of Afrikaner intellectuals to whom I talked took an even stronger line. They regarded Sharpeville as a major setback for the Europeans' cause. They were horrified. A senior police officer in Vereeniging went around saying publicly that the shooting was a horrible mistake and a tragedy. But behind it all—and it came out strongly in places like Worcester where armed people began to patrol the town—was a real sense of fear, a feeling that something had changed, that the ground had begun to move under their feet.

White South Africans, the present writer among them, have all been nurtured from the cradle on 'the *swart gevaar*'—the Black danger. My own earliest nightmares were about naked black savages rushing down to kill me and my family. There is enough evidence to show that this forms a pattern of children's dreams in South Africa. Fear of black naked savagery is an intrinsic feature of our society. The events after Sharpeville brought this fear into the open as a real possibility. For the first time people were going around speaking about the possibilities of a massacre.

What is surprising, of course, is that there had been no Black rising, no single white person was killed in the crisis. All the Africans had done was to march to police stations or to native administration offices in columns to protest against carrying passes,[1]

[1] For some account of the Pass Laws, see 'The Statutory Background of Apartheid', in *The World Today*, May 1960.

and later to burn their passes. There was no violence against the Whites; no attacks on property; no active resistance to the forces of law and order. The demonstration of the potentialities of resistance and of Black power was enough to make the threat to White society appear imminent and dangerous. The secret dreams of the nursery had suddenly appeared on the streets in full daylight. That the Africans were neither naked nor savage was irrelevant.

The reaction to this sense of danger was natural and predictable: defend yourself and weaken your enemy. So arms were bought, the army was called out in force, and the African political organizations were declared illegal.

But other mental processes came into play as well. The architects of *apartheid* sincerely believe they are the benevolent well-wishers of the Africans; they believe, too, that the Africans really love them and are contented and grateful for what is being done for them. If there are signs to the contrary, palatable explanations must be found to enable this image to be preserved: for example, that only a tiny minority of the Africans showed any sign of opposition, and that the majority was loyal and peaceloving. If they stayed away from work or marched in columns, such as the 30,000 who walked in solemn and disciplined procession through the streets of Capetown, it was because they were misled or intimidated—as no doubt some were. If they were misled, it could only be by 'Communists and liberals'—especially by White liberals who put ideas into the heads of Africans which they could not think up for themselves. These are the official arguments advanced by all the leading Government spokesmen. And if you believe in the truth of these arguments—as the Government sincerely does—then your action is clear: you must arrest all the troublemakers, Blacks and Whites, Browns and Coloureds.

But why, if only a minority—and a tiny minority at that—was infected, was there any need for a state of emergency? This question was asked often enough in the South African Parliament. The only answer was that it enabled the Government to deal with the situation more effectively, and minimized the chances of the danger spreading. But although some 1,600 people have been detained for political reasons, and perhaps 20,000 for other infringements of the law, the state of emergency still remains, nobody knows for how long.

The recent events in South Africa—apart, of course, from the shooting of the Prime Minister—are no new thing. There have been stay-at-home strikes, pass-burnings, bus marchers, and other

demonstrations, at regular intervals in the past fourteen years. But what really hit South Africa this time was the vehement reaction of world opinion. The sharp attack by the American State Department, followed by the U.N. censure debate (with the notable abstention of both Britain and France), and a chain of protests by almost every country in the world, profoundly shocked the Nationalists, encouraged the White Opposition, and raised the morale of the Africans.

The real disaster for the South African Government was not Sharpeville or Langa, but the world reactions to them. Within months of Mr Macmillan's friendly but serious warning that South Africa should be careful not to isolate herself from the rest of the world, his words had come true. No wonder some of Dr Verwoerd's colleagues publicly accused Mr Macmillan of being the real instigator of Sharpeville. Even in this country one finds people who think that there might be some truth in this allegation. But Mr Macmillan is no more guilty of Sharpeville than of Tolpuddle. The demonstrations that led to the Sharpeville shootings were 'in the mill' long before he had spoken in Capetown.

POLITICAL TRENDS

It may be useful at this point to consider the political trends inside the country.

Let us first take Afrikanerdom and the Nationalist Government. Afrikaner nationalism must be seen as a historical process which has its roots in the eighteenth century. Its task is almost completed. Its aim was to secure the identity of the Afrikaners—their language, their culture, their Church. Its method was to secure Afrikaner domination. The election and entrenchment of the Nationalist Government in and since 1948 marked the beginning of the last phase of that process. The Union Jack and God Save the Queen were abolished; separate Afrikaans education was established; Afrikaners were launched into trade and commerce; the Afrikaner concept of a just and abiding Native policy was set in motion. Only one aim remained to be fulfilled: the creation of an Afrikaner republic.

But the process has been losing its dynamism. An increasing number of Afrikaner intellectuals have begun to question some of the concepts on which Afrikanerdom is based. Doubts have begun to creep in about the practicability of *apartheid* after eleven years of its application, and, more important, about the moral validity

of the method whereby the present form of it is being appli

Dr Verwoerd's opponents can be divided into two groups: politicians who dislike his inflexible policies and desire a m broadly based Government, seeking a reconciliation with English-speaking Opposition; and those who have come to honest conclusion that *apartheid* as practised is neither practical morally justified.

The close contest in the election of Dr Verwoerd foreshadow the potential schisms within Afrikaner ranks. But his politica astute critics realized that a premature challenge to him would doomed to failure. Until the Republic came into existence it was s possible for the Afrikaner Establishment—the Broederbond— denounce the rebels as traitors, and to destroy them. Those w wished to destroy Dr Verwoerd realized they must first achieve t Republic. Thus it was that the urgent demand for the Repub came not from Dr Verwoerd but from his critics—the Ca Nationalists, led by Mr Donges. The argument was that once t Republic was established a reorientation of political parties wou become possible. The existence of this internal difference in t Cabinet explains why Mr Eric Louw, who is one of the few Ca Nationalists who stand solidly behind Dr Verwoerd, takes eve opportunity of saying that Mr Sauer, the senior Minister in t Government, is not expressing the party's views.

Another group, and a more significant one, is that of the Afrikar intellectuals at the universities, in the churches, and in commer It is interesting that the Boer Platteland community has alwa rather like the Scots, looked to their intellectuals, their success business men, and their teachers for leadership. It has always be the professors, the doctors, the teachers, the dominie who have the pattern of Afrikaner policy; it is these 'top people' who have cently shown signs of revising their thinking. One finds this on sides. For example, Professor S. Gericke, the Vice-Chancellor Stellenbosch University (which is the traditional breeding-grou of Nationalist politics), himself a convinced member of the Nation ist Party, in a recent Sunday night sermon in Stellenbosch made t following statement: 'The caravans of Black nationalism are on t march. There is no human force that can stop it. I am not sayi that this is good or bad. All I am saying is that we must calcul with that fact in deciding what our policy should be.' In one form another, leaders in SABRA, the South African Bureau of Ra Relations—Dr Jan Moolman, the chairman of the South Afric

Wool Board, Professor H. Pistorius of Pretoria University, Professor J. L. du Plessis of Potchefstroom University, Professor C. J. Uys of the Free State University, and many others—have begun bubbling up with this realization of what is happening in the African continent and of the changes that have become necessary in South Africa.

It is this kind of thinking about what must come after the Republic that prematurely forced Japie Basson, the young Nationalist rebel M.P., out of the caucus. He tried hard to prevent himself from being expelled from the Nationalist Party; but he outran himself and was put out of the Nationalist caucus, with the result that he was forced to launch his new party in opposition to the Government sooner than he had wished.

Sir de Villiers Graaff, the leader of the United Party, has long since given up hope of being able to win enough White voters in South Africa. He has deliberately—whether rightly or wrongly—adopted a policy of trimming his sails in order to be able to compete with the Nationalist Party for the mass of the right-wing European vote on the Platteland. This explains why he forced a show-down to get rid of his liberal wing (who now form the bloc of twelve Progressives in Parliament) and why he still says today that if his party returns to power it will do so on the basis that South Africa will have, for the foreseeable future, a purely White Parliament. That is the policy of the party which provides the alternative in the event of a change of government in South Africa.

As to the Progressive Party, its members know that if they were to contest an election now they would probably all lose their seats. This is because they have stated plainly that they are in favour of Africans having some form of representation in Parliament. The same applies to the Liberals, the other fringe of the very small 5 per cent of the radical White Opposition.

As to the African National Congress, I saw its leaders the day before they were arrested, and they then said: 'We think we can hold our position against the Pan-Africanists provided the A.N.C. is not outlawed.'

The Pan-Africanists are having a tremendous popular success in appealing to the racism—not the racialism but the race-consciousness—of the African, and particularly in attacking the African National Congress leaders for their reformist policy and for insisting on working with people of all races. The Pan-Africanist leaders—men like Robert Sobukwe—are young intellectuals. They are racists, but not racialists. They are prepared to work with Whites

provided the Whites work separately from them—Whites and Asians must each have their own organization. The one thing they will not do is to work with the Whites and the Asians in a single organization.

In conclusion, one is bound to say that the picture in South Africa is one, if not of alarm, certainly of despondency. The main factor is that there is no political force in South Africa today, either Black or White, that is capable of overthrowing the present Government. If that Government continues to remain in power, the forces of bitterness, of Black racism are bound to increase rapidly. If that is to be averted, some new factor must be introduced into the South African situation which is not a domestic factor. The question of international opinion has already become a factor in the situation since Sharpeville. What effects international opinion will have (the Commonwealth Conference, the United Nations, opinion in the African and Asian countries and in the West in general) remains to be seen. But at present it seems that South Africa is locked in her own dilemma—she has reached a cul-de-sac. The one possibility is that an alternative coalition Government, if it can come into being—and at present, as has been said, one does not see how it can come into being without some external pressure—may break the deadlock and restore, at least, some fluidity to the hardened situation that today confronts us in South Africa.

COLIN LEGUM

South Korea in the Wake of an Election

ON 15 March, in a much-criticized Presidential election, 91 per cent of the electorate of the Republic of Korea returned Syngman Rhee to his fourth consecutive term as President of that peninsula which United Nations forces stationed there term 'Freedom's Frontier'. That election irregularities deprived South Korea of that rather optimistic appellation was apparent in the disappointed, indeed outraged, reactions of the responsible world press. 'The election was a disgrace,' said an editorial of the Manchester *Guardian*; 'a tainted victory,' said the Washington *Post*; 'The Korean people

deserve better than this,' lamented *The Times*. Even in the Republic of Korea, where freedom of the press is tenuous at best, the independent *Hankook Ilbo* spoke out against the violence, intimidation, and 'election rigging' which characterized the country's attempt at democratic processes.

President Rhee, who had charted almost single-handed the course of South Korean politics since assuming the Presidency in 1948, ran unopposed in the March election as a result of the untimely death of his only opponent, Dr Pyong-ok Chough, on 15 February. Much the same thing happened in 1956, when Patrick Henry Shinicky, Rhee's only serious rival, died unexpectedly ten days prior to the balloting. In both cases the deceased candidates' names were, in accordance with the Korean Republic's election law, retained on the ballot, and produced a small but articulate protest vote aimed particularly at Rhee's refusal to set a new election date and so allow an opposition candidate to be registered.

The manipulations which resulted in Rhee's re-election, and in the election as Vice-President (and successor to the Presidency) of his hand-picked running mate, Speaker of the House Ki-Poong Lee, began on 1 February, when Rhee and his ruling Liberal Party advanced the usual May election date to 15 March in order 'to free the nation's farmers to participate politically without damaging crops or crop prospects'. It happened that the announcement came immediately after Dr Chough had left for an abdominal operation in the United States, from which he could not hope to return to campaign until early March.

After Dr Chough's tragic death, incumbent Vice-President Dr John Myun Chang, who had won the Vice-Presidency on the opposition Democratic Party slate in 1956,[1] pleaded with Rhee to set a new election date and permit the Democrats to present a new Presidential candidate, in order that the election be something more than, as the Government daily *The Korean Republic* triumphantly termed it, 'a vote of confidence in the father of our country'. But on 19 February, Minister of Home Affairs In-kyu Choi refused the Democrats' plea, adding with what may appear to be irony: 'The election date, once it has been announced, cannot be changed for any political reasons, not to speak of my own personal magnanimity.'

[1] Under the Korean Republic's election law, the President and Vice-President are elected on separate ballots, thus resulting in the possibility of a President and Vice-President of different political parties.

Examples of the administration's conduct of affairs before the election abounded before Dr Chough's death. Terrorists carried out an assault on independent Korean and foreign newsmen, while Rhee's highly disciplined National Police stood by apathetically; the suddenly less apathetic police at local elections in two Kyongsang Pukto districts 'examined' ballots before they were placed in the proper boxes; would-be presidential contenders found that their registration papers had been 'lost' on the last day allowed for registration; and Counter Intelligence Corps men classified army personnel according to political affiliations.

Once it was apparent that Rhee would be unopposed, the political atmosphere in South Korea quieted somewhat, only to flare up on election day when fourteen persons were shot to death by police in the city of Masan during voting riots. Isolated instances of violence and death also occurred throughout the countryside in protest against the Liberal Party system of 'cell voting', by which some 60 million sample ballots were printed before the election and teams of nine voters were carefully trained in marking the sample ballots for candidates Rhee and Lee; on 15 March the nine-man teams were divided into groups of three, a 'leader' in the centre who observed how the other two voted. The 'cell voting' technique resulted in the election of the generally unpopular Lee as Vice-President,[1] and removed the four-year-long irritation to President Rhee of having the oppositionist Dr Chang as Vice-President and successor to the Presidency—the latter a significant role when one considers that on 26 March Dr Rhee celebrated his eighty-fifth birthday and so became the world's oldest Head of State.

Precisely how unpopular Lee was among the Korean populace, and the true degree of the nation-wide exasperation in relation to him, were not immediately apparent after the election. The average working man, faced with threats of economic sanctions should he too verbally protest against the unsavoury election techniques, appeared resigned and took recourse to ineffectual grumbling. But not so the country's university and high school students, who at the time of the election were on Easter holidays. In mid-April they returned to their studies, and student demonstrations protesting against the conduct of the 15 March election sprouted in Masan, Pusan, Chungju—and, finally, in Seoul on 18 April. Underestimating the gravity of the protests, Dr Rhee ordered his National Police

[1] Final election results: Ki-Poong Lee, 8,337,059; John Myun Chang, 1,843,758.

to permit the demonstrations, controlling them without violence.

But on 19 April—now referred to as 'Blood Tuesday'—the demonstrations got out of hand, and the police lost patience and fired into the mobs of students. The irate students swarmed through the capital, burning police boxes, tearing up barricades, and setting on fire the Anti-Communist Centre, offices of a pro-Rhee newspaper, and various public buildings intimately identified with the Rhee administration. By nightfall more than 125 students lay dead and nearly 800 injured in the streets of Seoul.

President Rhee's first reaction to the insurrection was to blame it on Communist spies. This proclamation did not pacify the students, and he felt it necessary to follow it with an ambiguous declaration of his intention to separate himself from party politics and govern the Republic of Korea as non-political Head of State. The declaration was accompanied by martial law and a dawn-to-dusk curfew. For several tense days it appeared that Dr Rhee had survived the crisis. Seoul counted her dead.

However, a week after 'Blood Tuesday' university professors staged a similar demonstration, demanding new elections, the retirement of Vice-President-Elect Lee, and the immediate resignation of Dr Rhee himself. Students joined the professors, and despite the curfew a violent all-night street fight with police ensued. Both Dr Chang and Ki-Poong Lee offered their resignations, the former from sympathy with the grievances of the demonstrators. The National Assembly met and demanded the President's resignation, and on 27 April Dr Rhee astonished the nation, and the world, by stepping down. The revolution had gained its immediate aims

Now, under the caretaker Government of Foreign Minister Chung Huh, South Korea is quiet. Dr Rhee has retired to his private residence; Ki-Poong Lee, his wife, and two sons committed suicide on 29 April, and the Republic of Korea is without President, Vice-President, President-Elect, and Vice-President-Elect. Minister Huh has promised early elections; in the meantime he and his newly formed Cabinet of independent personalities must grapple with the innumerable political, international, and economic problems facing the nation.

ECONOMICS, DEFENCE, AND RELATIONS WITH JAPAN

Before the election, the Liberal Party promised the electorate (numbering 11 million) a 9-point programme of improvements,

among which the following four pledges were most significa

(i) Exaltation of public morality and reform of Government administ tion.
(ii) Establishment of a self-sufficient economic system and accelerat of over-all local development and promotion of small and mediu industries.
(iii) Development of fishing.
(iv) Reinforcement of diplomacy and national defence.

The Democratic Opposition, shocked by the death of th candidate and disorganized by a split in policies between t Chough and Chang wings of the party,[1] failed to give an expli answer to the Liberals' nine pledges, except to point out the hollo ness of the 'public morality' pledge in view of the Rhee administ tion's election techniques.

To one who observed South Korea in the summer of 1953, at t conclusion of the horrifying three-year Korean conflict, and w then compares those conditions with the state of industry a economy today, the Rhee Government's second pledge was som what less hollow and more promising than the first. Although t number of unemployed in South Korea still exceeds 1 million, t more deadly aspects of monetary inflation have been arrested in t past few years, mainly as a result of immense United States assi ance (more than £500 million since 1955) and an artificial peggi of the local currency, the *hwan*, at 500 to the dollar (while blac market rates approach 1,200 to the dollar). In February, howev Dr Rhee agreed, albeit reluctantly, to a readjustment of the *hwan* 650. So long as the rate remains unrealistic and is supported alm entirely by U.S. funds, inflation may be held in check, but r economic and industrial progress is unthinkable.

Probably the central economic problem faced by South Korea that of coming to economic terms with Japan. Understandably, half-century of ruthless Japanese occupation of Korea has left in t Korean Republic a distaste for anything Japanese, and a distrust Japanese military and economic motives. Thus constructive tra between the two nations—absolutely vital for the economic pr gress of South Korea—has been almost at a standstill since t second World War. It is, then, encouraging to note a certa liberalization; on 28 March the South Korean Minister for Co merce and Industry, Yong Suh Koo, announced that South Kor

[1] President Rhee made reference to the Democratic Party split when, on bei informed of Dr Chough's death, he commented: 'John Chang should be deligl ed that his chief rival is out of the way.'

had decided to 'normalize' trade with Japan, which he hoped would result in exports of £7 million-worth of Korean goods to Japan annually. Koo also hinted that South Korea may sign a long-term contract with Japan to supply rice and iron ores. A recent attempt to export rice resulted in a fiasco, in that the Koreans supplied polished rice, whereas the Japanese required unhulled rice, which could be stored for a longer time without spoiling.[1] But the recent trade agreement is promising, and the needed export market may invigorate the South Korean economy.

Following the successful insurrection, the caretaker Government has promised the immediate entry of Japanese news correspondents to South Korea and the establishment of a Japanese diplomatic mission in Seoul actions which would have been unthinkable under the Rhee administration. The opening of the Japanese mission and renewed Korean-Japanese trade may go far to improve the state of the country's economy.

This will not be accomplished, however, until the general standard of Korean products is notably improved; at present, standards of workmanship are so poor that Korean goods cannot compete on the international market. An improvement in quality and, in turn, further economic progress require that foreign capital be enticed to South Korea; unstable political conditions and the dictatorial rule of President Rhee have hitherto discouraged private foreign investors. However, in March the Government announced a liberalization programme designed to insure foreign investments against the hazards of war and unstable political and economic conditions; once a period of natural suspicion is past, and if the South Korean Government does indeed abide by its economic promises, much-needed foreign capital may begin to flow, if slowly, into the frail economy of the Republic.

The pledge to 'develop fishing' has again been hampered by President Rhee's intransigence towards the Japanese. Insistence on the controversial 'Rhee Fishery Line', beyond which Japanese fishing boats are forbidden to move, has resulted in an aggravation of the still abnormal diplomatic relations between the two nations. Japanese boats and their crews have been seized by Korean coastal patrols, and the Rhee Government has blustered about reprisals, indeed even war, against Japan if the Rhee Line is continually

[1] The unfortunate rice agreement was in fact blackmail, since South Korea offered to free interned Japanese fishermen if Japan would buy 30,000 tons of Korean rice.

ignored. However, on 29 March the first step towards a solutio the fishing dilemma was taken when 167 Japanese fishermen, s of them held in South Korea for as long as five years, were retur to Japan in exchange for Korean subjects held in Japan for ill entry. This exchange, which may lead to a settlement of the S Korean–Japanese fishing rights conflict and so to a peaceful velopment of the Korean fishing industry, is unfortunately tie with the larger and even more explosive issue of repatriation.

During the past four months, the first of some 600,000 Ko residents in Japan have been repatriated to North Korea o voluntary basis, under the guidance of the Red Cross. Repeat President Rhee has threatened to sink the Russian ships conduc the repatriation, and even to go to war with Japan over the issue points out that 97 per cent of the Korean residents in Japan c from South Korea, that most of them were taken to Japan as s labourers during the second World War, that they have been tre as second-class citizens in Japan, that they are being duped, if forced, by the Red Cross with promises of a better life in C munist North Korea—that, in fact, the Koreans are 'being sold Communist slavery'.

This friction over the repatriation of Korean citizens to N Korea approaches the central problem, or danger, of Dr Rh recent military and foreign policy. The party's fourth elec pledge included a programme 'to maintain crack armed forces modernize military equipment to enhance military might'. No denies the importance and the valuable services of the h (600,000-strong) South Korean army in the United Nations pc action of 1950–3 and, at the present time, in guarding the 3 Parallel frontier against the constant possibility of renewed C munist aggression. From the 'father' of the South Korean army, now retired General James van Fleet, on through the subsequ military commanders of U.N. forces, praise is rightfully accorde the Korean soldier for his toughness and his dedication in the f against Communism. Even today the U.S. Eighth Army depend thousands of South Korean soldiers to fill out its inadeq complement.

However, from an economic standpoint, an army which eat to 40 per cent of the national Budget of a poor nation is a luxu once unnecessary and unbearable. All attempts by foreign obser to encourage a more modest armed force have been met with ref by President Rhee, who re-affirmed as recently as 1 April that

division of Korea cannot be permitted to continue indefinitely.' U.N. forces have been in the uncomfortable and delicate position of having constantly to restrain President Rhee from ordering his huge army north to reunite Korea by force. Failing to gain U.N. or U.S. support for such a reckless action, he frequently suggested that 'South Korea was prepared to fight alone in unifying Korea.'

But now, in view of the admirable behaviour of the South Korean armed forces during the April insurrection—they were non-political and showed restraint at all times—the threat of a 'March North' has disappeared, and South Korea can get down to the job of national house-cleaning. Already a reorganization of the National Police is being effected as well as a reduction in the powers of the Counter Intelligence Corps. The National Assembly is debating a proposed amendment to the Constitution to allow for the establishment of a Cabinet system, fashioned on European models, to replace the Presidential system which resulted in extreme powers for the Head of State. Enthusiastic, elated by her democratic victory, South Korea has banished her play-on-words nickname—'Rheedom's Frontier'—and, freed from a discouraging *status quo*, has every hope of living up to her hitherto tarnished reputation as 'Freedom's Frontier'.

JOHN BARR

The Second U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea

AFTER six weeks of arduous debates and fruitless negotiations, the second United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, which opened in Geneva on 17 March 1960, has ended in dismal failure. Its record is thus far worse than that of the first Conference, which was held in the same city in the spring of 1958. At that first Conference, substantial and encouraging progress had been made towards filling what was one of the most glaring gaps in international law—a vacuum that had existed ever since the notion prevailed in the world that the society of nations should also be governed by rules of law. Until then, the Law of the Sea had been at best a patchwork of

one-sided regulations, bilateral arrangements, gentlemen's agreements, common usage, and stop-gap measures. It had never been fully developed or codified. The first United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, in nine weeks, erected an impressive legal structure that had remained unbuilt for centuries.

Working on the basis of drafts prepared by the International Law Commission, the first Conference reached a large area of agreement. In five separate conventions, a host of questions concerning the regime of the high seas, the measurement of territorial waters, the rights and duties of coastal States in their territorial waters and contiguous zones, the right of innocent passage, fishing rights in offshore waters, the continental shelf and development of mineral resources on the floor of the ocean, the air space above territorial waters, laying and maintenance of cables and pipelines, pollution of the sea by atomic waste etc. were dealt with.

No agreement, however, was reached on the cardinal issue of the day: the breadth of territorial waters. Failure to agree on a universally accepted standard for determining the reach of coastal State sovereignty over adjacent waters left in suspense much of the work accomplished by the first Conference. For what good is it to legislate on the regime of the high seas if nobody knows for certain just where national sovereignty ends and the high seas as the *res communis* or common property of all begins? It was like building an imposing edifice while leaving the foundation to be laid at some future date.

To provide this foundation, the second Conference was called in response to a resolution adopted in 1958 at the thirteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly. In contrast with the varied agenda of the first Conference, the second Conference on the Law of the Sea was to concern itself solely with two related issues: the breadth of territorial waters and fishing rights within a contiguous zone.

The three-mile limit of territorial waters, which won fairly general acceptance in the nineteenth century, but which had already been widely established before, has not been challenged seriously, or on an extensive scale, until the present day. The outstanding exception in the past was Russia, who under the Tsars as well as under the Soviet regime has consistently claimed national sovereignty over a twelve-mile zone from her coasts. It should be added, though, that the Soviets in 1950-1 entered into bilateral arrangements with Sweden and Denmark, and subsequently also with Britain, allowing

fishermen of these countries to ply their trade in Soviet-controlled waters up to a distance of three nautical miles from the coastline.

Since the end of the first World War, however, and more particularly after the failure of the 1930 Codification Conference at The Hague, more and more countries have unilaterally extended their territorial waters to distances of four, six, nine, or even twelve miles offshore. In one extreme case, Chile, Ecuador, and Peru in August 1952 sought to establish a claim to an exclusive fishing and whaling reservation in the South Pacific extending as far as two hundred miles from their respective coastlines.

Inevitably, this spreading practice of 'ocean-grabbing' led to friction between the coastal States and those countries that have traditionally been leaders in shipping, high-seas fisheries, and naval power. In the world-wide battle of words and diplomatic notes that ensued, the great maritime nations, in particular Great Britain and the United States, have been arrayed on one side as staunch defenders of the three-mile zone, while the smaller and newer nations have tended to make common cause with the advocates of change.

In the absence of international agreement in these matters, many nations decided to go it alone. In 1951–2, Norway and Iceland unilaterally extended their national sovereignty to a distance of four miles offshore. What is more, both countries applied arbitrary standards of measurement which made the most of their geographical configuration with its long and wide fjords, with the result that large areas that had hitherto been fished by nationals of other countries were now closed to them.

On 2 June 1958 Iceland went one step further, extending her coastal waters, by unilateral decree, from four to twelve miles. This was a severe blow to British fishermen, who had been operating in these waters for decades. As a matter of fact, the waters around Iceland used to account for about one-half of the white fish caught by British fishermen in the North Atlantic (excluding the Barents Sea and Bear Island).

The British Government refused to recognize the legitimacy of Iceland's claim to a twelve-mile territorial sea, as also did Germany, Belgium, and other interested countries. For its part, the Icelandic Government refused to budge from its position, with the result that severely strained relations developed between Great Britain and Iceland. The fisheries dispute between the two countries had in fact been going on for eight years, for it began when Iceland first changed her territorial waters limit from three to four miles, but it

entered the acute stage when the Reykjavik Government, from the summer of 1958 onwards, sought to bar British fishermen by force from the much wider area encompassed by the newly proclaimed twelve-mile limit. Ever since then, British trawlers have been harassed by Icelandic patrol boats and have been forced to carry on their trade under the protection of Royal Navy units. While the many incidents that have resulted from this abnormal situation have generally been on the lenient side, they have generated much bad blood between the two countries, allies in N.A.T.O.

A potentially even more serious situation arose when Indonesia, by virtue of a Presidential decree issued on 18 February 1960, proclaimed a twelve-mile zone of territorial waters for her entire far-flung archipelago, with the result that huge stretches of what used to be the high seas came under Indonesian sovereignty, at any rate as far as the Jakarta Government is concerned. While this unilateral action was immediately contested as illegal by the countries more directly affected, in particular the Netherlands, Australia, and the United States, it is hard to see what could make President Soekarno change his mind except an international accord—or naked force Hints that naval force eventually may be resorted to in this area have already come from two sources. For one thing, the Dutch Government in April dispatched three warships to the Far East for the protection of Netherlands New Guinea (a territory in dispute between the Netherlands and Indonesia). In order to reach their destination without undue detours, these ships would have to pass through waters over which the Jakarta Government now claims control. On the other hand, the American delegation to the second Conference on the Law of the Sea pointedly declared that the United States had no intention of subjecting the movements of its Seventh Fleet to permission from the Jakarta Government or to the detours of thousands of miles that would become necessary in order to avoid what Indonesia now claims to be her territorial waters.

The following quotation from a speech made at Geneva on 8 April 1960 by the Chairman of the U.S. Delegation, Ambassador Arthur H. Dean, will help us to appreciate fully the enormous consequences that may result in certain cases from the substitution of a twelve-mile limit for the traditional one of three miles: '. . . For example [Mr Dean said], a single offshore rock emerging from the water at high tide can under a three-mile limit have a territorial sea with approximately twenty-eight square miles of water surface. With a six-mile limit the same rock would be entitled to a territorial

of four times this area, or 112 square miles. Thus, in certain
ɜical situations the area of territorial water may increase in
netrical proportion though the breadth of the territorial sea
eases in arithmetic proportion.'
ne need only apply this statement to the Indonesian archi-
go, with its countless islands, islets, cliffs, and reefs, scattered
an area of thousands of miles, to realize what the change from a
e-mile status not merely to six miles (as in Mr Dean's example)
to the twelve miles now being claimed by Jakarta will do to the
dom of the high seas in that part of the world.
he Arab countries, too, have moved, or are about to move, to-
d the establishment of twelve-mile zones of territorial sea off
r long-stretching shores. Indeed, the Council of the Arab
gue, meeting at Cairo at the end of February 1960, urged all its
ıber States to extend their territorial limits to twelve miles. One
ıe major purposes of this resolution was to turn the Gulf of
ba into an 'Arab Lake' and to deny Israeli shipping access to
While the entrance to the Gulf of Aqaba is so narrow that it is
red by the territorial limits of the United Arab Republic and
li Arabia even under a three-mile limit, the effect of extending
onal sovereignty offshore to twelve miles, as planned by the
) States, would be to wipe out completely the now existing zone
gh seas within the Gulf.)
ven before the Arab League resolution was passed, the U.A.R.,
li Arabia, and Iraq had unilaterally extended their territorial
to a breadth of twelve miles. Now Morocco, Tunisia, and the
of the Arab States are expected to follow suit. According to a
ment made at Geneva on 12 April 1960 by the Indonesian
esentative, Mr Ahmad Subardjo Djoyo Adisuryo, some twenty-
sovereign nations in all had already adopted a territorial waters
in excess of six miles even before the second Conference got
er way.
view of the chaotic conditions now reigning in a field of vital
est even to the most solidly landlocked of nations—for, as the
gates of Switzerland and Austria pointed out at the Conference,
these countries carry on an intensive sea-borne export and
ort trade that is bound to be adversely affected by any change in
tatus quo of territorial seas—the Geneva Conference on the
of the Sea was dictated by a common and urgent need. As the
Conference had already shown, a substantial majority of the
d's sovereign nations today consider the three-mile limit out-

dated and would like to substitute for it a larger expanse of territorial waters. However, the countries advocating a limit of twelve miles or more were then, and still are, definitely a minority.

Realizing this, the United States, as the recognized leader of the conservative group of countries still adhering to the three-mile limit, as early as 1958 took the initiative toward a compromise solution. Its proposal was to extend territorial rights from three to six miles and at the same time to make provision for a contiguous fishery zone, again of six miles, under the jurisdiction of the coastal State, with the proviso that the 'historic fishing rights' of other nations should be respected. The move was made reluctantly and in a spirit of sacrifice, solely for the purpose of finding a way out of an untenable state of affairs marked by one-sided and arbitrary extensions of territorial limits. Canada submitted to the first Conference a somewhat similar proposal which aimed, however, at the establishment of an 'unqualified' contiguous fishery zone, not subject to any restrictions on the basis of historic fishing rights. Both these motions in 1958 failed to secure the necessary two-thirds majority and were therefore defeated.

The second Conference started out where the first had left off Both the United States and Canada reintroduced their respective formulas, the former incorporating into it an important new proviso. Indeed, Point 3 of the United States proposal, tabled by Mr Dean on 24 March, said:

> Any State whose vessels have made a practice of fishing in the outer zone of another State during the period of five years immediately preceding 1 January 1958 (hereinafter referred to as 'the base period'), may continue to fish within the outer six miles of that zone for the same groups of species as were taken therein during the base period to an extent not exceeding in any year the annual average level of fishing carried on in the outer zone during the said period.[1]

The British delegation, which was led by Mr John Hare, Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries, on 29 March, gave its support to the American proposal because, as Mr Hare put it, 'it aims to resolve in a fair way the interests of the coastal and the fishery States'. The Federal Republic of Germany, the Low Countries, France, Japan, Turkey, Italy, Portugal, and Spain also indicated their approval of the American proposal, while a number of other countries showed preference for the Canadian version of the '6+6' formula with its

[1] *The Times*, 25 March 1960.

insistence on exclusive coastal fishing rights out to a distance of twelve miles.

Mr Hare, in his speech supporting the American proposal, emphasized that this formula involved a heavy sacrifice for Britain. 'It means abandoning the three-mile territorial sea,' he said. 'It means accepting not only the exclusive right of coastal States to fish up to six miles, but also giving them a further six miles of exclusive fishing; this would be subject only to the requirement that this contiguous zone should be shared to a limited extent by other nations who have had full legal right to fish in those waters, many of them from time immemorial.'

On the opposite side of the fence, several groups of 'twelve-milers' formed, all seeking to establish a territorial seas limit of twelve miles (in some cases even more), with slight modifications. There was the ten-nation Soviet bloc, as monolithic as ever behind the Russian proposal of 1958 that any State should have the right to fix the limit of its territorial sea at between three and twelve miles and to exercise exclusive fishery rights up to twelve miles from its coast. The bloc lacked the votes of four associates (the Chinese People's Republic, the 'German Democratic Republic' or Soviet Zone, North Korea, and North Vietnam), which, not being members of the United Nations or affiliated with any of its special organizations (as are, for instance, Western Germany and Switzerland), had not been invited to the Conference; but it had the triple vote which the Soviet Union commands in the United Nations for its Russian, Belorussian, and Ukrainian components. Moreover, it enjoyed the unqualified support of the Yugoslav delegation.

Side by side with this Communist bloc, there emerged in the course of the Conference a heterogeneous alliance of seven Arab States (Iraq, Libya, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, the United Arab Republic, and Yemen), six Latin American countries (Chile, Ecuador, Mexico, Panama, Peru, and Venezuela), and five Afro-Asian nations (Burma, Guinea, India, Indonesia, and the Sudan), which came to be known as the 'group of eighteen'.

Iceland played a lone-wolf role on the twelve-milers' front, which was further underlined when her delegate, Foreign Minister Gudmundur I. Gudmundsson, on 12 April asked the Conference to allow coastal States the right to restrict fishing in their area even outside an exclusive twelve-mile fishing zone, after determining that there was a need to cut down fishing in the area. By adding that the measure should apply only to a country 'overwhelmingly' de-

pendent on coastal fisheries, Mr Gudmundsson made it fairly cl
that he was in effect seeking a special and preferential status
Iceland. She was, in fact, the only European non-Commu
country to join the twelve-milers' camp,[1] and the only Comm
wealth country to do so was India.

The various groups of twelve-milers could never hope jointl
severally to muster a two-thirds majority in the assembly, nor
the American and Canadian proposals stand a chance of doing sc
their own merits. Therefore, in an endeavour to rally enough v
for the '6+6' formula which from the outset was the only alter
tive to failure, the American and Canadian delegations presente
joint compromise formula to the Conference on 8 April.

The joint American-Canadian proposal, which was to become
pivot of all further proceedings, provided for a maximum six-n
territorial sea and for an exclusive fishing zone contiguous to it,
tending for an additional six miles from the coastal baseline
further provided that foreign States whose nationals had mad
practice of fishing in the outer six miles of this zone during the
years preceding 1 January 1958 might continue to do so for a per
of ten years from 31 October 1960.

Ambassador Dean, in submitting the joint proposal to the C
ference, stressed that it contained two very important concessi
on the part of the U.S. Government. The first was to agree to pl
a time limitation on foreign fishing rights within the six- to twel
mile area. The second was to agree that this grace period shoulc
only ten years, as compared with periods of fifteen years or m
which had been under consideration.

'For countries which basically would prefer to remain at a thi
mile limit of territorial sea and with no contiguous fishing zone, s
as the United States,' he added, 'this joint compromise prop
goes more than half way in my opinion toward the positior
twelve-mile countries.'

The British delegation on 11 April reluctantly endorsed the j
proposal as the best of various poor choices facing it. 'I cannot p
tend that I like the new proposal,' Mr Hare frankly told the Con
ence. He went on to say, 'Ten years is far too short a time for
distant-water fishermen to adapt themselves to the consequence
being shut out of fishing grounds within the twelve-mile z
where they have fished for generations.'

In the following days, most of the Western European nations

[1] Norway subsequently did so, on 14 May 1960.

well as all the Commonwealth countries except India, and numerous other States came round to supporting the joint proposal. One of the last converts was Sweden who held out until 22 April against any change in the *status quo*. When, on the following day, Ghana withdrew three controversial draft amendments which she had tabled and instead gave her support to the joint proposal, hopes were high that a two-thirds majority could be mustered after all.

The final count on 26 April, however, failed to bear out the optimistic forecasts. When Lebanon, who had been counted upon to support the joint proposal, chose instead to absent herself from the voting the one crucial vote that could have swung the balance in favour of a new Law of the Sea went by the board

As it was, the joint proposal received fifty-four favourable votes, while twenty-eight were cast against it This was one vote short of the two-thirds majority required for adoption. Five countries—Japan, Persia, the Philippines, Cambodia, and El Salvador—abstained. A subsequent motion by the U.S. delegation to have the proposal reconsidered, in an attempt to save the Conference, also failed to get the required two-thirds majority. After that, there was nothing left for the delegates but to pack and go home empty-handed.

The leaders of the Western camp, who could honestly claim that they had made a maximum of concessions at great sacrifice, made no attempt to conceal their disappointment

'Here we go back to the old chaos,' commented Ambassador Dean. The British viewpoint was summed up by Mr Hare with the words: 'It is a very bitter disappointment.' And he added, 'I think it is a sad day for the United Nations.'

JOACHIM JOESTEN

Economic Advance in Mongolia

THE People's Republic of Mongolia, lying between China and the central Siberian part of the U.S.S.R., and occupying, with the exception of the former republic of Tannu Tuva (now incorporated within the R.S.F.S.R.), the approximate territory of the Imperial Chinese dependency of Outer Mongolia, is the only independent

The Mongolian People's Republic
Main highways
Navigable rivers
Lakes
Scale
Capital of the Republic
Capitals of aimak
Borders of the Republic
Borders of aimak
Railways
U S S R
The Chinese People's Republic
Choibalsan aimak
Suhe-Bator aimak
Hentei aimak
Dorno-Gobi aimak
Tub aimak
Dund-Gobi aimak
Umnu-Gobi aimak
Ubsa aimak
Zabhan aimak
Arakhangai aimak
Ubur-khangai aimak
Bayan-Khongor aimak
Gobi-Altai aimak
Khobdo aimak
Bayan-Ulegy aimak
Ulan-Bator
Ulan-Ude
Choibalsan
Baruun-Urt
Under-Khan
Sain-Shanda
Mandal Gobi
Dalan-Zadagad
Arbai Khere
Bayan-Khongor
Tsetserleg
Bulgan
Altan-Bulak
Muren
Ulyassutai
Jusenbulag
Ulangom
Ulegy
Khobdo
Zun-Modo
Bor

State in Central Asia. Peculiar historical circumstances, which cannot be touched upon here, have resulted in its emergence since 1921, when its *de facto* separation from China was assured, as the first Soviet satellite republic. In the years before the second World War, Mongolia was, practically speaking, isolated from the world except for the U.S.S.R. Trade and other relations with Germany, which had been of some importance in the late 1920s, were broken off in 1929, by which time over 85 per cent of Mongolia's exports were destined for the Soviet Union. At the same time a Five-Year Plan for the Mongol economy was adopted and integrated with the Soviet plan which marked the end of Lenin's NEP.

Various factors contributed to the isolation of Mongolia. The country's geographical seclusion, its close association with the U.S.S.R. which did not encourage foreign observers at the time, and the threat of Japanese penetration from Manchuria which kept the country for several years on a war footing (by 1938 some 52·2 per cent of Government expenditure was devoted to national defence, a figure said now to be reduced to 2·9 per cent), combined with the total exclusion of foreigners and the effective lack of any reliable published information to hide from the outside world the reformation of society which was then in progress in Mongolia. Those years were devoted to the liquidation of elements opposed to the regime, in particular the lamaist church and the older nobility and intellectuals. Several military and political leaders also fell victim to purges and terror. As a result Mongolia emerged after the war, and more particularly in the early 1950s when outside observers were re-admitted, as a semi-modernized State well on the way to possessing a fully socialized economy and society.

The initial transformation was accomplished in obscurity, but the recent fulfilment of this process of development has been accompanied by much publicity. Two Five-Year Plans, followed by a 'Three-Year Plan for the Development of the National Economy of the M.P.R.' (1958–60), have resulted, in the words of the fourth Plenum of the Central Committee of the Mongol People's Revolutionary Party, held in December 1959, in the fact that 'socialist relations of production have become triumphant in all branches of the national economy.'[1] This marks the conclusion of a definite stage in the transformation of society, a conclusion anticipated by the Prime Minister, Tsedenbal, in a speech to the Thirteenth

[1] Montsame Press Agency Bulletin (subsequently referred to as Montsame), no. 20, December 1959.

Congress of the Mongolian Revolutionary League of Youth a year before: 'After Mongolia solves the problem of socialist transformation of agriculture which at present is being carried out throughout the country, she will enter a new period of her development of socialist construction. It is not long before the Mongolian people will face the task of gradual transition to Communism.'[1] Mongolian politicians are already talking in terms of a 'big leap forward' in 1960.[2] In view of the insistence in Party propaganda and in other publications that Mongolia, formerly a 'backward nomad society', has now developed into an 'agricultural-industrial' economy, it is clear that a thorough revolution in economy and social organization is being undertaken, which is being much publicized both internally and in official handouts in foreign languages abroad. Further, personal observation on the spot shows that official claims of considerable progress in agricultural development and in the growth of industry are not idle boasts, but correspond pretty closely to reality.[3]

Mongolia is known traditionally as a country whose prime interest is in stockbreeding, though at present industry accounts for almost half of the total value of the national production.[4] An early attempt was made, during a period of 'leftist deviation', at complete collectivization of the nomad herding economy Some 400 collectives were established in 1929–30[5] but for various reasons, notably managerial incompetence and popular opposition to what was seen as a simple confiscatory policy, the movement completely failed. Animals were slaughtered in numbers or driven over the border into Inner Mongolia to escape collectivization. Thus the hostility to the popular revolution of the herdsmen, the overwhelming majority of the population, was effectively demonstrated A few co-operatives survived from the 'thirties, notably one in Arkhangai province, whose establishment in 1939, with a membership of twelve persons and seventy-five head of cattle, was thought

[1] *op. cit.*, no. 1, January 1959.
[2] *op. cit.*, no. 20, December 1959. Report on the draft of the National Economy Development Plan for 1960 presented to the fourth session of the Great National Hural.
[3] Projects visited by the writer in 1958 and 1959 included two State farms, a co-operative, a coal-mine, and a new confectionery factory He was also able to visit schools, the University, the Committee of Sciences, the State Theatre, and other non-industrial organizations Progress made in Ulan Bator between the two visits in the way of road, bridge, and house construction was very noticeable. Except for Chinese labourers and some foreign specialists, factory and educational staff were Mongol.
[4] Montsame, no. 17, November 1959.
[5] I. J. Slatkin, *Die Mongolische Volksrepublik* (Berlin, 1954), p. 203.

worthy of public celebration twenty years later.[1] But it was only long after the second World War that it was found possible to draw the largest sector of the population a second time into full participation in the new revolutionary society and economy, and to carry out a revised programme of collectivization. On both occasions it has been the 'building of the socialist sector in the economy'[2] which has been the main aim and achievement, but the present policy has a far sounder economic and technical basis for its plans, and appears to be running successfully so far, in contrast to the earlier naïve doctrinaire enthusiasms which, aiming at socialization without the proper background of education, organizational abilities, or popular consent, brought the national economy near to ruin.

The present collectivization programme began in 1954–5, before which time there were in existence only a few co-operatives which 'represented the simplest pattern of collective endeavour and were semi-socialist in their essence'[3] In 1955 a code of model regulations was introduced and co-operatives began to develop into 'socialist' enterprises, though by 1958, when the movement for collective economy was said to have taken on a mass character, only 35 per cent of the rural population had joined in.[4] Before the end of 1959 the whole herding population had joined the co-operatives, and about three-quarters of the country's livestock is said to have been collectivized—the rest remaining in the private possession of the co-operatives' members. Official figures published at the beginning of this year speak of 389 big agricultural co-operatives, each with an average of 475 households, an average population of 1,685, of whom, 1,161 are actual members, and an average of 59,000 head of livestock of which 43,000 are common property.[5] This points to a rural population of about 655,000 where each household of approximately four members retains at present about thirty-four beasts for its private use. The number of co-operatives has steadily diminished and the size has grown as the percentage of the rural economy included in them has grown. Thus 728 co-operatives had been set up by October 1958, when only about 56 per cent of the rural economy had been collectivized,[6] a figure reduced successive-

[1] Montsame, no 7, April 1959.
[2] Montsame, no 1, January 1959 A speech by Tsedenbal, the Prime Minister.
[3] 'New Step to Co-operative Development in the Mongolian People's Republic', in *Mongolia Today* (New Delhi), Vol. II, no. 1 (5), January 1960.
[4] *ibid.*
[5] *ibid.*
[6] 'K voprosu o perechode na osedlost', in *Sovremennaya Mongoliya*, no. 10, October 1959.

ly to 694 by the end of the year and 426 by April 1959.[1] Labour is increasingly being carried out by 'permanent brigades' who are replacing the *ad hoc* 'seasonal brigades',[2] and is being organized by special cadres drawn from Party and Government offices.[3] However, properly trained personnel are not expected to be in adequate supply before 1967.[4]

This massive and swift reorganization has of course required considerable preparation. The agricultural co-operatives, termed in Mongol 'rural economy co-operatives', are, as their name implies, not merely herding units, but are expected to engage in a certain amount of subsidiary agriculture proper. They are assisted in these joint tasks by some forty machine and livestock stations, which have already been set up and which carry out on contract such tasks as land-tilling, hay-making, artificial insemination, electric sheep-shearing, timber cutting, and transport of goods.[5] Veterinary centres, staffed by specialists trained both in Ulan Bator and abroad, and supplied from the three biochemical factories at Songino (near Ulan Bator), Tsetserleg, and Kobdo, have reportedly dealt successfully with some epidemic diseases such as cattle plague, foot and mouth disease, and infectious pleuro-pneumonia of goats, and are also able to treat large numbers of individual beasts for non-infectious ailments.[6] Within the co-operatives themselves, the establishment of schools (at present 315 primary and 56 secondary schools), clubs, shops, cinemas, medical and veterinary centres, and so on has aimed at making it more attractive for this traditionally nomad people to settle down in fixed communities of tents and prefabricated wooden houses, a process which is a corollary to the establishment of a non-nomadic, fodder-consuming type of cattle-breeding.

Nevertheless, the rapid socialization of agriculture has not escaped considerable growing pains. The main task of the Government now consists in 'further all-out structural and economic

[1] Montsame, no. 3, February, and no. 7, April 1959.
[2] Montsame, no. 8, May 1959.
[3] Montsame, no. 2, January 1959 By a decision of the Central Committee of the Mongol People's Revolutionary Party 'best Party and Government workers will work in agricultural co-operatives'. The object is to strengthen their 'organizational and economic structure'.
[4] Montsame, no. 1, January 1960. Report of the Second Congress of Agricultural Co-operatives.
[5] 'Rural Economy in the Mongol People's Republic', in *Mongolia Today*, Vol. I, no. 3-4, November-December 1959.
[6] 'Veterinary Service in Mongolia', in *Mongolia Today*, Vol. II, no. 2 (6), February 1960.

strengthening of agricultural co-operatives, steady observance of the socialist principle of distribution according to labour, raising the productivity of labour by co-operative members, increasing output, ensuring the growth of income of the co-operatives, and educating the co-operative members in the spirit of socialist attitude towards labour and social property'.[1] As pointed out in the resolution of the fourth Plenum, serious shortcomings exist in all these directions. Members of co-operatives are not 'sufficiently enrolled in collective creative labour', labour productivity is still low, many members do not work the minimum of work-day units, little attention is paid to the socialist principle of distribution according to labour, there is no adequate calculation and book-keeping, and so on. As a result, such basic deficiencies as lack of warm winter shelters for three-quarters of the country's livestock can be observed.[2]

It seems that in spite of the 'great victory' obtained in the socialization of agriculture—a political victory, not an economic one—it will be a considerable time before the new system is running smoothly. The fourth Plenum of the Central Committee of the Party, after voicing much criticism, proposed many changes in present practice, even finding it necessary to insist on such a basic point as the need to begin to introduce planning in all branches of the co-operatives' economy. Further, it has been found necessary to increase State aid to the co-operatives, and, within the re-organization of the system of State deliveries, to write off arrears in compulsory deliveries of agricultural produce from co-operatives, their members, and individual herdsmen, which had been accumulating regularly since 1954.[3] At the same time it has been found necessary to introduce new model regulations which for the first time define the rights and obligations of co-operative members, instituting disciplinary punishments—reprimand, a fine in terms of work-day units, and, as a last resort, expulsion from the co-operative. The maximum number of head of cattle which a co-operative member may retain for private use is to be reduced from 100 (150 in the Gobi areas) to 50 (75), though, as shown above, the actual average is well below this already. At the same time the number of work-day units to be fulfilled is increased from 75 to 150 a year (to 100 for women, who comprise more than half the rural labour

[1] Montsame, no. 20, December 1959. Resolution of the fourth Plenum of the Central Committee of the Party on results of co-operation of arat (i.e. herdsmen's) households and some measures for structural and economic strengthening of agricultural co-operatives.
[2] *ibid.* [3] *ibid.*

force).[1] In fact women in both rural economy and industry have recently been called upon by the Central Committee of the Party to work still harder, inspired by the selfless labour of various named labour heroines.[2]

Collectivization represents a bold step in the reorganization of the country's rural economy. It is too early to speak of results achieved. The co-operatives are not in general profitable enterprises yet,[3] being supported by Government credits and also by such 'popular' efforts as contributions raised by workers in industry towards funds to help the co-operatives.[4] However, this policy has, at least in Government statements, a properly planned basis and funds, and some trained personnel are on call. It has achieved its main purpose of transforming the largest and least revolutionary group in the population into members of a fully socialized system, and may also succeed in its practical economic aims of expanding and improving herds on a fodder rather than a nomad basis Quantitative increase is a very uncertain matter, however. At the beginning of 1959 Surenjav, who was subsequently purged from his position as First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers, looked forward to an increase to 25 million head of livestock at the conclusion of the Three-Year Plan in 1960[5] The draft of the National Economy Development Plan for 1960 now expects a total of 24,300,000 by September 1960,[6] itself a very much lower figure than the 1940 and 1941 totals of 27,370,000 and 27,500,000 respectively.[7]

In collectivizing the herding economy the authorities have had to reorganize an existing and conservative system The development of large-scale agriculture and of industry, on the other hand, has been carried out, practically speaking, from scratch, and here the State has been from the start the organizer and manager, with the exception only of some production co-operatives. By mid-1959 twenty-five large State farms were in operation, cultivating four-

[1] Montsame, no 1, January 1960 'For further strengthening agricultural co-operatives of M P.R ' Under this heading is printed a short version of the report of N Jagvaral, Minister of Agriculture, at the Second Congress of Agricultural Co-operatives, held at Ulan Bator, 21–25 December 1959

[2] Montsame, no 5, March 1960

[3] Resolution of the fourth Plenum of the Central Committee of the Party

[4] 'Glorious 1959', in *Mongolia Today*, Vol II, no. 1 (5), January 1960 'Already millions of tugriks have been contributed to the funds for helping agricultural co-operatives '

[5] Montsame, no 1, January 1959 [6] Montsame, no. 20, December 1959

[7] Slatkin, *op cit*, p 254, and E. M Murzaev, *Die Mongolische Volksrepublik* (Gotha, 1954), p 48

fifths of the land actually tilled,[1] but great expansion of this area is now taking place under the virgin lands programme, which has been made possible by large-scale help from the U.S.S.R. in material and personnel. Hundreds of tractors, seeding machines, reapers, combines, and so on were to be supplied during 1959 and 1960, together with repair shops and agricultural experts, mechanics, and tractor drivers.[2] Unskilled Chinese labour is being employed at such tasks as the building of irrigation systems.[3] It was possible in the autumn of 1959 to see some of the achievements of agriculture on the State farms at Bat Sumber, north of Ulan Bator, and at Karakorum to the west—good crops of maize, wheat, and potatoes had been gained.[4] The main crop is wheat, and it is intended, with the help of flour mills now being set up in different areas with Soviet aid, to make Mongolia self-supporting in flour by next year.

Foreign help is being employed to a very high degree in the establishment of Mongolia's industry—a process which had hardly begun by 1945. The U.S.S.R. had previously shown little interest in Mongolia except as a military base and source of auxiliary troops to face the Japanese threat from Manchuria, and of raw materials during the war against Germany, in which Mongolia does not seem to have taken any active part. More especially since the rise of China as an important Power, Mongolia has been able to get economic assistance from both the big Communist States and also, on a smaller scale, from the East European States, especially East Germany and Czechoslovakia. Previously Mongolia's small industry was based on the processing of the products of the herding economy, but it is now being developed on a rather wider basis. The extractive industries work coal, oil, crystal, and tungsten deposits. The manufacturing industry is being expanded at a considerable rate and in 1959 such new enterprises as several flour mills, a worsted factory, a shoe factory, a dairy plant, a glass factory, and a paper and plywood factory were put into operation.[5] By Western standards the expansion is not at all miraculous, and even in Mongolia it would be unthinkable without very liberal foreign help in material and money and in trained specialists who get the new factories going, and also in the loan of thousands of labourers from China who are to be seen working on any enterprise of importance in Ulan Bator and elsewhere, especially on the building of

[1] 'Rural Economy in the Mongol People's Republic', quoted above.
[2] Montsame, no. 3, February 1959. [3] Personal observation.
[4] Personal observation.
[5] Various Montsame reports and personal observation.

roads, bridges, and houses. However, this is all a new departure for this traditionally nomadic country and justifies to some extent the claim that Mongolia is an agricultural-industrial State.

Ulan Bator, the capital, has an estimated population of 150,000, a large proportion of the total population of the country, which from figures currently available can be calculated at about 900,000.[1] The city, known formerly as Urga, was the residence of the Living Buddha, the supreme lamaist dignitary in the then theocratic-feudal State of Mongolia. The past forty years since the revolution have witnessed a complete change in the appearance and character of the capital. Though a considerable proportion of the inhabitants still lives in the picturesque felt tent or yurt, a movable habitation well-suited to the nomad life, or in equally picturesque but shabby huts of wood and plaster, these are quickly being replaced by blocks of flats.[2]

Most of the temple buildings have disappeared. Of those which survive only the Gandang monastery still functions, staffed by some eighty old lamas who perform their offices but, having no disciples and being forbidden to teach, are the last vestiges of a dying organism. Only four other lamaseries exist in the countryside, with a further 120 or so monks between them. The church is in fact a façade with no independent function. It still serves as a venue for the pious among the inhabitants of Ulan Bator and as a tourist attraction for the foreign visitor, and also impresses south Asian Buddhists as a holy shrine. Thus the Rev. Amritanand, President of the Nepalese Buddhists' Association and Vice-President of the World Fellowship of Buddhists, is reported, while on a visit to Mongolia, to have referred to lamaism as the 'common religion' of Nepal and Mongolia.[3] That the Mongolian church, whose dignitaries are high members of such bodies as the Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee of Mongolia, enjoys no originality of expression is, however, clear from the terms in which Mongolian Buddhists are said to have referred to the recent rebellion in Tibet, where, they said, 'Being incited by crafty foreigners, the black forces of reaction and obscurantism have committed bloody crimes and thus plunged the peaceful laymen and innocent clerics in the country in sorrow and sufferings. . . The loathsome rabble and the wretched traitors, having the support of American grabbers, and in collusion with the

[1] In January 1960, Montsame, no. 2 reported 850 doctors, with one doctor available for every 1,070 people.

[2] Personal observation. [3] Montsame, no. 17, November 1959.

Chiang clique, attempted to wrest Tibet from People's China, mighty with its national unity', and so on.[1]

Against the background of the decay of Buddhism in Mongolia is to be seen the impressive growth of Ulan Bator as an administrative and industrial centre. Though industry is concentrated also at such centres as Sukebator (near Altan Bulak) in the north, Choibalsan in the east, and at Sain Shand in the Gobi, Ulan Bator is responsible for half the industrial production of Mongolia. All four centres are linked to the Trans-Siberian railway system, and the two latter with Peking also. The growth of Ulan Bator has been rather unequal, a new sports stadium and a grandiose road-over-rail bridge having had priority over other more useful projects, but with the help of Chinese labour and money the authorities are carrying out an impressive programme of building and are laying out what is planned to be a complete system of drainage, water supply, and centrally produced municipal heating.[2]

As in the days of the Mongol empire, Mongolia is linked with both ends of Asia, and nowadays the country enjoys certain distinct economic advantages from the otherwise dubious privilege of belonging to the Soviet bloc. Modernization is certainly being attempted at a gruelling pace. The population is constantly being adjured to work harder, especially women, who form half the industrial labour force; young workers are said to be constantly overfulfilling their production norms, inspired by the love of work, in order to qualify for the title of 'socialist work team' granted under the present 'emulation movement' whose slogan is: 'Work, study, and live in a socialist way!'[3] Officials and intellectuals from the Prime Minister downwards do a fixed number of days of manual labour each year, and on special occasions tens of thousands of city dwellers, led by members of the Politbureau and of foreign embassies, turn out for 'voluntary' Saturday and Sunday labour (known by the Russian terms Subbotnik and Voskresnik).[4]

It must, however, be observed in this connection that the material basis for this 'great leap forward' is present only because of Mongolia's economic integration within the Soviet bloc. As the Prime Minister said in an interview with a *New York Times* correspondent, 'The MPR fully meets her requirements by developing and strengthening economic and trade relations with friendly coun-

[1] Montsame, no 7, April 1959.
[2] Personal observation.
[3] Montsame, no 2, January 1960.
[4] Montsame, no. 8, May 1959.

tries of Asia and Europe.'[1] While Mongolia remained a satellite of the U.S S R alone she enjoyed no economic choice at all, but now, although 65 per cent of her trade is still with the Soviet Union, she is able to direct her exports quite widely throughout Eastern Europe and China and to import goods from there. Between 1958 and 1959 the type of car to be seen in the streets of Ulan Bator changed noticeably—Polish vehicles had begun to replace Russian ones, and Skoda buses were in evidence.[2] For the first time since the 'twenties European technicians are working in Mongolia on an appreciable scale—East Germans have helped to set up a printing works, Czechs gave help with a shoe factory, and so on.

Until 1945 Mongolia's international status was very equivocal Russia had recognized her both as being autonomous and capable of pursuing an independent foreign policy and also as being an integral part of China As Mongolia was occupied by Soviet troops on and off till after 1945 such declarations were in any case not worth much. Though the Mongolian Constitution of 1940 asserts Mongol independence, it was not till 1945 that the matter was tested by a plebiscite and Chinese agreement was obtained, and only after the establishment of the Communist regime in China did the two countries exchange full diplomatic recognition. Subsequently Mongolia has established similar relations with all the countries of the Soviet bloc and also with India, Indonesia, Burma, and Yugoslavia. Whether she is able to pursue an independent foreign policy is doubtful. Her geographical situation limits her contacts, and her public announcements on foreign affairs faithfully echo those of other members of the bloc without any evidence of originality. In her relations with India, her most important foreign contact, where her embassy must necessarily serve as a door into the non-Communist world, Mongolia may find some scope for diplomatic experience outside her stereotyped Communist contacts, and it is noteworthy that the present Foreign Minister, Mr Shagdarsuren, spent some time *en poste* in New Delhi.

The immense changes within the country, the growth of agriculture and industry, the establishment of health services, the manning of international and internal air, rail, and lorry services, printing and publishing, and so on have necessitated a heroic work of education since the establishment of the Republic. Now schools serve the whole country and feed a number of institutions of higher education, including a university. Books of all types are published,

[1] *Mongolia Today*, Vol I, no 1 September 1959. [2] Personal observation

including collections of folk literature, proverbs, and poetry, and are sold widely through bookstores and open-air booths. A small cinema industry is growing up, and the State Theatre has a high standard of performance in an international repertory. It is evident to the foreign visitor that Mongolia has succeeded in supplying herself with all the essentials of a modern State—education, medical services, communications, etc. can all be taken for granted. On the other hand, the country has also equipped itself with a firm system of State and Party control which stifles independence of expression and inculcates by all methods the Party line of propaganda. The 'cultural revolution' in progress is said to have abolished illiteracy in the country, but, at the same time, writers are denied freedom of expression and find themselves violently criticized in the Party press if they offend by showing independence of thought.[1]

The foreign visitor to Mongolia is impressed by the kind and unfeigned welcome he gets and cannot fail to respond to the courteous and open hospitality of all with whom he has to do. It is, then, a pity to have to say that Mongol propagandists, who have a wider audience than those few visitors who go to the country, consistently overplay their hand and arouse mistrust and even hostility by their tone of sanctimonious self-eulogy coupled with vituperative abuse of those—at present, the U.S A.—who happen to have been chosen as the symbol of the enemy. Any visitor to Mongolia will be prepared to recognize the considerable economic and social change in the country, but bombardment from afar by references to 'dirty foreign reactionaries' or 'American criminal plans for the preparation of a new war',[2] and the knowledge that such sentiments are being persistently spread and encouraged by wall-displays and slogans in clubs and shops and by organized indignation meetings,[3] cannot help Mongolia's present campaign for full recognition as an independent nation and for admission to international agencies.

The collapse of Japan's military ventures in mainland Asia in 1945 and the success of the Communists in China brought with them an absolute relaxation of international tension in the Mongolian area. While it is permissible to speculate on Russian-Chinese rivalry across Mongolia, especially since China has shown her

[1] For example, the campaign initiated against Professor Rinchen in the Party newspaper *Unen* on 19 August 1959, culminating in his forced self-criticism in the same newspaper on 20 January 1960, his dismissal from his post as Director of the Institute of Language and Literature, and the reported dismemberment of the Institute itself.

[2] From Montsame bulletins.

[3] Personal observation as actuality or in Mongol news-reels

openly imperialist aims in the west and south-west, and while individuals in Mongolia do express some private anxiety about the re-establishment of a large Chinese diplomatic colony in Ulan Bator there is no evidence yet of the growth of new international rivalries. The Government and Party crisis in March 1959, when half the Mongolian Politbureau lost their posts, may be interpreted perhaps as a victory for a pro-Russian group under Tsedenbal, but in the sense of the victory of those who wanted to press forward with a Soviet-supported socialization at all costs. Occasional reports of armed uprisings may be dismissed absolutely. Some echo of such disturbances would be bound to come to the notice of foreign visitors. Though individuals may disagree, there is no overt opposition, and the population seems to be shouldering its increased burdens, with what will remains to be seen.

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Notes of the Month

The Japanese Riots

COMING so soon after the successful revolutions in South Korea and Turkey, the recent 'demos'[1] in Tokyo may have struck many newspaper-readers as being another popular, national movement directed against an oppressive, anti-Communist Government that has only managed to stay in power thanks to U.S. support. By analogy this movement might be expected to bring down the Government and to pave the way for a new, more popular, regime. The analogy would seem, however, to be mistaken. The young Japanese rioters represent something quite different from their counterparts in Korea and Turkey. For by no stretch of the imagination can it be claimed that the opponents of the new U.S.-Japan Security Treaty have been deprived of their democratic rights or subject to arbitrary rule. The controversy about the new Security Treaty has been raging for some two years and is part of the fundamental debate of the past decade about whether Japan should preserve her present close ties with the United States and the West or should strike out on a more neutral policy in the Cold War.

This has been the overriding point in all the recent elections.[2] In both the Lower House elections of 1958 and the Upper House elections of 1959 domestic issues were overshadowed by the question of how Japan should steer her foreign policy. On both these occasions the overwhelming majority of the voters declared themselves in favour of the conservative party, which, while advocating greater 'independence' for Japan, gave priority to maintaining and even strengthening ties with the United States and the West in general. The Socialists, who had been gaining slowly but steadily in successive national elections, actually suffered a loss in their percentage of the popular vote in 1959 and it would seem that the great majority of Japanese voters do not accept the Socialist policy of replacing the Security Treaty with some sort of non-aggression pact

[1] Characteristically the Western word 'demonstration' has been mutilated in Japanese and used to describe the current wave of riots, mass meetings, etc. aimed against Japan's close ties with the West.

[2] See I. I. Morris, 'Foreign Policy Issues in Japan's 1958 Elections' (*Pacific Affairs*, Sept. 1958) and Douglas Mendel, 'Behind the 1959 Japanese Elections' (*Pacific Affairs*, Sept. 1959).

between Japan, the Soviet Union, China, and the United States (The most bitter opponents of the Security Treaty, the Communists, continued to receive only a derisory percentage of the vote.)

The huge national student organization, Zengakuren, which until now has taken the leading part in the 'demos', is an extreme left-wing group, which on occasion has criticized even the Communist Party as being too mild in its tactics, and which represents at the most some 20 per cent of university students. It is implacably opposed to Japan's close relationship with the West and supports a neutral policy, which in effect would mean forming close political and economic ties with China and Russia at the expense of those with the United States. Realizing that it is unable to change policy by the normal democratic process, it has decided to impose its will forcibly on the majority. For this purpose it has joined strength with other opposition groups, notably the immense left-wing trade union organization (Sōhyō), the Communist Party, the radical union of teachers (Nikkyōso) and the Socialist Party itself, and intends to bring the democratically elected Government to its knees At the moment its main fury is against Mr Kishi (the Prime Minister), but it is quite clear that its attack would automatically be shifted to any successor not prepared to yield to its demands

If one is to look for an analogy, it should be, not in contemporary Korea or Turkey, but in Japan some twenty-five years ago when young right-wing extremists were attempting to change their country's policy by terrorism and assassination. Like the extreme rightists of the 1930s, the student organizers today are a fanatic minority who believe that they are acting for the good of the country and of the people, and who are prepared to use force in overthrowing what they consider to be a corrupt and misguided 'bourgeois' Government. The young officers of 1936 were eventually crushed by the Government; but the influence exerted by them and other right-wing extremists was far-reaching and disastrous

The leaders of the present 'demos' draw considerable strength however from the fact that neutralist sentiment in Japan is widespread and has been temporarily reinforced by the U-2 incident It takes numerous forms and derives from a variety of motives[1] but in every case it involves doubts about the current revision of the Security Treaty, ranging from serious concern to fanatic opposition The fact that the Socialists themselves have for years been clamour-

[1] See I. I. Morris, 'Japanese Foreign Policy and Neutralism' (*International Affairs*, Jan. 1960).

ing for a revision of the 1952 Security Treaty in order to give Japan greater equality of status, and that the revised pact will in fact put Japan on a more equal footing (and in addition increase her control over the disposition of American forces in the country) has been deliberately beclouded or ignored. Many people who are prepared to accept the need for close ties with the West are nevertheless opposed to the revised Security Treaty, which, they have been led to believe, will not protect Japan but simply increase her chances of being involved in a future war. The main issues have by now been sufficiently obfuscated for logical argument to have little effect on current attitudes to foreign policy.

Assuming, however, that the revised pact becomes law, the present issues may before long be seen in better perspective, and many Japanese people may wonder why they should have been so opposed to the revised treaty—which will in effect improve their position *vis-à-vis* the United States One of the main effects of the present 'demos' may well be to have strengthened the Government's hand in dealing with Zengakuren and similar organizations. The suggestion (made recently by the Foreign Minister) that the leftist riots have shamed their country in the eyes of foreigners can carry considerable weight among the Japanese and may help to justify certain measures that the Government has long wished to take against the militant left. The threat against the Emperor can have a similar effect. By identifying themselves in people's minds with violence, scorn for democratic methods, and behaviour that can bring shame or 'loss of face' to Japan, Zengakuren and its allies may be digging their own political graves. It is worth while to remember that it was largely as a result of switching in 1950 from a 'lovable' policy to one of violence and disruption that the Communists lost the not inconsiderable support they had in 1949

The Odds in the Belgian Congo

THE main outlines of the Congo problem are familiar. As late as 1955 intelligent and responsible Belgians were still confidently defending the Belgian policy of economic and educational development for the Congolais at artisan/clerical level with little secondary and no university training; Van Bilsen's plan for independence in thirty years was widely regarded as over-hasty and visionary. Perhaps even more important, there was no Congo-wide political party. In consequence today the Congo plunges into full independence with African political parties which, though nominally national, are

still overwhelmingly tribal in feeling, and without the stiffening (any considerable layer of highly educated or experienced suppor Before considering the political future however, one needs to loc at the most immediate problem—will there be a breakdown (public security, a disintegration into regional units, an econom collapse? Factors for and against can be listed.

Factors which support the hope that the transition may go reasor ably smoothly are:

(*a*) *Vis inertiae*. In a huge country with bad communications, may well be that authority and administration, at least in rural area will simply continue because there is no reason why they should sto|

(*b*) *The Force Publique*. Small as it is, the police force is wide| regarded as well trained and stable.

(*c*) *Expatriate business*. Security and order are the first needs (Belgian and other international firms. One can reckon that wha ever African administration reaches power, it could have tl effective support of the whole business community, if it so wishe in trying to establish a smooth transition.

(*d*) *National leaders*. Without question, Kasavubu, Lumumb and other leaders will feel Congo independence to be on trial in tl world's eyes and in the eyes of Nigeria, Ghana, etc. They will ther fore be desperately anxious to sustain a coherent political econom

(*e*) *The Belgian Civil Service*, much of which is dedicated to th Congo.

(*f*) *The Churches and Missions*, Protestant and Catholic, who a bound to exercise a moderating influence.

On the other side of the ledger must be set:

(*a*) *Tribal and regional jealousies*. This is by far the most dangerou element. The high feeling between the Lulua and the Baluba b itself could cause a major internecine war. In January 1960 a agreement was signed between the chiefs to remove no fewer tha 90,000 Baluba from the Lulua territory where they live and worl A trickle of murders and minor affrays has continued ever sinc After independence this could flare up to dangerous proportion 90,000 people have not been moved, and are not easily move Tensions between Bacongo and Bangola, Lulua and Baluba, th Katanga versus the West are all still unsolved. If in fact Lumuml and the Mouvement National Congolais, with strong backing in th East, manage to consolidate their electoral advantage, and if th Bacongo are prepared to accept their victory, some tempora stability might be assured. If there is a resurgence of Bacong

domination, trouble in Stanleyville, Luluabourg, and Katanga would seem almost certain. It is to be hoped that the present secessionist noises being made by Kasavubu and in the Katanga are more in the nature of bargaining counters than serious intentions.

(*b*) *Personal jealousies among the political leadership*, leading to strife between their tribal supporters.

(*c*) *Rumour and bad communications*. No one can be assured that, at least in some areas, absurd or far more dangerous outbreaks of violence against Europeans or Africans may not take place, based on rumour or total misunderstanding of what independence means.

(*d*) *Possible outbreaks against petits blancs*, Portuguese traders, etc., partly based on economic jealousy, especially in Léopoldville.

In the first place, then, there is the primary problem of local public order and regional peace. It is probably inevitable that there will be local outbreaks of violence, and it would be mistaken to take these as of major importance (however horrible for the victims) provided that they have quietened down within a few weeks. The larger issues of inter-tribal and inter-regional relationships may take longer to come to a head, but will be decisive for the future.

On the economic side, the uncertainty of the last year has meant a flight of capital and the inevitable freeze-up of confidence and enterprise. But an even reasonably smooth transition, and the emergence of a Congolese Government which had any substantial look of stability, might well result in a rapid regaining of confidence. Uncertainty is for business only one degree better than real disaster, once the issue is clear, even if it is not wholly to the liking of business, business will accommodate itself.

In a situation changing almost from hour to hour, it is clearly impossible to forecast the temporary outcome. Excitement, uncertainty, probably some turbulence, seem inevitable for a few months. But in the longer view it is not unduly optimistic to believe that there is a reasonable likelihood of the emergence of a single, nationalist Congo. The challenge and the exhilaration of independence have elsewhere brought out unsuspected reserves of courage and leadership, and will doubtless do so in the Congo; nor is Western education a precondition of this. The Congolese leaders are well aware of all the dangers; the Belgians who have taken so desperate a gamble will be equally anxious, politically and economically, that it should succeed. Responsible opinion in the West can now only hope for a strong Congolese government and be prepared to give it every possible economic, political, and personal support.

Relations Between the Six and the Seven

A Survey of Recent Developments

WE are at the beginning of a new phase in the relations between the Six of the European Economic Community (E.E.C.) and the remaining O.E.E.C. countries. The stage is now set for an acceleration of the Rome Treaty timetable, which will mean the more rapid approach of trade discrimination by the Six against outsiders. At the same time, the British Government, in concert with its new trading partners in the 'Outer Seven' or European Free Trade Association (E.F.T.A.),[1] has assumed a notably more flexible attitude towards finding accommodation with the Six, who, on their part, are intent on reaching full economic integration and political union. In addition, the United States has begun to play an active role in linking European economic problems with those of the world.

At the opening of this phase, the broad alternatives before the policy makers have been essentially threefold. The first has been to confine immediate direct action to efforts in reducing to a minimum the damage of trade discrimination between the Six and the Seven by *ad hoc* measures affecting trade in specific commodities combined with the pending move under G.A.T.T. towards further world-wide trade liberalization. This alternative is supported by the United States and has been canvassed for some time by the European Commission, the executive of the Six. The second possibility has been that, besides interim measures for the removal of immediate causes of friction, negotiations should also begin for the attainment of a long-term settlement on future relations between the Six and the Seven. It was with this end in view that the British Government hinted at substantial concessions that might be made to overcome objections of the Six and to meet the difficulties foreseen by them. The third possibility, which has been canvassed in some sections of the British press, is that Britain should consider an offer to join the Six as a full member. This article will recapitulate what is known of the diplomatic history of the last few months and will at the same time try to clarify the present position.

THE HALLSTEIN PLAN

Acceleration of the Rome Treaty timetable was already in the air in 1959. It was encouraged by the new dynamism of the European

[1] See 'The Outer Seven', in *The World Today*, January 1960.

economies, and by the way the business communities in the Six countries were moving ahead unexpectedly fast in anticipation of the advantages promised by the Common Market. The transformation within a year of the French economic scene went far to explain pressure from French business and the French Government for acceleration; this was a contrast indeed from the days when France insisted on powers of delay. As late as the autumn of 1958 France's ability even to take on the full Treaty obligations was uncertain. To the British Government acceleration appeared as a most unwelcome development and it thus threatened to worsen British relations with the Community. At the beginning of March 1960 concrete proposals for a speed-up, just submitted to the six Governments by the European Commission, were made known by Professor Hallstein, the Commission's President. On 10 March the Hallstein Plan was discussed by the Council of Ministers of the E.E.C., but final decision was postponed because of disagreements.

In essence, the proposal concerned the speeding up of the process of eliminating internal trade barriers, the speed-up to begin to come into effect on 1 July, and concurrently—that is eighteen months before schedule—the first steps towards establishing a common external tariff. The unexpected feature of the proposal was that the future level of the common external tariff towards which the national tariff rates were to be gradually adjusted should be provisionally fixed 20 per cent below the level agreed under the Rome Treaty. Internal tariff concessions would be extended to 'third' countries up to the level of the future common tariff.

From the national points of view of France and Italy—both high-tariff countries—the Plan implied that they would open their countries more liberally and that they would gain some competitive advantage in Germany, for instance, as against non-Community suppliers. The provisional 20 per cent reduction of the future common tariff represented a concession to the low-tariff fellow members of the Community and to United States wishes for world-wide trade liberalization, while at the same time lessening the discriminating effects in Europe. From the point of view of Benelux and Germany, the Plan implied that they would have to raise many of their tariff rates on goods coming from 'third' countries whereas those on imports from their partners would be lowered. They disliked the prospect of raising any of their tariffs. In Britain and the other European non-members the prospective discrimination in the German and Benelux markets, which between them absorb about

70 per cent of the Common Market imports, caused the greatest concern. For the European Community as a whole, the Plan represented primarily a means of consolidating its existence.

In Germany, the first upward adjustment to the future common external tariff would cause particular difficulty because the tariff level at the base date had been 25 per cent higher than the present actual level.[1] This aroused strong opposition in Germany, as well as worrying Britain; in the industrial sector preference margins of up to 100 per cent in some cases would be established at one stroke. The main Dutch concern was that agriculture should be included in the speed-up and that again was opposed, particularly by Germany, the chief importer concerned. Early in May the Hallstein Plan was discussed in the Bundestag and the German Government included in its proposals for amendments a six-months' postponement of the speed-up and an immediate invitation by the Six to the Seven for trade talks.[2]

When the Council of Ministers of the Six met on 11–13 May in Luxembourg, it decided on a compromise which retained the basic features of the Hallstein Plan but somewhat mitigated its effect and gave what has been described as a short breathing-space—up to 31 December 1960—in the dispute with the Seven. At the same meeting the Six declared themselves ready to enter into negotiations with the Seven in order to settle commercial problems and to 'seek to maintain existing currents of trade in Europe and to increase them if possible' in accordance with the rules of G.A.T.T.[3]

BRITISH POLICY

The terms of this 'invitation' could raise only the slenderest hope that anything more was intended than discussion of measures to mitigate the immediate adverse economic effects of the speed-up on trade relations between the Community and the European outsiders; particularly so, if the full text were studied. This stated that the formation of the Customs Union, which is the core of E.E.C., must not be 'brought into question'. It referred expressly to the ministerial decision of the Six of 24 November 1959 on relations with 'third' countries and the proposal then made for a Contact

[1] The base date level for calculating the common tariff is that of 1 January 1957. In August 1957 Germany reduced her tariff unilaterally by 25 per cent, as a matter of national policy.

[2] See press of 5 May 1960.

[3] For a summary of the immediately relevant provisions, see *Board of Trade Journal*, 27 May 1960, text reproduced in *Bulletin des Presse-und Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung*, Bonn, No. 95, 20 May 1960.

Committee to watch and meet day-to-day difficulties in the Community's trade with the E.F.T.A.

Nevertheless, an atmosphere of expectation has been generated in the United Kingdom by the Government's reactions to this invitation. Indeed, for some months past there have been signs of a very remarkable shift in the British position. Preference continued to be expressed by Government spokesmen for an association on the lines of a free trade area, that is, a multilateral association which would allow the non-Community members to retain, in principle, their own external tariffs and freedom in commercial policy. There was also continued resentment over the policy of the Six in pressing forward with building their 'Europe' without heed for the British viewpoint, as well as a continued sense of pressure that the foundations for a permanent all-West European settlement must be laid before the Community advanced too far. The danger of an economic split in Europe which would lead inevitably to a political split continued to be the principal theme But, imperceptibly, the tone became increasingly more conciliatory and, more important, hints became increasingly explicit that the British Government was now ready to depart from the rigid insistence on certain principles which, ostensibly at least, caused the breakdown in November 1958 of the free trade area talks. The most important of these had been British refusal to consider harmonization of tariffs on trade with the outside world As recently as November 1959, in reply to a Labour Party question in the House of Commons as to whether Commonwealth preferences might be put on the bargaining table, the answer was discouraging.[1] On 21 January 1960 when Mr Selwyn Lloyd redefined the British position in Strasbourg before the Council of Europe Consultative Assembly, the main impression he gave was that Britain was as determined as ever to work for a wider multilateral European settlement. But, whereas he did not endorse the Swedish Trade Minister's suggestion for a degree of harmonization in external tariffs, he did state that 'changes in position' might be necessary on all sides and implied that no more could be said without giving away in advance possible bargaining counters.[2]

By early May Mr Maudling, the President of the Board of Trade, spoke of the high price of European unity, worth substantial sacrifices. His speech at a recent dinner in Leeds on 13 May was as suggestive in its omissions as in its content. He stated that the most

[1] H.C. Deb , 23 November 1959, coll. 36–7.
[2] *The Times* and *Financial Times*, 22 January 1960.

difficult problem of association was undoubtedly 'the existei non-existence of a common tariff—the fundamental differen(tween the Customs Union of the Six and the Free Trade Area Seven. It would be wrong to underestimate this difficulty. Pa larly the outstanding problem for the United Kingdom was t the system of duty-free entry for Commonwealth products. has for many years been a foundation of our world-wide tr policy and I think reflection must show all the formidable culties that would stand in the way of any modification of it.'[1] was said on the final day of the Commonwealth Prime Mini Conference, where these problems had been discussed. Ther no mention whatever in the speech of Commonwealth prefer(

A week later, questioned by the press on his return fror Lisbon meeting at which the Ministers of the Seven had respc to the invitation of the Six with wishes for 'willingness to promise on both sides' to 'provide a partnership of the two [E and E.F.T.A.] in a common system of European trade cons with the G A.T.T. . . .', Mr Maudling indicated that the Seve not rule out, though they were not committed to, negotiating the Six on a joint customs union.[2] The inference from a cautious hints was that some degree of tariff harmonizatic least, was now on the cards with the consent of the Commonw Prime Ministers. To many of those who followed the 1957–{ trade area negotiations it appeared that previous British in bility on precisely this point had finally tipped the scale tov ultimate breakdown. Yet it is hard to escape the conclusion tl least as important an obstacle to a settlement has been susp of British motives on the part of the Six and the fear that a association would frustrate their efforts to integrate.

A proposal designed to allay these suspicions has been curr(recent weeks to the effect that Britain should offer to join Eur and the E.C.S.C. as part of a deal in seeking a multilateral settlement. There are those—both in Britain and on the Cont —who argue that such a step would help to convince the S a British change of heart, or again, that it would force the for Britain ultimately to merge with the E.E.C. also. Other convinced that the Six would interpret a British applicatio membership in two of their three communities merely as an

[1] *Board of Trade Journal*, 20 May 1960.
[2] *Observer*, 22 May 1960; clarified by the Prime Minister, H.C. Deb., 2(1960, col. 677.

attempt to frustrate their aims, particularly since all three are ready organically linked and at the point of a possible more cc plete merger.[1] The British Government has pronounced readir to consider changing the present association with Euratom ; the E.C.S.C. to full membership provided three conditions satisfied: that Britain is welcome, that she can be sure of the polit effect on the immediate situation, and that full regard is paid to loyalties towards her 'Outer Seven' associates.[2] Common ca with the 'Outer-Seven' partnership is a repeatedly stressed feat of present British policy.[3] On 16 June a Western European Un decision at ministerial level was announced to study the possibi of Britain joining Euratom and the E.C.S.C.

All in all the British official position appears to be roughly tl There have been nothing but the gravest misgivings about the p to accelerate the Rome Treaty timetable, but now that time has b gained for mitigating the specific trade distortions that would ar the Government has for the first time shown itself ready to conf negotiations for the moment to these immediate issues. T emerged from the Paris meeting on 9 June between the Six and Seven within the framework of the Committee of twenty-one[4] a was in fact the outcome of the invitation by the Six referred to abc

Nevertheless, the overriding aim remains to reach agreem between the two groups on a permanent, single, and cohes European system. The British Government is trying not to anta; nize the Six any further, is searching for ways in which the coi dence of the Six can be won, and has evinced a new open-mind ness on the question of economic concessions.

ECONOMIC OBSTACLES TO A MULTILATERAL ASSOCIATION

In the vexed question of agriculture the basic difficulty arises fr structural differences between Britain and the Continent. Britain, where imports meet about half of food requirements a domestic farmers' output accounts for only some 5 per cent of gross national product, the system of agricultural protection

[1] See correspondence in *The Times*, 24, 26, 27, 28, 31 May 1960; *Guard* 26 May 1960, first of two articles by H. H Whewell.

[2] Mr Profumo, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, at W.E U. Assem meeting of 2 June 1960 where a resolution was passed unanimously to study possibility of Britain joining Euratom (*The Times*, 3 June 1960).

[3] See for instance H C. Deb., 26 May 1960, col. 678.

[4] The Committee of twenty-one was set up as a result of the Dillon talk Paris in January 1960 and consists of the eighteen O.E.E.C. countries, Cana the United States, and a E.E.C. representative (see *The World Today*, Febru 1960).

ased on farmers' subsidies combined with cheap imports and heap prices for the consumer. In the E.E.C., where farm output epresents a much higher proportion of the national product (about 3 per cent on the average and about 15 per cent in France), subdies would be unworkable. Thus, inside the E.E.C., present tariff nd quota protection will be replaced by a managed market based n minimum prices. But even during the ill-fated free trade area egotiations, agriculture ceased after some time to appear as an nsurmountable obstacle to co-operation.

Harmonization of social policies, by which the French set such reat store, was in 1958 a cause of much ill feeling, more for reasons f principle than because it presented a serious economic problem 'his was particularly unfortunate because, as will be remembered, rance felt herself at the time at a severe competitive disadvantage 'he French 'miracle' achieved since devaluation and the concurent inauguration of the rehabilitation programme at the end of)58 should ease any future negotiations. A comparison of labour osts (including social charges) in eight European countries preared by the Institut National de la Statistique in Paris showed that April 1959 French labour costs were well below those in both ritain and Germany.[1]

Free movement of capital did not seem to present unsurmountable problems during the free trade area negotiations As far as free ovement of labour is concerned, there have recently been stirrings nong British trade unionists which suggest that the Government ight now be able to go further than before.

The Commonwealth aspect, the most vital issue, has been the ibject of much public discussion and the British Government can irdly escape the charge that it has used Commonwealth commitents as an excuse for its lack of flexibility both on the agricultural sue and, later, on the external tariff question. It now seems ready make a real effort towards reconciling tariff harmonization in urope (or perhaps even entry into something very near a full istoms union) with the requirements for safeguarding the British arket for Commonwealth goods. It is probably entitled to claim iat from a purely technical and economic point of view it should ow be perfectly possible to work out an agreement of association hich could be made acceptable to all—as the free trade area pro-

[1] Taking an index of 100 for Germany, Britain stood at 99 and France at (figures taken from a full report of the study in *Blick durch die Wirtschaft*, *ankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 28 April 1960).

posals were not—through balancing the economic advantages of the individual members with their economic obligations.

But this leaves the specifically political aspect out of account and this is, and always has been, decisive. The inability to agree on institutional problems in the proposed free trade area was an obvious reflection of the fundamentally political nature of the quarrel.

POLITICAL ASPECTS

It is of course true that the economic concessions the British Government is now apparently willing to offer inevitably imply a commensurate increase in political commitments. But a fundamental difference in approach remains. The creators of the Schuman Plan, the Euratom, and the Common Market aim in their 'harmonization' policies at a unified European economy and ultimate political federation, whereas the 'Outer Seven' do not wish to commit themselves beyond economic co-operation that would further common economic interests and ensure the satisfactory working of the gradual elimination of trade barriers between them.

M Monnet, an influential force behind the Community concept, indicated quite plainly in a recent I.T.V. television interview that, as far as he was concerned, a customs union between the Six and the Seven without full commitment to the political aims of the Community did not offer a solution.[1] This suggests that now, as before, for the federalists at least, any settlement confined to commercial differences would need to concede acceptance of some degree of discrimination between the inner, tighter, group of the Six and the remaining European countries.

The rather different attitude of President de Gaulle towards the political aims of the Common Market was high-lighted in a national radio and television speech from Paris on the failure of the Summit. The nations associated in the Common Market, he declared, must not cease to be themselves and the path followed must be that of 'an organized co-operation of States, with the possible expectation of an imposing confederation'. There followed the vision of 'a Western group at least equivalent to that in the East [which] might one day permit the foundation of a European entente between the Atlantic and the Urals.'[2] He had expressed on an earlier occasion the

[1] *Guardian*, 4 June 1960.
[2] *The Times* and *Daily Telegraph*, 1 June 1960. Also *The Times*, 17 June 1960, for quotations clarifying the current French position.

belief that the Common Market corresponded to an economic necessity;[1] he now stated that an accommodation between the interests of the members of the other European countries 'must be expected'. The results of the contact between the Six and the Seven on 9 June in the Committee of twenty-one disappointed some British press correspondents, but de Gaulle's speech still holds out new possibilities for removing mutual distrust between Britain and the Six, the prerequisite for an ultimate long-term settlement.

THE G.A.T.T. AND THE FUTURE OF O.E.E.C.

The immediate practical measures for an accommodation must take into account the new dollar situation and world economic relationships. The 1960–1 G.A.T.T. Tariff Conference, which will open in September 1960, originated from American initiative and is aimed at achieving real advance in tariff reductions on a world scale. The United States will be offering concessions under a Congressional mandate, which will expire on 30 June 1962, for reduction on individual tariffs up to 20 per cent. The European Economic Community will be negotiating as a single unit on concessions in its future common external tariff and it is on the outcome of these negotiations that the finalization of the 20 per cent reduction assumed in the Community speed-up measures is to depend. Each of the 'Outer Seven' will come to the conference mindful of their common offer, agreed on 12 March in Vienna, to extend the 20 per cent tariff reduction effective among themselves on 1 July to the other members of G.A.T.T. on a reciprocal basis.[2] The negotiation of these new concessions will begin at about the end of 1960 and is expected to last about six months. Hoping for results in this Tariff Conference, the United States Government has been supporting the speed-up plan of the Six without wishing to imply opposition to the 'Outer Seven'. 'We do not, however, share the belief of some of the Seven,' stated Mr Dillon, Under Secretary of State, 'that the mere creation of the Common Market will inevitably cause such serious trade difficulties that Europe will be split in two.'[3]

The weaknesses of G.A.T.T. as an effective international policy instrument have no doubt partly contributed to the United States' decision to participate as a full member in a reconstituted O.E.E.C. This plan, which was launched during the Paris Dillon talks in

[1] *New York Times*, 24 April 1960.
[2] Text of communiqué, *Board of Trade Journal*, 18 March 1960.
[3] Address at New Jersey Business Conference of 12 May 1960 (U.S. Government Press Release).

January, has now been examined by four experts. Their report[1] was discussed at a meeting of the Committee of twenty-one on 24–5 May. Apprehension lest the establishment of the new organization, to be called Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (O.E.C.D.), might frustrate co-operation on common European problems was sufficiently strong to lead to the decision that the recommendations of the Group of Four be re-examined and that Swiss counter-proposals to their suggestions be taken into consideration.

But the future role of the proposed O.E.C.D. has vital interest not only for the European but also for the primary producing and under-developed countries, not least because one of its main tasks is to be co-ordination of the Western aid effort. This became apparent at the sixteenth G.A T T. Session held in May when these countries' point of view had a first hearing The aspects of the proposal that were then raised[2] have not, perhaps, received the public attention in Britain which they deserve compared with that given to the 'European family quarrel'.

MARIANNE GELLNER

The New East African Republic of Somalia

ON 1 July the United Nations trust territory of Somalia, Italy's former East African dependency, becomes an independent State five months before the Italian Trusteeship mandate assumed at the end of 1949 is due to expire. In relation to the external political problems facing Somalia and the new State's social development but economic backwardness this slightly accelerated emancipation has little significance. The date for British Somaliland's independence has also been advanced. Following a conference held at the Colonial Office early in May and attended by elected Ministers from the Protectorate, the British Government announced that the Protectorate would become independent on 26 June 1960.

[1] *A Remodelled Economic Organization. A Report by the Group of Four* (Paris, April 1960).

[2] See *New York Times*, 22 May 1960, and *Blick durch die Wirtschaft, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 27 May 1960.

With its Muslim population, Hamitic, predominantly nomadic, and inordinately proud, Somalia belongs more to North Africa than to Africa south of the Sahara. The country covers an area of some 194,000 square miles and runs from British Somaliland in the north round the eastern flanks of Ethiopia along the Indian Ocean coasts to the barren plains of northern Kenya in the south. It is not an enviable environment. Much of the region is semi-desert, and with its sparse rainfall and torrid heat fit only for the pastoral nomadic existence to which the majority of Somali are dedicated The main wealth of the country consists of the large herds of camels, flocks of sheep and goats, and in the better-watered areas of cattle, with which the pastoralists move over wide areas engaged in a continual struggle for access to grazing and water. Such arable land as there is, an estimated 8 million hectares, is concentrated in the better-watered regions between the Shebelle and Juba rivers of the south where a variety of subsistence and cash crops are grown At present less than a tenth of this area is under cultivation. The total population at a conservative estimate—there has been no complete census—numbers about 1½ million and includes some 40,000 Asian immigrants chiefly engaged in commerce and concentrated in the main coastal towns. Of the Somali, at least 70 per cent are nomads, or pastoralists with some subsidiary interest in cultivation.

Before the war under the colonial regime when the territory was a foothold for the conquest of Ethiopia, the Italians encouraged immigration to ease the population problem at home. But there was never a very large European settler community and today there are only about 4,000 expatriates who, except for a few hundred farmers, are chiefly engaged in technical employment in the Government And certainly since Italy assumed administrative authority under the trusteeship there has been no European settler problem, nor has the Asian community given rise to serious political issues. The basic problems are the development of the territory's slender resources and the social and political progress of its Somali inhabitants.

The roots of much of the present social and political advancement can be traced back to the British Military Administration which assumed responsibility for Italian Somaliland after the Italian defeat in 1941. With slight resources both in finance and manpower this administration attacked the economic and social problems of the ex-colony with considerable success. After the Italian sur-

ender, the country was in dire straits. By the severance of relations ith Italy the various para-statal organizations which had monoolized trade under the Fascist regime had collapsed and trade was irtually at a standstill. The B.M.A. refused to protect the former talian monopolies and strove to reorganize the economy by enouraging local trade and commerce. Equally, by removing the estrictions of the Fascist regime on social and political activities ncouragement was given to the formation of clubs and societies mongst the Italian community (which then numbered 9,000) and mong the Somali population at large. Drawing upon their unity rough Islam and their traditional sense of national pride, and imulated by contact with Italian socialist groups and progressive ritish Political Officers, a few modernist Somali began to form ieir own societies. These had anti-tribal ideals which the Military dministration, faced daily with tribal strife, regarded favourably. n 1943 these new currents of progressive thought blended in the rmation of the Somali Youth Club, a society with nationalist spirations but no clear programme. The Club's founding members epresented most of the main tribal groups in the country and included men of cultivating as well as nomadic stock.

At first there was little popular support for the new movement. ut by 1948 when a Four-Power Commission visited Somalia to iscuss her future status the Club had changed its name to the omali Youth League and had become a well-organized political arty. At the time, though opposed by many of the cultivating eoples of the south, the League campaigned strongly against the eturn of Italian rule and pressed for an immediate union of the five omali territories—French, British, and Ethiopian Somaliland, omalia, and the Northern Province of Kenya. This pan-Somali leal had also been supported, on a more restricted front, by the ritish Foreign Minister, Mr Ernest Bevin, but it did not gain iternational acceptance and Italy was returned as administering ithority of a United Nations Trusteeship with a ten-year mandate independence.

In the event it is doubtful if any other administering authority ould have done more than Italy has done to prepare Somalia for elf-government. Spurred on by a not always well-informed but ways concerned United Nations Advisory Council sitting in Mogadishu, the Italians at once embarked upon an ambitious lucational programme. The foundations they had to build on were egligible; in the last years of the B.M.A. only about a thousand

students were enrolled in schools. By 1958 educational expansion had proceeded to a point where there were some 31,500 children and adults of both sexes in primary schools, 246 pupils in secondary schools, 336 in technical schools, and a considerable number of others in higher educational institutions.

Higher education was given high priority from the first since the immediate need of the territory was clearly for an educated cadre of Somali officials to take over senior posts in the civil service. For this purpose, and also to train political leaders, a School of Politics and Administration was opened at Mogadishu in 1950. The School provided a three-year diploma course, normally followed by a year at a higher institution in Italy. This proved so successful that by 1956 all Districts and Provinces were in the direct charge of Somali officials. In the following year the emphasis switched to technical training and the School of Politics was transformed into a Technical and Commercial Institute. Meanwhile, at a higher educational level, a Higher Institute of Law and Economics was opened at Mogadishu in 1954. This provides a two-year Rome University diploma course In January of this year the Higher Institute was up-graded to a University Institute charged with the task of co-ordinating all higher education in Somalia These early educational developments and the rapid progress of Somali advancement in the civil service convinced Somali of the good intentions of the Italian Administering Authority and produced an atmosphere of healthy co-operation very different to the distrust with which the Somali people had received the returning Italians in 1950.

In the political field progress has been equally striking In 1956, two years after the first municipal elections, a general election was held for a central legislature Forty-three of the sixty available Somali seats (there were ten other seats reserved for the Italian, Arab, Indian, and Pakistani minority communities) were won by the Somali Youth League while the main opposition, the Digil Mirifle Party, representing the southern cultivating tribes, gained thirteen seats In this first national election voting rights were restricted to males. Candidates were required to be literate in Italian and Arabic and to have been resident at least one year in Somalia In the municipalities electoral registers were prepared and voting was by direct ballot: in the interior of the country voting took place through tribal and regional gatherings at which representatives were appointed to carry block votes to the recorders. The elections were conducted in an orderly manner and there was a high poll; but it is

generally admitted that despite the care taken with the rural voting many irregularities occurred.

When new municipal elections were held in October 1958 the vote was extended to women who, despite all predictions to the contrary and despite the male bias of traditional Muslim society, showed great interest. The most recent general election, of March 1959, when the S.Y.L. swept the polls again, followed universal suffrage and many important innovations in electoral procedure were introduced. The Assembly itself was enlarged to ninety seats and the reserved minority seats were abolished. The territory as a whole was made into one electoral college and the ninety seats distributed amongst thirty districts In each district seats were allocated to each list of candidates in proportion to the number of votes obtained. All Somali citizens over eighteen years of age were entitled to vote and no distinction in voting procedure was made between rural and municipal areas.

With the success of educational advancement it has thus been possible to widen the franchise very rapidly while maintaining reasonable literacy standards for candidates And as a whole political progress has kept pace with general social advancement to a degree which has not often been achieved in other emergent African territories. At the same time, there is not in Somalia the tight separation between politics and administration which is enjoined in British colonial territories. A Somali official may seek leave to contest a seat in the Assembly, and if he is unsuccessful, or when he loses his seat, return to his previous position in the civil service. Whatever its disadvantages, this eases competition between politics and administration for capable men, and encourages the political parties to seek candidates of proved ability in the civil service.

This bare record tells little of the character of Somali government. In general the Somali Government has shown a firmness and resilience little short of that displayed by its civil service, particularly the local administration and police, both of which have high standards of service. From the first its watchword has been stability, and it has concentrated on improving the perilous economic position of the country. On its appointment in 1956 the S Y.L. Cabinet announced that it proposed to balance the Budget (running at an annual deficit of about £3 million made good by grants-in-aid from Italy) by attracting foreign capital and aid, and by increasing taxation. Over the past ten years indirect taxes levied as import and export dues have accounted for about 70 per cent of the annual re-

ceipts while direct taxation has only contributed 13 per cent. At every turn attempts to extend direct taxation have been hampered by the nomadic bias of the country. There is no poll tax, no general stock tax, and for the most part the nomads have shown extreme resistance to schemes designed to collect revenue on either basis. The Government, however, has made some slight progress in this field by extending taxation to huts and small farms in the southern areas, and a graduated income tax has been introduced which it is hoped will contribute materially to the territory's revenue. The effect of these improvements is reflected in the 1959 Budget which provided for receipts of some £3 million and expenditure of £3·5 million.

From Italy Somalia has received an average annual subsidy of about £3 million over the past nine years. Through its International Co-operation Administration agency the United States has also made substantial contributions and smaller grants have come from the World Health Organization, Unicef, and Egypt. A series of Seven-Year Development Plans for the period 1954–60 designed by the Italian Trusteeship Administration envisages an expenditure of some £4 million, over half this sum being allocated to agricultural and livestock development. In the field of private investment, between 1950 and 1957 little short of £3 million had been invested by Italians in agriculture and industry. This is an indication of confidence in the future of Somalia on the part of Italian interests; and certainly the main Italian concessionaries, the Società Agricola Italo-Somala, and the other important expatriate enterprises show little anxiety for the future. Unless oil or other readily exploitable mineral resources are discovered, however, there is little likelihood of foreign capital investment increasing markedly, and there is no doubt that foreign aid will remain the main hope for further development. Even to balance the Budget, it is estimated that from this year onwards for at least twenty years Somalia will require foreign aid to the annual value of at least £1¾ million. By 1962 assets in the balance of payments are expected to amount to approximately £5·2 million and liabilities to £7 million.

These figures indicate something of the magnitude of the economic problems confronting the new State. In practical terms, intensive agricultural and irrigation schemes are in progress in southern Somalia, especially in the arable land between the Shebelle and Juba rivers; the ports of Bosasu, Kismayu, and Mogadishu are being extended; water-boring and pastoral im-

provement projects are being implemented amongst the nomads; and four oil companies hold mining concessions. The local light industries, which produce sugar, textiles, alcohol, oils, meat and fish, etc., are all being encouraged. But the country's most valuable export asset remains the banana industry, until recently exclusively the province of Italian concerns. The production at present is uneconomic since despite preferential treatment Somali bananas sell on the Italian market at uncompetitive prices. It is hoped, perhaps optimistically, however, that reduced shipping costs may in the future enable the Somali banana industry to stand on its own feet. It is extremely important that the industry should improve, since although the production of sugar shows promise, there is at the moment no other local product capable of making such a substantial contribution to Somalia's economy.

Meanwhile pastoral nomadism with its associated industries of meat and hides export and the export of stock on the hoof remains the basic livelihood of the majority of the population. The first Somali Government accepted this and its concomitants—a continued adherence to tribal loyalties and collective tribal responsibility—as an inevitable fact of the country's ecology. But the present Government intends to encourage settlement and the adoption of agriculture in an effort to diminish the nomadic population which, with its constant struggle for access to grazing and water and its interminable feuds, sets serious problems in the maintenance of internal security. Here the extension of bore-holes and provision of adequate water-points is an important first step.

This new policy aims at weakening traditional tribal loyalties, thereby reducing tribal friction and encouraging the growth of national solidarity. Previously the main emphasis was on the extension of education, especially adult education, which it was hoped would widen people's horizons and stimulate a new sense of national patriotism. The problem of tribalism was in any case minimized by the 1956 Somali Government in its first flush of political success and it was held that education would remove what remained of traditional tribal loyalties. Today, however, the continuing force of tribal allegiance is frankly acknowledged and its eradication has become an important issue.

To some extent this new attitude is connected with an upsurge of pan-Somali nationalism, a resurgence of Somali aspirations for the unification of their territories in one sovereign nation. It also reflects the concern of many Somali leaders for the future stability

of Somalia which they see threatened by a continuous tribal strife What is the reality? Over the last few years the explicitly tribal parties which competed with the nationalist parties in the first elections have disappeared—partly as a result of legislation making it illegal for political parties to bear tribal names. Beneath the surface, however, tribal ties remain strong and the national parties tend to split into rival factions along the lines of tribal cleavage Even the increasing political success of the S.Y.L. is an illustration of this process. More and more opposed tribal interests have become accommodated under the nationalist banner of the party, which itself is now in reality a vast consortium of rival tribal groups weakly linked through the common aim of nationalism and self-determination.

This means that although with its overwhelming majority the present S.Y.L. Government presents the picture of one-party rule, that does not imply political domination by one monopolistic group In reality the Government could hardly be more representative of the public at large. The present Cabinet includes members from all the main tribal groups in the country and represents a precarious balance between their rival interests It has been attacked by some of the new intelligentsia as a return to naked tribalism But this is an unrealistic assessment since in the present economic conditions of the country the main interest groups cannot be other than tribal Industrialization and modern economic developments have not yet been sufficient to lead to the formation of new social classes on any wide basis. Nor is it likely that they will for many years to come

The new interest in pan-Somali nationalism bears directly on the external problems of the new State. Ethiopia, whose backward Harar Province contains some 500,000 Somali, has viewed Somalia's rapid political development with concern. Here an important aggravating factor, an unfortunate legacy from the Italian colonial regime, is the undefined border between the two States. With the assistance of the United Nations several attempts have been made to define the boundary, but no solution acceptable to both sides has yet been found.

Relations with the British Protectorate (population *c.* 600,000) are more friendly but equally ambiguous. The British Government has stated its willingness to facilitate the unification of its rapidly developing Protectorate with Somalia, and every effort is now being made to accelerate advancement to a point where British Somaliland can manage her own affairs. The 'Somalization' of the civil service

has, by comparison with Somalia, lagged a little behind political advancement; but all Districts are now in the direct charge of Somali officials, many of whom have had training at British universities. The territory's second general elections, with suffrage restricted to the male population, were held in February last and the first Somali Ministries have just been established. As has been mentioned earlier, the Protectorate becomes independent on 26 June 1960.

But while the Protectorate will soon be in a position to join with Somalia on a fairly equal footing, the merger will raise considerable problems. For one thing, there is no guarantee that the same political parties will be in power in both countries—the S.Y.L. fared badly in the recent Protectorate elections. More important, however, is the question of the international status of the joint State. What form will the association take, and can the British territory remain within the Commonwealth while joined to the republic of Somalia? There is little doubt that the Protectorate will wish to retain its British connections in some form since its economy is hardly less precarious than Somalia's and since it is without adequate military resources. The latter are particularly important in relation to the protection of grazing rights which British Somali hold in the Haud and former 'Reserved Areas' which, by a treaty of 1897, belong to Ethiopia, but which were only surrendered to Ethiopian administration by the Anglo-Ethiopian agreement of 1954. The use of this large and extremely important grazing area has given rise to a series of squabbles and to some serious incidents since the handover, and there is little reason to suppose that the position will improve when the Protectorate becomes independent and has to face its formidable neighbour, Ethiopia, alone, or almost alone. Britain has here an especial responsibility to the Somali, and it will be the moral duty of the British Government to see that the grazing rights of its former subjects are fully protected after independence.

Finally, there is the question of the status of French Somaliland which has decided to remain an Overseas Territory of France. Economically, this territory, more arid even than the Protectorate, consists of little more than the port of Jibuti, the main outlet for Ethiopian trade. But despite its economic and, until very recently, extreme social backwardness, many of its Somali population uphold the pan-Somali ideal, however they may have voted in the de Gaullist referendum. In reply to these aspirations the French Government has announced its firm intention of staying in the

Côte and, as the Governor recently put it, of resisting all attempts at 'annexation' on the part of foreign Powers. From the nationalist Somali point of view the position is further complicated by the economic ties of the territory with Ethiopia. Recently these links have been strengthened by an agreement signed at the end of last year making the Jibuti–Addis Ababa railway for all intents and purposes an Ethiopian concern with the profits being shared between Ethiopia and France.

All these local factors affecting Somalia's future are overshadowed by wider international interests in the area. Perhaps the most important imponderable is the future policy of Egypt and the extent to which Egypt designs to use pan-Somali nationalism as a vehicle for the promotion of pan-Islamic aims in Africa. So far Egypt has shown something of her hand by offering scholarships to Somali students, by sending a considerable number of Egyptian teachers, and by dabbling in Somali politics, especially through the extremist Greater Somalia League. This interest has not always been well received and there have been protests at unwarranted Egyptian interference in the internal politics of Somalia. The Somalia Government has also displayed considerable caution in accepting offers of foreign aid except where no commitments are implied. Perhaps the most important bearing of future Egyptian interest, however, will be on Somali-Ethiopian relations.

Whatever happens when Somalia makes her debut and is followed by the Protectorate, it will be a grave injustice to the Somali and a disgraceful waste of energy and initiative on the part of the Italian and British expatriate administrations if adequate international safeguards are not provided to protect the interests of the new Somali State.

I. M. LEWIS

The United Arab Republic and the Iraqi Challenge

THERE were many who thought at the time of the Iraq Revolution in July 1958 that the Arabs were about to take another great step towards political union. Syria had shown the way five months earlier by rushing into marriage with Egypt: Iraq, freed overnight from

the monarchical and Western fetters of her *ancien régime*, was expected to follow. The ancient rivalry between Cairo and Baghdad would be turned into concord as the two peoples marched towards their common goal, demonstrating, as Nasser has put it, that 'the Arab destiny is one and one fate is written for the Arabs.' But this nationalist creed has once again been shown to be myth. Iraq and Egypt are again at each other's throats, locked in a battle of invective and subversion that makes the Nuri–Nasser duel over the Baghdad Pact seem tame. What destroyed those early hopes? What went wrong?

Today's dispute is seen in very different terms in Cairo and in Baghdad. The U A R. press,[1] radio, and official spokesmen see it as a naked struggle between true Arab nationalism, represented by President Nasser, and the new Communist imperialism which has made Iraq its spring-board. In contrast, Iraqi publicists depict General Kassem as the champion of a democratized, freedom-loving Arab nationalism against the centre of 'reaction' and predatory ambition which Cairo has become. But the present conflict, more bitter and ideological in content than in the past, has been grafted on to a long-standing divergence between Cairo and Baghdad as to the meaning and purpose of Arab unity and as to the methods used to secure it. Echoes of past controversies break through into today's jargon.

More important still, perhaps, for an understanding of the present phase in the struggle is to note that it is being fought on the traditional territorial battlefield of Syria—the area where Iraqi-Egyptian rivalry has always been observed in its purest form. A tacit premise has long underlain the Arab policies of both Egypt and Iraq: that Syria was the key factor in the contest for leadership of the Arab community. The policy of each rival was to contain the other on his home river—Egypt on the Nile and Iraq on the Euphrates. Each realized that whoever controlled Syria or enjoyed her special friendship could isolate the other and need bow to no other combination of Arab States. This was partly due to Syria's geographical position at the head of both the Eastern Mediterranean and the Arabian peninsula and at the northern frontier of the Arab world. It was also due to her intellectual prestige and her nationalist heritage. Alone, Egypt and Iraq were something of a match for

[1] Under a decree dated 24 May 1960, all leading newspapers and periodicals in the U.A R. are to be run by the National Union, the State party organization, to which all newspapers and journalists must apply for licences (*The Times*, 25 May 1960).

each other: Syria had only to move towards one or the other for this balance to be destroyed. In consequence, strong Governments in Damascus, such as that of General Adib Shishakli which fell in February 1954, tended to maintain this balancing act by giving their friendship more or less impartially to both Cairo and Baghdad and by a jealous concern for Syria's independence. (However, in fairness to Egypt it should be said that Syria, right up to the Union in February 1958, never felt actively threatened from that quarter. It was Iraq that was for ever talking and plotting *Anschluss*)

Apart from their common preoccupation with Syria, Egypt and Iraq have pursued, often under the same banner of Arab unity, two conflicting Arab policies. Iraq, faithful to the forty-year-old tradition of the Arab Revolt, has seen unity in terms of a merger under her royal house of the 'Fertile Crescent' States in the Eastern Mediterranean which would erase the artificial frontiers drawn by Western statesmen on the Arab map. This once glorious ideal has, since the war, degenerated into a series of squalid, ill-managed conspiracies against Syria (often, alas, abetted by Britain) and increasingly out of sympathy with popular Arab aspirations Egypt, a late convert to the cause of Arab unity, has seen it in terms of a united Arab front, under Egyptian leadership, against the foreigner, without prejudice to the existing frontiers of the Arab States.

In fact, since the war and up to the Union with Syria, Egypt's Arab policy has appeared to rest on two principles. The first was the need to forge a solid Arab bloc in dealings with great Powers, and in particular Britain. This, in effect, meant harnessing the Arab States behind her in support of her claims The aim of Egypt's Arab policy, therefore, became the control of the foreign policy of her north-eastern neighbours and *not* their annexation. Secondly, she devoted herself to the defence of the territorial *status quo* in the Middle East as laid down by the great Powers after the first World War. This ensured that no combination of Arab States emerged to challenge her, so that she could play the role of elder sister for which the weight of her population, her wealth, and her intellectual and Islamic institutions seemed to fit her.

There is ample evidence that this is the Arab policy which Nasser inherited, which he did little to change until 1958, and which has triumphed, on the whole, over rival Iraqi pretensions since the war. The 1945 Arab League Charter, freezing the territorial *status quo* and aiming at Arab unanimity on foreign policy, was a clear victory for Egypt. Four years later, in the autumn of 1949, the Egyptian

Foreign Ministry neatly countered a projected Iraqi-Syrian federation by proposing an inter-Arab Collective Security Pact. This pact, conceived under Farouk, was given a central—at least propagandist—role by Nasser, striking evidence of the extent to which he was acting within an inherited tradition. From first to last, throughout the whole of its abortive life, the Pact was used by Egypt, under the slogan of Arab unity, as a weapon to subdue Iraq and assert Egypt's supremacy. This central role for the Pact, and for the policy objectives it embodied, emerges clearly from Anwar as-Sadat's book, *Story of Arab Unity*,[1] published in December 1957, less than two months before the Union with Syria. In this book, perhaps the most authoritative full-length statement of Egypt's Arab policy by one of the regime's leading publicists, the Pact gets a mention on the very second page and on most subsequent pages of the opening chapter. The recurrent theme is a vigorous rallying cry to all Arabs to fall in behind Egypt, to put teeth into the Pact—'sole hope of the Arabs'—and to throw off all foreign bondage. There is no hint in it of the aspirations for territorial and political union which have traditionally fired nationalists in Syria and Iraq.

This is the background against which events since the Union in February 1958 and since the Iraq Revolution five months later must be appraised Nasser has accused the Communists in Syria of conspiring to detach that country from the U.A.R and of seeking to carve out, from their new base in Iraq, a 'red' Fertile Crescent. At the same time he has insisted in speech after speech that when he preaches unity he means primarily a united Arab front—in line with Egypt's traditional Arab policy—and not a territorial merger of all the Arab States. Assuming that one is prepared to accept Nasser's good faith and take his words as a true expression of his Arab policy, one may then want explained the paradox that it was Egypt and not Iraq that first shattered the *status quo* by merging with Syria. The puzzle is resolved by the fact that the initiative for the Union did not come from Egypt but from an alliance in Syria of the Ba'th party and an Army group, led by the Chief of Military Intelligence, Colonel Serraj, which seemed in danger of having its flank turned by the Communists. They appealed to Nasser to agree to an immediate fusion of the two countries—the first step towards the ideal of the unity of the Arab nation, one of the pillars of the Ba'th's *credo* to which Nasser had given ample lip-service, although, as we have

[1] *Qissat al-Wahda al-Arabiyya* (Cairo, Dar al-Hilal, 1957)

seen, the Egyptian connotation was somewhat different.[1] Nasser did not particularly want to take over Syria. Such an annexation was not a logical consequence of Egypt's Arab policy. But he must soon have realized what powerful stuffing Syria's immolation would give his own concept of Arab unity. He became overnight the heir to all the dreams and patriotic fantasies for which Syria had so long been the focus. Saladin had returned to the capital of the Umayyads

With the U.A.R. came an overnight change in the local balance of power: Egypt had won a decisive round in her struggle with Iraq. In the months following the Union, Baghdad vainly tried to recapture some of the lost ground, but the struggle was unequal Yemen joined the U A.R. in a loose federal arrangement, Saudi Arabia was driven into neutrality, Lebanon was paralysed by internal strife, the Hashemites were isolated, and Nasser was unchallenged. But what was perhaps not fully realized in the fierce joy of Union was that the Ba'th had forced Nasser to accept their territorial conception of Arab unity instead of his own more sober objective of a united Arab foreign policy front Egypt had in fact departed from her traditional policy of defending the territorial *status quo* and had embarked on a process which, Arab nationalists believed, would result in a unitary Arab state in the Middle East After absorbing Syria, Nasser could not very well retract to his former positions. Moreover, the Ba'th, who held a virtual monopoly of power in Syria after the Union and on whom he was forced to rely, were in no mood for caution. They considered Nasser as their secular arm, the compelling figurehead under whose aegis they would become the great political party and ideological source of a unified Arab world.

With the Iraq Revolution in July 1958 the Ba'th must have believed that their destiny was soon to be fulfilled. But Kassem was not to be rushed, and the more the Ba'th sought to coerce him into taking the plunge, the more he reflected on the advantages of an independent Iraq and the more he came to rely on the Communist wing of his support, which was wholly hostile to the idea of submission to Nasser. It was only after the 'Arif fiasco[2] and the disastrous revolt led by Colonel Shawwaf in Mosul in March 1959 that

[1] See 'The Meaning of the United Arab Republic', in *The World Today*, March 1958.

[2] Colonel Abd-al-Salam 'Arif, Deputy Commander-in-Chief and Deputy Prime Minister in Iraq until September 1958, was arrested and sentenced to death for conspiracy in February 1959 See 'A Year of Republican Iraq', in *The World Today*, July 1959.

Nasser could no longer fail to see where the Ba'th's aggressive 'unionism' was leading him. With characteristic flexibility, he decided to cut his losses and to attempt a reversion to his former position: in speech after speech he was to stress that his aim was Arab solidarity, not political union. ('The Arab unity we advocated did not in any way convey any constitutional meaning, but it meant Arab solidarity.'—Anniversary speech, 22 July 1959. Or again: 'I say again that this does not mean that all the Arab States should constitute one state. What concerns me is that Arab solidarity should emerge and the struggle be unified. . .'—Interview with *New York Times*, broadcast by Cairo Radio on 7 November 1959.)

This retraction to more modest objectives must have seemed like betrayal to the Ba'th whose first article of faith was the 'unity of the Arab Nation'. Signs of strain in Nasser's relations with the party were soon to appear. But what made his break with the Ba'th inevitable was the great change in the balance of forces in the Middle East which followed the Iraq Revolution: not only did Baghdad emerge as a rival centre of Arab nationalism, but, under cover of the revolution, the Syrian and Iraqi Communists moved in to the attack against Nasser's positions in Syria, forcing him on to the defensive. Nasser was faced with an ugly dilemma: the rise of a strong nationalist regime in Iraq would present a powerful attraction for Syria and might detach her from the U.A.R. He was, therefore, inclined to favour disturbance and unrest in Iraq as providing the best conditions in which to consolidate his hold on Syria. But an even graver danger lay in allowing the unrest in Iraq to degenerate into anarchy, as a Communist take-over would present a still more deadly threat to Syria and to the rest of the Arab world. A nationalist Iraq would rival Nasser's leadership, but a Communist Iraq would be a still more fearful obstacle to his dreams of Arab solidarity.

Nasser's counter-attack, which he has unfolded over the past eighteen months, has been three-pronged. First, he launched a campaign against the Syrian and Iraqi Communists—at the risk of alienating the Soviet Union, his strongest international backer until that time—which he opened with his speech at Port Said on 23 December 1958, openly accusing the Syrian Communists of plotting to detach Syria from the U.A.R. Secondly, he consolidated his grip on Syria by outmanœuvring the Ba'th, eliminating them from public life and appointing Marshal Abdel Hakim Amer, Vice-President of the U.A.R. and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, as his proconsul in Syria with full powers to rule in

his name. Nasser's third reaction to the threat from Iraq was to outline more clearly and to implement more vigorously his own economic, political, and social aims for the U.A.R. He seemed thereby to recognize that his dispute with Iraq had moved from a simple conflict of ambitions to the rivalry of opposing social systems: his own, authoritarian, conservative after the first flush of revolution, Iraq's, more clearly 'progressive'. Nasser was experiencing the complex, all-embracing competitiveness of the Cold War.

Nasser's duel with the Communists was to preoccupy him for the whole of 1959 and to overspill into 1960. The Syrian Communist leader, Khaled Bakdash, who had left Syria for Eastern Europe shortly after the Union was proclaimed, returned that autumn and, on 14 December 1958, outlined the position of the Syrian Communist Party in an important interview with the Beirut Communist weekly *al-Akhbar* [1] In a thirteen-point programme he called for greater autonomy for the Syrian region, greater 'democratic freedoms', and closer links with Iraq This was a declaration of war on Nasser's regime and indicated a shift in Party support away from the U.A.R. and towards Iraq, where the prospects for a Communist seizure of power seemed better than in any other Arab State. Nasser struck back with his Port Said speech on 23 December, Bakdash left the country two days later (possibly with the connivance of the authorities, who may have been unwilling to make him a martyr) shortly before the great wave of arrests of Communists in both regions of the U A R. which was to reach its peak on New Year's Day 1959.

As Nasser told Russy Karanjia, editor of the Indian magazine *Blitz*, '. . . information which we obtained disclosed a basic Communist plan to take over Iraq and establish a Soviet State in that strategic Arab region. This would be followed by destruction of unity between Syria and Egypt. The final Communist aim was to establish a "Red" fertile crescent composed of Iraq, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, and Kuwait which would enable Communist influence to penetrate not only to the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Aqaba but also to the Indian Ocean. . . I unmasked their conspiracy against the Arab people. The Communists subsequently escaped to Baghdad, which has now become the headquarters of international Arab Communism.'[2]

[1] See *L'Humanité*, 3 January 1959

[2] Cairo Home Service, 18 April 1959 (B.B C, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, 20 April 1959).

Mr Khrushchev provided further evidence of the Soviet Union's reappraisal of Nasser at the Twenty-first Communist Party Congress in Moscow (27 January–5 February 1959). He considered it his duty as a Communist to tell the Congress that it was unjust to accuse Communists of weakening or dividing the national effort in the struggle against imperialism. There were no men more devoted or courageous than the Communists in fighting colonialism. He had, he said, to make quite clear his attitude towards the campaign which some countries were conducting against progressive forces. Such opposition to the Communist and other progressive parties was nothing short of reactionary.

The Mosul affair introduced an edge of sharpness into the dispute. On 19 March 1959 Cairo Radio declared that 'the struggle between Communists supported by Moscow and Arab nationalists' had begun At a press conference in Moscow on the same day, Mr Khrushchev told correspondents that President Nasser was young and rather hotheaded and that he was in danger of straining himself. On 30 March Nasser retorted by revealing that the Soviet Union had given Egypt no more than moral assistance during the 1956 tripartite attack. Referring to a statement by the Soviet leader that unity in the Middle East should be achieved through democratic means, Nasser said: 'Those who talk of democracy today must remember what happened to their country in 1917 when parliament was dismissed by force of arms Now they forget their history and their chief stands up and attempts to stir up feelings against us—but no President of any foreign State can cause dissension among us and split our nation We will not be subjected—either by West or East ' On 4 April the Egyptian newspaper *Akhbar al Yom* printed, for the first time in Egypt, Khrushchev's indictment of Stalin at the Twentieth Party Congress

What concerns us here is not so much the detail of the dispute, which continued in the press and on the radio, with exchanges of letters and moments of respite, but the pattern which emerged from it. It was clear that the Soviet Union in 1959–60 was as unwilling to recognize Nasser as the uncontested leader of the Arab world as were Britain and the United States in 1954–5. Russia, moreover, wanted to secure full recognition for the role which Arab Communists had played in the struggle for independence and unity. Not only would such recognition pave the way for Communist participation in government—the Iraqi Communists publicly asked for a share in power on 28 April 1959—but it would also deflate Nasser's

claim that only his way to unity was valid. Arab solidarity behind Egyptian leadership had been, as we have seen, the guiding objective of Egypt's Arab policy: to harness the Arab States behind her and to force the great Powers to acknowledge that nothing could be done in the Middle East without Egypt's consent. It must have been heartrending for Nasser that, just when he had wrung a reluctant acceptance of this principle from the West, the Soviet Union should once again put it in question by finding in Kassem a rival champion of Arab nationalism.

This latest version of the rivalry between Egypt and Iraq is once again being played out on the familiar battlefield of Syria, where Nasser is exerting his best efforts to refurbish the ideological and economic structure of the U A.R. The National Union elections of July 1959; the elimination of the Ba'th from public life; Marshal Amer's appointment; the overhaul of Syria's administrative machine; the drafting of an ambitious five-year Syrian development plan to take effect from this July—these are some of the landmarks in Nasser's struggle over the past year to make Syria safe from the blandishments of Baghdad.

The real revolution, he has repeated time and again, has not yet been carried out Its aim is to set up a 'co-operative, democratic, and socialist society'. The vehicle chosen to bring about this ideal is a one-party, nation-wide organization known as the National Union. 'What is the National Union?', Nasser asked in an election-eve broadcast last July. He continued: 'My reply is that the National Union is the necessary means, in our national and external circumstances, for the realization of the revolution It is the framework within which, in order to preserve the safety of the homeland on the internal front, the revolution must take place. . . The National Union is the means and the framework. The revolution is the aim and the object.' The Union's Secretary-General has stressed that it is not a Government party but 'the political organization which includes all the people'. It seems to be an attempt to give the U A R a popular, grass-roots base from which political activity can later be gradually guided upward, to provide a vehicle for the expression of public opinion independently of the Army and the bureaucracy.

There were clear signs in the first half of 1960 that the Iraqi leaders were aware of this challenge. In the months before the abortive Summit conference, Kassem seemed eager to demonstrate that Nasser was not the only factor for stability in the region. Most observers agreed that there were signs of a strong rallying of

anti-Communist forces in this period, although Iraq still seemed more favourable terrain for Communist activity than the U.A.R. As individuals, if not yet as a party, the Communists seemed to have earned Kassem's antipathy, while their violence appeared to have estranged a large sector of Iraqi opinion.

Mr Mikoyan—perhaps the most important Russian to visit the Middle East in the last decade—was received in Baghdad last April with a minimum of official fuss.[1] Baghdad Radio did not even broadcast the official speeches at the opening of the large Soviet industrial exhibition, while *Al-Hurriya*, a right-wing nationalist newspaper, reappeared in April after a four-month voluntary suspension to publish an open letter to Mikoyan calling on him to disown the 'criminal gangs' which constitute the Iraqi Communist Party. The severe sentences recently passed on persons accused of setting up an improvised 'People's Court' at Mosul after the Shawwaf revolt, together with the repeal of the death sentence on several servants of the old regime, have been taken as further evidence of the growing stability of Kassem's rule. It is always possible that, impressed by the vigour of Nasser's counter-attack, the Soviet Union itself no longer favours a Communist coup in Iraq which might isolate her as effectively as she was isolated by membership of the Baghdad Pact. But whatever the manœuvres of the great Powers, it seems unlikely that the masters of the Tigris and the Nile will readily be deflected from the central conflict for local dominance, camouflaged and entangled though it often is behind the issues and slogans of other and wider disputes.

PATRICK SEALE

Political Prospects for the Cameroun

ON 1 January 1960, against a background of slaughter and chaos, the French Cameroons became the independent Cameroun Republic. In February a referendum to approve the country's new Constitution was preceded by the murder of twenty-one women and thirty-six children; over fifty deaths heralded the first general elections in April. In spite of these unfavourable signs, the prospects for the

[1] *L'Orient* (Beirut), 16 April 1960.

Cameroun are now more hopeful than they have been for many years. Violence in this former Trust territory has a long and com plex history: it cannot be ascribed only to militant nationalism, to French mistakes, or to internecine tribal warfare, though each of these has played a part But it looks as though the framework for effective pacification has at last been established on the basis of a be lated recognition of the real nature of the problem

Slightly smaller than Sweden, the Cameroun has a population of some 3½ million. Fundamentally it is a divided country One hundred and forty different ethnic groups include the Foulbes and the Kirdis in the culturally cohesive Muslim North, and Christians and pagans in the South who constitute the majority of the popula tion. Even within the South, there are broad divisions between the western, central, and southern peoples, each with strong ethnic loyalties.

Politically the divisions go even deeper For historical reasons no political party has been able to command national popular support The loose alliance of individuals and groups which governed the country at the time of independence was elected without the par ticipation of a nationalist movement and before independence wa envisaged. The Union des Populations Camérounaises (U P.C.), the nearest, but untested, equivalent of a national liberation movement was outlawed in 1955, and had no effective successor when the nev State was born The Prime Minister, M. Ahmadu Ahidjo, who wa elected an Opposition member, had been elevated to the Premier ship without intervening elections. Independence was celebrated uneasily, with eleven out of twenty-one departments under a state o emergency, and with M. Ahidjo ruling by decree Ghana and Guinea at first withheld their recognition of the new republic in token of their support of Dr Félix-Roland Moumié, the émigré leader of the outlawed U P C. M. Ahidjo, himself a Muslim, though not one of the ruling Foulbes, was tacitly supported by the North which, it was believed, would have preferred a more aristocratic Premier. The most that could be said for his very conservative Government was that it held a tenuous balance between the North and the South—in itself no mean feat.

The Opposition was equally divided. From Conakry and Cairo Dr Moumié led the U P.C -in-exile to ferment an undisciplined and very bloody revolt mainly in the Bamiléké province which abuts on the British Southern Cameroons. In the Assembly, M. Ahidjo's Government was opposed by a fluctuating and unrepresentative

alliance of groups and individuals none of which could claim national support.

That was the position on 1 January 1960. This lack of political unity was the result of the interplay of three main influences: the suppression of the U.P.C. in 1955; chronic and potentially explosive grievances within the Bamiléké tribe; and a mid-stream change in 1958 in French policy for the territory's political advancement.

In 1955, the U.P.C., then still in its infancy, was banned for its alleged Communist aims. Calling for independence and unification with the British Cameroons, it went underground in two main areas: the Sanaga Maritime and the Bamiléké provinces. In the forests of the Sanaga Maritime province in the south-west, the 'maquis' (a name conceded to it by the French) was a coherent political movement with specific nationalist aims It was led by Ruben Um Nyobe, by all accounts a leader of potential national stature, who was killed in action in October 1958. Soon afterwards the French announced that independence would be granted on 1 January 1960. In response, the highly disciplined 'maquis' formally disbanded under the terms of an amnesty offered at the time. Led by Mayi Matip, a lieutenant of Um Nyobe, it went over to peaceful campaigning for three main aims: elections before independence, Africanization of the Civil Service, and unification with the British Cameroons In lieu of the U.P.C. label, which was still unlawful, it called itself the 'force de réconciliation', and it fiercely opposed the terrorist methods which were still being employed in the Bamiléké province.

There the story was quite different. This mountainous province lies in the heart of the fertile highlands of the Cameroun Prosperous peasant farmers live in small, scattered communities among a profusion of banana plantations interspersed with the cash crops of cocoa, coffee, and tea. Half a million Bamiléké live in this highly cultivated province, which gives the impression of a very large, loosely knit village on its own. The density of its rapidly expanding population is already three times the country's average. The Bamiléké are an industrious, virile, and intelligent people. Pressure on land has already driven about a third of their number out of their own province in search of fresh opportunities. Wherever they go they establish tenacious, exclusive communities with a reputation for go-getting which has bred resentment against them. The Bamiléké province is the only Southern province which is still ruled by strong

hereditary chiefs, and some of their administration is by all accounts harsh and corrupt. Attempts to democratize local government have been half-hearted and unsuccessful, partly because the dangers of the situation were not fully realized, but partly also because the Bamiléké are themselves ambivalent as to the changes they would like to effect: some of them are attached to the institution of chieftainship while opposing those who abuse it. Thus the essential problem here is that of a disintegrating tribal structure: land hunger and an autocratic and sometimes corrupt administration have shackled an energetic people and produced a simmering discontent which needed very little to spark it into explosion.

These problems are not essentially those of a nationalist movement. But they predisposed the tribe to espouse the U P C cause Dr Moumié was able to use an already seething situation to ferment violence on a scale which created anarchy over much of a province He directed his part of the resistance from the British Cameroons until the U.P C was proscribed there Dr Moumié became a Marxist in the course of his medical training as a very young man Later he came under the influence of the nationalist Ruben Um Nyobe and led the impetuous left wing of the U P C After he was expelled from the British Cameroons, he formed a Government-in-exile in Cairo, where he was in close contact with the Russians as well as the Egyptians Since his exile he has made several trips to Eastern Europe, and became a familiar figure in Peking and Moscow In these capitals, as well as in Accra, Conakry, and Cairo, he is accepted as the spokesman for the Cameroun and has received substantial financial and other help He has also presented the U P C case at the United Nations He claims that violence in his country arises from the frustrated nationalism of the Cameroun people.

Certainly the Bamiléké province shows all the signs of political sabotage: telephone wires straddling the road, charred skeletons of buses and lorries on the verges of the road, crops destroyed, and villages abandoned. Visitors to the Bamiléké province travel with a military escort on the only road which the French troops have been able to keep open, and which is in many places scarred by the terrorists' trenches. Officials report that most of the modern weapons recovered are of Czech origin, and Moumié has never denied the presumption that he supplied them. Three separate armed bands claimed U P.C. inspiration, though one was reported to dispute Moumié's leadership and to clash openly with the others.

But there are other terrorist bands with a variety of motives for

violence. Villagers clash with chiefs and their supporters, old rivalries are played out, and war-lords take advantage of the confusion to plunder and murder for loot. By the end of last year it was reckoned that over fifty civilians had been killed every month since June 1959. In areas where a popular chief commanded loyalty and unity, life moved on much as usual—except that the men (apparently feeling discretion to be the better part of chivalry) left any necessary travelling to their womenfolk, who were less liable to attack. In other parts, where the chief was corrupt and unpopular, there was no sign of life and the fields smouldered in untended desolation By the end of last year, it was clear that the U.P.C. was no longer in control of the situation.

The extension of violence to Douala and Yaounde largely reflects the concentration in these cities of large numbers of Bamiléké. The intense campaign of violence which started in Douala in June 1959 seemed at first to be directed primarily against the French· more than twenty Europeans were murdered in the first few months. But since then the victims have nearly all been Africans, a fact which partly reflects more effective European security measures, but partly also the increasingly internecine pattern of violence. There was no representative leadership of the Bamiléké as a whole, no individual or organization with whom negotiations could be conducted. On the other hand, it has long since been obvious that there can be no purely military solution to violence in this area The isolated communities cannot be protected from intimidation or prevented from helping the terrorists Put at its simplest the situation demands a reform of the administration and more land for the Bamiléké

Meanwhile inconsistent French policy for the political advancement of the territory fed the grievances of both terrorist and constitutional nationalist movements Having outlawed the U P C , the French decided in 1958 to press ahead with independence for the Cameroun under a Government composed of moderates who might be expected to be favourable to France. The 1957 Government of André Mbida ended abruptly in a quarrel with the French High Commissioner over Mbida's policies towards the terrorists. Mbida then did a complete volte-face and left to join Moumié in exile; and M. Ahidjo became Prime Minister. There was no reliable test of electoral opinion between 1957 and the referendum of February 1960. M Ahidjo refused to concede elections before independence. Technically he was within his rights since the resumed session of the United Nations General Assembly in 1958 voted to grant the

Cameroun independence without stipulating that it be preceded b
U.N.-supervised elections. But this provoked a very real politic
grievance on the part of the nationalist movements, both terrori
and constitutional They maintained that although it was their pre
sure which forced the French withdrawal, they had never bee
given a fair chance to establish a following and to lead the country
independence. The position of Mayi Matip's 'force de réconcili
tion' was a particularly difficult one. Members of the Governme
tended not to distinguish between this body and the U.P.C.-in
exile. And M. Ahidjo's refusal to agree to elections before inde
pendence made it increasingly difficult for Mayi Matip to justi
constitutional action to his aggrieved nationalist supporters At or
stage he had to think seriously of returning to the forest to foresta
defection among his supporters to the terrorists who operated in th
Bamiléké province.

Inevitably, M. Ahidjo has been accused of subservience to th
French: this is an impression which needs correction. M. Ahidjo
nobody's puppet. An inarticulate, shy, but tough little man, h
mind and his ideas are not less independent than those of his sup
porters. He adopts an empirical approach to his country's problem
and is not committed to a doctrinaire position. He keeps his ow
counsel, reads *Le Monde* religiously every day, and inspires ve
little hero-worship. Slow to make up his mind and slow to change i
his chief failings are stubbornness and a lack of political flair.

In February 1960, six weeks after independence, M. Ahidjo sub
mitted his own Constitution to a referendum. The new elector
arrangements give the North a majority of seats, although it repre
sents a minority of voters. Partly for this reason, and partly becau
the Constitution provides for a very strong executive Presiden
Mayi Matip, still working peacefully, called for a vote against i
Moumié demanded a boycott. A 75 per cent overall poll gave th
Constitution a small (12 per cent) majority; it was soundly defeate
in most of the South, particularly in Yaounde and Douala; and
50 per cent poll in the Bamiléké province favoured it by a tir
majority. These results reflect the relative strength of Ahidjo, Ma
Matip, and Moumié; and only Mayi Matip could draw any re
comfort from them. His relative success must be attributed at lea
in part to the feeling in the country that by that stage nothing coul
be achieved by violence which could not equally be achieve
through available constitutional channels. Mayi Matip could poi
out that M. Ahidjo's dependence on French troops, which wa

Moumié's chief complaint, was no proof of his subservience to the French, but a consequence and an indictment of Moumié's own methods. On the other hand, it was true that M. Ahidjo's Government had done little to correct the French failure to Africanize the Civil Service. Southern Camerounians particularly resent the French domination of the economy and administration, and their failure to train Africans for responsibility. But Mayi Matip could now claim that these grievances could be settled without recourse to violence.

In March 1960, Ghana and Guinea formally recognized the Republic of Cameroun, largely through the mediation of Liberia. Whatever their reasons for doing so, the effect will be to strengthen the constitutionalists as against the terrorists. In response, M. Ahidjo agreed to legalize the U.P.C. Moumié decided not to return, claiming, probably with some justification, that his life would be in danger if he did. He called for a boycott of the elections in April. The former Prime Minister, André Mbida, quarrelled with Moumié and returned to lead a new party, the Cameroun Democrats. Mayi Matip's movement adopted the U.P.C. label despite Moumié's denunciation of his right to do so The stage was set for the struggle not only, or even primarily, between Government and Opposition forces, but between the constitutional opposition and the terrorist opposition. For it now seemed clear that the success of one would reflect the failure of the other.

On 10 April, against a crescendo of renewed violence, general elections were held to fill the Assembly's hundred seats. M. Ahidjo's party, the Union Camérounaise, was returned with fifty-nine seats and the support of two Independents. Forty-four of these seats, all in the North, had been unopposed. Five out of seven of M. Ahidjo's Southern Ministers were defeated. Thirteen U P.C. candidates were returned as well as nine of their known supporters. Mbida's party won eleven seats, all of them in and around Yaounde. The remaining six Independents are expected to align themselves with the Opposition. This gives the Opposition thirty-nine seats to M. Ahidjo's sixty-one. The overall poll represented nearly 70 per cent of the electorate, but in parts of the Bamiléké province and in the Bamiléké quarter of Douala it was as low as 17 per cent and 15 per cent.

This result cannot be regarded as a victory for M. Ahidjo. He has very little support in the South, and the Opposition has good grounds for claiming that some of his Southern seats were won

largely because of clever constituency delimitation. It is not y(certain how Mbida's party differs from the U.P.C. What is clear that although some degree of unity has been established in th formation of Government and Opposition blocs, there is still n party which can command national support. For none of the Oppc sition parties gained ground in the North, where most of the sea were not even thought to be worth contesting.

M. Ahidjo has decided to accept the strong executive position (President, to which he was elected with the votes of all but ten mem bers of the Assembly, all of them from the U.P C. alliance His fir move after the elections was to decree a general amnesty coverin all crimes, misdemeanours, and violations of a political nature, wit the sole condition that arms must be surrendered. Under the term of this amnesty, over two hundred political prisoners have been re leased This decision, as well as his choice of a Premier and Cabine have shown a remarkable flexibility on M. Ahidjo's part. The defe of some of his most conservative Ministers and deputies allows hi to initiate a united and realistic approach to pacification of hi country He is assisted by the formation of a 'People's Front fo Peace and Unity', which consists of eighteen deputies representin the Bamiléké, Mungo, and Wourri departments This front cut across party lines, and is designed to deal with the specific prob lems of the Bamiléké tribe It represents a recognition that thes problems can be solved only by encouraging representative leader ship of the Bamiléké on a non-partisan basis. They have adopted programme calling for the surrender of the rebels, the unconditiona removal of foreign troops in the Cameroun, and the formation o a national army.

The new Premier, M Charles Assale, is one of the two moderat former Ministers who were re-elected In 1958, as leader of th National Action Party, he was in opposition to Mbida's administra tion, and later he served as Finance Minister in M. Ahidjo' Government. He has chosen his Government with a view to es tablishing a 'wide national union'. It consists of thirteen Minister and five Secretaries of State. Of these, M. Ahidjo's Union Camé rounaise has been given six Ministries and three Secretaryships the People's Front group, three Ministries; Mbida's party, tw Ministries and one Secretaryship; while the Progressives, wh combine the National Action Party and the Cameroun Socialis Party, have one Ministry as well as the Premiership. The U.P.C. wa offered one Ministry and one Secretaryship, which it refused t

ccept on the ground that the offer was inadequate if the Govern-
nent were to be styled a national union. In view of its strength
nside and outside the Assembly its decision is probably justified.
Iowever, there is much to be said for maintaining a strong, un-
ommitted Opposition, whose criticisms of Government policies
ave been very constructive on the whole. The evidence of success-
ıl radical pressure within the Assembly must continue to sap the
trength of the violent Opposition. And the inclusion in the Cabinet
f Moumié's former associate, André Mbida, will certainly
rengthen the constitutionalists Terrorism continues, but the
amework has been established for political action without which
ilitary force cannot succeed in restoring peace in the Cameroun.

MARGARET ROBERTS

The Ancient Frontier of Ladakh

IBETAN history knows of a Julian the Apostate—Lang-dar-ma
836–42), who tried to 'submerge' Buddhism and to re-establish
e old Bon religion He was assassinated, and his son, 'Od-srung
842–70) was obliged to reinstate the Buddhist faith In about the
'ar 900, 'Tibet being in a state of revolution', 'Od-srung's grand-
n, Skyid-lde-ñi-ma-mgon (*c* 900–30) migrated to Western Tibet.
t first, he established himself at 'mKhar-dmar of Ra-la' (either
harmar, near Ru-thog, or Ra-la Dzong, between Tashigong and
akmaru). Later, he married the daughter of the chieftain of Pu-
ang, and moved his capital to his wife's country. 'Then he con-
ıered mṄa'-ris-skor-gsum completely and ruled in accordance
ith the faith.'[1] Note that the term 'mṄa'-ris-skor-gsum' included,
this time, not only (a) Ru-thog and Demchog, and (b) Gu-ge,
ar-thog, and Tsaparang, and (c) Pu-hrang but also Mar-yul or
adakh. Before his death, Ñi-ma-mgon divided his kingdom
nong his three sons. To the eldest, Pal-gyi-lde, also known as
ig-pa-mgon, he gave

[1] Quotations in this article, up to and including that from the Treaty of 1842,
: from A H Francke's *Antiquities of Indian Tibet, Part II The Chronicles
Ladakh and Minor Chronicles, Texts, and Translations, with notes and maps*
cheological Survey of India, New Imperial Series, Vol 50, Calcutta 1926.
ıe chronology followed is that of Luciano Petech *A Study of the Chronicles of
'dakh (Indian Tibet)*, Calcutta Oriental Press, 1939

racing from the Times Atlas of the World (1958) Vol I, Plate 23, with additional in-
ation from the Survey of India's Map of the Northern Frontier, July 1905, Reg No
5.05, Sheet No 14S.E , and *ibid* , August 1905, Reg No 310–S 05, Sheet No. 22N W

) 'Mar-yul (Ladakh) of mÑa'-ris; (2) Ru-thogs of the east and the gold ıne of aGog (Thok-jalung?); (3) nearer this way, lDe-mcog-dkar-po)emchog); (4) at the frontier, Ra-ba-dmar-po; (5) Wam-le (Hanle), ı the top of the Yi-mig rock (Imıs Pass); (6) to the west, to the foot of the ashmir Pass (Zoji La) from the cavernous stone upwards hıther; ·) to the north, to the gold mine of aGog (or mGon-po); (8) all the places :longing to rGya (in Rupshu)'.

Francke, the editor and translator of the *Chronicles of the Kings* ʻ*Ladakh*, did not identify 'Ra-ba-dmar-po', but ın the 'Map of the unjab, Western Hımalaya and the adjoinıng parts of Tıbet', comıled by John Walker, Geographer to the East India Company, to :company Alexander Cunnıngham's *Ladak*,[1] we find a place ılled 'Rabma' between Ru-thog and Tso-rul (Spanggur Tso). ould thıs have represented the ancient frontier between Ladakh ıd Tıbet? Of the two other sons of Ñı-ma-mgon, the elder obıned 'Gu-ge, wıth Pu-hrang, rTse (Sami?), etc.', whıle the ɔunger was gıven 'Zangs-dkar, Spı-tı, Spı-lcogs (Lahul?), etc.'

The eldest branch prevaıled over the others Thus, Utpala . 1080–1110) ıs said to have conquered Ñung-tı (Kulu), and to ave 'subjected bLo-bo (the Tıbetan provınce north of Muknath in Nepal) (and the country) from Pu-hrang downwards ıther'. To Tshewang Nam-gyal (*c* 1535–75) is credıted the conuest of '(all the country) from Nam-rıng in the east, downwards ıther (viz) bLo-bo, Pu-hrang, Gu-ge, etc.; to the south, aDzumng (Jumla, ın Nepal?) and Ñung-tı (Kulu)' But on the death of 'shewang, 'all the vassal prınces, ın one place after another, lıfted p their heads.' Sengge Namgyal (*c.* 1580/90–1640/1), ın about 530, annexed Tsa-parang—where a Jesuıt mıssion had been ıtablıshed by Antonıo de Andrade in 1625—and Ru-thog to his ıngdom. He then trıed to retrıeve the conquests of Tshewang ın ıe interior of Tıbet. At Shırı, on the bank of the Charta Tsangpo, e stopped, or was stopped. A treaty was concluded between engge and 'the Kıng of U-Tsang', by which 'ıt was agreed that hıs Sengge's) domınıons should ınclude all the country up to U-Tsang'. ſ and Tsang are the two central provınces of Tibet, of whıch the ıpıtals are Lhasa and Shıgatse respectıvely. The 'King of U-'sang' is the *Desi* (Regent, temporal ruler) of Tsang, who overırew the Pag-mo-du or Sıtya dynasty of 'Kıngs' (*Tsan-pos*) of ·hasa ın 1630, and was himself overthrown, ın 1641, by Gushı ·han, the Khan of the Kalmuk (or Olot) Mongols of the Koko-

[1] *Ladak, physıcal, statıstıcal, and hıstorıcal, wıth notıces of the surroundıng untrıes* (W. H Allen & Co , London, 1854)

Nor area, otherwise known as the Khoshotes. The London Manuscript of the *Chronicles of the Kings of Ladakh* says of Sengge that 'he reigned from Pu-(h)rang, Gu-ge, Zangs-dkar, Spyi-ti and Purig, as far as the Maryum Pass in the east.'

In 1664–5, Ladakh accepted the suzerainty of the Mughal Emperor of India (Aurangzib, 1658–1707). In the time of Deleg Namgyal (*c.* 1675–1705), 'the people of Bhutan and the Tibetans had a dispute. Now, (the head lama of) Bhutan was the patron lama of the King of Ladakh. The latter sent a letter to Tibet, saying that he was prepared to take up his quarrel.' Tibet was now under the Regency of Sanggye Gyatsho (*c.* 1680–1705), the illegitimate son of the Great Fifth Dalai Lama, Lozang Gyatsho (1615–80), but the military force was still the Kalmuk force brought in by Gushi Khan in 1641. In 1680, the Kalmuks invaded Ladakh, defeated the Ladakhis at Zha-mar-lung (half-way between Tashigong and Gar-gunsa) and, entering Ladakh, laid siege to the fortress of Babsgo. After three years of siege, the Ladakhis appealed to the Mughal governor of Kashmir for help. A Mughal army was sent and the Tibetans were defeated. They were then pursued to Tashigong, where they shut themselves up in the fort. Upon this, the Lhasa government sent the Bhutanese head lama to mediate and negotiate for peace. The Treaty of Ting-gang (gTing-sgang) (1683), which was arrived at, laid down as follows:

(1) 'As in the beginning, King Skyid-lde-ñi-ma-mgon gave a separate kingdom to each of his sons, the same delimitations to hold good', (2) The Ladakhis were not to allow an army from India to proceed to an attack upon Tibet, through Ladakh; (3) mNa'-ris-skor-gsum was 'set apart (from Ladakh) to meet the expenses of sacred lamps and prayers (offered at Lhasa), but at Menser (Menze, near Mount Kailasa), the King (of Ladakh) shall be his own master, so that the Kings of Ladakh may have wherewithal to pay for lamps and other sacrifices at the Gang Tso; it shall be his private domain. With this exception, the boundary shall be fixed at the Lhari stream at Dem-chog.'

The Treaty also regulated, in great detail, the trade between Kashmir and Tibet, and the presents which the King of Ladakh was to send to the clergy of Tibet every third year.

This was the last definition of the Ladakh–Tibet frontier 'at the time of the Ladakhi kings'. In 1715, when Father Desideri of the Society of Jesus passed from Ladakh to Tibet, the town of 'TresciJ-khang' (Tashigong)—whether by usage or otherwise—marked the frontier between the two countries. In 1834–5, Ladakh was conquered by Zorawar Singh, the commander in Kishtwar of Gulab

Singh, the celebrated Ranjit Singh's administrator of Jammu. In 1841, Zorawar conquered Baltistan. Flushed by his success, he decided to invade Tibet (1841–2) Having captured Ru-thog, Gar-thog, and Pu-hrang, he withdrew to Gar-thog to establish his headquarters there. The Tibetans immediately counter-attacked, and slew the Dogra garrison at Pu-hrang. Zorawar advanced to meet the Tibetans but was defeated and killed. The Tibetans then moved up to Gar-thog. On this news reaching Ladakh, a rebellion broke out, and the Dogra garrison at Leh was besieged (spring 1842). The Tibetans now came up to Chimre (lCe-'bre) to aid the Ladakhis. But Dogra reinforcements arrived, and the Tibetans were defeated at Chimre and pursued to Dorkhug, where a Tibetan army of 5,000, under Zurkhang and Ragashar, had arrived. On the advice of a Ladakhi chieftain, the Dogras dammed up a brook and flooded the Tibetan camp. 'Their equipment, the powder, etc. became wet. As no other course was left, the Tibetans bowed their heads' Ragashar committed suicide, but Zurkhang and Pishi-shakra (the captain of the archers) were brought to Leh, and peace was concluded with them. 'The conquered Ladakh, according to the frontiers it had during the times of the (Ladakhi) kings, was annexed by the high government (of Jammu and, therefore, by the Sikh government of Lahore) . . Everything was arranged exactly as had been during the times of the former (Ladakhi) kings and a contract was written.'

In 1845–6, the First Sikh War was fought between the British and the Sikhs By Article 4 of the Treaty of Lahore (9 March 1846), Maharaja Dalip Singh (1843–9) ceded to the British, as the equivalent of an indemnity of 10 million rupees, 'all his forts, rights and interests in the hill countries, which are situated between the Rivers Bias and the Indus, including the provinces of Kashmir and Hazara'. On 16 March 1846, by the Treaty of Amritsar, the British gave to Maharaja Gulab Singh, for the sum of 7½ million rupees, 'all the hilly or mountainous country, with its dependencies, situated to the eastward of the River Indus and westward of the River Ravi, including Chamba and excluding Lahul. . .' Article 2 of the Amritsar treaty laid down that the eastern frontier of Kashmir—the frontier between Ladakh and Tibet—was to be defined by commissioners appointed by the British and by Gulab Singh.

The following quotation from C. U. Aitchison's *Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sanads, relating to India and the neighbouring countries*, 5th edition (revised and continued up to 1929),

(Government of India, Calcutta, 1939), Vol. 12, page 5, is relevant here:

'As regards the Ladakh-Tibet boundary, the commissioners, owing to Imamuddin's rebellion in Kashmir—(Imamuddin was the last governor of Kashmir (1845–6) appointed by the Sikh government of Lahore)—were unable to reach the Tibet border. Mr Vans Agnew, one of the commissioners, however, wrote a memorandum in which he pointed out that the line was, as he thought, already sufficiently defined by nature, and recognized by custom, with the exception of the two extremities. On the appointment of the second commission (1847), steps were taken to secure the co-operation of Chinese and Kashmir officials; but no Chinese delegate appeared, and the demarcation of the frontier had to be abandoned. The northern as well as the eastern boundary of the Kashmir state is still undefined.'

Under the Maharajas of Kashmir, a Minister (*Wazir Wazarat*) was posted at Leh, for the administration of Ladakh and Baltistan To assist him in the supervision of the trade with Tibet and Sinkiang, the British Government of India posted a Joint Commissioner at Leh. In 1947 as a result of the events following the partition of India, of the territories of the former Jammu-and-Kashmir State north of the Himalayas, Gilgit and Baltistan came under the effective control of the Government of Pakistan, Ladakh under that of the Government of India. Across the eastern frontier of Ladakh, Tibet came within the control of the People's Republic of China, as a result of the Sino–Tibetan Agreement of 23 May 1951.[1]

ZAHIRUDDIN AHMAD

[1] See 'Tibet under Communist Occupation', in *The World Today*, July 1957

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Notes of the Month

U.S. Bases in Britain

THE incident of the U.S. RB47 bomber shot down over the Barents Sea, following closely upon the pre-Summit U2 affair, has highlighted a situation which has been described at various times as 'unprecedented in times of peace' (Mr Churchill in the House of Commons debate, 26 November 1951) and as 'the most formidable step taken by the late Government' (House of Commons debate, 6 December 1951). The history of the post-war re-establishment of U.S. aircraft on bases in this country reads rather like a history of the British Constitution; the situation has developed with changing circumstances, in this case in a series of informal unwritten secret agreements between successive British Prime Ministers and U.S. Presidents, and follows in direct line from the practices of war-time.

On 31 December 1946 the U.S. Army Air Force authorities in Washington announced that agreement had been reached with the R.A.F. for the continuation in peace-time of war-time co-operation in staff methods, tactics, equipment and research between the two air forces; and on 1 January 1947 the British Air Ministry announced this agreement for the exchange of officers in training. In January 1947 three high-ranking U.S. Army Air Force officers visited the R.A.F. and in June there were demonstration flights over Britain by nine U.S. B29 Superfortresses of the type used to drop atom bombs. In July 1948 sixty of these B29 U.S. Superfortresses arrived at three R.A.F. stations in East Anglia; their arrival was described officially as 'routine', 'for a short period of temporary duty', 'part of the normal long-range flight training programme'.

On 28 July 1948 the Secretary of State for Air in answer to a question in the House of Commons announced that these U.S.

[1] It is interesting to note that a Soviet military writer, General Galaktionov, writing in *The New Times*, Moscow, commented that this agreement for joint training would doom Britain to 'dependence on American military policy' (*New York Times*, 2 February 1947.)

units were not visiting Britain 'under a formal treaty' but 'under informal and longstanding arrangements between the two air forces for visits of goodwill and training purposes'. By September 1948 there were ninety B29 bombers at seven R.A.F. stations, and the former U.S. supply base at Burtonwood in Lancashire was re-opened to serve them. In answer to a question in the House on 3 November 1948 the Secretary for Air announced that 'it had not been decided how long these arrangements would continue.'

From that date the number of planes and of R.A.F. stations given over to their use increased until in June 1954 the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Defence announced that there were 45,000 U.S. military personnel in Great Britain. The arrangements for this undertaking were unpublished at the time, and when they were made public later were stated to rest on informal and unwritten understandings, but they were accepted by the British public—much to the surprise of high-ranking U.S officials such as the U.S. Secretary of Defence Mr Forrestal (see his *Diaries*, pp. 428 and 460)—as a natural continuation of war-time co-operation in the light of developments in the cold war (i.e. the Czech *coup* of February 1948 and the Berlin Air Lift). On some matters relating to the bases, such as the financial aspect, there were later written agreements, but on the whole, as Mr Macmillan explained in the House of Commons on 19 July 1960, 'it has seemed better to rely on *ad hoc* discussions in the light of changing circumstances' None of these arrangements with regard to the strategic bombers had anything to do with N.A.T.O., after the signing of that treaty in April 1949. The long-range bombers in this country have always come under the direct control of the Commander-in-Chief of Strategic Air Command at Omaha (Nebraska). Only the tactical air force comes under the European Allied Command, with short-range bombers and reconnaissance fighters, such as those transferred from France in the summer of 1959 after the refusal of General de Gaulle to allow N.A.T.O. nuclear stockpiles on French territory.

It is not strange that U.S. officials should have been surprised by the unquestioning reception of their planes by the British Government and public. As the Commander of the U.S. air forces in Britain told a press conference in June 1949, 'never before in history has one first-class Power gone into another first-class Power's country without any agreement. We were just told to come over and "we shall be pleased to have you".' But the climate

of opinion at the time was still dominated by the memory of war-time co-operation and the desire to retain U.S. interest in Europe. There were some criticisms in the House of Commons that Britain was being turned into an aircraft carrier. On 19 April 1951 Mr Churchill referred to 'the offensive atomic base in East Anglia' and in his Guildhall speech in November 1951, after his return to power, he commented: 'Under the late Government we took peculiar risks in providing the principal atomic base for the U.S. in East Anglia and in consequence placed ourselves in the very forefront of Soviet antagonism.' Mr Attlee denied in the House of Commons debate of 6 December 1951 that these bases were ever 'put forward specifically as a base for the atomic bomb against Russia'. But the presence of U.S. bombers on British soil was accepted by the majority of both Parliament and public opinion in the country as an essential contribution to Western defence, and Mr Churchill, in answer to a question in the House of Commons on 21 November 1951, paid tribute to the Labour Government for 'having had the wisdom and courage to make such a far-reaching step possible' and stated that the U.S. aircraft would remain 'so long as they are needed in the general interest of world peace and security'.

The unwritten arrangements of 1948 ran parallel with top-level negotiations in Washington during December 1947 and January 1948 between the U S.A., Britain, and Canada over the sharing of atomic information. At Blair House in January 1948 a *modus vivendi* was worked out which overruled the Quebec Agreement of 1943[1] between Mr Churchill and President Roosevelt and abolished Britain's powers of veto on the use of the atomic bomb. The final decision concerning the use of the bomb was left in the hands of the U.S. President and exclusive U S. control brought matters in line with the McMahon Act of 1946 on the withholding of atomic information from other countries. In the Commons debate of 1 April 1954 Mr Churchill attacked Mr Attlee for having abandoned the British veto on the use of the bomb, but the papers of Senator Vandenburg, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee of the U.S. Senate, imply that he considered that the Senate required the abandonment of any British right of veto over the bomb as a *quid pro quo* for Marshall Aid.[2] A new Atomic Energy Act of August

[1] Published in April 1954 as a White Paper, Cmd 9123.
[2] *The Private Papers of Senator Vandenburg* (New York, Houghton Mifflin, 1952), p 361

1954 (Public Law 703, 83rd Congress) followed agreements signed in June with the United Kingdom and Canada, and empowered the President to transfer to friendly Powers of regional defence organizations data on the tactical use of atomic weapons, information on training for atomic warfare, and evaluation of the atomic capabilities of potential enemies, but the veto on the disclosure of the design or construction of atomic weapons remained until the amendment of the McMahon Act in July 1958, when such information was made available to allied countries which had already made 'substantial progress' in the development of such weapons, namely Great Britain.[1]

The outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 and the increasing pressure from the United States for possible all-out action against Communist China brought real danger of decisive difference on strategy between Britain and America The Truman-Attlee Conference in Washington in December 1950 undoubtedly clarified the British position but, as Mr Churchill revealed in a debate on foreign affairs in the House of Commons on 26 February 1952, the United States

> on several occasions in the last year asked the British Government what military action they would agree to if certain things happened. On the first occasion in May 1951, before the Korean truce negotiations began, the late Foreign Secretary replied to an enquiry that His Majesty's Government had decided that in the event of heavy air attacks from bases in China upon United Nations forces in Korea they would associate themselves with action not confined to Korea. . . Only they wished quite properly that they should be consulted beforehand. . . In September the United States proposed that in the event of a breakdown of the armistice talks and the resumption of large-scale fighting in Korea, certain action should be taken of a more limited character. . . Whereas in May the right of prior consultation had been required by the late Government in the specific instance, before our consent could be assumed, in the more limited proposals of September the Socialist Government did not insist upon this right. In both cases Her Majesty's Government consider that the decision of our predecessors was right.

From these negotiations in 1951 can be presumed to stem the Truman-Attlee agreement of that October, referred to by Mr Macmillan in his answer to a question in the House of Commons on 12 December 1957 on the arrangements under which U S. strategic bombers were based in Britain, namely, that 'the use of the bases in an emergency was accepted to be a matter for joint decision by

[1] See *Russia and the Western Powers in the Post-War World*, by Margaret Cornell (London, O U P for R I I A, 1960), p 36

the two Governments in the light of circumstances prevailing at the time.' This understanding depended upon no formal document but was accepted as a mutually satisfactory arrangement and as such was confirmed in a communiqué issued on 9 January 1952 after the Churchill-Truman Conference in Washington and reiterated as an arrangement with the Eisenhower administration following discussions between Mr Eden and Mr Dulles in Washington in March 1953.

Such a 'gentleman's agreement' over so vital a matter as the control of atomic bombers based in this country has inevitably raised many doubts as the strategic revolution has developed. In the House of Commons on 3 March 1955 the Prime Minister was asked the precise terms of the agreement between President Eisenhower and himself 'whereby U.S. aircraft based in Britain will not become engaged in operations of war without the prior consent of Her Majesty's Government', and an assurance was also sought that in no circumstances could the consent of the Government be presumed in advance; the communiqué of 9 January 1952 was quoted in reply, with the addition that it might be supposed that 'an immediate, destructive, surprise and treacherous attack with the hydrogen bomb upon this island might possibly be acted upon by our allies in the U S. almost immediately without further or prior consultation.' In a written answer to a question on 9 February 1955 as to how much notice was needed for a denunciation of the agreement concerning the U.S. bases, the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs replied that U.S air force units 'are stationed here under informal arrangements which do not call for notice of termination and which will continue so long as they are needed in the interests of world peace and security'.

The pre-Summit U2 incident, and particularly the evidence about it before the U S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, have raised a number of questions as to the possibility of such espionage flights taking place from this country, and the RB47 affair brought from the Prime Minister a statement in the House of Commons on 19 July that such reconnaissance flights as are countenanced by international law have been taking place continually during the past twelve years by both British and U.S. planes. With regard to U2 espionage flights the Prime Minister reiterated his confidence in President Eisenhower's undertaking that such flights would be discontinued in future.

The crux of the matter of control was brought up during the

debate of 12 July 1960 by Sir H. Legge-Bourke when he said that 'one of the greatest anxieties which people in this country have is lest the military machine should become the dictator of political policy.' Moreover, the RB47 incident has raised the whole question of the definition of 'use in an emergency' as laid down in the much-quoted communiqué of January 1952 and the doubt as to whether the original Attlee-Truman agreement on 'joint decisions' would cover such activities as reconnaissance flights of the RB47 type. The level at which this 'joint decision' is taken, whether at top or local level, is also in doubt. The opinion expressed by Mr Gaitskell and others that changes in nuclear strategy since the time of the Attlee-Truman agreement necessitate a new and more precise and formal agreement was rejected by the Prime Minister in the debate of 12 July, but he promised that he was 'taking up with the President whether there should be any modification or improvement' of the working arrangements between the two Governments.

He refused, as he had done in a similar debate on 14 July 1959, to reveal details of the procedure of discussion to be followed before the command could be given for operational use of the U S nuclear forces stationed in this country; such revelations, he said, would not be in the national interest, but in the July 1959 debate he declared that they were satisfactory. 'There are of course those who feel that the presence of the U.S. bases in this country is a threat to our national security,' he said on 12 July 1960. 'But I am bound to say that I think that there are many more of us who feel that their absence would be an even greater threat.'

More precise arrangements were made, however, when agreement was reached on the siting of U.S. ballistic rockets in this country. Arising from the Bermuda discussions between President Eisenhower and Mr Macmillan in March 1957 and the N.A T O Summit meeting at the end of that year, a formal agreement was drawn up and published as a White Paper on 24 February 1958 [1] The United States agreed to supply to Great Britain a number of I.R.B.M.s and their related specialized equipment and to make available training assistance in order to facilitate their deployment by the British Government. They were to be sited at places agreed by the two Governments, Britain to provide the sites and supporting facilities, and the ownership of the missiles was to pass to the British Government; but all nuclear warheads were to remain in full U.S. ownership, custody, and control, and decision to launch

[1] Cmnd. 366

; missiles was to be a matter for joint decision by the two Gov-
ıments 'in the same manner as the arrangement for taking deci-
ns under the Attlee-Truman agreement'.[1]

New Phase in the South Tyrol

[T was in 1953, when the Italıans spoke of a plebiscite in the then
ee Territory of Trieste, that the more extreme elements among
South Tyrolese, the German-speakıng population of the Italian
vınce of Alto Adige, first demanded the same thing. But the
vious ımplication that they wished to secede to Austria was em-
atıcally denied by all their responsible leaders. This was still so
en Dr Kreisky spoke of the South Tyrol at the United Nations
September 1959: at that tıme the Sudtirolervolkspartei (the
ty representing the German-speakıng populatıon in the South
rol), supported by Vıenna, advocated only the separation of the
o Adige from the Trentıno and ıts complete autonomy within
ly. Indeed, although the South Tyrolese leaders emphasızed the
ognıtıon of Austrıa's official ınterest ın the Alto Adige by Sıgnor
Gasperı when he made hıs agreement wıth Dr Gruber ın Sep-
ıber 1946, they still seemed embarrassed by the traditional ex-
mısm of certaın irredentıst cırcles in Innsbruck. This extrem-
ı, whıch hugged the notıon of the hıstoric entıty of a Tyrol con-
ıing the Trentıno, strengthened the ıntransıgent elements ın
ly.

n September 1959 the South Tyrolese question was also brought
ore the Council of Europe which recommended that ıt be re-
red to the Internatıonal Court of Justice at The Hague. This
posal was agreeable to the Italıan Government, whıch had ful-
ed its oblıgatıons withın the letter of the law. At that tıme the
strıans felt uncertaın about forcing the ıssue at the Unıted
tıons as they were afraıd of findıng themselves backed by the
mmunıst against the N.A.T.O. Powers.

Today the sıtuatıon has changed in strıkıng fashion. After the
lıan Government had on 25 June 1960 formally proposed a re-
ence to The Hague, Dr Kreısky saıd thıs was nothing but a
et' to Austrıa's demands, and on 6 July he referred the South
rolese question, as a danger to Austro-Italian relatıons, to the
ıted Nations. By thıs time the South Tyrolese leaders were
nly speaking of a plebiscıte ın the South Tyrol, a vote, that is
say, as to whether the Alto Adıge should remaın ın Italy or be

[1] Mr Sandys ın the House of Commons, 24 February 1958.

transferred to Austria: the new challenge to the Brenner frontier was not repudiated by the Austrian Government.

This important change in Austrian policy can be explained by the delaying tactics apparently adopted by the Italians in the direct negotiations between Rome and Vienna which began some two or three years ago. During 1960 the long governmental crisis in Italy, followed by Signor Tambroni's exceedingly weak caretaker Government which collapsed in July in favour of Signor Fanfani, brought these negotiations to a standstill, and it is not surprising that the Austrian Government should regard them as abortive There can be little doubt, however, that the indignation of the South Tyrolese themselves has been stimulated by events in Africa In 1959 they often referred to the example of Cyprus, but in 1960 each fresh State to achieve independence in Africa reminded them of their own claim to self-determination, and they brushed aside the problem of the 33 per cent Italian population of the Alto Adige concentrated in its towns. As for the Austrian Government, it has no doubt decided that it can enrol the support of the growing Afro-Asian vote in the General Assembly of the United Nations. Mr Khrushchev's exhortations, on his recent visit to Austria, demanding that the Austrian Government should reproach that of Italy for the N.A.T.O. bases on Italian territory, cannot have simplified relations between Vienna and Rome.

CORRIGENDUM

In relation to the article on 'Present-Day Peru' (*The World Today*, May 1960), at p 210, the Editor's attention has been drawn to the fact that there have been no border disputes between Peru and Chile since the signing of the treaty of Lima in 1929, which settled the dispute over two border provinces by assigning Takna to Peru and Arica to Chile.

Austria, the Free Trade Area, and the Common Market

An Austrian newspaper recently suggested that the Austrian Federal Government should hold its meetings in future in the restaurant of the Vienna Airport, for that would be the easiest place in which to encounter the various members of the Government. Their frequent journeyings go to show that, following on the solemn declaration of neutrality in the year 1955, Austria has not retreated into the 'backyard of world history' as some people then expected. The Hungarian revolution of October 1956 afforded the first proof that Austria, even if she wanted, could not keep out of world political disputes. At that time, far from being the 'backyard of world history', she constituted the most advanced Western position of the free world, able to provide shelter for the stream of refugees from Hungary

The economic division of Western Europe into the European Economic Community and the European Free Trade Area, and Austria's membership of the latter, are less dramatic events, but their repercussions will affect Austria more than any other event since the conclusion of the State Treaty The frequent foreign trips of members of the Austrian Cabinet are directly or indirectly connected with these decisions. And it is not only the Government which has been concerned in Austria with the problems of E.E.C. and E.F.T.A. For the first time in a relatively long period, the man in the street has also taken an interest in the public discussions on this subject The average Austrian may not always be well informed about the motives, significance, and implications of his Government's political and economic decisions, but with the traditional understanding of the inhabitant of a small country with a great past he at least senses their implications. He feels instinctively that for various reasons Austria occupies a special position in Europe, that this special position makes the country a kind of 'thirteenth guest' at Europe's table, and that Austria would also have been in the same somewhat uncomfortable position if she had become the seventh partner of the E.E.C. rather than the seventh partner of the E.F.T.A.

What is this special position of Austria in Europe? Three facts should be stressed First, until 1955 Austria was occupied by four

foreign Powers and could therefore only partially participate in the efforts for European union. She joined the Marshall Plan in 1948—despite the protests of the Soviet occupying Power—and became a member of the O.E.E.C. and the European Payments Union, but it was only after the conclusion of the State Treaty that she joined the Council of Europe and the United Nations.

Secondly, on 26 October 1955, the Austrian Parliament, of its own free will, decided that Austria should be 'permanently neutral' This neutrality is exclusively of a military character. During the discussions on E.F.T.A. which took place in Austria it emerged clearly that economic neutrality was not a practical possibility. Given the present state of armaments the connection between military and economic affairs is so close that it is often very difficult to draw a borderline. A neutral State has to exercise particular caution in delineating these frontiers.

Thirdly, on the basis of the State Treaty, Austria is obliged to make unrequited deliveries of oil and commodities to the Soviet Union for some time. She therefore has certain economic ties with the Soviet bloc which she cannot sever unilaterally.

Thus, given this special position of Austria, it is understandable that she should have joined the E.F.T.A., although at first glance she might appear to be an obvious partner for the E.E.C She is situated between two big E.E C countries, the German Federal Republic and Italy; she borders on only one E.F.T.A. country, Switzerland. Her foreign trade is largely concentrated on the E E C countries. Switzerland and Austria are the only two E.F.T.A countries which have no direct access to the sea. Austria's main ports for import and export (to the south Trieste, to the north mainly Hamburg and Bremen) are in the E.E.C. area The nearest E.F.T.A. port is Copenhagen, where Austrian imports or exports are very seldom trans-shipped.

Statistics further demonstrate the close connection of Austria with the E.E.C. countries. In 1958, 49·6 per cent of Austria's export trade and 54·4 per cent of her import trade was with those countries, while only 10·6 per cent of her export and 11·2 per cent of her import trade was with E.F.T.A. countries. For some important commodity groups the relationship with the E.E.C. area is even more significant: among Austria's total exports, 96 per cent of live cattle, 92·6 per cent of fuel, 91·5 per cent of timber, and 84·2 per cent of food are directed to the E.E.C. countries. During the discussions on Austria's economic position in Europe it was rightly pointed out

that, in order to maintain the volume of her foreign trade at the existing level, a 10 per cent reduction in trade with the E.E.C. countries would have to be replaced by a 50 per cent increase in trade with the countries of E.F.T.A. Austria traditionally has a deficit in her trade balance and a surplus in her overall balance of payments. The difference is made up mainly by income from tourism, which in 1959 amounted to 5 3 milliard schillings. In the field of tourism, too, there is no question about the main emphasis: more than 86 per cent of the tourists come from the E.E.C. area, 75 per cent of them being accounted for by the Federal Republic of Germany.

In view of this close connection with the E.E.C. area, it is obvious that it was for political reasons that Austria preferred to join the E F.T.A. Her policy of neutrality, though not directly linked with this decision, was a contributing factor. True, there was nothing in the text of the declaration of neutrality of 26 October 1955 which might have given any grounds for maintaining that Austria's membership in the E.E.C. would constitute a violation of it. Nevertheless her membership of E.E.C. would have implied a limitation of her sovereignty, which would in the future have made it more difficult or even impossible for her to pursue an attitude in accordance with her own conception of neutrality. The Austrian Federal Chancellor Julius Raab dealt extensively with this problem in the parliamentary debate of 23 March 1960 which preceded the ratification of the E.F.T.A. Agreement. He pointed out that Article 3 of the E.E.C. Agreement provided among other things for a common commercial policy *vis-à-vis* third countries as well as for the implementation of common social, agricultural, and transport policies. In accordance with Articles 111, 115, and 116 of that Agreement the organs of the E.E.C. will have the right, from the third stage of the transitional period onwards, to take binding decisions in matters of commercial and customs policy by a simple majority vote. In this connection Raab declared:

Austria, a small and weak country, is situated in the midst of the field of tension between East and West at the frontier of the Western world. Her relations to the West and to the East must be carefully considered and cultivated. It is essential that Austria be truly independent and free in order to be able to shape these relations according to her own interests and according to her own experience and knowledge, without being subject to foreign influence.

He added further that 'Austrian neutrality would not prohibit

membership in the E.E.C., but the Austrian policy of neutrality must also take into account the possibility of various eventualities and must be ready and prepared to face each of these.'

Austria's decision to join the E.F.T.A. was facilitated by the fact that her economic associations with the E.E.C. area are not as fundamental as the statistical and economic data would seem at a first glance to indicate. It is true that half of her exports are directed to the E.E.C. countries, but only about 60 per cent of these are semi-manufactured and manufactured goods, whereas the remainder is made up of raw materials. One of the most important export commodities to the E E.C. countries is timber, and for this product Austria is hardly likely to have to suffer discrimination since the E.E.C. countries can cover only about three-quarters of their requirements from their own supplies, while the rest must be imported. Consequently imports of timber either are duty-free or the import duty has been suspended. The situation in respect of livestock is somewhat similar. Another important export item is steel: Austria exports 50 per cent of her steel production, and half of this is directed to the E.E C countries. In the steel sector Austria has already been subjected to a discrimination of some 8 to 12 per cent as a consequence of the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community, but in view of her lower production costs the setback to exports has so far been limited.

On the other hand, Austria's exports to the E.F.T.A. countries, which amount to 11 per cent of her total exports, are to a very large extent (90 per cent) composed of semi-manufactures and manufactures—of commodities, in fact, whose export can be expanded more easily than in the case of raw materials. It is a fact that during the first few months of 1960 Austrian exports to E.F.T.A. countries increased substantially. Time will show whether in future the impetus for this expansion through a drive for improved market research and intensified marketing efforts will be maintained. Before the Austrian Parliament ratified the E.F.T.A. Agreement there was much public and often heated discussion of the subject, in which not only competent experts but also many neophytes and outsiders took part, so that one sometimes felt inclined to vary a famous saying of Sir Winston Churchill's: 'Never before have so many people talked so much about a problem of which they understand so little.' Economists talked about international law, international lawyers about economics, while the politicians cheerfully discussed both these aspects of the problem.

The Socialist Party leader, Vice-Chancellor Dr Pittermann, in supporting Austria's membership of the E.F.T.A., even went so far as to state that membership of the E.E.C. might entail the danger of a new *Anschluss*, an argument which according to the principles of international law is completely untenable and which is politically dangerous in view of the future possibilities of European unification. Because of such statements it is hardly astonishing that some extreme conservatives in Western Austria were quick to denounce the E.F.T.A. as a 'Socialist clan', an idea which was fostered by the fact that the Austrian Foreign Minister Dr Kreisky spent the second World War as an émigré in Sweden and has subsequently maintained close contacts with the various Socialist Governments of the Scandinavian countries. Nevertheless, it is entirely unrealistic to attach the label of 'Socialist' to the E.F.T.A., given the political situation in the United Kingdom, Switzerland, and not least in Austria, to say nothing of Portugal. The differences of opinion about E.E.C and E.F.T.A. in no wise reflected disagreement on the subject between the leadership of the parties forming the Austrian coalition Government; rather, as in Britain, they cut across party lines. On the very day on which the deputies of the Austrian People's Party and of the Socialist Party were deciding on participation in E F.T.A., a leading Socialist weekly called that decision a 'farewell to Europe'; a few days before, the Governor of Styria, one of the most prominent representatives of the People's Party, had uttered the warning that 'Austria must not starve in neutrality'. Such declarations clearly express the discomfort of the thirteenth guest at Europe's table. Austria's agriculture provides an example of the inevitable division of ideas on the subject: for almost all her agricultural exports are directed to the E.E.C. countries, but at the same time the E F.T.A. Agreement, unlike that for the E.E.C., enables member countries to maintain tariff and quota protection in agriculture.

Does this mean that because of her peculiar position Austria is the weakest link in the chain of the seven E.F.T.A. countries? Such a view cannot be justified. As a result of her own post-war history, characterized by her long struggle to regain her freedom and independence, Austria has learned a lesson which is scrupulously observed by her Government and Parliament—that of absolute fidelity to contracts. Now that membership in E.F.T.A. has been decided upon, Austria will consequently adhere scrupulously to the obligations resulting from the Agreement. This does not exclude

further efforts on Austria's part to prevent the economic division in Europe becoming permanent and to bring about an amalgamation of the two economic communities in accordance with earlier plans. For some time it was thought that such an amalgamation might come about in the form of a bilateral association between the E.E.C and Austria. The Austrian Association of Industrialists, which as a private organization has more liberty of movement than the Government and the public authorities, sent one of the country's best known economic experts, Dr Taucher, a Professor of Graz University and former head of the E.R.P. Office, to Professor Hallstein in order to explore the possibilities for 'forming a bridge' (an expression frequently used in Austria). The outcome of his explorations yielded the same result as the trip by the Danish Foreign Minister Krag to the capitals of all the E.E.C. countries last year a prerequisite condition for such a unilateral association is the acceptance by Austria of the common outer tariff of the E.E.C. Such a solution might easily lead to a situation in which her role of 'bridge' would impose on Austria all the obligations of full E.E.C member without according her the corresponding rights.

From her position within the E.F.T.A., Austria will continue to be an untiring advocate of multilateral negotiations with the E.E.C. The Austrian representatives at the E.F.T.A. meetings were foremost among those who desired the inclusion in the preamble of the E.F.T.A. Agreement of the declaration that the European Free Trade Association is not an ultimate aim, but a means for bringing about European-wide integration. Upon Austrian initiative the same idea was expressed in a special resolution taken by the Cabinet Ministers of the seven countries on the occasion of the initialing of the Agreement. For the same reason Austria requested at an early stage the reactivation of the O.E.E.C. as a meeting place for the E.E.C. and the E.F.T.A. This request has now been met by means of the expansion of O.E.E.C. to O.E.C.D. (the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development) which will include the U.S.A. and Canada. The pessimists assert that this new organization only proves that Europe cannot unite and therefore has recourse to world-wide solutions. The optimists, on the other hand, point out that the inclusion of the U.S.A. marks a definite advance, especially in view of the apparently unequivocal preference which the United States accords to the E.E.C. The surprise visit of the Austrian Minister of Commerce Dr Bock to Washington last April, which he utilized for discussions with the Secretary of Commerce

and Under-Secretary of State Douglas Dillon, had the purpose of creating a better understanding within the U.S. Government for the problems of the E.F.T.A. countries in general and of Austria in particular. Austria also paid great attention to the voices from the E.E C. area which warned about Dr Hallstein's plans for acceleration This was taken as proof of the fact that the consequences of a 'deep gulf' between the E.E.C. and the E.F.T.A. are not feared by the E.F T A. countries alone.

A survey of Austria's position *vis-à-vis* the E.E.C. and the E F T A would be incomplete without reference to the internal domestic situation of the country. By comparison with her past, and also with other European countries, Austria finds herself today in a very favourable economic position The Austrian national product increased by approximately 45 per cent between 1952 and 1958; only the Federal Republic of Germany shows a higher rate of increase (48 per cent), while the average increase of the national product for all E.E C. countries during the same period amounted to 37 per cent. Austria also occupies third place in Europe as to expansion of exports, which in 1952–8 amounted to 81 3 per cent, surpassed only by the Federal Republic of Germany (118·3 per cent), and Italy (83 per cent). The development of prices and the cost of living has also been very favourable. Between 1952 and 1958 the cost of living in Austria increased by 7 per cent, the same as in Switzerland. Over the same period the other European countries recorded rises in the cost of living of between 7·8 and 22·7 per cent.

To this should be added the fact that by tradition the Austrian economy has acquired a great capacity for adjusting itself to changing circumstances. One must bear in mind that within the past thirty years the country has undergone three major changes of structure. The dismantling of the Habsburg Monarchy deprived Austria of important sources of raw materials, of prosperous industries, large markets, and a natural hinterland which provided access to the Adriatic. In the years 1918–30 Austria had to effect the transition from a large-scale to an efficient small-scale economy, which in turn became dependent on the expansion of exports and of tourism in order to achieve a satisfactory balance of payments. The world economic crisis of the 'thirties made this transition extremely difficult. The annexation by Germany in 1938 brought the second big change to the Austrian economy. The country was included in the German plans for rearmament, new industrial complexes developed, and the traditional trading relations degenerated. Lastly,

the rebirth of Austria as a sovereign nation in 1945 presented fresh tasks for her economy. Apart from the reconstruction of the industrial plants destroyed during the war, new markets for exports had to be opened up. After 1918 the share of the Eastern European countries in Austria's foreign trade was more than 33 per cent of the total. After the Iron Curtain came down this was reduced to practically zero, and even now accounts for only about 15 per cent, with small prospects of any notable increase. But just as Austria has succeeded in finding substitutes for the loss of her traditional markets, so too it should be possible for her to counterbalance the changes in the market structure which will result from the recent economic developments in Europe Austria's facility for adjusting to changing circumstances, as well as the present strength of her economy, should suffice to dispel any surviving discomfort she may feel as the thirteenth guest at Europe's table, even if the economic division of Europe into the 'Six' and the 'Seven' should last longer than many on both sides now hope.

GOTTFRIED HEINDL

South West Africa before the United Nations

OVER the past few years, South Africa's affairs have been thoroughly probed and analysed outside her borders, despite her Government's protestations that her racial policies, their causes and their effects, are her own concern alone. The shootings at Sharpeville and Langa in March 1960 sharply focused world opinion on the question of what constitutes a nation's internal affairs, and in what circumstances the world community, individually or collectively, is justified in intervening. Most informed observers outside the Union, and some within, believe the situation in South Africa to have reached a stalemate in which increasingly authoritarian methods will have to be used by the Government to enforce its policies against a growing tide of opposition, European as well as non-European, and that violent explosion is inevitable without

outside pressures of some kind. But this in itself is not sufficient reason, in international law, to justify intervention of any kind by other countries. The Charter of the United Nations allows that international forces may be used to restore order in any situation which represents a threat to international peace. The Union can at least argue that her policies within her borders do not constitute such a threat, any more than do, for example, French policies in Algeria or British policies in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland.

But the problem of South West Africa is of a different order altogether. The International Court of Justice at The Hague has given its opinion that South Africa cannot modify the status of this Mandated Territory without United Nations consent. When, therefore, the question of South West Africa is raised for the fifteenth consecutive year at the General Assembly of the United Nations in September, it is likely to prove one of its most crucial debates. There is at stake not only the future of South West Africa itself but also the status of the United Nations Organization as a body capable of fulfilling its obligations—as well as the whole concept of international accountability originally enshrined in the Mandates system and inherited by the International Trusteeship system.

South West Africa is a territory about the size of France which is bounded on the south and south-east by the Union of South Africa, on the east by the Bechuanaland Protectorate, on the north by Northern Rhodesia and Angola, and on the west by the Atlantic Ocean. Together with Bechuanaland it constitutes a large part of the Union's north-western frontier and western seaboard. In so far as such exists, it forms a natural economic and geographical unit with the Union. During the first World War, South African troops under General Botha invaded South West Africa and captured it from the Germans on behalf of the Allies. Since that time the Union has administered the territory, at first with and later without the blessing of the international community.

The Mandates system of the League of Nations had its roots in world indignation at evidence of the maladministration and atrocities perpetrated in the German and Turkish colonial empires. The result was a decision to regard the colonial possessions of these nations not as the spoils of war, but as 'sacred trusts of civilization' to be administered on behalf of the international community. The clear intention was to restore justice and good government to the inhabitants of these territories until such time as they could govern themselves. Something of the solemnity of

these sentiments is revealed in Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, which reads as follows.

To those colonies which . . . are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world, there should be applied the principle that the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilization, and that securities for the performance of this trust should be embodied in this Covenant.

In South West Africa the administration had been particularly harsh Only 15,000 out of the 80,000 Hereros survived a concerted German campaign to exterminate the tribe after a Herero rebellion Those who remained were left impoverished and divided between South West Africa and Bechuanaland where the Chief and some of his people had taken refuge. Some of the atrocities of the German administration in South West Africa are recorded in a British Government Blue Book.[1]

The five principal Allied and Associated Powers—Britain, France, the United States, Italy, and Japan—had the task of assigning the proposed Mandated territories to the administering authorities. The Mandate over South West Africa was conferred upon 'His Britannic Majesty, to be exercised on his behalf by the Union of South Africa'. As the Mandatory, South Africa agreed to fulfil certain obligations, of which the following are the most important for our purposes:

Article 2. The Mandatory shall promote to the utmost the moral well-being and social progress of the inhabitants of the territory. . .
Article 3 The Mandatory shall see that the slave trade is prohibited and no forced labour is permitted, except for essential public works and services, and then only for adequate remuneration.
Article 4. . . . no military or naval bases shall be established or fortifications erected in the territory.[2]

South Africa was also required to submit annual reports to the Permanent Mandates Commission and to transmit petitions to it from the inhabitants of the territory. During the inter-war period she carried out these obligations, though no petitions were in fact sent to the Commission. The Mandates Commission was an expert, not a political body. its members were appointed for their

[1] *Report on the Natives of South-West Africa and their Treatment by Germany* (Cd 9146), London, H.M.S O , 1918.
[2] Mandate for German South-West Africa (text in League of Nations, *Official Journal*, January/February 1921)

knowledge of problems relevant to the administration of these territories, and they were not responsible to their 'home' Governments. Its decisions required unanimity.

In 1934 South Africa began to press for the incorporation of South West Africa into the Union. Despite her cordial relations with the Mandates Commission (at that time South Africa's intentions were apparently as good as those of any other Mandatory) this was never agreed to, although it was also not dismissed as a possibility. Since the second World War, increasing dissatisfaction with South Africa's administration of the territory, and the growing disparity between progress in South West Africa and that in other African ex-Mandates (subsequently Trusteeship territories), have placed South Africa on the defensive; and the possibility of incorporation with international approval has receded accordingly. A referendum held among the population of South West Africa in 1946 resulted in a large majority in favour of incorporation; but it seems at least likely that the majority of the voters did not fully understand the terms of what they were voting for.[1]

After the war, when the United Nations Organization succeeded the League, the Mandates system was replaced by the International Trusteeship system. Every Mandatory Power except South Africa submitted a trusteeship agreement for those Mandated territories which were not independent, and continued to administer them under the supervision of the General Assembly through the Fourth (Trusteeship) Committee. South West Africa is the only one of the original Mandated territories in Africa not to have achieved or been promised its independence under a democratically elected government.

South Africa has refused to submit a trusteeship agreement for South West Africa on the ground that the lapse of the League implied the nullification of the Mandate, over which the sovereign rights, she claims, remain with South Africa. She refuses to accept the United Nations as the second party to her agreement over South West Africa; thus, she argues, the League having died, there is now no longer a second party to the agreement. She maintains also that the United Nations cannot claim to have succeeded the League as guardian of the Mandate, since the supervisory procedures differ from those of the Mandates Commission Both the General Assembly and the Trusteeship Committee are political

[1] See 'The International Status of South West Africa', by Michael Scott *International Affairs*, July 1958).

bodies composed of representatives of governments, and both may adopt resolutions by a two-thirds majority.

In 1947 the Union Government submitted an annual report to the United Nations, while firmly maintaining that she was not legally obliged to do so. The report was pronounced unsatisfactory, and in 1949, after the defeat of General Smuts's Government, South Africa declared her intention 'in the interests of administration' to discontinue reports, since these, she said, were being used as propaganda against the Government of the Union. Since then she has consistently refused either to submit annual reports or to transmit petitions from the inhabitants of the territory In 1953 the General Assembly set up an Ad Hoc (now a permanent) Committee on South West Africa to report annually on the administration of South West Africa, in lieu of reports by South Africa South Africa has refused to co-operate in any way with this committee Its members have not been given access to the territory, and its reports are based upon official government publications and evidence from petitioners.

In 1958 South Africa departed from her principle not to negotiate with the United Nations. She agreed to discussions with a three-man Good Offices Committee, which was set up by the General Assembly to negotiate with South Africa 'an international status' for the territory. The Committee reported that the only suggestion involving the United Nations which the Union Government was prepared to consider was partition of the territory, the southern and central portion to be incorporated into the Union, the northern part to become a Trust territory administered by South Africa under the International Trusteeship system. This suggestion was rejected by the Trusteeship Committee on the ground that it implied a violation of the geographical integrity of the territory without the consent of its inhabitants. It was further pointed out that partition would not only give moral support to South Africa's *apartheid* policies in the territories; in a very practical way, it would also help her to implement them Petitioners to the Trusteeship Committee declared themselves strongly opposed to partition, and the idea was not pursued. The negotiations of the Good Offices Committee in 1959 produced no results.

So much for the negotiations. Despite her refusal to submit to supervision by the United Nations, South Africa claims to administer South West Africa in the spirit of the Mandate. But the sixth Report of the Committee on South West Africa, which was

submitted last year, concluded that 'the apparent intention of the Mandatory Power to continue to administer the Territory represents a situation contrary to the Mandates system, the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.'[1]

This is hardly surprising when it is considered that South Africa's administration of South West Africa is in almost all respects identical with that of the Union itself Article 2 of the Mandate states that 'the Mandatory has full powers of administration and legislation over the territory subject to the present Mandate, and may apply the laws of the Union of South Africa to the territory.' The Territorial Assembly of South West Africa retains the right to order its own fiscal policies, but in all other respects its authority is very much the same as that of a Provincial Council in South Africa The executive head of the territory is an administrator appointed by the Union Minister of the Interior.

In 1949 the South African Parliament was expanded to receive six members of its House of Assembly and two Senators, all of whom are elected by the European voters of South West Africa. Two further Senators are nominated by the Governor-General, one of them 'mainly on the ground of his thorough acquaintance with the reasonable wants and wishes of the coloured races of the territory'. This one nominee apart, non-Europeans are not represented in the Union Parliament, in the Territorial Assembly, or in the urban councils, nor may they stand for election to any of these representative bodies The value to them of their representation through a nominated Senator may be judged from the following extract from a speech made in the Union Senate by Dr Vedder, representative of South West Africa's non-Europeans:

In South West Africa the foundations of apartheid were laid fifty years ago. . . We already have the institution of reserves, and the Union government has continued along these lines. The German government started this. . . The mixing between Europeans and non-Europeans has since 1918 been prohibited by law. . . It is obvious that upon working days Europeans and Natives have to work together, but at 9 o'clock at curfew all the Natives have to be in their locations and are not seen in the town after this time unless they have a permit. . . In South West Africa we have the only country in the world where apartheid has been exercised in an increasing degree for fifty years.[2]

[1] U N. *General Assembly Official Records*, 14th Session, Supplement No 12, p 33

[2] *Hansard* (South Africa), Senate, 28 May 1956.

Since 1954 the Union Department of Bantu Administration has been responsible for the administration of African affairs in South West Africa Africans are required to carry passes, and they may not move about the country without official permission, seek work in an urban area without special qualifications, take part in trade union activities, or hold political meetings without permission Even residence in one of the 'Reserves' requires a permit. In brief, non-Europeans in South West Africa have no automatic right to reside or work anywhere in the territory, none of the elementary rights to freedom of speech, movement, or assembly normally assumed in democratic countries, and no voice whatever in their own government

The total population of this large and prosperous territory is only about 540,000, of whom 66,000 are Europeans, 21,000 are people of mixed race, and 432,000 are Africans Its wealth is derived largely from minerals, mainly diamonds and base metals, and concessions have been granted for oil prospecting There is very little secondary industry, but Persian lamb pelts, fish, and dairy products each contribute substantially to a rapidly expanding economy. The wealth of South West Africa may well be a significant factor in South Africa's refusal to concede international rights over it

Both the people and the wealth of South West Africa are unevenly distributed over its area. For Europeans the standard of living is, on an average, even higher than that in South Africa, but the average wage for an African worker in the capital of Windhoek is only £8 a month.

In the far north of the territory live the Ovambo and the Okavango tribes which number over 270,000 people In these 'Reserves' local administration is left largely to the traditional tribal authorities: in the rest of the territory, known as the Police Zone, European local administration and policing prevail. Ovamboland and Okavangoland contain, potentially, some of the richest farming lands in South West Africa, but development such as irrigation and damming has not been undertaken, and many of the Ovambo people have left the reserve in search of employment in the mines. The central and southern areas contain all the mineral wealth of the territory, the two ports of Walvis Bay and Swakopmund, and most of the developed farming lands. European settlement is concentrated round the mining areas, the capital of Windhoek, the ports, and scattered market towns. African tribes

other than the Ovambo live in eight separate demarcated 'Reserves' within the Police Zone.

The Hereros have been associated more than any other tribe with the African protest against their European rulers. They are a proud and intelligent people whose traditional home was in the southern areas of the territory. They were therefore the first to come in contact with the German missionaries, teachers, and rulers, and to imbibe the Christianity and the education which were offered to them. Following the war with their German rulers, the tribe is now divided: some 50,000 live in South West Africa and about 11,000 in Bechuanaland, but owing to their tribal coherence the two sections have remained in close contact with each other.

Under the leadership of Chief Hosea Kutako of the Hereros, and with the growing support of the Namas, Bergdamaras, and Ovambo tribes, the South West Africa National Union has been established to channel the protests of the non-white population of the territory. It is not a revolutionary movement or even a nationalist one in the militant sense in which the term is usually understood. Chief Hosea Kutako himself is an elderly, traditionalist leader, who speaks no English, preaches non-violent resistance, and is a staunch Christian Whereas the hallmark of most African nationalist movements is generally the demand for voting rights, the chief articulated grievance of the Hereros, the most 'rebellious' of the South West African tribes, has been the removal of their lands. Since the South African Government became responsible for the territory, more land has been taken from the Africans for settling white immigrants than was taken during the entire period of the German administration. Finally, it should be said of African 'nationalism' in South West Africa that it is directed almost entirely to the United Nations, in the form of constant petitions. It is to the General Assembly that the Africans in South West Africa look for a just and humane determination of the future of the territory.

European politics in South West Africa largely reflect political divisions in South Africa. About one-third of the 66,000 Europeans are Germans, about half Afrikaners, and the rest English. The Germans form a culturally cohesive community, whose political sympathies have always been with the Nationalist Party of South Africa. This is partly because some of their leaders were interned during the war by the United Party Government of General

Smuts for sympathies with the Nazi cause, and this has alienated them from the United South West Africa Party, which is allied with the United Party of South Africa. All of the territory's nine elected members of Parliament were returned as Nationalists, although one, Mr J P du Plessis Basson, was recently expelled from his party caucus. Despite the fact that it has not been able to win a seat, the United South West Africa Party has substantial support in the territory: in the last elections in 1958 it polled 11,568 votes to the Nationalist Party's 16,388.

The chief policy difference between the two parties lies in their approach to the territory's incorporation into the Union and to Afrikaner nationalism. The Nationalist Party has always favoured incorporation; although on this issue they lack the whole-hearted support of the German community which dislikes the idea of becoming a tiny minority within a greater Union of South Africa But they do not actively oppose the Nationalist Party on this issue The United South West Africa Party is opposed to incorporation, it recognizes the existence of the Mandate, but only for the purpose of proposing its formal termination and the establishment of an independent South West Africa separate from South Africa. It dislikes the exclusive Afrikaner nationalism of the Nationalist Party

On race policy the differences between the two parties are less fundamental. The United South West Africa Party is opposed to the doctrinaire application of *apartheid*, which sometimes threatens the economic interests of its members and, it argues, produces 'unnecessary' bitterness among non-Europeans. But it would be wrong to assume that a fundamental change in race policy would gain any significant support among the present electorate of South West Africa, and no political party proposes any effective change in the composition of the electorate.

The question therefore arises, how can the United Nations fulfil its obligations towards the inhabitants of South West Africa? The General Assembly has already sought and obtained from the International Court an advisory opinion (in 1950) and two subsidiary opinions (in 1955 and 1956) on the international status of South West Africa. The gist of its conclusions are given as follows in the sixth report of the Committee on South West Africa:

> The obligations of the Mandatory continue unimpaired with this difference, that the supervisory functions exercised by the Council of the League of Nations are now to be exercised by the United Nations.[1]

[1] U.N, *G A O R.*, 14th Session, Supplement No 12, p 5.

By a small majority the Court found that South Africa is not legally obliged to submit a Trusteeship agreement for South West Africa But it also declared that the Union is not entitled to alter, unilaterally, the international status of the territory; and that she is obliged to submit annual reports of her administration, and to transmit petitions from the inhabitants of South West Africa. South Africa has consistently refused to comply with this decision of the Court given in 1950.

In two subsidiary opinions of 1955 and 1956, the Court declared the present procedures of the Trusteeship Committee and the General Assembly to approximate closely enough to those of the Mandates Commission for them to qualify as legitimate successors of the Commission Again, these opinions did not alter South Africa's attitude. She rests on the legal fact that since these decisions of the Court are advisory opinions, they are not binding upon her.

South Africa having failed to respond both to the moral obligation to regard an opinion of the Court and to negotiations offered by the United Nations, it is now proposed to invoke the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court in a contentious proceeding against her Article 7 of the Mandate agreement states that:

> The Mandatory agrees that if any dispute whatever shall arise between the Mandatory and another member of the League of Nations relating to the application or the interpretation of the provisions of the Mandate, such dispute, if it cannot be settled by negotiation, shall be submitted to the Permanent Court of International Justice. . .

In its 1950 opinion the International Court declared that under this Article (as well as under Article 37 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice[1]) South Africa is subject to its compulsory jurisdiction in relation to South West Africa.

At the Conference of Independent African States held in Addis Ababa in June 1960, it was announced that the Governments of Liberia and Ethiopia, both former members of the League of Nations, intend to institute contentious proceedings against South Africa over her administration of South West Africa. If these proceedings succeed, and if South Africa refuses to comply with the Court's judgement, the other party (Liberia and/or Ethiopia) has recourse to the Security Council for its enforcement of the decision.

[1] The effect of Article 37 of the Court's Statute is simply to substitute the International Court of Justice for the now defunct Permanent Court of International Justice.

There are three main difficulties involved in this approach. First, it is likely to take several years, if we are to judge by previous proceedings of this nature. Secondly, it is not altogether clear how far the Court's jurisdiction extends under Article 7. South Africa could at least argue that in law neither Liberia nor Ethiopia, as individual States, has a dispute with her over South West Africa, since it was the League of Nations as a body, and not its members as individual States, which was the second party to the Mandate agreement. Whether or not South Africa could sustain such a case, she would probably use it; and in any event the outcome of the case would depend upon what the Court declared to be the nature of the dispute between South Africa and the other party. In other words, there are a number of jurisdictional points which are still obscure, and which, at best, would delay the Court's judgement and, at worst, might produce a limited or uncertain judgement. Thirdly, the enforcement of the judgement would require a political decision by members of the Security Council no less because it is a binding judgement than if it took the form of an advisory opinion. On the other hand, of course, such a political decision may be more likely to follow a binding judgement than an advisory opinion.

It might therefore expedite the whole process if the General Assembly were simply to ask the Court for another advisory opinion, this time concerning not the status of the territory, which has already been defined, but the action which the United Nations is entitled to take in view of South Africa's refusal to fulfil her obligations in international law. The General Assembly might, for instance, ask the Court for a ruling as to whether South Africa is in breach of the Mandate agreement by virtue of her administration and her refusal to submit to international supervision; and if so, whether this breach justifies the revocation of the Mandate by the United Nations. A clear answer from the Court on these issues would probably provide as good a legal justification for revoking the Mandate, or for ensuring its proper fulfilment, as would a binding judgement. It must be remembered that even a binding judgement is not automatically enforceable, but requires a composite political decision by members of the United Nations.

The outcome of any such course of action depends very much upon Britain's attitude at the United Nations. In the past she has supported South Africa, largely on the ground that the supervisory procedures of the United Nations are not sufficiently close

to those of the Mandates Commission to oblige South Africa to submit to them. On the other hand, in April of this year Britain abstained from the vote in the Security Council on South Africa's conduct at Sharpeville and Langa; and this might presage a change in her international approach to South Africa. Mr Macmillan's speech in Cape Town on 3 February 1960 and his part in the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference this year also suggest that the British Government might be unwilling to continue supporting South Africa unconditionally in international affairs.

If this inference is correct, South Africa will find herself with no powerful support at the United Nations. This in itself is likely to encourage a more flexible approach on her part: as long as she could rely on British support, South Africa has felt herself strong enough to risk defying the United Nations. At the last session of the United Nations in October 1959, the Union delegate showed signs of a willingness to negotiate which could only arise from a recognition of the gravity of South Africa's increasing isolation. Settlement by negotiation is clearly preferable to a head-on clash with the international community. It is just conceivable that South Africa will be induced to negotiate if there is no other alternative open to her. It is extremely unlikely if she can expect continued support from Britain at the United Nations.

M. R.

Political Forces in Venezuela

THE BACKGROUND

POLITICS in contemporary Venezuela centre around a power struggle between two major groups of forces. One represents the traditional order—the land barons, the politically inclined military officers, the large merchants, the conservative clergy—all those élite elements that dominated the Republic from the beginnings of nationhood down to the end of the second World War. They represent the *status quo*. Their outlook is static. They resist change. The other represents the masses of the people—the white-collar workers, organized labour, the landless peasantry—all those popular ele-

ments aspiring to a better life. The latter is a revolutionary force. It proposes fundamental reform. It demands popular rule, redistribution of wealth, new class alignments. Thus the great political struggle between the two is fraught with far-reaching economic and social issues. Venezuela today is in the throes of a painful process of revolutionary transformation. The upheaval is still in the early stages.

Venezuela came into existence as an independent State in 1830 when the rich landowners encouraged the military to declare independence from Gran Colombia. Though the objectives of the landowners and the army officers were dissimilar, they were not in conflict. For the rural aristocracy did not have political aspirations They merely wished to perpetuate the manorial socio-economic system that had characterized the colonial era. So long as their wealth, properties, privileges, and status were preserved, they preferred to eschew political responsibility.

Into the political vacuum created by the disappearance of Spanish royal authority, then, there quite naturally moved the warrior element that had led the revolutionary forces to victory over Spain Politics, to the army leaders, were viewed as opportunities to obtain power, wealth, and social prestige. Though the competing military politicians kept nineteenth-century Venezuelan political processes in turmoil, the feudal character of the socio-economic structure was not seriously disturbed. The *caudillos* displayed little inclination towards improving the lot of the poverty-stricken, politically apathetic, and illiterate masses; instead they sought to work within the existing system, using their political offices—as did, for example, Antonio Guzmán Blanco (1870–88) and Juan Vicente Gómez (1908–35)—to amass great fortunes and become a part of the landed élite themselves.

For more than a century, this military/land-baron diarchy held complete political sway. Closely associated with them, in the beginning, was the Catholic Church hierarchy. As in colonial times, the Church was a wealthy corporate institution with an extremely conservative socio-political outlook. Until crushed by Guzmán Blanco's anti-clericalism in the late nineteenth century, the Church connived with, and supported, the landed and military oligarchs to preserve the *status quo*.

Until the October 1945 revolution, political power in Venezuela had been exercised by various regional *caudillos* who successively seized control of the capital. The ruling military clique was gener-

y allied with the landed gentry, for the principal aims of both oups were the maintenance of order and the preservation of the *itus quo.*

For a generation prior to 1945, however, the Venezuelan economy d society had been undergoing a fundamental transformation ich rendered political control by the generals and the land barons ore and more anachronistic. It was the development of the oil dustry in the 1920s that marked the beginning of the end of the iditional order. The oil boom forced the hitherto rural-oriented onomy of Venezuela to give way to industrialization and urbani- tion An economy that was almost exclusively agricultural in 1920 d been transformed by 1945 into one that was both industrial and ricultural.

These drastic economic changes were major causes—and also rtial effects—of profound social changes The traditional ruling ments began to be challenged as emerging new social groups— iour and the middle class—started to reshape the Venezuelan vironment. The absorbing force of oil development and the con- quent meteoric growth of cities such as Caracas and Maracaibo cked in labour from the farms and stimulated the rapid growth of ddle-class and labour groups. Thus Venezuelan society no longer nsisted solely of an élite corps of generals and land barons, an ignificant professional and commercial middle class, and a great iss of illiterate rural peons. By the time of the second World War ere had begun to appear industrial entrepreneurs and small pitalists, larger professional groups, and large bodies of literate ge-earners in the cities and the oil fields. It was these new urban- ented and industry-oriented groups which brought pressures to ir for fundamental political change.

The chief political vehicle for these new groups was the Acción mocrática (A.D.) party, the labour-leftist reform organization ich first campaigned for universal suffrage, an end to political e by the military, genuine representative government, more id industrialization, agrarian reform, more public health facili- s, more welfare measures, and universal education.

Despite the sweeping economic and social changes and the wth of a large popular opposition party, traditionalist elements re able to resist the mounting popular pressures until 1945. The ernational crisis produced by the World War had helped to eze the Isaias Medina regime (1941–5) in power so long as the urity of the hemisphere was threatened. But the war also pro-

duced pressures that made the maintenance of the *status quo* progressively more difficult. As economic development and social change intensified under the war-time stimulus, the pressures upon the anachronistic political system became unbearable Civilian foes of the *status quo* were joined by military ones, young officers restless under a static armed forces organization that offered little opportunity for change and advancement. The upshot of this alliance between the A.D. and the junior officers was the revolution of October 1945, an event which marked the attainment, for the first time, of political power by the Venezuelan people. A struggle for power between the traditionalists and the social revolutionary forces has raged ever since

Acción Democrática, which represented Venezuela's hitherto ignored lower and middle income groups, quickly launched a broad programme of fundamental reforms. Under the aegis of the party's political and intellectual leader, Rómulo Betancourt, taxes on the foreign oil companies and the larger Venezuelan businesses were sharply increased; labour was encouraged to become organized, and its wages and welfare benefits were improved, a thorough reorganization of the educational system was begun with a view to reducing illiteracy; economic development and diversification programmes were set in motion; and a blueprint for land reform was drawn up. To get a verdict on its programme, the A D went to the people After providing for universal suffrage, in the liberal democratic Constitution of 1947, it selected as its candidate for the Presidency the novelist Rómulo Gallegos, and elected him by an overwhelming majority.

But the young officers who had launched the popular-liberalizing revolution of 1945 began, after 1947, to become dissatisfied with the A.D.'s radical programme. After several attempts had failed, a *coup d'état* succeeded in November 1948 Acción Democrática was ousted and outlawed, and the army once more took charge of the government. They decided to halt the political and social revolution and resume their long tradition of exclusive domination of Venezuela's politics. A military junta ruled until 1953, when Colonel Marcos Pérez Jiménez, after staging a notorious electoral farce which clearly demonstrated popular antipathy to him, assumed the office of President. For the next five years he ruled as an absolutist military dictator. The political reforms introduced by the A.D disappeared. The material gains achieved by the lower and middle income groups were preserved, but few new ones were introduced.

[n January 1958 the dictatorship, which appeared firmly en-
nched, succumbed with surprising ease to naval and air force
position backed by the populace. A revolutionary junta then ar-
iged for free elections, which were won in late 1958 by Acción
mocrática. Early in 1959 Betancourt was inaugurated as Presi-
it He is now reactivating the long-range political, economic, and
ial reform programme which he had initiated in 1945.
The political situation in Venezuela today can perhaps best be
derstood by a consideration of the various components that make
the whole power complex.

THE LANDOWNERS

The large landowners account for only 2 per cent of the rural
ulation, yet they own 75 per cent of the country's arable land.
le to many of their estates dates from the colonial era So power-
has been this propertied element that throughout Venezuela's
ire history it has been impossible to impose any kind of tax on
d
The notion that the landed oligarchy ought to share some of their
nmon holdings with the 350,000 landless peasant families was
t fostered by a Venezuelan Government in the years 1945–8.
en though it was proposed that only idle or ill-utilized lands
uld be distributed, and that the owners should be justly com-
isated, the landed oligarchy nevertheless bitterly resisted land
orm at every turn. It was probably more than coincidental that
military *coup* against the A.D. in November 1948 occurred
y soon after the passage of an agrarian reform law and before this
could be implemented. It has been a traditional tactic of the
ded élite to support the opposition to any government that pro-
es to tax or, more recently, to expropriate their lands.
A new agrarian reform law, very similar to the law of 1948, came
) effect on 5 March 1960. The landowners are, in general, de-
mined to resist implementation of the law by every means at
ir disposal. By themselves, they are so small in numbers that they
exert little effective legal political pressure. Their main hope is
in to provoke the armed forces to intervene and oust the present
vernment. Of the three components of the traditional order, this
dholding element is the most adamant in its attachment to the
system and in its resistance to change. It has refused to com-
mise in any way with the new revolutionary forces that are now
mpting to remake the Venezuelan economy and society.

THE ARMED FORCES

Though the bulk of the nation's real estate is controlled by a very small minority of the population, an even smaller group, that of the army officers, which today numbers less than two thousand, has traditionally dominated the country's politics. 'Venezuela is a barracks,' said its founder, General Simón Bolivar at the time of independence, and it remained a barracks for more than a century The history of Venezuela can almost be told in the lives of its military dictators.

Military rule began with the wars for independence. The soldiers who created the nation insisted on ruling it. The few nineteenth-century attempts of civilians to exert political influence were short-lived, as the army arrogated to itself a governing monopoly. In the eyes of the military, civilian rule was deemed synonymous with political irresponsibility and administrative incompetence

During the early nineteenth century this military intolerance of civilian political control did not represent selfish praetorianism The army at first considered that its role lay in filling a political vacuum until such time as responsible civilian parties emerged. But with the passage of time and the dying-off of the revolutionary heroes, the patriotism characteristic of early military rulers such as Simón Bolivar and José Antonio Páez began to wane By the middle of the nineteenth century, Venezuelan politics were virtually reduced to a battle between competing factions of the armed forces. Particularly in the latter half of the nineteenth century, the caste spirit of the military became firmly imbedded, and the armed forces became an essentially predatory institution. Their internecine struggle was little more than a fight for control of the nation's treasury. During the twentieth century the military caste insisted on exclusive political control right down to the October 1945 revolution. Subsequently they merely shared control with the A.D for three years and then restored their traditional political monopoly in the decade 1948–58.

Since February 1959, for the first time in Venezuela's history, except for brief periods of less than a year's duration, there has been civilian government in Venezuela. This in no sense means that civilian forces have come to dominate the military, nor that they are at liberty to take actions which might adversely affect the interests of the armed forces. Such tactics led to the overthrow of the A.D. in 1948; the armed forces simply refused to accept either a reduction in status to that of a mere police force or the building up of a civilian

militia as a counterpoise to the regular army. Also, they interpreted the A.D.'s vigorous efforts to de-politicize the army as little more than a veiled attempt to subvert the armed forces.

Well aware of the military's power to oust him, President Betancourt is treating the armed forces with great caution and respect. He has deliberately over-emphasized the 'important' military role which the army (10,000 strong), the navy (2,500), and the air force (5,000) exercise in protecting the nation's boundaries and preserving order. He is not attempting to develop counterpoises to the overwhelming ultimate political power of the military.

A sort of gentleman's understanding appears to exist. The administration is allowing the armed forces to function as a virtually autonomous official institution. True, the President may call upon the military to preserve internal order, but where institutional military matters are concerned the civilian authorities have no control. The military's representative in the Cabinet, the Defence Minister, sees to it that the armed forces' customary generous share of the national Budget is not revised downward. It is a price the civilian authorities must pay to ensure their own tenure in office.

Of course there is no guarantee that the military will not again suddenly arrogate to itself the privilege of ruling Venezuela. That habits a century and a half old cannot be broken overnight was revealed during President Betancourt's first year in office when several conspiracies had to be quelled. It appears that the Venezuelan military are torn in several directions. One group of officers apparently wants to retain the military's traditionally dominant role in politics in order to resist further labour-leftist evolution, or at least slow it down. A second group wants to leave politics to the civilians. Some members of this group are devoted professionals; others, disillusioned over the failure of Pérez Jiménez to resolve major national problems, particularly the social crisis, simply feel that this is a time to stay on the sidelines. Still a third group actively identifies itself with the reform programme of the Betancourt administration and feels itself guardian of the cause of social and economic revolution.

Which group dominates the military at any given time depends largely upon external pressures operating upon the armed forces. Obviously the traditionalist elements gain strength as political tensions increase, whether it be due to landlord resistance to agrarian reform or to a breakdown of the present coalition Government. Time, however, appears to be on the side of the professionalist ele-

ments and those who think it essential for the armed forces to reach a *modus vivendi* with the new order rather than bow to the forces of tradition. If Rómulo Betancourt can use sufficient skill and moderation to carry out his reform programme while at the same time keeping the officers out of the presidential palace to the end of his constitutional term of office, he will have made an unprecedented first important step in helping to rid the nation of the long curse of militarism. Nearly everywhere else in Latin America the day of the military politician appears to be passing. Several more years of uninterrupted constitutional government in Venezuela will do much to initiate the establishment of a civilian tradition there.

THE CHURCH

Of the three traditionalist groups, the Catholic Church has probably gone furthest in accommodating itself to the revolutionary trends. The political role of the Church has varied throughout Venezuela's history. Clerical influence in government has never been very strong. From the beginning the right of patronage has belonged to the State. Although the Catholic religion was never made the State religion in independent Venezuela, until the middle of the nineteenth century the higher clergy was closely associated with the governing conservative oligarchy and in addition played a dominant, nearly exclusive, role in the educational system.

The coming to power of the Liberal oligarchy in the latter half of the nineteenth century ushered in a period of anti-clericalism. In the 1850s, foreign priests were barred, marriage became a civil ceremony, and Protestant religious cults were encouraged. Anti-clericalism reached its most extreme phase under Dictator Antonio Guzmán Blanco. Under this regime (1870–88), the political power of the Catholic Church was all but destroyed. The Church in Venezuela never fully recovered from the ferocious attacks he made upon its wealth, its position in education, and its spiritual and moral influence over the people.

Though some *rapprochement* between Church and State began to occur at the turn of the century, Guzmán Blanco's spate of anti-clerical legislation (freedom of worship, civil registry, civil marriage, prohibition of convents and monasteries, prohibition of religious ceremonies outside church buildings) was not removed from the statute books by Venezuela's twentieth-century rulers. Both Cipriano Castro (1899–1908) and Gómez (1908–35) maintained an air of correctness, but coolness, towards the Church, and although

in recognition of its patronage obligations, the State subsidized the Church (mostly in the form of paying clergymen's salaries), it kept the subsidy deliberately low, thus undercutting the strength of the Church and worsening the calibre of the priesthood.

Since 1935 the Church has been making a comeback. Since Gómez's removal of property-holding restrictions it has become gradually more wealthy and therefore more independent of the State. Though the public education system has absorbed the vast majority of students, parochial schools, supported wholly by tuition fees and Church grants, have remained important and vigorous institutions.

The main reason for the political comeback of the Church, however, has been its active intervention in the country's developing social crisis. Immediately after the second World War, the influence of prominent Catholic laymen was apparent in the founding of the COPEI (*Comité Popular Electoral Independiente*) party, which evolved into a sort of Christian socialist organization with a strong interest in the welfare of the people. Also, the Church hierarchy itself, by virtue of its criticism of tyranny, administrative irresponsibility, and maldistribution of wealth, played an important role in bringing the Pérez Jiménez dictatorship to an end. This clerical identification with the rising expectations of the Venezuelan masses is in turn strengthening the spiritual and moral influence of the Church.

THE UNIVERSITY STUDENTS

One of the principal catalysts in the Venezuelan political process is the university students. They have been traditionally active in the country's politics. The autonomous status of the universities has afforded the students special licence to participate freely in politics, particularly in revolutionary activities.

In the early nineteenth century, student agitation centred around demands for educational reform, particularly in the universities. In the latter half of the nineteenth century university students became the self-appointed repositories of liberal democratic ideals. They were usually found in the forefront in resisting political repression, in fighting for individual liberties and constitutional rights. In the twentieth century they became imbued with a social conscience as well, as they began to learn about socialism and Marxism.

Dictators might attempt to crush them, as did Guzmán Blanco, Gómez, and Pérez Jiménez, but they would always rise again. True,

student leaders would graduate, settle down, and become increasingly conservative, but there was always a new generation.

It was primarily at the universities, of course, that fledgling civilian politicians received their indoctrination. For example, Rómulo Betancourt, Jovito Villalba, and Gustavo Machado, leaders respectively of the A.D., Democratic Republican Union (U.R.D), and Communist parties, were all student leaders of the 'generation of 1928' which fought so bitterly against the Gómez tyranny.

Central University in Caracas is the headquarters for student political action. From here are directed several nation-wide student political action groups, each affiliated with one of the various Venezuelan party organizations. The Communists tend to be much stronger in the universities than on the national party level

The effectiveness of the students in politics is well illustrated by their key role in bringing the Pérez Jiménez dictatorship to an end Following Pérez Jiménez's destruction in 1952 of the long-cherished traditional autonomy of the universities, the students went into uncompromising opposition. In 1955 they created a University Front to overthrow the dictatorship. They went on strike against tyranny, demonstrated in the streets, and during 1957 worked closely with the underground Patriotic Junta, which represented all the political parties. In the last days of the dictatorship they led the street mobs

With the restoration of constitutional government the universities have demanded, and received, restoration of their autonomous status. Student political activity, though again non-violent, is still intense. The professorial element is also heavily inclined towards partisan politics.

LABOUR AND THE MIDDLE SECTORS

Of the new political pressure groups that have emerged in Venezuela since the war, organized labour is the largest, most cohesive, and therefore the most powerful. Labour probably accounted for more than half of the 2½ million votes cast in the December 1958 elections, and the majority of these votes went to the victorious A.D party. The congressional seats won by the Communists were also largely accounted for by the labour vote.

Labour is a new, young force that did not begin to have weight in the political balance until the early 1940s. It backed the October 1945 revolution, but as a political counterpoise to the armed forces it proved ineffective in the revolution of November 1948. Whether

it is today any better equipped to resist political intervention by the military is doubtful.

The effectiveness of labour as an independent pressure group is materially reduced by its close association, via the trade unions, with the A D. and Communist parties, and by the paternalistic attitude of the Government—though this appears to be declining somewhat —towards the labour movement as a whole.

Since 1945 various middle groups in Venezuela's society have organized themselves, principally along occupational lines, to exert their influence upon the government and the political parties. The strongest and most influential of such groups are the domestic industrialists (Federación de Cámaras de Industria), the agricultural producers (Associación de Productores), and the merchants (Associación de Comercio). The bankers, the engineers, and the lawyers have also combined in associations to form pressure groups. The power of these middle sectors, a heterogeneous conglomeration of unrelated occupational groups, is however weakened by a notable lack of common purposes and ideals.

POLITICAL PARTIES

The channels of legal, non-violent action for the foregoing groups are limited to three major political parties—A.D., U.R.D., and the Christian Socialists (COPEI) Since all of them are left-of-centre, favour land reform, and oppose military political intervention, two of the three traditionalist elements (the large landholders and the army officers) can only work outside the existing political system, and, incidentally, outside the law. The Church has been able to work through COPEI. Of the three major parties, U.R.D. is the most radical and revolutionary, COPEI the most moderate. The ruling A.D. party, though by no means centrist, lies somewhere between the two. It is reform-minded, socialistic, and revolutionary.

Though political parties are becoming institutionalized, the tradition of personalism is still strong in Venezuela. The party leaders still have immense personal power. Generally, they are able to impose their will and ideas with little difficulty or question. Today, the leader of the majority A.D. party is also President of the Republic. As Head of the State, his personal, executive powers dwarf those of the legislative and judicial branches of government.

EDWIN LIEUWEN

The author has just completed a study on Venezuela in the Chatham House Latin American Information Series It is hoped that this will be published by the Oxford University Press during 1961

Change of Scene in Algeria

WHATEVER the outcome may be, the recent visit to France of two emissaries of the G.P R.A. (the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic) presents a suitable occasion to review the course of the Algerian rising. The meetings behind closed doors which took place in the Melun *mairie* from 25 to 29 June, and the subsequent suspension of negotiations, can be regarded as an interlude before the rising of the curtain on the third, and it may be hoped final, act of the Franco-Algerian drama.

ACT I: FROM THE RISING TO THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT

The first act covered events from the outbreak of the rising on 1 November 1954 until the proclamation of a 'Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic' on 19 September 1958, a little less than four years later. In this act the Muslims were the protagonists The spectators witnessed the growth of Algerian national sentiment The amorphous mass which had long lost all faith in existing political groups responded with increasing enthusiasm to the stimulus of a resistance movement which, though long-prepared, consisted at first of no more than five hundred men armed largely with shot-guns National sentiment became coherent and crystallized Eighteen months later, by the spring of 1956, almost all Muslim intellectuals and former leaders were joining the movement which had taken the name of the Front of National Liberation (F L N.) The only notable exception was the old leader, Missali Hadj, with part of his followers. But though these refused to sink their individuality in the new national organization and preferred to form a group of their own, the Mouvement National Algérien (M.N A), they took a similar line and organized a *maquis* of their own in central Algeria. By degrees an underground administration was established and the insurgent writ ran unquestioned in large stretches of the less accessible countryside. A system of levies, enforced by summary punishments and if necessary by executions, provided funds F.L.N. representatives opened offices in all the world's more important capitals. Within the country, this process reached a climax in 1957; in the following year the seal was set on it by the proclamation of a provisional government in exile. This was set up with the approval of the Tunisian and Moroccan Governments, and was soon recognized by all Arab States and a few others.

Throughout this period French actions were a response to Muslim initiatives and followed traditional lines. Police and military repression was accompanied by the prospect of elections for some unspecified body and purpose, and by vague promises of a better time to come. A new Governor-General, Jacques Soustelle, reputedly liberal, was appointed and received with traditional suspicion by the European Algerians. A year later he had gone through a transformation which was equally traditional and left office as the most ardent champion of *Algérie Française*, the bitter opponent of Algerian nationalism, and the idol of the settlers. Guy Mollet, the Socialist Premier, brought into power on a programme of peace in Algeria, very soon underwent a similar transformation as the result of a visit to Algeria on 7 February 1956, during which he was greeted by his compatriots with catcalls and a bombardment of tomatoes. On returning to France he dispatched an army of 500,000 men to restore order and appointed Robert Lacoste as Resident Minister.

During all these, strictly conventional, proceedings, an old idea was tentatively taken up As long ago as 1865, Napoleon III had stated that France could only hope to retain Algeria indefinitely if she made the Algerians so much better off than other Arabs that the latter would actually envy them their position. The altruistic efforts and the expense which such a task would involve, combined with the strong objections of the settlers, always prevented any serious effort being made to implement such a project. It proved easier to tranquilize public opinion by issuing glossy pamphlets filled with misleading statistics to prove that Algerian Muslims were already incomparably better off than other Arabs. This propaganda was successful in deceiving French and other foreign observers. The rising of the Muslims (who had not been deceived) came therefore as a shattering shock to those who had regarded Algeria as 'an unshakable rock, under the French flag, from end to end' (as the French expert Robert Montagne wrote in 1953) It was suddenly realized that Algeria and the French Union of which it was the centrepiece were in imminent peril.

Something had to be done. Inspired by Germaine Tillion and other writers in touch with Muslim realities, first Jacques Soustelle and then Robert Lacoste gave the lie direct to the glossy pamphlets. Speaking in the Algerian Assembly on 21 February 1956 the newly appointed Minister Resident stated that in Algeria 'five million people live with the utmost precariousness on an average income

which . . . does not exceed 16,000 francs [say £14] per head per year'—an average income less than half that estimated for the Egyptian fellah, or two-thirds of that for the Indian peasant. Efforts were to be made at once to bring about some improvement The previous three departments were increased to twelve. A certain distribution of land to Muslim cultivators was promised; the number of schools would be increased, and the introduction of Muslims into the administration accelerated In order to restore contact with the people, Special Administrative Sectors (S.A.S.) were created and staffed with selected officers familiar with the local language and accustomed to handling Muslims.

Neither the measures nor the presentation of them was sufficiently spectacular to have any effect on Muslim opinion. The projects themselves, however, were to develop greatly later on and to act as a major salve to the now troubled French conscience. They made it possible to maintain that whatever the cause of Muslim Algerian pauperization might have been, it was now the duty of France, indeed a great act of altruism on her part, to remain in Algeria, since she and she only had the knowledge, and was willing to produce the funds, necessary to create a prosperous Muslim people. Army officers, at first highly suspicious of any recognition of Muslim grievances, were gradually won over This was partly due to genuine idealism, particularly among the S.A.S. officers, and partly to political calculation. In Indo-China they had seen how a people who had been subjected to suitable indoctrination would accept the complete loss of political rights for the sake of the better material conditions which the regime promised to create. Side by side with the reforms, therefore, a psychological action service was set up. This, however, proved totally ineffective; for it ignored the fact that the driving force in Indo-China had been provided by native leaders.

By the time the curtain fell at the close of the first act, the spectators had seen Algerian national sentiment attain full consciousness and become the keynote of Muslim thinking. On the French side an immense military and administrative apparatus had been built up; propaganda went hand in hand with repression, including the use of torture. Machinery was being created to bring about an improvement in the living conditions of France's Algerian subjects From off-stage it had been learnt that the protectorates over the sister countries of Tunisia and Morocco had been abandoned All forces were being concentrated upon the more essential Algeria.

ACT II: THE ADVENT OF DE GAULLE

Act II overlaps a little in time, for it began on 13 May 1958. In this act the Europeans in Algeria and in France were the protagonists. As the curtain rose, the former were discovered sacking the large and comfortable offices of the Government General in Algiers. This insubordination had been inspired by the belief that a new French Government might be thinking of negotiating with the F.L.N. The army officers were at first taken aback but, being themselves disgusted with the instability of French Cabinets, went on to take charge of the movement. A common basis of policy was found in the slogans of 'integration' and 'de Gaulle to power'. As the plot developed, however, it gradually became clearer and clearer that General de Gaulle himself, while approving of the second proposition, had no use for the first. His own preference was for an associated but autonomous state, described by him later as an 'Algerian Algeria', closely linked with France. He let the laboriously approved *Loi-Cadre*[1] lapse, but in other respects deviated hardly at all from the objectives of previous Governments, which themselves differed little from the avowed purpose of the Statute of Algeria of 1947 that had declared Algeria to be 'a group of departments endowed with a civic personality, financial autonomy, and an organization special to itself'.

This attitude was not at all welcome either to the European community or to the officers who had brought General de Gaulle to power, and in due course one of the most eminent of the latter, General Massu, was to be dismissed for stating that they had perhaps made a mistake in doing so. General Massu and the settlers may well be right in believing that an associated state would at once find the way to independence as Morocco and Tunisia had already done. In their opinion the only way to keep the Muslims and Algeria within the French orbit was to make it quite clear that in no circumstances would they be permitted to leave it. The means of reconciling this with the principle of self-determination was 'integration', that is, to absorb Algeria into France. The Muslims would thus become a relatively small minority in a much bigger unit, stretching from Dunkirk to Tamanrasset.

In other respects, too, de Gaulle's administration followed directives laid down by his predecessors, but with greater determination. 'Pacification' was carried on with increased energy and casualties

[1] The 'framework' law, passed in January 1958, governing a projected new regime for Algeria.

mounted to new levels. At the same time the conciliatory policy towards Tunisia and Morocco, planned by preceding Governments, was no longer allowed to be sabotaged by such unauthorized military initiatives as the bombardment of Sakiet. The promises of material betterment were multiplied to a degree which made them, humanly speaking, incapable of fulfilment. Known as the Constantine Plan from de Gaulle's speech in that town on 3 October 1958, their codification alone required the services of a staff of 1,500 Christians and Muslims for over a year. In announcing the plan, de Gaulle undertook that within five years salaries and allowances would be raised to the French level; that two-thirds of all Muslim children—that is, 1,125,000 extra pupils—would be found school places within the same period; that 625,000 acres of land would be distributed to Muslim cultivators; that houses would be built to accommodate a million people, that a great metallurgical works would be created at Bône which, with other industrial and commercial developments, would provide employment for an additional 400,000 workers.

Meanwhile universal suffrage, with one Muslim equal to one French vote, was actually introduced and a referendum and carefully conditioned elections were held in November 1958 Seventy-one seats in the French Parliament were allotted to deputies from Algeria, two-thirds of them to be filled by Muslims. In renewing the cease-fire appeal made by his predecessors to the insurgents, General de Gaulle endeavoured to render it more acceptable by recognizing the courage of the fighters, though he still poured scorn on what he called the 'external organization of the rebellion'. When, however, this produced no response during the year which followed and there began to be a certain restiveness of opinion in France, he made a striking advance. On 16 September 1959 he announced that the only solution worthy of France was that the Algerians should decide their future for themselves. But this was to be brought about in a way determined exclusively by the French Government. Within four years after the establishment of peace (defined as the occurrence of less than two hundred incidents in a year) a referendum would be held. This would offer the electors three choices—integration (referred to disparagingly as 'frenchification'), association, or secession. It was however indicated, and later specifically stated, that a majority for secession would mean partition. Algerian territory would be allotted to the minority who voted for the French connection, while the majority would receive what remained. Since

those who are likely to vote in favour of the connection are to be found mainly in the ports, where all the industry is situated, and on the most fertile lands, it appears that the seceding majority would be left in a state approaching destitution.

Nevertheless, the recognition of the right of the Algerians to decide their future by a majority vote was a revolutionary step which went half-way towards the F.L.N.'s position. The Provisional Government welcomed the recognition of the principle as a great victory which their struggle had won, but declared that their willingness to negotiate a cease-fire must be subject to agreement on conditions ensuring real freedom of choice at the referendum and the rejection of partition. Though nothing further emerged in the form of negotiations, the suggestion was sufficient to cause the less responsible Europeans in Algeria to organize another demonstration (24 January 1960) and to set up two barricaded camps in the heart of Algiers in the hope of provoking a further change of regime. But this time the army would not go with them, though it handled them very gently. Seeing that sentiment in France was also unfavourable to their cause, the insurrectionists yielded in face of General de Gaulle's resolute attitude, hoping that a better moment would come and an initiative originate in France. Following this episode, however, the General found it necessary in the course of a tour of army posts in Algeria to reassure the officers. In private conversations with them he confirmed that operations against the rising would not be relaxed, and that the presence of the army would still be required after a cease-fire and until the conclusion of the referendum.

Nevertheless, when there were still no signs of the rising coming to an end or of a 'third force' arising among the Muslims in favour of an associated state, the General on 14 June in the course of a broadcast to the nation addressed a further appeal to the insurgents, this time recognizing them as the 'leaders of the insurrection' and avoiding the use of wounding terms or the mention of unacceptable conditions. In view of this marked change of emphasis, two emissaries at last proceeded to France. But the French representatives confined themselves to informing them of the conditions in which negotiations could be conducted, without admitting any discussion on possible modifications. The Provisional Government therefore announced, after hearing their report, that while it remained ready for negotiations at any time it did not consider the present moment opportune. In a subsequent broadcast its leader, Ferhat Abbas,

amplified this by pointing out that there was a considerable difference between the public declarations of the French Government and its policy in practice. The Provisional Government, he said, could not commit the country's future on the basis of public discourses, which had no binding ('only a relative') value, but only on the basis of duly negotiated agreements.

ACT III: A CEASE-FIRE AND AFTER?

The curtain has still to rise on the third act, and the dénouement can be conjectured only on the basis of conditions today. These are totally different from those of 1954. At that time the two contestants faced one another with quite irreconcilable demands The French Government would consider no proposition which would weaken the link between Algeria and France; the F.L.N. would negotiate only if the principle of Algerian independence were first recognized Today there is agreement that the future of Algeria is to be settled by her own inhabitants The differences now concern the terms of the cease-fire and conditions preceding and during the plebiscite

These are indeed no mere formalities The position of the F L N pending and during the election will have a profound influence on the result. It is no doubt the hope of the French Government to re-introduce party members into peaceful political life in Algeria as individuals, not as a party entitled on its record to play a major part in the organization and supervision of the elections. Remembering the past history of Algeria, the Provisional Government is not in the least likely to put itself at the mercy of the French army and administration in this way, but will demand unimpeachable guarantees for the period leading up to the plebiscite and during its implementation. It will probably request the formation of mixed commissions, with the F.L.N. participating as such, or, alternatively, international supervision. There can be no doubt of the sincere desire of both sides to bring the war to an end. But the General is hoping that the fatigue and sufferings of the insurgents will enable the army to restore order —if necessary, even without an agreed cease-fire. The Provisional Government, on the other hand, reckons that continued resistance will bring a new, more favourable offer, perhaps even by September

Meanwhile the country, for its Muslim inhabitants, has become one vast reformatory. It has been cut off from its neighbours, Tunisia and Morocco, by prohibited zones; these have been emptied of their inhabitants (many of whom are refugees in the neighbouring lands), enclosed by electrified entanglements, strongly

patrolled, lit by searchlights, and covered by artillery. The coast is guarded by the French navy which intercepts any suspect vessel. The Saharan limits are kept under observation from the air. Within the country at least 150,000 Muslims have been killed in the fighting or reprisals, and some 10,000 French officers and men. One and a quarter million villagers have been 'regrouped' under the direct control of the French authorities. The thousand villages of the Kabyle country have themselves also been reduced by 'regrouping' to 750, and a French military post established in every third village. This means that a third of the inhabitants of Algeria are prisoners not only on account of the barriers by which the whole country is enclosed but also in the sense that they must have a permit to leave their enforced place of residence, even for the purpose of cultivating their own fields if they have any. There is hardly a Muslim family which has not lost one or more members, killed by French forces, assassinated as a traitor by his compatriots, or imprisoned with or without trial and possibly tortured.

On the other hand, good conduct by the inmates brings rewards. They have been given votes, even if conditions do not yet permit them to use them as they might wish. Muslims are being admitted more freely into the public service. As credits permit, handsome villages are being built to replace the hovels into which the regrouped persons are at first huddled. These villages have piped water, electricity, a school, and medical services, and they themselves elect a Muslim 'mayor' to carry out the instructions of the French authorities. A hundred and fifty thousand Muslims are now serving as auxiliaries with the French forces or in the village 'self-defence' units, often less from political sympathy than as a means of gaining a livelihood and of avoiding excessive police inquisition. In the big cities there is an air of boom due to the vast expenditure which the war has brought with it. New building in Algiers and Oran is impressive and hotel rooms are impossible to find. But though progress is being made in education and health services, the Constantine Plan as a whole is in the doldrums. The project for the steel works at Bône, the expected extensions in 250 existing factories, and the promised creation of new enterprises are not so much a measure of new private capital being invested as of the scale of government aid and urging. On the whole the flight of capital is greater than the influx. Only 20,000 of the 400,000 new jobs which were to be produced by the Constantine Plan are yet in sight and many of these are likely to go to Europeans. The reforms are essen-

tially paternalistic, and their effect is to submerge the Muslims further and further under an army of French officials and experts Meanwhile such elements of Arabic culture as had hitherto survived are forced deeper underground or destroyed. There is no sign in French-controlled Algeria of Muslims taking the lead and doing things for themselves as they do in the nationalist organizations.

As for the rising itself, the army are justified in claiming that it has been contained and that the large formations have been broken up in many areas. Movement is fairly easy for Europeans in the daytime provided that they keep to the safe roads and areas But there are no signs of the rising coming to an end, or of sentiments more favourable to France coming into being among the Muslims On the contrary, nationalistic feelings have been enhanced by the changes which have occurred outside, as well as within, the country In 1954 Indo-China was the only French territory in the process of achieving independence. Tunisia had just been promised internal autonomy; Mohammed V of Morocco was an exile in Madagascar and ben Arafa was installed in Rabat. For the African portions of the French Union there was still no talk of independence. In the Middle East the Suez Canal had not yet been nationalized, Syria was still an independent State, and Iraq was still ruled by the Hashemites and Nuri Said. Cumulatively the effect of the subsequent changes has been enormous. The Algerian Muslims find it harder than ever to understand why they alone of Arab and African peoples should be denied the independence granted freely to peoples far less qualified to exercise it.

In France the effect is hardly less marked. General de Gaulle's Government, it is true, appears to be still hoping to mobilize Muslim opinion in support of an Algeria organized as a federation of Arab, Berber, European, and perhaps Jewish communities, associated with France. Nevertheless, the liquidation of the French Union makes the possible detachment of Algeria seem less rather than more painful than before. On the other hand the sentiment of the army and of the Europeans in Algeria has still to be reckoned with; General de Gaulle himself is obviously still as hesitant about Algeria as he was about the African states before he undertook the journey in which he offered the possibility of independence and Guinea, to his indignation, opted for it. It is possible that the Algerian leaders are right in thinking that the independence of Algeria is ~~not~~ far over the horizon.

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Notes of the Month

Who's Who in Laos

IN a country such as Laos, where politics are in the hands of the few educated aristocrats and princes of royal blood, the recent irruption of a newcomer caused some surprise among foreign observers. This was Captain Kong Lae, an unknown twenty-seven-year-old officer in the 2nd Parachute Battalion who, with the help of his troops, seized the administrative capital, Vientiane, early in the morning of 9 August 1960. He then proclaimed that there should be an end to 'civil war' in the country (his battalion has been putting down Pathet Lao rebels), that American aid, both financial and technical, should be terminated, and that Laos should return to a policy of neutrality and friendliness to all foreign countries.

The leading ministers of the Government unseated by Kong Lae were all members of the Paxasangkhom Party, the political wing of the Committee for the Defence of National Interests. This Committee was formed in 1958, after Communist successes in the supplementary elections in May of that year, by pro-Western army officers and civil servants, and it immediately became an influential group. In July it obliged the Prime Minister, Prince Souvanna Phouma, to resign by refusing to co-operate with him. It accepted the King's nomination of Phoui Sananikone as Premier in August 1958, and aided him in forming a Cabinet in which two important portfolios, Foreign Affairs and Finance, were held by C.D.N.I. leaders, Khampan Panya and Thao Leuam Ratsasomvat. In Premier Phoui's Cabinet reshuffle on 14 January 1959 the Chairman of the C.D.N.I., General Sounthone Patthamavong, was given the portfolio of Defence. This predominantly C.D.N.I. Government, through its fear of Communism, magnified the disturbances in the summer of 1959 into a full-scale invasion by North Vietnam and called on the U.N. for help.

When Mr Hammarskjöld visited Laos in November 1959 he advised that the country should follow a policy of neutrality. It is

thought that Premier Phoui may have attempted to do so and that this resulted in the withdrawal from his Cabinet, on 19 December 1959, of seven members of the C.D.N.I. Phoui's position was further weakened on 27 December by the death of the Deputy Premier, Katay Sasorith, an influential man of moderate views. Phoui, further undermined by alleged unconstitutional irregularity, no longer had sufficient support to govern, and he resigned on 31 December, much against the will of the King, who empowered the Army High Command to take charge. Thus Generals Sounthone Patthamavong, Phoumi Nosavan, and Ouan Rattikone, stalwarts of the C.D.N.I., acquired control. On 6 January a caretaker Government was formed under Kou Abhay, a non-party man, with Khampan Panya as Foreign Minister and Phoumi Nosavan as Minister of Defence. This Government was to remain in office until the elections due on 24 April 1960 were completed.

The C.D.N.I. was strongly suspected of manipulating the election results of last April as all the seats, even in areas where left-wing candidates might possibly have had some success, went to pro-Government candidates. On 3 May the Paxasangkhom (Democratic Party for Social Progress), the political wing of the C.D.N.I., was formed. This claimed to hold thirty-four out of the fifty-nine seats in the Assembly.

On 2 June the King called on Tiao Somsanith, Vice-Chairman of the Paxasangkhom Party, to form a Government. Tiao, a cousin of the King and a former member of Prince Souvanna Phouma's party, the Laotian People's Rally,[1] was thought to have fairly pliable views, and there seemed little doubt that the power in the Government was the Defence Minister, General Phoumi Nosavan, the leader of the Paxasangkhom Party. General Phoumi was said to be a nephew of the military dictator of neighbouring Thailand, Marshal Sarit Thanarat, and it has even been alleged that interests in Siam may have helped to finance the C.D.N.I.[2] This may explain why Phoumi flew to Bangkok from Vientiane on hearing of Kong Lae's *coup* before appearing in Southern Laos to organize opposition to the rebels.

Prince Souvanna Phouma, appointed Premier as a result of Kong Lae's *coup*, is a half-brother of the Communist leader, Prince Souphannouvong, and in 1957 negotiated the final agreements with

[1] This was a coalition uniting the two previous right-wing parties. It was formed in June 1958, about the same time as the C.D.N.I., to provide opposition to Communism.

[2] *Daily Telegraph*, 23 April 1960

him on the reintegration of the Pathet Lao.[1] Nevertheless, he seems to have no illusions about the difficulties of neutrality in Laos, where there is an official Communist Party, the Neo Lao Hak Xat (N L H.X.). When he resigned from the Premiership for the first time, in July 1958, it was on the ground that he could not work with two members of the N.L.H.X. in the Cabinet.

Souvanna Phouma presented his new Cabinet to the National Assembly on 16 August, retaining for himself the portfolios of Defence and Foreign Affairs. His experiences in 1958 made it unlikely that he would appoint any N.L.H.X. members to the Cabinet, and indeed he has said that he would not do so. He put forward a policy of neutrality and friendliness to all abroad, and efficient administration and development of the economy at home. Real neutrality for Laos seems to be the only path which could lead her to stability, and Souvanna Phouma perhaps has enough experience of both left and right wings to achieve that neutrality.

A Unitary or a Federal State in the Congo?

WHETHER the Congo is to be a federal or a unitary State is still an unanswered question. Since the beginning of 1959, when the coming of independence was first announced, the Belgian Government had insisted on a unitary state, admitting however a measure of decentralization of power to the provinces, but always with a strong central government. Their eyes were on the Lower Congo region—the Bakongo country—where Joseph Kasavubu's followers were demanding the reconstitution of the old Congo Kingdom, which included the mouth of the river, Portuguese Cabinda, and parts of Angola and of the French Congo. This would have transformed the economy of the whole territory, quite apart from the political confusion which would result. The Belgian Government feared that any favouring of a loose federal system would be the first step towards secession. While it was realized that secession of the Lower Congo would inevitably encourage Katanga separatism, the immediate problem was the agitation aroused by the ABAKO (association of Lower Congo tribes), which spread rapidly after the Leopoldville riots of January 1959.

Probably both the Katanga and the province of Leopoldville (the Lower Congo region) could prosper if they seceded. Katanga is in a strong position both because of its minerals and the fact that its rail communications run south to Rhodesia and west to Angola,

[1] See 'Laos and the Communists', in *The World Today*, September 1959

while those with Tanganyika and the east coast could easily be improved. Its great need would be outside labour for the mines which, as Katanga could pay higher wages than other Congo provinces, would probably be available. It would also have to import some food. Except for one tribe, the Baluba, its tribes are not scattered over the other provinces. Ethnically it might be described as more compact than any other province. Leopoldville province could also prosper because of its geographical position, its outlet to the sea, and its rich soil—especially if capital were available for the great Inga dam project to provide electric power, which would, it is thought, be enough for the whole territory and for the French Congo and Angola as well.

The Congo stripped of the Katanga might begin as a pauper and bankrupt state, but provided order were restored and confidence created, allowing for foreign investment, it should in the long run emerge successfully. Gold and diamonds, its great agricultural potential—coffee, palm oil, cotton, and the rest—added to river transport and the possibility of cheap electric power, could make it a rich and prosperous country. A Congo including Katanga, but without Leopoldville, on the other hand, would be rich in some ways but unbalanced. Its river transport could be paralysed at any moment by the state commanding the mouth of the river, and the cheap electric power from Inga would cost just as much as the traffic could bear. In fact, the Lower Congo state could easily blackmail all its neighbours. It remains doubtful, however, if a unitary state with a too-rigid central government—and new African states tend to have dictatorial ways—might not be more likely to lead to secession than a federal system allowing for far greater provincial autonomy than has yet been envisaged.

In his radio address on 9 January, after returning from a short visit to the Congo, King Baudouin said that those he had met out there all seemed in favour of a large measure of provincial autonomy At the Round Table Conference held in Brussels in January-February 1960 the delegates, with the Government's obvious approval, decided on a unitary state. This was always opposed by Moïse Tshombe, leader of the CONAKAT party of Katanga, by the ABAKO (although the delegates to the conference were somewhat neutral in the matter), and by the dissenting wing of the *Mouvement National Congolais* (M.N.C.) led by Albert Kalondji for the Baluba in the Kasai. Since the conference, therefore, the constitution makers have been at work on plans for a unitary state, and

nothing but vague statements have appeared regarding a federal system, and these mainly for electoral advantage.

The Congo general elections held at the end of May had shown that the M.N.C.-Lumumba—so described in order to avoid confusion with the M.N.C.-Kalondji, in opposition—had supporters in all the provinces except Katanga; whereas, with the exception of the *Parti National du Progrès* (P.N.P.) which gained seats in three provinces, all the other parties were local and gained no seats in other than their own province. Lumumba's party won 36 seats in the National Assembly, and with allied parties could count on 49 altogether. These parties all insist on a unitary state and are pan-African in outlook. The ABAKO (Lower Congo–Leopoldville province), the CONAKAT (Katanga), and the M.N.C.-Kalondji (Kasai) demand a federal system; together they have 27 seats in the House. The P.N.P. (mainly in the north-west of the Congo), which seems to be the most moderate party, could with its allies count on 28 seats. The two extreme parties, the *Parti Solidaire Africain* (P.S.A.) in Leopoldville and the CEREA (*Centre de Regroupement Africain*) in the Kivu, have 23 seats between them. Ten seats out of the Assembly of 137 members were won by chiefs and individuals with mainly tribal interests. The two extreme parties, whose views appear to be Marxist, may become of great importance for, voting with Lumumba's group, they make his position secure, but if they threw in their lot with the federalists his position would become very difficult. On the subject of unitary or federal government they have not yet pronounced any very clear views. At first they are likely to be on the side of Lumumba, but in the future they will certainly be wooed by the ABAKO.

As Lumumba insists on a unitary state, the federalists have so far only been able to protest, and try to gain support for their views, having some success in the Kasai and Kivu. Much depends upon the continued co-operation of Kasavubu, the Head of State and leader of the ABAKO.

The European Common Market and Africa

THE question of the six Common Market countries and their associated territories in Africa is probably, from the political point of view, one of the most delicate problems with which the Community is confronted.

Originally, the Treaty of Rome—the Common Market Treaty[1]—was not intended to deal with overseas problems, and it was only at a late stage of the negotiations in 1956 that the French Government put forward the suggestion that the dependent territories of the Six be associated with the Common Market. This suggestion did not at first meet with the approval of some of the other partners: in particular, the Governments of the German Federal Republic and of the Netherlands were afraid that to associate the dependent overseas territories would compromise their relationship with other Asian and African countries Nevertheless, after difficult negotiations it was decided to establish through the Treaty a limited system of association relating to the overseas territories of France, Belgium, Italy, and the Netherlands. They are listed in Annex IV of the Treaty. The great majority of these associated territories are in Africa.

What, then, is the system as established in the Treaty? It is based on three principles, one of which is the 'preferential system' laid down in the fourth chapter of the Treaty and therefore part of the Treaty itself. The second principle is the Investment Fund, a fund of $581 million to be spent in five years on social and economic development projects in the associated territories. The third is the principle of non-discrimination among the Six as regards establishment in the associated territories and countries. The two latter principles are laid down in the so-called 'Appended Convention', a convention concluded for an initial period of five years which will have to be renegotiated in 1961 or 1962; its date of expiry is 31 December 1962. The distinction between the Treaty itself and the Appended Convention is important because the Treaty itself has been agreed upon for an indefinite period of time, whereas the Appended Convention is for five years only.

Such consultation as took place with the territories concerned at

[1] Text in Communauté Économique Européenne *Treaty establishing the European Common Market and connected documents* (Brussels, Secretariat of the Interim Committee for the Common Market and Euratom, 1957)

e time of the negotiations was carried out through the metro-
litan authorities with which the territories entertained what the
eaty calls 'special relations' (Art. 131). There was no formal con-
ltation between the negotiating conference and the territories that
imately became associated at the conference table in Brussels.
This fact may account for the hesitations that existed in Africa
ncerning the association, in particular during the first year after
Treaty came into force. Developments in Africa have been ex-
edingly rapid since 1956. The status of the French overseas terri-
ies was at that time determined by the *Loi Cadre*; the French
vernments of the Fourth Republic had since 1945 granted in-
nal autonomy to its dependencies overseas. Among the associated
ritories were the Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi, a U.N.
ust territory administered by Belgium; the French Cameroons
d Togoland, both of them U.N. Trust territories with France as
Trustee Power, and Somalia, also a U.N. Trust territory,
ministered by Italy At the time of ratification of the Treaty it
ild be foreseen that some of these countries would become inde-
ndent in a few years' time. This is the reason why declarations of
ention have been appended to the Treaty relating to Italian
maliland and to the independent countries of the franc area
ie latter declaration also applies to Tunisia and Morocco. What
ild not be foreseen, however, was the rapid overall political
velopment in Africa.

The Fifth Republic enlarged the system of the *Loi Cadre* and
ablished the Franco-African Community. In that Community
velopments have been influenced by two tendencies: the 'federal-
tendency of the Prime Minister of the Ivory Coast, M. Hou-
ouet-Boigny and his friends, and the 'confederalist' tendency
ended, in particular, by the leaders of the Mali Federation,
ighor, Modibo Keita, and Mamadou Dia. What the federalists
nted was a kind of federation with a federal Cabinet and federal
rliament. The confederalists were in favour of a kind of con-
ieration with the accent on independence for its members. There
s no quarrel between the two groups about the desirability of
ong links with France.

In December 1959 General de Gaulle made his famous speech in
Louis de Sénégal in which he stated his Government's willingness
enter into negotiations with those countries of the Franco-
ican Community which wanted independence. The result of
s important declaration was that the Mali Federation and

Madagascar were the first countries to ask for negotiations with Paris. The negotiations led to a favourable result during the first four months of 1960, and the independence of both countries has recently been formally declared.

The Cameroons became an independent State on 1 January 1960 Togoland followed on 27 April, the Belgian Congo on 30 June, and Italian Somaliland on 1 July. Practically all the other associated countries and territories in Africa will become independent before the end of this year. Last but not least, Nigeria, a country not associated with the Common Market, will become independent on 1 October. She will undoubtedly play a considerable role on the West Coast.

Political events, therefore, have been exceedingly important and have followed much more rapidly than anyone could have imagined in 1956 when the Treaty was being negotiated.

What has been the development of the relationship between the Common Market and the associated territories overseas? So far the relationship between an associated territory or country and the European Commission in Brussels has been governed by the relationship existing between the mother country and its dependent associated territory. If an associated country wanted to submit an investment project to the European Commission in Brussels, it did so through the intermediary of the metropolitan capital, that is to say through Paris, or, in the case of the Congo, through Brussels, or, in that of Italian Somaliland, through Rome. From the very beginning the associated countries have sought to establish direct relations with Brussels through sending their delegates to visit the Commission's headquarters there. The attitude of the E.E C countries in this respect has been generous. They have enabled the Commission's staff to engage widely in travel in the associated countries.

The result of this has been that a network of relations has been built up between Brussels and the Governments of the countries and territories overseas, and in this way a basis of mutual confidence has been established. There are indications that most of the countries and territories overseas want to continue the association once they obtain independence. The Cameroons when they became independent on 1 January, and Togoland last April, formally applied for the association to continue.

The Commission and the Council of Ministers of the E.E.C. are therefore faced with a complex problem. For, at the same time, at

ctically all the African conferences, the African states are dis-
sing the relationship that is to be developed among themselves.
his way territories that were formerly French or British are es-
lishing relations among themselves as well as with States that
e already independent. There is a growing tendency to think in
ns of African political and economic co-operation or even unity.
at the same time there is a tendency among territories of former
nch dependence to re-establish among themselves the economic
tionship that existed previously.

'he Prime Minister of Togoland, M. Olympio, in his address to
National Assembly on Independence Day (27 April), pointed
the desirability of establishing a kind of O.E.E.C. for West
ica. He spoke in the following terms:

is true that for some time the idea of African unity has been gaining
ind. Some of the leaders of the independent African States have out-
l their ideas about it. Nevertheless, it seems that in discussions on this
ingly topical question the emphasis has too frequently been laid on
tical rather than economic unity. There are, in fact, numerous
iomic problems which are common to the whole of Africa, and it is
that a concrete and practical proposal should be put forward in the
're of economic co-operation. For my part, I am convinced that it is
ugh economic co-operation that we can henceforth contribute to a
iderable extent to the welfare of the inhabitants of West Africa who
ctly concern us By this means we shall have more chance of succeed-
than in the political sphere, where we are faced with long-term,
plex, and often arduous problems.

or reasons which are perhaps easy to understand, the administrative
European authorities in West Africa have in the past done little to
note a policy of co-operation between their different territories.
ay, when many African states have achieved independence or are
to do so, the responsibility for this daring undertaking must hence-
i rest with the Africans themselves.

i West Africa, we are faced with various problems of trade and ex-
ige, labour, and emigration, all of which urgently need to be solved.
rder to do this, a meeting of all the interested independent African
es should be initiated.

i view of the special character of West African trade today, we should
ist consult the views of those with whom we trade in order to see all
of the problem and arrive at a practical solution.

oreover, we should not exclude from this meeting interested ob-
ers such as the representatives of international organizations, for ex-
le the U.N. Economic Commission for Africa. As a more concrete
'estion, we could envisage the prompt establishment of an organiza-
for economic co-operation in West Africa, on the lines of the
.E.C. Such an organization could be a meeting-place for important
issions and would make possible a co-ordination of efforts within a

clearly specified field, while avoiding any involvement in the internal affairs of the member States.

It would seem that the time has come to envisage the creation of this important organization, but I would hope that its first meeting should not take place before the definite proclamation of independence in Mali and in Nigeria.

While African unity, both economic and political, is the aim we have at heart, that does not mean that we shall limit our horizons to Africa alone. On the contrary, wishful as we are to practice the policy of the open door, we desire to entertain with all States, of whatever continent, relations of friendship based on mutual understanding and reciprocal respect for each country's institutions.

It may well be that the tendency towards economic co-operation or even some sort of unity will make more rapid progress than the development towards political unity. It also appears true that there is a great deal of overlapping among the various groups Nevertheless it seems quite clear that the pattern of co-operation in Africa will rapidly develop during the coming years and that by the time the Appended Convention expires and becomes the subject of fresh negotiation the situation in Africa may have changed considerably.

It would therefore seem to be in the interest of Africa as well as of Europe and the Western world as a whole that there should be an increasing co-ordination of Western policy in relation to Africa In particular, a co-ordination of policies between the E.E C and the Commonwealth would seem highly desirable. In the African countries outside the group associated with the E.E.C. there is anxiety about the Community's outer tariff and about possible eventual trade discrimination

So far, however, these fears have proved to be unfounded Ghana's and Nigeria's trade with the E E.C. countries, and notably with the German Federal Republic and the Netherlands, has increased of recent years. Those two countries now follow immediately after the United Kingdom in importance as trading partners It seems highly unlikely that they would be prepared to divert their trade and investments to any considerable extent from countries with which relations have been developing favourably. The European Commission is aware of this problem. Its President, Professor Hallstein, said in his speech on 25 June before the joint meeting of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe and of the European Parliamentary Assembly (the Parliament of the European Community) that any solution envisaged in relation to the

ociation of the countries listed in Annex IV should take into
count the interests of other African countries.

It would seem that any such solution will depend largely on the
lowing factors: (*a*) the attitude of the countries which are now
ociated on the basis of Annex IV of the Rome Treaty; (*b*) the
itude of neighbouring non-associated countries in Africa, and
ssible forms of co-operation in the economic field between
ociated and non-associated countries in Africa; (*c*) the attitude
the Six; and (*d*) the attitude of the United Kingdom and other
mbers of the Commonwealth

The European Commission has so far taken the point of view that
associated country on becoming independent should be enabled
continue the association if it so desires. The present system could
is be continued in substance till the date of expiry of the Ap-
nded Convention, and if the associated country should desire it
ragmatic solution could be found in the matter of its relations
h the institutions of the Community in Brussels. In this way it
uld not be necessary to apply Article 238 of the Treaty, which
vides for the association of third countries with the Community.
is would seem all the more advantageous because the procedure
Article 238 is long and cumbersome, and fresh negotiations will
any case have to take place in 1961 or 1962. Moreover, it would
m very odd politically if a country, on becoming independent
l asking for the association to be continued, were to be confronted
h a situation in which the advantages provided for might be
ninished or withdrawn

n the Preamble of the Treaty the six countries have declared their
ention 'to confirm the solidarity which binds Europe and over-
s countries' and expressed their desire 'to ensure the develop-
nt of their prosperity, in accordance with the principles of the
arter of the United Nations'.

Article 131, paras. 2 and 3, refers back to the Preamble in the
owing terms.

The purpose of this association shall be to promote the economic and
ial development of the countries and territories and to establish close
nomic relations between them and the Community as a whole.

n conformity with the principles stated in the Preamble to this
'aty, this association shall in the first place permit the furthering of the
'rests and prosperity of the inhabitants of these countries and terri-
es in such a manner as to lead them to the economic, social, and cultur-
evelopment which they expect.

The argument, therefore, that the Six have an especial responsibility towards the associated countries, and in particular towards those countries that wish to continue the association on becoming independent, is a solid one. There seems to be no reason why this responsibility could not be extended to other overseas countries should they wish it. But in that case two main difficulties would arise: the need for co-ordination between the 'preferential system' outlined in Part IV of the Treaty and the Commonwealth preference, and the need to act in conformity with the G.A.T.T. rules

It has already been said that so far there seems no reason to be unduly worried about the E E.C. preference. Trade figures for the associated countries have not notably changed since 1958, and though this might gradually happen as the outer tariff comes into force, some E.E.C. countries would not be too enthusiastic at seeing a change in their pattern of trade with non-associated countries in Africa. The anti-E.E.C. bias of some independent non-associated countries in Africa would seem to be inspired by political rather than by economic motives. The overall need in Africa is for aid in the fields of infra-structural development, trade development, and professional training. These problems should clearly be approached along lines that transcend the previous colonial boundaries. Investment measures in former British dependencies may well influence development in countries associated with E.E.C. and vice versa The same can be said of trade development.

There would therefore seem to be a strong case for urging a co-ordination of policies in relation to Africa. A beginning has been made with the Development Assistance Group (D.A.G.), established early this year. But that is not enough.

The situation which has developed in the newly independent Congo serves to underline the need for a co-ordination of Western policies in relation to independent Africa if that continent is to be preserved from subversive tendencies. So far the policies of the British and French components of Europe have met with some success in Africa. The Belgian experiment is still in the balance But to project the Sixes and Sevens into Africa would be unjust and dangerous.

J. J. VAN DER LEE

Turkey: The End of the First Republic

SINCE 3 o'clock in the morning of 27 May 1960, Turkey has been ruled by the National Unity Committee, a body of mostly junior officers (only four of its thirty-eight members are generals) which, as representative of the Armed Forces, has taken over the sovereign power constitutionally delegated by the nation to the Grand National Assembly.

Any foreigner who did not happen to know that Ataturk, founder and first President of the Republic, died in 1938 could be excused for thinking that he was back in power His pictures are to be seen everywhere: in shop-windows, in restaurants, on the front page of the newspapers. His name occurs in every editorial and in all the speeches made at the almost daily rallies in celebration of the Second Republic: rallies with themes such as 'We are with the Army'; 'We are with the students'; 'We forgive the police'. But all the invocations of the great name cannot conceal the fact that what has happened is in violation of Ataturk's firm principle that the Army must take no part in politics.

The astute political analyst who is unfamiliar with Turkey will fall into some obvious traps: he will regard Turkey as yet another democracy overthrown by ambitious soldiers; he will see the Revolution of 27 May as the culmination of years of plotting to establish an Army dictatorship; he will make the equation Gursel = Neguib and will speculate about who the Turkish Nasser will be. In fact, the Turkey of Menderes was not a democracy, the Revolution came after not years but months of plotting, the Army does not intend to maintain a dictatorship, and some of the best brains in Turkey are now devising a Constitution that will make the emergence of a Turkish Nasser an impossibility. Nevertheless, there is some truth in at least the first half of the cocktail-party witticism that the decade 1950–60 was the only time in history in which the Turks have been ruled by an entirely civilian Government, and that the Army could not tolerate this innovation any longer

The Turks' 'first civilian Government' was corrupt, cynical, and hypocritical. Yet when it took office in May 1950, putting an end to the long dictatorship of the Republican People's Party, it was amid popular rejoicing unparalleled since the day in 1908 when Sultan Abdul-Hamid's absolutism was overthrown by the Party of Union and Progress. There had been graft and extortion in the era of the People's Party, the press had been controlled, the minorities had

been bullied. The Democrat victory was hailed by the liberal tellectuals, who saw it as a step towards Ataturk's goal of a mu party system; by the business men whose style had been crampe étatism; by the then small but growing class of industrial work forbidden to organize effectively and forbidden to strike at all; by religious conservatives, mindful of how the People's Party had throned Islam. For the first few years the Democrats seemed t living up to their promises. True, they did not grant the righ strike, nor did they tax agricultural incomes, a measure which economists have always insisted is the prerequisite of finan stability for Turkey. Yet for the most part people were content

What went wrong? This is a question on which many a doct thesis will doubtless be written in years to come, but two elemen the answer are clear. the failure of the 1954 harvest after an precedented run of good years, and the personality of the two le ing Democrats, Bayar and Menderes The failure of the har should have been the signal for the Democrats to reconsider t grandiose schemes for industrial expansion, but they were blin by their self-confidence and their well-founded belief that Turk allies would never let her plunge into total economic ruin.

It is not yet possible to say with certainty whether Baya Menderes bears the heavier responsibility, but one can safely as that Bayar was not the figurehead some diplomats supposed hi be. He was very proud of his nickname of 'Comitadji' which he won by his ruthlessness in the cause of the Party of Union Progress, before the first World War. 'Comitadji' meant Bal terrorist; applied by Turks to a Turk it had the same sort of c notation as if a white settler in Kenya were to be known to his ne bours as 'Mau Mau'. It was no surprise to anyone when B pulled a gun on the officers who came to arrest him on 27 May.

Adnan Menderes is very different A politician of great pers magnetism, he filled the peasants' need for a colourful leader wl they could regard as sharing their devotion to Islam (though as as one can tell he is not a practising Muslim) His escape from d in the Gatwick air-crash raised him in these people's eyes to sa hood, a promotion which he exploited. Power obsessed and toxicated him. 'No one will ever call me an ex-Prime Minister' one of his sayings. The Turkish press at present is full of repor the corruption of the old regime: of the immense fortunes depos in foreign banks, the jewels, the yachts, the vast estates. Mender alleged to have transferred currency illegally to Switzerland for

purchase and furnishing of a luxurious villa, and to have used State funds to improve his own farms; but he has not been accused of outright peculation. His cotton interests made him a rich man before he entered public life, and he seems to have differed from his ministerial colleagues in not seeking financial gain (subject to the reservation that tomorrow's headlines may tell a different story).

What he wanted was power. The Democrat Party constitution lays down that candidates for the Grand National Assembly are to be chosen in local primaries, but the leader of the Party can disregard these primaries and nominate whom he wishes. The Democrat representation in the Assembly was therefore largely composed of Menderes's followers, over whose heads he held a weapon stronger than any sanction ever wielded by a Party Whip: dossiers on their private lives and misdemeanours, a blackmailer's dream. A wealthy Opposition deputy left the People's Party to join the Democrats; it emerged that he had been caught evading taxes and smuggling currency, and had then been presented by Menderes with the choice between a criminal prosecution and joining the party. The outrageous Press Laws of 1954 and 1956, which made it an indictable offence to attack the 'honour or reputation' of any official, provided the cover for systematic robberies which would have brought a blush to the cheek of any Ottoman extortioner. Foreigners whose acquaintance with Turkey does not go back to the years before the Democrats' rise to power have generally supposed that the baksheesh mentality in officials was part of the unchanging Turkish background. In fact it was a reversion to a mode of conduct which, if it was not obsolescent by 1950, was at any rate no longer the norm. The fish, says the Turkish proverb, begins to smell at the head. The corruption of the rulers was common knowledge among the literate class, though the peasants, even if they were aware of what was going on, were not disturbed by it because this was just the sort of behaviour they have always expected from those in power. The result was that the generality of young officials, who in 1950 and even as late as 1953 were keen patriots, had by 1960 become cynical and disillusioned.

The most glaring instance of Democrat corruption is generally considered to be the organization of the riots of 5–6 September 1955, with the purpose of demonstrating to the British and the Greeks the strength of Turkish public opinion about the Greek claim to Cyprus. The agents seem to have been largely drawn from the 250,000 Turkish deportees from Bulgaria who have supplied the

Democrat Party with the thugs it needed to break up Oppos
gatherings and to silence those journalists who were subtle en
in their attacks on the Government to escape the tentacles o
Press Law. Defenders of Menderes used to deny his complic
this and other crimes: he was, they said, such a busy man th
was dependent on his entourage for information, and they kept
in the dark about his Ministers' villainies Now that his black
files have come to light, he will clearly have to think of a b
defence than that.

In the 1954 elections the Democrats received over 58 per ce
the vote. By 1957 they had lost a good deal of support, even an
the farmers, because of the country's perennial economic c
Nevertheless, nobody seriously doubted that Menderes would a
be victorious. His hold on the conservatively religious masses
still firm, and most members of the racial minorities were still
pared to vote Democrat, because of the memory of long yea
People's Party discrimination against them. But this was not en
for Menderes, who regarded each single vote cast against him
personal attack. The elections were rigged from start to finish-
detailed results have still not been published—and a Dem
victory was announced. To diagnose Menderes's trouble as p
noia may seem an oversimplification, but it is hard to see any
explanation for his words to a booing crowd of students in An
not long before the Revolution · 'Do you love me or do you wa
kill me?' Yet to put all the blame on Menderes is unfair None c
Ministers, nor President Bayar, could afford to run the risk
change of Government, with its inevitable consequence of an
vestigation of their activities.

In March 1960 all the Opposition talk was of early elections '
that the economic situation is better . . . than it will be next yea
is pretty certain that elections were in fact being planned,
Menderes received the reports of his Ministers who had
touring the provinces to sound public opinion. On 3 April, I
Inönu, the leader of the People's Party, former President, hero o
War of Independence, and negotiator of the Lausanne Treaty,
on a train bound for Kayseri, east of Ankara, to address his
porters. The Governor of the province, whose orders were to
vent him from getting there, had the train stopped and callec
troops to bolster his authority. One of the Army officers
cerned, a major, resigned his commission in protest at being ord
to violate a citizen's constitutional right to travel where he ple

The major was arrested, pending court martial. The probability is that the officers' plot to overthrow the regime began at that point. As in the days of Abdul-Hamid, the officers form the most westernized class in the population. Not a few of them have served abroad in Korea or with N.A.T.O., and having seen something of the outside world for themselves they were less likely than most to accept the Menderes Government's claim to be democratic.

On 18 April the Assembly voted the creation of a Commission, composed of fifteen Democrats, 'to inquire into the affairs of the Republican People's Party and of a section of the press'. 'To ensure the smooth progress of the investigations', the Commission prohibited all political activity and any kind of published reference to the debates of the Assembly. Nine days later, after several fights between Government and Opposition deputies, the Commission was given dictatorial powers by the Assembly. In spite of the ban on reporting, this news was known in Istanbul by the following morning, 28 April. A demonstration by students of the Law Faculty gave the police the excuse to invade the university campus. The Rector was manhandled when he protested, and the police opened fire on the students, shooting to kill. One death was admitted by the Government; the true figure has still not been determined, though most people believe it to have been eleven or twelve. The Army was called in to restore order, which it did with consummate tact and gentleness, chiefly by getting the hated police out of the students' sight. Martial law was imposed that afternoon. The next day, students in the Law and Political Science Faculties at Ankara demonstrated, and they were fired on by soldiers as well as by police, the Martial Law Commander at Ankara being a Menderes man. It should be emphasized that such student activity, though the norm in most Eastern countries, is unprecedented in Turkey. Moreover, unlike most 'student demonstrations' in the Arab countries, the students involved were university undergraduates, not elementary and secondary school children.

One can only guess how long the Army would have borne with Menderes's Government had the students not brought things to a head. Was there collusion between officers and students? Perhaps, but there is no evidence to prove it. But it is worth bearing in mind that Turkey has universal conscription, and that this year's junior officers are last year's students. At all events, the Army's resentment at being used to prevent Inonü from going about his lawful business was intensified by the shedding of Turkish blood by Turks and the

imposition of martial law to silence the young critics of the De crats' undemocratic behaviour. On 3 May, General Cemal Gu Commander of Land Forces, wrote a forthright letter to Minister of Defence, deploring the 'unintelligent use of tr against the students', and insisting that the situation could no saved by force. The first essential was for the President of the public to resign, 'in view of the general conviction in the cou that all the evils proceed from him'. There should be changes in Cabinet; the Governors and police chiefs of Ankara and Ista and the Martial Law Commander of Ankara should be repla the Commission of Inquiry should be abolished, anti-democ laws repealed, there should be an amnesty for imprisoned jou ists, the arrested students should be released, and the exploitati religion for political ends should cease.

The Minister of Defence at once sent the General 'on l pending his retirement in September', when he was due to reacl age limit. Gursel thereupon issued a farewell message to the tr under his command, to be brought to the attention of all rank which he urged them not to let the honour of the Army be sullie involvement in the ambitions of politicians. The circulation o message was of course stopped, but its contents were rapidly kr to everyone. (One extraordinary feature of life in Turkey durin period has been the accuracy of most rumours.) The General went home to Izmir, where he occupied himself with his garde

Meanwhile, cadets and instructors of the two War Colleg Ankara and Istanbul were planning their *coup*, using the s efficient methods of secret organization that had paved the wa Sultan Abdul-Hamid's overthrow in 1908 The details of what to be done were planned by cells of four men, only one of whom in contact with any other cell. Army commanders and other se officers known to be in sympathy, including Gursel, were infor in the most general terms—'We are planning something. Are with us?'—and all of them expressed their support.

It is said that the original date fixed was Saturday, 28 May, b was brought forward by twenty-four hours when the plo learned that the Government was planning to shoot some i lectuals and four leading Opposition members on that day Cabinet even considered a suicidal scheme to liquidate the Colleges. The execution of the *coup* was as brilliant as its plan At 3 o'clock in the morning of 27 May, officers and cadets took every Government office and communications centre in Turke

the whole operation there was only one casualty, a lieutenant shot by an auxiliary policeman at the Ankara Post Office. The members of the Government and other leading Democrats were quietly rounded up and interned. Gursel had been instructed by telephone the previous day to be ready for a journey early on Friday morning. He startled his wife and provided the Revolution with a legend by being up and dressed and watering his garden before 4 a.m. By 10 20 he had been picked up by an Air Force jet and flown to Ankara, where he was proclaimed President of the National Unity Committee, the organizing body of the Revolution. That same morning five law professors of Istanbul University were flown to Ankara to begin drawing up a new Constitution. It is an indication of the efficiency with which the secret had been kept that the officer who collected them from their homes and put them on the aircraft was the one who had, the previous evening, by order of the Martial Law Commander of Istanbul, walked in on a meeting the professors were holding and told them to disperse.

Did the Army have to intervene? Could not democratic processes have been used to overthrow Bayar and Menderes? Once martial law had been declared the Army had no alternative. Gursel's warning had been disregarded: the Government was confident that the Turkish tradition of obedience to authority would keep the people in line The only groups in Turkey with sufficient initiative to begin the attack on the undemocratic regime were the universities and the Army. When the students demonstrated in the streets, the general public stood on the sidewalk and applauded. Given a few more days of senseless shooting, some of the urban population might have taken an active part, but the mass of the peasantry would have remained loyal to Menderes, as would the Democrat Party's squads of professional toughs, to whom weapons and Army uniforms were being issued by municipal authorities. If the Army had maintained martial law indefinitely, the revolutionary fervour of the universities would have died of frustration and boredom. If, on the other hand, the Army had stood aside and refused to uphold the Government, that would have been tantamount to an invitation to civil war.

And what now? The legislative power is exercised by the National Unity Committee, whose President, General Gursel, is Prime Minister. In his seventeen-man Cabinet, the Ministers of Defence, Communications, and the Interior are also Army officers, the remaining Ministers being civilians, mostly professors or civil

servants. The National Unity Committee has pledged itself to h
over power to a new Assembly as soon as elections can be held,
provisional date for these being 27 May 1961. Celâl Bayar is tc
charged with high treason; Menderes, all his Ministers (with
exception of Namık Gedık, Minister of the Interior, who commit
suicide in custody), and the entire Democrat membership of
Assembly face charges of 'abrogating the Constitution and red
ing the Grand National Assembly to impotence'. In spite of m
bloodthirsty rattling of typewriters by certain journalists, pres
indications are that there will not be large-scale executions.
Army officer's reply to a question on this theme was an indigr
'This isn't Iraq, you know!'

The trouble at the moment is that many of Menderes's peas
devotees refuse to believe that he is a bad man and that the Natic
Unity Committee are good men. The Democrats' encouragem
of the more reactionary manifestations of religious feeling had v
them many votes. It had become a commonplace for preacher
tell their congregations that anyone who did not vote for Mende
was an infidel The numerous Turks who find it possible to b
the same time sincere Muslims and loyal citizens of a secular
public could obtain no satisfaction by protesting to the civil
religious authorities.

When Ataturk set parliamentary democracy as the goal
Turkey, he knew it would be a long job, in a country where nea
80 per cent of the people were peasants for whom Islam meant
a man's personal religion but the entire frame of everybody's
istence. Hence the failure of the two attempts in his lifetime to
up an official Opposition (in 1924–5 and 1930); if the will of
Turkish people had been freely expressed at that time, it would h
been to undo the Kemalist reforms. But the generation that
growing up in the late 1930s imbibed the Kemalist spirit, if not v
their mothers' milk, at least with their A B C; the real charge aga
the Democrats is that they delayed the westernization of Turkey
a decade.

What the Menderes Government did was to give the untuto
masses what they wanted by conniving at numerous breaches of
laws which formed the basis of the secular State: turbans were f
quently to be seen in Anatolian villages; marriages, including pc
gamous marriages, were performed by village imams. Self-appoi
ed 'religious' leaders went around the villages spreading prepos
ous slanders against the Opposition. An imam in Kayseri forbade

congregation to have their teeth filled: extractions were perhaps permissible, but the filling of teeth was a sinful innovation, being unknown in the time of the Prophet. In Rumelihisar, a village with a largely Christian native and foreign population, an unemployable citizen with a low I.Q. and an immense drum (the former congenital, the latter provided by the Democrat Party) roused the village between 2 30 and 3 every morning during the month of Ramadan this year, so that everyone could be up in time to begin the Fast. People who complained to the police were referred to the local government office, whence they were referred back to the police. But there were uglier stories, too, this Ramadan, of restaurant proprietors being intimidated into closing down during the hours of daylight, of people insulted and threatened for smoking in the streets, of a village girl dying because her father would not permit her to take medicine during the Fast. This last case displays a complete ignorance of Islamic teaching, and suggests that what the fanatics understand by Islam is simply the antithesis of modernism; Islamic is equated with pre-Republican and un-Western.

With the Revolution, the exploitation of religion for political ends has again become a punishable offence, though the Committee is being careful not to offend genuine religious feeling. But all is not yet quiet in Anatolia. Immediately after the Revolution all firearms in private hands were called in, but within a week or so shot-guns and hunting rifles were returned to their owners. On 8 August, however, a new order was issued calling them back again. A farmer who can prove a genuine need to destroy agricultural pests may, after a complex string of formalities, be permitted to have his shotgun (but not rifle) for a strictly limited period only. Revolutionary Tribunals are being created to deal with counter-revolutionary activities; every few days one reads of arrests of people caught speaking against the regime. So long as the regime is synonymous with the Army, no counter-revolution can succeed. But what of the future?

'The world will see,' said General Gursel on 9 June, 'that the moment our task is ended we shall return to our own honoured ranks, our own units, and our own duties.' The National Unity Committee is not following a deep-laid plan to usurp power in perpetuity; close scrutiny of its statements and actions indicates that it is not following any plan at all, but is dealing with each new situation as it arises—and dealing, one must say, most effectively.

The People's Party, which at first was confident that it would soon

be back in power, has had its hopes damped by the Committee's repeated assertion that the Revolution was undertaken to eliminate an unconstitutional and evil Government, not for the benefit of any political party. Ismet Inönu, who at seventy-five is still active, wise, and mellow, is an honoured elder statesman, but there is little likelihood of his being permitted to stand for office again The Committee would like a Government of men above party, this must mean a Government of university men, journalists, ex-civil servants, and ex-officers. Of the last-named there will be no shortage, since 235 out of 260 generals, admirals, and air-marshals were retired on 3 August. The obvious interpretation is that they were men known to be opposed to the new regime, not necessarily because of sympathy with Menderes but because generals do not like taking orders from colonels and majors. Another possible interpretation is that some at least of the 235 may be intended to form the backbone of the new Assembly. There is no doubt that the Committee is being perfectly honest when it speaks of yielding power to civilians, but some of these may turn out to be civilians of not very long standing. If, as seems likely, the franchise is restricted to the literate (something over 40 per cent of the population), the next Government is likely to be a dictatorship of the intellectuals. This possibility seems to have been in the mind of the man who suggested that the first two clauses of the Constitution be amended to read 'The Turkish State is a Republic. Its official language is Turkish Its capital is the University of Istanbul.'

Whether such a Government can capture the people's imagination is another matter. In the old days the Turk could go about his work confident in the knowledge that the Sultan was 'maintaining the order of the world by his prayers'. Then came Enver, then Ataturk, then Ismet, then Menderes, and now Gursel. Quite apart from considerations of approval or disapproval of these men's actions, each in his turn has been regarded as the man who was running the show. And it seems that for the Turks there has to be such a man. This is not to imply that Turkey needs a dictator, but just that most Turks are not accustomed to the idea of impersonal rule by a committee, junta, or debating society. Whoever emerges as the next Prime Minister is going to find himself, whether he likes it or not, looked up to as Big Brother. Of the four classes mentioned earlier as the likely sources of the next Assembly, the ex-officers are most likely to produce such a man.

GEOFFREY LEWIS

The Economic Background of the Spanish Situation

N order properly to consider the present situation in Spain one eeds to go back to the early 1950s. That point may be regarded as he end of a chapter which began after the termination of the Civil Var, and the opening of a new one. Till then it was perhaps possible o regard the outcome of the Civil War as something that might be evised, after that point it could be said that the possibility of a direct ttack against the regime had ceased to be actual and a new situation ad emerged. It was also the most critical moment of the cold war. nd, economically, it was the moment when in Spain production ad more or less returned to the level reached before the Civil War.

In those years we find the definite consolidation of European ost-war recovery, and the 'boom' generated by the Korean War. merican aid for Spain was about to begin. The new Minister of 'rade, Manuel Arburúa, launched a policy of expansion. From that oint on, considerable increases in the gross national product ok place every year. The average annual rate of growth between 900 and 1935 was 0·8 per cent; from 1935 to 1955 it was 1·61 per ent, between 1949 and 1957 it was 5·27 per cent.

Many things could, however, be said about this growth. A comarison of agricultural and industrial output in 1956, 1957, and 1958 ows the following results:

Production Indices

	Agriculture	*Industry*
1956 base year 1925–30	92 9	256 0
1956 „ „ 1953–4	105 7	122 8
1957 „ „ „	107 3	133 6
1958 „ „ „	109 6	144 0

ut out of ten basic sectors of production considered in a recent udy, seven were below the average level of increase, e.g. (reckong 1925–30=100) chemicals, 214; coal, 191; gas, 220. The incease was shown to be mainly due to electricity (=533), nonetallic minerals (i.e. pyrites, potash, sulphur, and some others, 620), and some consumer goods industries, such as the manucture of automobiles, a new industry in Spain which in 1958 roduced some 30,000 units.[1]

[1] La Documentation Française *Notes et Études Documentaires*, 14–16 January 58 'Aspects de l'Économie Espagnole (1940–1957)' The figures given here are ken from this publication and from Banco Central, *Estudio Económico*, 1958, ariano Rubio Jiménez, 'Estabilización, ahorro y desarrollo económico', in *Economía* (Madrid), May–June 1959, pp 521–41.

The following contradictions then emerge: first, that in a country which is still mainly agricultural, and whose population, also mainly agricultural, has increased by 20 per cent in the last twenty years, agricultural production has remained stagnant; secondly, that electricity, so scarce that even in 1957 private consumption had to be cut for several days a week, has now become one of the main factors in raising the curve of industrial output; and thirdly that, in a country with a very low level of consumption, priority is given to consumer goods industries, but not specifically for mass and cheap consumption.

At the end of the last century there was considerable industrial development in Spain The population had almost doubled during the nineteenth century and the need for a change in the economic structure of the country was strongly felt. But agrarian Spain resisted any such change and industry was forced to compromise From this moment onwards Spain became an increasingly closed and stagnant market, where industry sought mainly to produce articles to replace imports, irrespective of cost, and only for a very restricted market. The share of foreign trade in the national income amounted to 10 per cent in 1911, 11·5 per cent in 1929, and 4·9 per cent in 1955. Wealth has always been in the hands of a very few, and these few, because of the situation just outlined, have always preferred secure incomes to adventurous projects

The Spanish economic system as a whole tends to produce a very low rate of savings. Forced savings through taxes could not play a very important part under the fiscal system that prevailed· 83 per cent of the population gets 30 per cent of the total national income and pays 60 per cent of the taxes. Moreover in the Budget non-productive expenditure predominated; from 1950 to 1958 public expenditure went up from 18,000 million pesetas to 50,000 million (representing around £107¼ million and £296¾ million at the present rate of exchange), divided as follows: military expenditure 25 per cent, administration 40 per cent, economic departments 20 per cent, and education 9 per cent.

As for foreign investment, Spain, with such a restricted and protected market, and without great natural resources, held out no great attractions. American aid, on account of the prevalent economic policy, was mainly devoted to filling the gap in the balance of trade.

Thus the greater part of finance was obtained through the creation of new money. Between December 1949 and December 1951

currency circulation rose by 31 per cent and total money supply by 34 per cent. In the following three years the inflationary trend was reduced, perhaps on account of American aid: currency circulation went up only by 18·5 per cent and the total supply of money by 32 per cent. But in 1955 and 1956 it rose again—by 30 and 38 per cent respectively.[1]

In 1951 an American economic commission, led by Mr Sidney Sufrin, visited Spain and prepared a report. Priority, it stated, should be given to agriculture where, with the help of fertilizers, irrigation, etc., production increases of up to 20 per cent could be obtained in a short time. In industry the first need was to renew old equipment and the second to modernize existing industries; only after this should new industries be established. It is true that an increase in agricultural output could have raised exports, thus bringing in the currency needed for new industrial equipment, releasing manpower for industry, and at the same time broadening the market. But it was an impossible policy to advocate, because the first step would have been to change the agrarian structure—in other words, to attack those very interests whose defence had constituted a large part of the reason for the Civil War.[2]

AGRICULTURE

Spain has an excess of agricultural population in relation to the income derived from agriculture. The population dependent on agriculture is 42 38 per cent of the total, whereas the income from agriculture is only 27 per cent of the total. The proportion of peasant population in Spain is 30 per cent higher than that of France (the absolute figure is more or less the same in both), and though the surface cultivated is roughly the same, the value of the Spanish cultivated square mile is little more than half (0·57) that of the French According to last year's O E.E.C. report, 40 per cent of the agricultural population can be regarded as surplus

The conditions of work are very bad because of the lack of adequate investment. Spain has always been, and still is, a thirsty land. The Republic published a National Plan for the irrigation of some 3½ million acres, but the Civil War put a stop to it. The situation today is as follows:

[1] Figures from Marius Gandilhon, 'Bilan du Franquisme', in *Esprit* (Paris), December 1959, pp 625–49, 'Economic Policy in Spain', in *The Statist*, International Banking Supplement, 13 December 1958, pp. 115–18

[2] The French agrarian economist René Dumont states this clearly in his work, *Économie agricole dans le monde* (Paris, Dalloz, 1954), pp. 241–2.

	Acres	*Percentage of total cultivated land*	*Percentage of total surface*
Dry farming	47,090,000	91·5	37 5
Irrigated land	4,370,000	8 5	3 5

(*Source*. Xavier Flores, 'El problema agrario español. I Estructura y distribucion de la tierra', in *Iberica* (New York), 15 May 1960)

By 1934, 3,416,000 acres were irrigated. What has been done since is therefore not so much as is claimed. According to the Instituto de Cultura Hispánica, by 1972, taking into account the expected population increase, the irrigated surface should amount to 7,798,000 acres if the food needs of the Spanish people are to be met. That would mean an annual increase of 160,000–170,000 acres, or double the rate of recent years As to the cultivation methods, although some progress was made in the last few years in respect of fertilizers and mechanization, nevertheless in 1958 Spain had only one tractor to every 1,625 acres, whereas England and Germany had one per 45 and Italy one per 460 acres. In that year 30,000 private cars were produced but only 1,500 tractors.

Moreover, crop distribution is irrational, much too large an acreage being devoted, for example, to wheat, with the lowest productivity in Europe In 1951, René Dumont,[1] observing a decline in the area under wheat, thought this might indicate a beginning of rationalization, but in 1958 it rose again to 10¾ million acres, as in France. There, however, production reached 8 million tons, whereas in Spain it was only about half that amount. The failure to improve living standards can easily be illustrated. In 1954 Spain, with an average of 2,535 calories per inhabitant according to the Instituto de Cultura Hispánica, lagged behind all the developed countries and even such countries as Egypt, Greece, and Southern Rhodesia, in 1956 *per capita* consumption represented the energy equivalent of 0·88 metric tons of coal, whereas the world average was 1·35 metric tons.

The reason for this situation lies in the country's agrarian structure, which impedes economic growth. There are approximately 17 million acres of *latifundia* (or land under extensive cultivation), 25 million acres of small holdings, and only 8½ million acres in medium-sized holdings. The big estates are divided between 10,584 owners and have an average size of 1,600 acres. There are 6,100 estates of 625–1,250 acres, with a total surface of 5,350,000 acres; 3,136 of 1,250–2,500 acres, totalling 5,300,000 acres; and the rest consists of 1,312 estates of over 2,500 acres. René Dumont says

[1] *op cit*

in the work already quoted: 'South of Toledo, beginning at La Mancha, and embracing the two Andalusias and Extremadura, we find the *latifundia*, occupying from 31·5 to 40 per cent of the surface .. They are generally less cultivated than the *minifundia* in the north Some big estates are devoted only to the breeding of bulls for bullfighting. Many others, deserving of serious development, are devoted to pasture and hunting... Some others are cultivated only one year out of five, with two or three years devoted to pasture and two years fallow... Since in these places we find many unemployed wage labourers, and all the population suffers from a shortage of food, it is evident that the big landowners do not fulfil their duty.' The social situation remains as Brenan has described it;[1] and we find here, in the Guadalquivir Valley, some of the best land in Spain In these conditions any improvement of agriculture is impossible; the owners are not interested, since they can get sufficient results with very low wages, and the peasants are powerless to fight against their semi-feudal situation.

In the other half of Spain, most peasants live on plots of land too small to be economic or to permit of any rational cultivation. Only in the northern fringe, in Catalonia and parts of Valencia, is the situation satisfactory. In Galicia, where the average holding is around half an acre, and in the corn belt of Old Castile, where it is about 1½ acres of very poor land, the situation is truly dramatic. And in Old Castile intensive cultivation is even sometimes attempted on very poor land that should really be devoted to afforestation

Land is not organized to yield the greatest output, but to provide the highest possible income to the small class of landowners, who live usually in the towns and are not interested in the land but only in the income obtained from it through peasant labour. And the peasants, when they are not mere wage labourers, have to pay part of their meagre crop as rent to the owner; 60 per cent of them have their land on lease and retain barely enough of their produce to live on.[2]

[1] See Gerald Brenan, *The Spanish Labyrinth* (Cambridge University Press, 1943)

[2] Figures from Banco Central, *Estudio Económico*, 1958, *Estudios Hispánicos de Desarrollo Económico La Agricultura* (Madrid, Instituto de Cultura Hispánica), René Dumont, *op cit* , Manuel Delasalle, 'Espagne d'hier, Espagne de demain (Développement économique et structure sociale)', in *La Nouvelle Critique* (Paris), March 1959, pp 38–78; Xavier Flores, 'El Problema agrario español', in *Iberica* (New York)—I Estructura y distribución de la tierra (15 May 1960), II. Producción consumo y productividad (15 June 1960); III La situación social de nuestros campesinos (15 July 1960)

INDUSTRY AND FOREIGN TRADE

The organization of industry is also not such as to produce the best results. The aim of the military rebellion was mainly to protect agrarian interests. It was for this reason that the industrialists complained for a long time about the 'dirigisme' of the regime. However, in the 1940s they were able to acquire large profits by taking advantage of the black market and by exploitation of the crushed and disciplined workers. The corrupt control of foreign trade gave a further source of profits, through speculation with export and import licences. In the early 1940s, the I.N.I (National Institution of Industry) was established. This organization could have been very important for the industrial development of Spain, but it failed because its policy, being influenced by considerations of nationalist self-sufficiency, lacked a genuine economic basis, and also because of the incompetence of the management, consisting mainly of Generals who were given these posts in order to guarantee their fidelity to the regime. In private industry, the traditional Spanish protectionism is coupled with a high degree of monopoly; practically the whole of Spain's industry is controlled by six great banks For the past twenty years these various interests have obtained great benefits through inflation and through the exploitation of both workers and consumers, without paying much heed to the development of the country.

The following figures demonstrate the inflationary trend and the foreign trade situation:

	Increase in total supply of money (per cent)	*Increase in gross national product* (per cent)	*Prices* 1953=100	*Cost of living* 1953=100	*Pesetas per 1 US $ in Tangier*
1951	17·5	7·6	92·6	100·4	—
1955	14·0	1·2	104·4	105·3	43·13
1956	19·8	4·7	113·9	111·5	45·20
1957	16·8	5·6	133·1	123·5	54·19
1958	14·5	4·3	146·0	140·0	55·48

Foreign Trade
($ million)

	Imports	*Exports*	*Balance*
1951	427·9	498·0	70·1
1955	617·3	446·3	−171·0
1956	766·7	441·4	−325·3
1957	862·2	475·8	−386·4
1958	849·0	485·7	−363·3

(*Source*. Banco de España *Informe sobre la situación de la Economía Española en 1958*)

SOCIAL CONDITIONS AND UNREST

From a social point of view the 1950s witnessed a certain improvement in the standard of living; it must be remembered that in the 1940s that standard was one of hunger, and hunger often meant death The increase in economic activity also brought with it higher wages, although people often had to work for as much as twelve or fourteen hours a day, and productivity was still very low, as has already been mentioned earlier in discussing the food situation. Also, prices rose more rapidly than wages and salaries. In 1936, a half-hour's work by an average worker would enable him to buy a pound of bread; in 1956 he needed one hour twenty minutes; and consumption of meat, milk, eggs, and sugar in Spain is often below that of Portugal and Greece.[1] In the spring of 1956 a great wave of strikes took place in Catalonia and the north; wages were raised twice in the cities, and in 1957 in the countryside too. But with a structure such as has been described above, an increase in industrial wages can only lead to greater inflation, and an increase in the peasants' wages to greater unemployment

During these years the economic aristocracy of the regime also became firmly established. Fortunes continued to be made on the black market and their proceeds placed to a great extent in Swiss and North American banks.

Finally, we find the children of this aristocracy revolting against the regime. In an inquiry conducted in the University of Madrid at the end of 1955, 74 per cent of the students accused the Government of incompetence, irresponsibility, and ignorance, and 85 per cent of immorality; 90 per cent considered the military to be ignorant, 50 per cent thought them immoral; 67 per cent considered the Catholic hierarchy to be immoral and materialistic, and 70 per cent thought it not at all interested in the people, 60 per cent were against any kind of totalitarianism, and 70 per cent against the socio-economic structure of Spain.

The year 1956 was an important one. The economic crisis began to be acute, and was coupled with labour unrest; and following the troubles in Madrid in February of that year opposition to the regime among the students and intellectuals became widespread. From then onwards it once again became possible to speak of the provisional duration of the regime.

In February 1957 a change took place in the Cabinet. Manuel Arburúa, the Minister of Commerce, was replaced by Sr Ullastres,

[1] Marius Gandilhon, *op. cit.*

who initiated a new economic policy to fight the crisis. A number of orthodox measures were adopted: an increase in the bank rate from 4·25 to 5 per cent; freezing of the rediscount ceilings; directives to the banks asking them to reduce certain types of loans; devaluation of the peseta on the official exchange market; first steps towards simplification of the multiple exchange rates; and, in 1958, a tax reform which increased the tax revenue and reduced public expenditure. As can be seen from the tables above, the rapid rise in the money supply was checked and the gap in the trade balance reduced, but prices continued to increase and the peseta to fall, and production and imports were restricted. The situation became steadily worse, and at a certain moment in 1958 currency reserves amounted to only $5 million. Crisis point was reached at the beginning of 1959, coinciding with the introduction of partial convertibility of most European currencies and the beginning of the Common Market.

Since 1956 the opposition has been constantly active It has made itself felt through university unrest, protests by intellectuals, civic action such as boycott of buses and tramways, strikes, and, as a result, frequent arrests. The policy advocated by the most active conspiratorial groups aimed at the establishment of a coalition ranging from the liberal right to the democratic left, a kind of coalition of all potential forces. Other groups have attempted to organize mass movements So far both tactics have failed The Spanish masses have not yet recovered from the utter crushing that followed the Civil War and from twenty years of exploitation and demoralization. As for the potential coalition, if it cannot be backed by a mass movement it must obtain the help of all or some of the supporters of the dictatorship: the Church, the Army, and the Banks, or of the U.S.A.

DEVELOPMENTS IN 1959

During the first half of 1959 a wind of hope and optimism was felt in Spain. The economic situation created panic among the ranks of the regime; proof of the widespread demoralization and lack of confidence was given when the arrest of an agent of a Swiss Bank showed that at least $1,000 million had been quietly exported From the United States point of view, Franco had swallowed more than $1,200 million in five years, yet the economic and social gap between Spain and the rest of Europe was greater than ever. The fall of so many Latin American dictators, as well as the experiences

of Mr Nixon in Lima, Caracas, and elsewhere, was remembered by the State Department. The end seemed at hand, and a detailed plan of action was agreed upon.

However, the acute economic situation at last forced Franco to accept the conditions insisted upon by O.E.E.C. as a prerequisite for Spanish membership of that organization. Experts from O.E.E.C. and the International Monetary Fund visited Madrid in December 1959 and subsequently published a report.[1] Although it was hoped that the long-term effect of the stabilization measures recommended would be beneficial, the immediate result of their adoption was to increase hardship.

In July 1959 the so-called Stabilization Plan was approved and Spain became a member of the O.E.E.C. This plan is based on the principle of the so-called 'package deal'; its aim was to put a brake on the increasing inflation and the gap in the balance of payments, and to stabilize money and prices The budget deficit was to be narrowed to 3,000 million pesetas, an amount which, taking into account the expected increase in the national income, would not necessarily be inflationary The bank rate, already increased to 5 per cent in 1958, was raised again to 6·25 per cent, and a ceiling was established for the creation of new credit by the banks. The peseta was devalued to 60 to the dollar. Foreign trade was liberalized up to 50 per cent, a considerable increase over the previous 9 per cent. However some brakes were imposed on imports, such as the restriction of credits and the obligation to make a prior deposit of 25 per cent of the value of the imports Exports were favoured by devaluation of the peseta and unification of the rate of exchange. At the same time foreign investments were encouraged by the abolition of an old law of 1939 and the granting of permission for up to half the capital of an enterprise to be derived from foreign sources; moreover those who wished to repatriate their capital were accorded an amnesty. These measures were accompanied by a new foreign loan, consisting of $75 million from the I.M.F., $100 million from the O.E.E.C., $45 million from the consolidated commercial debt, $168 million from U.S. banks, and $130 million from the U.S. Government.

From the monetary point of view this stabilization has been a success Currency circulation in 1959 went up by only 2·2 per cent, and the total supply of money by 4·8 per cent; and since the national income went up by 4·9 per cent, no inflation took place. The value of the peseta has been maintained at 60 to the dollar. The trade

[1] Paris, O E E C Information Division, 12 February 1960, Press/D(60) 13

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deficit went down by some 25 per cent, imports falling by 8 9 per cent and exports rising by 3·5 per cent. The balance of payments showed a credit balance of $104 million, $50 million being due to repatriated money. In the first four months of 1960 the balance of payments showed a credit balance of $59·9 million.

Production and employment, on the other hand, fell considerably. The rise in the national income was due mainly to the good harvest, resulting in an increase in agricultural output of 10 33 per cent. But the annual increase of industrial output slowed down considerably compared with earlier years:

1954=8 2 per cent	1955=7·9 per cent	1956=7 1 per cent
1957=3·4 per cent	1958=6 5 per cent	1959=2 6 per cent

The hardest hit was the mining industry, where production fell by 3·34 per cent in 1959. Naturally the situation was more serious in those industries, such as coal and textiles, which had already experienced difficulties. Stocks accumulated in many industries, but this did not lead to a fall in prices because industrialists preferred to accumulate stocks, hoping for better times.[1]

Unemployment at the end of the year was numerically not very high, but in recent years most of the workers had been doing many hours overtime, and this overtime now practically ceased. In the textile industry, where for some years a sixty-hour working week had been in operation, the number of hours worked per week had by December fallen to twenty-four; many industrial firms went bankrupt. Some months ago an agreement was signed with Germany providing for emigration of Spanish workers Recently, Manufacturas Metalicas Madrileñas, the enterprise of Nicolas Franco which for years had been living, and making profits, on the State Budget, dismissed more than half its workers, advising them in a public statement to go to Germany. More than 5,000 Spanish workers were expected in Frankfurt alone this summer.

This is not the place for a detailed analysis of the Spanish economic situation or a prognosis of its future; the object of this article is rather to study the socio-economic background of the present situation. It can hardly be denied that there is now a serious social crisis in Spain. Why does not this lead to a political crisis? We find

[1] Facts and figures about stabilization are derived from Banco Central, *Estudio Económico*, 1959, Banco de Bilbao, *Informe ante la Junta general de Accionistas celebrada el día 23 de Abril de 1960*; *Boletín Informativo del Centro de Documentación y de Estudios* (Paris), No. 1, February 1960, No 2, April 1960, *Información Comercial Española* (Madrid, Servicio de Estudios del Ministerio de Comercio), No. 320, April 1960.

n Spain today an extremely well-organized police and army. ˈor strategic reasons the United States has found it opportune to ɲve support to the Franco regime and this has enabled Franco to naintain them in the economic interest of a restricted minority. ſhese forces are confronted by the firm unanimity of the Spanish ɪeople, but only mass action could give this unanimity a solid ɪeapon. To understand why such a mass action does not take place, deeper and broader study would be necessary than can be attempt-d here Among other things it would be necessary to institute a istorico-sociological analysis taking into account such considera-ions as the crushing of the social revolution in 1936–9, the physical estruction of the country's progressive forces through exile and :pression, and the twenty years of exploitation and demoralization hich the Spanish people have experienced since the Civil War.

One thing, however, is clear the regime alone cannot face its own roblems No doubt private foreign investments will be found to elp in the present crisis. But it is extremely doubtful whether such ivestment will solve Spain's problems. It is doubtful whether ıfficient investment can be found to carry on the irrigation plans,) invest the 72,000 million pesetas that are needed over fifteen :ars for railway development, to double the production of coal and ˈment and quadruple that of steel and electricity.[1] It seems more kely that foreign capital will be used to establish the kind of in-ıstries that will bring in sure and quick profits. And those profits ill only to a small extent be reinvested in Spain. Meanwhile iousands of Spaniards will be obliged to leave the country. Spain, ke many other under-developed or semi-developed countries, :eds to mobilize her workers in accordance with a rational plan, ilizing such foreign aid as she receives towards this end.

RELATIONS WITH E E C AND E.F T.A.

The problem of Spain's economy in relation to the world abroad ˈcame acute with the advent of the Common Market. Officially, is regarded as a good thing that Spain should join the Common arket. Many of the reasons advanced are political; it is well known at Franco occupies a place in the so-called 'Europe de l'Ordre orale' (Adenauer, de Gaulle, etc.). In a study of the Cámara ficial de Industria of Barcelona it was pointed out that Spain's ide with the Common Market countries in 1955 represented ·73 per cent of her imports and 33·73 per cent of her exports. But,

[1] Marius Gandilhon, *op. cit.*

the study argued, it was even more dangerous to be inside than side; first, because the proportion of trade with the countries o Free Trade Area was similar; secondly, because the characti the Spanish economy meant that integration in the Common M: would damage innumerable economic activities in all fi thirdly, because the Common Market did not accord the : degree of liberalization for agriculture as for industry.

Direction of Trade by Areas
(per cent)*

EXPORTS TO	*1955*	*1956*	*1957*	*1958*
E E C	39 1	32 4	33 6	38 7
E F T A	27 6	26 0	25 1	13 0
U S and Canada	10 2	14 1	10·7	8 7
Latin America	9 8	10 5	13 2	7 0
Other countries	13 3	17 0	17 4	32 6
Total	100 0	100 0	100 0	100 0
IMPORTS FROM				
E E C	32 0	30 3	23 0	24 5
E F T A	19 6	15 9	14 2	8 5
U S and Canada	16 0	25 4	31 0	17 4
Latin America	11 6	8 8	8 9	12 1
Other countries	20 8	19 6	22 9	37 5
Total	100 0	100 0	100·0	100 0

* based on totals for first six months of year stated

Source Banco Central, *Estudio Económico*, 1959

Spain naturally cannot remain isolated when the general tre for countries to integrate into larger economic units, but sl faced with a serious dilemma. Integration of Spain in the Com Market might lead, on the one hand, to the total integration of tain sectors of her economy which, with foreign investment, c work on European standards—and, on the other hand, to se damage of the remaining two-thirds of the economy. Spain n as has been said above, a long-term plan and adequate help for l term investments. The aforementioned study of the Cámara O de Industria of Barcelona took the view that for the time bein Free Trade Area was the best solution.

To many it seems crystal-clear that it is only the interventi the United States which has prevented the contradictions o regime from bringing it down. Meanwhile, the spirit activatin Spanish Democrats is well illustrated by a quotation from editorial article in a recent issue of the illegal review of the D

cratic Union of Students:[1] 'We may be sure that nobody will prevent us from attaining our aims. Nobody will prevent the Spanish people from being free. Historical realities cannot be kept perpetually hidden. Our country, with its great demographic strength and vital wealth, where a normal growth is prevented by a backward economic structure.. will one day break this structure... We shall attain freedom however much the "free world" may strive to prevent it'

VICENTE GIRBAU-LÉON

Collectivization of Agriculture in Central Europe

ON 25 April 1960 Walter Ulbricht announced in the People's Chamber of East Germany that 'the peasants of the German Democratic Republic have completed their merger into agricultural producer co-operatives' On behalf of the Council of Ministers he proposed that the House should take note of the 'complete transition of peasants to collective work'. In other words, East Germany became the first Central European country within the Soviet orbit where the overall collectivization programme had been carried out. A 'White Book' published by the West German Government[2] described this achievement as the 'annihilation of the independent peasantry'. It drew the attention of international public opinion to the 'brutal infringement of human rights' and the 'campaign of terror' whereby hundreds of thousands of farmers with their families had been forced into the collectives within an amazingly short period of time.

Articles in the Western press described the ruthless methods of 'persuasion' used by the Ulbricht regime: the raids of Party activists over the villages, the virtual mobilization of the countryside, and the deployment of loudspeakers and searchlights. Such accounts, however, overlooked the fact that collectivization of agriculture, as such, is, in both theory and practice, an integral part of

[1] *Union*, Portavoz de la Unión Democrática de Estudiantes, No. 4, February 1960

[2] *Die Zwangskollektivierung des Selbstaendigen Bauernstandes in Mitteldeutschland* (Bonn, April 1960).

Communist policy. It has been going on for many years, in East Germany as well as other Central European countries of the Soviet bloc, as a permanent feature in the pattern of economic and social transformation. The surprising elements in the East German events of last spring were the haste, the timing, and the spectacular results achieved (on paper at any rate) within a very short time. But the collectivization drive itself and the methods used were no novelties in the history of the Soviet orbit.

In three and a half months—between January and April 1960—2½ million hectares of East Germany's agricultural land were collectivized—nearly as much as in the years between 1952–9 As the total agricultural land in East Germany is estimated to be 6.4 million hectares, this would mean that at the end of last year nearly half of the agricultural land still belonged to individual farmers This private sector was virtually absorbed during the recent 'Blitzkrieg' when more than 250,000 new members were recruited in the producer co-operatives. The magnitude of the new membership figure can be appreciated in the light of last year's statistics, according to which in 1959, during a slower process of collectivization, an average of 7,500 peasants were 'persuaded' each month to join the collectives. The total membership now is over 900,000.

The assertion of the Bonn Government that the motives for the haste and the timing of the drive were political rather than economic is borne out by articles in the East German press and statements made by Ulbricht himself. *Neues Deutschland* (22 March 1960), in an article much publicized in the Communist world, hailed the 'Socialist Spring' and stated that the 'socialist transformation of agriculture' was of 'fundamental national importance'. And Ulbricht, in his speech in the People's Chamber, not only spoke of the 'historic necessity' of this development but called the association of peasants in the collectives a 'popular vote for peace' and a step of 'great significance in the struggle for Germany's reunification' In his report to the March 1960 Plenum of the S.E.D. Central Committee Ulbricht made it clear that one of the motives of the collectivization drive was to create a *fait accompli* before the Paris Summit meeting, and he hinted that the decision had been taken at the agricultural inter-Party conference held at the beginning of February in Moscow. Before that conference the East German Government expected to complete the collectivization of agriculture by 1965. The plans were suddenly changed at the end of last winter Political motives, however, merely altered the pace: the ultimate

m had been set as early as 1952 and persistently pursued ever nce.

THE PATTERN IN COMMUNIST CENTRAL EUROPE

At the end of last year, East Germany still lagged behind every her Soviet bloc country except Poland in the field of agricultural ›llectivization. While in East Germany individual peasants still wned and tilled nearly half of the agricultural area of their country, Czechoslovakia the socialist sector[1] was already predominant: ere, only 16 per cent of the agricultural land (which totals 7·3 illion ha) was at that time in private hands. And the process of ›llectivization in Hungary—after a serious setback in 1953-4 and ı even graver blow during the Revolution of 1956—was also ıghtly ahead of East Germany at the end of last year: only some ¦ per cent of the arable land was privately farmed.[2]

Between 1953 and 1956 collectivization declined in Czecho-›vakia too; but in a vigorous campaign during the first nine onths of 1957 more than 200,000 peasants were induced to join oducer co-operatives and nearly 1 million hectares of agricultural nd were collectivized As a result the socialist sector comprised per cent of the agricultural area; this figure rose to over 75 per nt by the end of 1958 and to 84 per cent by the end of last year In ay 1960 the official figure was given as 86 per cent and the target, r the end of 1960, is 90 per cent.

In 1957, when the new drive was launched in Czechoslovakia, the ne was not ripe for the Hungarian regime to embark on a similar nture The years 1957 and 1958 were devoted to consolidation and redevelopment at a very slow pace. At the beginning of 1959, ›wever, a collectivization drive—more concentrated than in :echoslovakia—was launched in Hungary. In three months 20 per nt of the arable land was added to the socialist sector which now vered half of the arable land. After a new slow-down of some ven months another campaign was launched in November 1959. · February 1960 well over two-thirds of Hungary's arable land longed to the socialist sector. The target for the end of 1960 is

[1] The aggregate of producer co-operatives and State farms The latter are ms expropriated after the war but not distributed under the land reform They ' mostly model farms and extend in East Germany over 8 per cent, in Poland d Hungary over some 14 per cent, and in Czechoslovakia over 19 per cent of ' agricultural area

[2] Total arable land 5 4 million hectares In Hungary, unlike the other ntral European countries, official figures usually refer to the arable, not the ricultural, land The latter includes forests, pastures, orchards, etc.

85 per cent, and the planners want to complete collectivization by 1965.

During the early 1959 campaign 330,000 peasants were recruited to the producer co-operatives and in the second drive between November 1959 and February 1960 the number of new members was 370,000. There are now 870,000 collective farmers in Hungary, as late as the beginning of last year 700,000 of them were individual peasants. During each of the two drives many more peasants were coerced into the collectives than in the more publicized and perhaps more spectacular 'Blitzkrieg' against the independent peasantry of East Germany.

The 'persuasion' of the Hungarians—as of hundreds of thousands of farmers in Czechoslovakia—was carried out in a fashion similar to that used in East Germany. The 1957–8 drive in Czechoslovakia and the two concentrated campaigns in Hungary were forerunners of the events in East Germany and, according to unofficial but reliable sources, the methods adopted were similar. Apart from the special urgency of political considerations such as the timing of the process in East Germany for the eve of the Summit conference, the pattern was substantially identical in the three countries This was in conspicuous contrast to the course of events in Poland.

Collective farms in Poland extend over 240,000 hectares, which is slightly more than 1 per cent of the total agricultural area (20·9 million hectares) There are about 29,000 collective farmers, comprising 0·2 per cent of the rural population. Before the great change in October 1956 about 10 per cent of the agricultural area belonged to collective farms Together with the area of State farms the socialist sector extended over 23–24 per cent of the total agricultural area; now the figure is less than 15 per cent. Poland, unlike Hungary was not forced back on to the road of collectivization after the events of 1956, and private farming continues to prevail. This is of more than local significance as the size of the agricultural area in Poland is about the same as that of East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary combined. The Gomulka regime is, however, trying to revive and consolidate another institution: the Agricultural Circles—peasant associations of old tradition. As Gomulka himself admits they will 'serve the cause of socialist transformation of the countryside' but they are not collectives on the kolkhoz model. Since August 1959 they have administered the Agricultural Development Fund—in which the Government invests its profits on compulsory deliveries—and purchased tractors for communal use. Agricultura

machinery thus becomes joint property and, as Gomulka put it, the peasants' joint efforts are being organized' in the co-operative use of machinery, the purchase of seed, etc. Some of the land administered by the State Land Fund, if farmed without tenancy contracts, is also being handed over to the Circles for management, but so far only 55,000 hectares of arable and some pasture land are thus involved. By the end of last year the number of Agricultural Circles was said to be 22,000, embracing 600,000 farmsteads. They have been established in about half of the villages and some 20 per cent of the peasants have joined them. They did so under pressure but not under ruthless mental—let alone physical—violence.

The contrast between agricultural policies in the two halves of the agricultural area of Communist Central Europe lies in the different application of the principle of voluntariness. The objective is basically the same: collectivization 'The Party', Gomulka said last year, 'believes in the socialist transformation of agriculture and realizes that such a transformation can be implemented only through setting up large collective peasant farms, that is, producer co-operatives.'[1] While, for the time being, and for the sake of increasing agricultural production, he would not dismay the peasantry by forceful methods, ideologically Gomulka believes in the collectivization of agriculture no less than Ulbricht or Novotny.

But what is collectivization in the modern sense of the word as Communist regimes apply it? It has very little to do with property rights and is not a legal issue at all. In his report to the People's Chamber, Ulbricht emphasized that 'co-operative property enjoys special protection' and that 'the members' property in land, buildings, and the farm is guaranteed' This, however, is a mere formality, since the member of the producer co-operative may not detach his plot which he had 'brought in', should he quit the collective. The situation is similar in Czechoslovakia where the new draft Constitution speaks of the 'social utilization of land joined together'. According to Novotny's own interpretation this means that by forming collectives 'nothing is being changed in the ownership of land . . . which they have consolidated for purposes of co-operative farming'.[2] In Czechoslovakia and Hungary it has been emphasized that property rights of producer co-operative members are inheritable But, formal property rights notwithstanding, the peasant who

[1] Speech of 22 June 1959 at the Second Plenum of the Central Committee, Polish United Workers' Party

[2] Speech of 5 July 1960 at the National Conference of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia

joins the collective unavoidably loses his economic independence his peasant way of life, and his traditional ties with his own soil H himself, and not only his land, is being 'consolidated': lumped to gether with the others for 'social utilization'. Collectivization is a integral part of the social revolution from above, and a means in dispensable for the regime to exercise control over the peasantry Property rights may not change, but social relations, includin labour relations, do.

MOTIVES AND OBSTACLES

Every Communist regime is ideologically committed to carryin out the collectivization of agriculture. Marx, Engels, Lenin—le alone Stalin—expressed mistrust and sometimes contempt for th peasantry, whom they regarded, perhaps rightly, as guardians o the old spirit. In the drive for a classless society the independen peasantry must disappear: it must be absorbed into and assimilate with the working class.

But—apart from ideology or long-term considerations of chang in the structure of society—there are compelling reasons for co lectivization in Communist Central Europe. The ambitious ir dustrialization schemes in the countries under review required large-scale transfer of agricultural labour to industry. But how ca agricultural output be maintained and even increased if there ar fewer farmhands available? The answer, obviously, is by the ir crease of productivity—through modernization in general, an through mechanization and the improvement of organization an labour discipline in particular. These, in turn, can be achieved o the basis of large-scale farming more efficiently than on sma individual plots. On large units better use can be made of Sta or communal machinery, and labour-saving mechanization an organization of agricultural operations can be more rationally ca ried out. Collectivization, as a method of establishing large-sca enterprises in agriculture, has thus become not only a desirable bu an indispensable feature of development in Communist Centr Europe, provided it is not defeated by psychological factors, by th reluctance of those directly involved. 'Manpower economy throug collectivization' might indeed be the slogan of the programme if were to be deprived of its ideological paraphernalia. And the fast the decrease of agricultural population—for the sake of industri expansion—the more compelling the collectivization of agricu ture.

In recent years the demographic trends[1] in East Germany, zechoslovakia, and Hungary aggravated the manpower problem nasmuch as the rate of growth of the total working-age population egan to decline; and this tendency is expected to continue. In ast Germany the working-age population is expected to decline etween 1958 and 1965 by some 600,000 persons, or 7 per cent. lass emigration from East Germany to the West is, of course, a onsiderable factor, but even in Czechoslovakia and Hungary 'the xpected increments in the adult population are not large enough to lter radically the current trends of manpower supply.'[2] Between 955 and 1965 the population of working age is expected to increase n Czechoslovakia from 7·9 million to 8·4 million and in Hungary rom 6 million to 6·2 million, which is a very slow rate In Poland, n the other hand, working-age population is increasing faster than he regime would desire[3] and, instead of having to face the problem f manpower shortage, the regime is worried about over-population. omulka recently declared that in the years 1961–5 Poland could xpect an increase of nearly a million persons of productive age, and the subsequent five years a further rise of about 1½ million. He oted the 'complete ignorance of realities glaringly manifested by igh dignitaries of the Church who bitterly resist birth control' and vited them to 'find the miraculous means' to attain proportionate roduction increases.[4]

Taking into account the demographic trends, the Hungarian onomic plans anticipate a decline of about 15 per cent in agri- ıltural employment over the next seven years In Czechoslovakia, om 1960 to 1965, a fall of about 20 per cent is now predicted. The olish plans, on the other hand, assume a stabilization of the resent volume of agricultural employment until 1975.[5] In the light f these trends and of the discrepancies between expected develop- ents in Poland and in the other three countries under review, the aste in the process of collectivization in East Germany, Czecho- ovakia, and Hungary, in contrast to Gomulka's patient and prag- atic attitude in Polish agricultural policy, becomes more easily nderstandable.

The execution of collectivization schemes, no matter how com-

[1] Cf U N. *Economic Survey of Europe 1959*, Chapter 3.
[2] *ibid*
[3] 1955· 16 6 million, 1960 17 million; 1965 18 36 million
[4] Speech of 21 June 1960 at the Fifth Plenum of the Central Committee, lish United Workers' Party.
[5] U N *Economic Survey of Europe 1959*.

elling for the regime or how advantageous for the peasants them-
elves, is faced with tremendous obstacles and severe limitations in
ace. The main obstacle is the desperate reluctance of the peasantry,
hich is not entirely rational. Emotional and sentimental factors—
hich Ulbricht mildly calls 'hesitations under the influence of old
aditions and habits'—play a role as important as the rational revolt
gainst the curtailment of economic freedom. And among the
otives of peasant resistance there is demonstration of mistrust and
islike for the socialist system. During and shortly after the war a
eat many people joined the Communist movement for negative
asons such as hatred of Nazism; and in the period of the Com-
unists' rise to power in the East European countries masses of
on-believers took an active part in the defensive struggle of the
hurches. Similarly, the peasants' fight against collectivization is, at
ast partly, a form of non-co-operation with a hostile regime
ccasional outbursts of official spokesmen against the peasants'
difference and unwillingness to perform proper work on the col-
ctive farms are in fact understatements and euphemisms for a
lent but stubborn form of sabotage

In Hungary, for instance, at an early stage of collectivization it
as openly admitted that 12 per cent of co-operative members did
ot take part in common work at all, and in Poland, before col-
ctivization was stopped in 1956, nearly 1 million hectares of land
ere left lying fallow

To combat peasant reluctance, the regimes in Communist
entral Europe are using a wide variety of devices to make collective
rming more attractive and individual farming less desirable. They
nge from simple discriminatory measures (such as special tax
oncessions, price reductions for seeds and fertilizers, and generous
edits offered to producer co-operatives) to threats, blackmail, and
timidation (such as crippling limitations of free marketing
cilities, fines, and political persecution) in order to render the lives
f private farmers unbearable. Nevertheless, reluctance persists,
ıd the peasant has to be forced into the collective by virtual vio-
nce, unless the regime is prepared to suspend or abandon the col-
ctivization scheme.

In Poland, where the whole pattern has changed since 1956, the
easants' fear of collectivization is still so deep that they mistrust
gricultural Circles as possible traps whereby they might find
emselves caught in the collective. Soon after the popularization
ampaign for the Agricultural Circles had begun, Warsaw Radio

spoke of the peasants' 'fear that any collective work may lead to the social transformation of rural areas';[1] and later on it was admitted that 'members of some Agricultural Circles are fighting tooth and nail against nomination for office in the organization.'[2] In one instance members of an Agricultural Circle moved an amendment to the draft statutes to the effect that the signing of the statute would not commit the signatories to joining a producer co-operative. Warsaw Radio—with a tone of irony—assured listeners that membership in the Agricultural Circle would no more involve such a commitment than, for example, the obligation to join a trade union or an association of soldiers' friends.[3]

A natural limitation to hasty collectivization, which the regimes often tend to disregard, is of a financial and organizational character. The latest drive in Hungary, for instance, had to be halted abruptly in the second week of February 1960 instead of four or six weeks later, as originally planned, because resources were exhausted. There was a shortage of buildings, machinery, fertilizers, etc , and, in the words of the Central Committee, members were expected to 'mobilize their own resources and develop self-help'. Presumably things failed to develop in line with the optimistic expectations, and the authorities could not raise further investments to cope with more co-operative farms. Some 30 or 40 per cent of the collectives set up during the Hungarian campaign early in 1959 did not start actual co-operative work until the autumn of that year. It often happened that Party officials proudly reported the birth of new co-operatives without practical steps being taken to reorganize cultivation, to build communal barns and stables, or to obtain the necessary machinery. Ploughing and sowing went on, as before, on individual plots.

A similar situation arose in East Germany last spring. At a Peasant Party Conference in Guestrow, nearly three weeks after Ulbricht's 'victory announcement', Herr Gruenberg, a candidate member of the Politbureau, boldly declared that a number of producer co-operatives 'still exist on paper only'. There was inadequate enlistment of new members, and problems were being left unsettled. There was, he said, 'an excessive rush' to set up big producer co-operatives, which was not the task of the hour. 'For the time being the task must be to help the new co-operative peasants to perform their joint work properly,' he concluded.[4]

[1] Warsaw Home Service, 27 November 1959 [2] *ibid* , 9 March 1960
[3] *ibid* , 30 August 1959
[4] A D N (East German News Agency), 13 May 1960.

These difficulties may, of course, prove to be transitory, and paper co-operatives' may soon be consolidated into working collectives, unless hasty collectivization should defeat its own ends This can happen if too many peasants—especially too many young men—abandon the countryside and move to the towns to seek jobs n the factories. This migration of young peasants was one of the major problems during the latest collectivization drives in Hungary, o that last spring Party directives and a press campaign called for heir return. And in Czechoslovakia, owing to transfiltration of oung men from agriculture to industry, the average age of the agricultural worker has for years been as high as forty-five years The opulation transfer—one of the basic motives of collectivization to urther industrial expansion—may overshoot its mark and become mass exodus of discontented peasants. Even though the authorities nay succeed in halting the avalanche by radical administrative neasures and may manage to cope with the problem of agricultural nanpower, the fulfilment of production plans will remain a burning uestion as long as the peasant refuses to 'bring into the collective ot only his property but his heart as well'.[1]

According to current economic plans the anticipated (cumulative) ate of growth in gross agricultural output is slightly over 4 per cent n the countries under review This is a modest rate, but it must be emembered that in recent years there was a falling rate of growth in East Germany and stagnation in Czechoslovakia. Last year Hungary vas the only country under review where, compared with 1958, gricultural output was rising. When we recall that in 1958 the vorld average output was 37–38 per cent higher than before the var, whereas in Hungary today, according to official statements, otal output is still only 15 per cent above pre-war level,[2] the grave oncern of agricultural experts in the East European countries is quite understandable. In East Germany agricultural production, n Ulbricht's own words, is 'growing more slowly than consumption' and the country relies more and more on grain and fodder import. The same applies to Czechoslovakia and Hungary. The *Economic Survey of Europe 1959* rightly emphasized that all these ountries 'count upon considerable gains in labour productivity and ll plans presuppose large increases in yields per hectare and per nimal' which are considerably lower than in Western countries Given the limited resources for investment and the difficulties

[1] *Nepszabadsag*, 9 February 1960

[2] The output of wheat and rye, however, is below pre-war level.

caused by manpower shortage, increase of productivity is, indeed the logical answer. But the desirable increase of *per capita* output can hardly become a reality so long as, owing to peasant reluctance improvement of productivity is hampered by collectivization which has been designed by the Communist regimes as the very lever of productivity.

Supposing that the regimes in Communist Central Europe find a way out of this vicious circle, a new set of problems will await solution. At least two of them have already arisen.

The holdings created by hasty collectivization are not of optimum size Since September 1959 the amalgamation of small collective farms into large units has already been on the agenda of the Czechoslovak planners, and by the end of last February 1,579 producer co-operatives were merged into 659, thus increasing the average area of holdings from 266 to 638 hectares, but the national average size of a collective is still only about 400 hectares. The situation is similar in East Germany where the problem has not yet been tackled. But unless in due course a merger scheme is carried out labour productivity is unlikely to increase and manpower shortage will continue.

Another aftermath of hasty collectivization is the heterogeneous composition of the new collectives. In Hungary, for example, until the autumn of 1952 former landless peasants and dwarf holders formed 91 per cent of membership in the producer co-operatives Peasants with medium-sized holdings—branded as 'kulaks'—were kept out. Later, however, and especially during the recent drives prosperous farmers had to be recruited who had better and larger holdings as well as substantial livestock. At the beginning of last year the proportion of former prosperous farmers was 47 per cent of the total membership; today it is 85 per cent The Hungarian press has recently launched a propaganda campaign in favour of the 'unity of membership in the producer co-operatives'.[1] It appears that the presence of former 'kulaks' in the collectives created an atmosphere of social discrimination and resentment on the part of the former farm labourers who constituted the membership 'old guard'. Communist ideology notwithstanding, the Party press felt it necessary to stand up for the former 'class enemy', and especially for the kulaks' rights to enjoy land rent from the col-

[1] E.g an article by G Rapai, head of the 'Agitprop' Department of the Party Central Committee, in *Nepszabadsag*, 12 May 1960, and a series of articles based on interviews with a hundred co-operative leaders (*ibid*, 29, 30 June, 1 July 1960).

lectives, to which the former landless peasants cannot be entitled

The same problems do not, of course, arise in Poland. But productivity and output are just as precarious in that vast area of private farming as in East Germany, Czechoslovakia, or Hungary. The Gomulka regime handles the peasantry more cautiously than do the other regimes. In the absence of collectivization there are 3½ million separate agricultural units, and more than 80 per cent of them are smaller than 20 hectares. This state of affairs is, from the point of view of productivity, just as unlikely to lead to improvement as the unpopular measures of collectivization. Gomulka will hardly risk a radical change in the foreseeable future. When visiting one of the few collective farms in Poland Khrushchev endorsed Gomulka's collectivization policy, saying 'You do not get water from a well by kicking it.'[1]

In East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary they *are* kicking the well. But kicking or no kicking, the results are equally poor.

PAUL KATONA

[1] *The Times*, 20 July 1959

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Notes of the Month

United Nations Intervention in the Congo

SINCE mid-July the United Nations has been operating in the Congo on a scale and in a manner for which there is no precedent in its fifteen years' experience. At first the task seemed straightforward. U.N. troops were invited to the Congo by the Congolese Government to help to get Belgian forces out of the country. The Security Council, in agreeing to do this, authorized the U.N. force to give military assistance until the national security forces should be able to fulfil their tasks. This could only mean that the force had the duty of maintaining law and order.

But the course of events has inevitably involved the U.N. force in internal Congolese politics. Mr Lumumba first sought to use U.N. troops to restore his authority in Katanga and Kasai, and then, as open revolt spread, it became clear that there was no generally recognized Congolese Government with whom the U.N. forces could collaborate without prejudging the constitutional issue. Mr Hammarskjold has consistently refused to let his troops take sides in the internal conflict, even when requested to do so by what was at the time the internationally recognized Government. This was strictly in conformity with international law, which assigns a well-recognized status to separatists and insurgents once they have established themselves in some part of the country, as more than one of Mr Lumumba's rivals has done. In a civil war only foreign support for the rebels can legally justify foreign support for the Government.

Mr Hammarskjold has accordingly sought to avoid a military clash with either side, but by the mere act of checking lawless violence the U.N. forces have inevitably incurred the charge of obstructing one side or the other. The crisis came when, following a direct incitement to civil war, broadcast by Mr Lumumba in Leopoldville, the U.N. commander closed the radio station and prevented Mr Lumumba from using it. It is arguable that such action implied intervention by the U.N. in the internal struggle for power, and this charge was levelled both by the U.S.S.R. and by

some African States. The local reality was, however, that there a power vacuum, accompanied by growing violence, which l forces could scarcely ignore without endangering their la mission.

Previous precedents for U.N intervention do not quite fit present situation. The invocation of Article 51 of the Charte justify U.N intervention in Korea in 1950 was regarded as a ma both of law and fact, of defending the Republic of Korea fron ternal attack—though the U.S S.R represented it as an aggre intervention in a civil war. The U.S. landing in Lebanon and sending of British parachutists to Jordan in 1958 was argue justifiable on the grounds that the intervention was directed tow meeting externally inspired rebellion and had been invited by l the Governments concerned. In the present instance, the l forces were initially invited into the Congo by the Congo Government, but now, in the absence of any generally accej Congolese Government, they run the risk that any action, how negative, which they may take may be interpreted as interven in support of one faction or another.

The situation is further complicated by the appeals which l been made in the name of the Congolese Government for help f individual countries. The Soviet intervention on behalf of Lumumba provides an example of the difficulty of applying l criteria to foreign intervention in internal disputes The So planes and men were ostensibly supplied for civilian purposes refusal to channel them through the U.N. was politically re hensible but not in itself illegal. Their diversion to military p poses, though well-authenticated, was hard to prove in any auth tative way, since no international tribunal exists capable of nouncing upon such matters

In these circumstances legal argument has begun to seem important compared with the political issues at stake, above all possible extension of the Great Power conflict to Central Af and the future of the United Nations itself. On these issues decisive element has been the attitude of the other African Asian States, and on 20 September in a special meeting of General Assembly they voted overwhelmingly in support of United Nations action and, by implication, against Great Po intervention. This vote opens a new phase in United Nat history. Here, it seems, is a field where the Great Powers neutra one another and only the United Nations can act.

The Twenty-fifth International Congress of Orientalists

BEFORE the Congress, which took place in Moscow from 9 to 16 August 1960, opinions were divided on how the Russians would handle it Some thought that they would regard it first and foremost as a political exercise designed to capture Asian and African opinion and to denigrate the West. Others thought it was outrageous to suppose that Soviet orientalists were affected by political considerations or that the Congress would be any less academic than its predecessors The latter view was prevalent among Western, and particularly British, orientalists, the great majority of whom are either ignorant of Russian, and are thus unable to read Soviet publications, or are concerned mainly with the remote past, a field in which there has been some good and comparatively non-political Soviet work

In the event, the Congress was given a political setting to which only convinced Soviet supporters and bemused eccentrics could have been blind. This setting was provided by the long speeches by Mr Mikoyan and others at the opening and closing sessions, by the strong positive and negative propaganda contained in some of the Soviet papers, and by the Soviet comments on Western papers, which had been prepared in advance on the basis of the previously submitted scripts. At the same time it was clear that considerable efforts were made not to alienate the goodwill of Western orientalists, most of whom the Russians regard as 'bourgeois' in outlook and as living in the past and lacking in political comprehension. Deference and some tributes were paid to many of the distinguished scholars present, and insulting references to 'colonialists and imperialists' and 'bourgeois scholarship' were by Soviet standards kept to a minimum

From the point of view of international scholarship the value of the Moscow Congress was probably on balance about the same as that of its predecessors. It provided an equally good meeting ground for scholars of many nations; the average standard of scholarship was probably about the same, and it was equally cumbrous and indeterminate. The fine university buildings should have provided better facilities than either Cambridge or the Bavarian University in Munich; but there were some organizational defects, such as the absence of any common room where participants could meet and of a list of the participants, until just before the conclusion of the Congress

From the Soviet political point of view the success of the Con-

gress must be regarded as uncertain. From the voluminous advance publicity given to the Congress it was clear that the Russians hoped that there would be more orientals present than orientalists The absence of the expected Chinese delegation of 400 destroyed this hope, and, according to the official list, out of 1,446 participants only 337 came from Asian and African countries, and of these 115 were from the eastern republics of the U.S.S.R. The general impression created on Asians and Africans by the university, by the various entertainments provided, and by the flattery contained in the opening and closing speeches may well have been considerable Although Western scholars were inclined to speak slightingly of the Soviet contribution of 191 papers out of a total of 766, it seems likely that the Asians and Africans were favourably impressed by its range and versatility, by the relative modernity of many of the subjects chosen, and by the competence which Soviet orientalists displayed in the modern forms of Asian and African languages Western scholars were perhaps too ready to judge the depth of Soviet orientalism on the basis of the papers presented, rather than on that of the vast mass of printed Soviet literature; they are also apt to forget that the great Soviet drive in oriental studies began only five years ago.

Controversy about the venue for the next Congress in 1963 aroused considerable bitterness. Invitations were extended by the United States, India, and the U.A.R India was eventually decided upon, the Soviet delegation making it clear that they had voted for the U.A.R Doubts are already being expressed whether the Congress now serves any useful academic purpose, and it is possible that these doubts may grow in the future.

Soviet Target: Fifteen Million Flats

THE building industry in the U.S S.R. has come a long way since the break with the Stalinist tradition of construction on a monumental scale was officially announced in 1955.[1] The aim now is to eliminate the shortage of housing in the next ten to twelve years This is a formidable task. For many years after the revolution housing was the Cinderella of Soviet industry. During the war 1,700 towns and urban districts and 70,000 villages were destroyed and 25 million people rendered homeless, while the urban population has increased more than threefold in the last thirty years.

[1] See 'Troubles on the Building Front in the U S S R', in *The World Today*, January 1956

The most important step in the implementation of this task has been the decree on housing construction published on 2 August 1957.[1] This severely criticized the building industry, which, it said, was badly organized, mainly in small units, and unable to utilize the State funds allocated to it. The decree expressed the hope that the reorganization of all industry into economic regions would be conducive to greater efficiency in building as well. The State funds available for building were to be increased over the five-year period 1956–60 by 78 milliard rubles and the plans for both State and private building revised accordingly. The decree promised increased assistance to private builders and encouraged enterprises to build housing for their staffs by utilizing for this purpose a large proportion of funds accruing to them for overfulfilment of production plans. In rural districts the decree urged the creation of collective farm building units and inter-collective farm building enterprises which could produce some of their own building materials.

The project of the Seven-Year Plan, published in November 1958,[2] envisaged an even more rapid development. The State funds available were to be increased by some 80–83 per cent compared with the previous seven-year period, and the output of the building industry was to be roughly doubled. Finally, in June of this year, the first All Union Congress of Town Planners took place in Moscow. It was addressed by Kucherenko, Chairman of the State Construction Committee.[3] He maintained that the U.S.S.R. was now building more housing units per year than the U.S.A., Britain, France, West Germany, Sweden, Holland, Belgium, and Switzerland combined. The rate of building is now 14·9 housing units per 1,000 inhabitants per year. He reaffirmed the decision of the Twenty-first Party Congress to build 15 million flats in the course of the Seven-Year Plan, i.e. during 1959–65.

At the present time urban construction is financed and directed in three principal ways, by local authorities, industrial enterprises and ministries, and from private sources. Such co-ordination as exists between these three methods is very imperfect. The town council controls private building to a certain extent by allocation of building plots, but apparently these can be subdivided by the original owner without the authorities' consent. Nobody seems to be responsible for the provision of approach roads, sewerage, or water and electricity supplies on private building estates. Enterprises

[1] *Pravda*, 2 August 1957. [2] *Pravda*, 14 November 1958.
[3] *Pravda*, 8 June 1960.

build their housing estates on the land they own, and provide the services themselves, or link them with the town supplies. According to the Soviet press, this is also a frequent cause of friction and inefficiency. It is a fact worth noting that the present Town Planners' Congress was the first of its kind in the Soviet Union In the course of it mention was made that out of 331 towns in the Ukraine, for instance, general plans exist for only 187 towns, and have been confirmed for 136 towns. Most town plans are worked out in centralized institutes and frequently ignore local climatic and topographical conditions. The Congress urged that planning should be transferred to the localities, that chief town architects should be appointed in all towns, and that all building funds should be concentrated in the hands of local authorities.

The impression prevails in the West that nearly all housing in the Soviet Union is constructed by the State Soviet emphasis on the low rent charged for such housing (it accounts for some 5 per cent of a worker's income) fosters this belief In fact, however, the private building sector is very large. Nearly all collective farm dwellings, housing about half the Soviet total population, are privately built and owned. New building is assisted by loans of money from the collective farm funds and help with materials and labour by the farm management, but such help has to be repaid over a period of time. The collective farms also often build their own schools, hospitals, and old people's homes. In addition, according to the Seven-Year Plan, private building in the urban sector and on State farms should account for one-third of all building in the 1959–65 period.[1] Some of this, particularly in rural districts, would be done by the owner himself with the help of family and friends, but voluntary building associations were also to be encouraged. One type was the building co-operative in which members contribute work and money and the resulting houses are held as co-operative property, and another is a looser association—the building collective—in which flats built with members' labour and funds become their own individual property. In both cases the preparation of the site is carried out at the cost of the enterprise in which members are employed.[2]

It seems at first sight strange that, in spite of the negligible cost to the tenant of State-built accommodation, such a large proportion of housing should be privately built and owned. The main reason is,

[1] *Partiinaya Zhizn*, No 15, 1958.
[2] *Sovetskoye Gosudarstvo i Pravo*, No 3, 1958.

of course, that there is not enough housing to go round. In 1958 it was confidently expected that by 1960 the allocation of living space per person would rise to 9 square metres, but at the Town Planners' Congress it was stated that some local authorities were still allocating 6 to 7 square metres per person. Another important inducement for private building is the fact that it is the only outlet, other than savings banks, for investment, which is becoming more important with the increasing money wages. Building for anything but occupation by the owner is considered definitely 'anti-social', but the Soviet press continually features articles about houses being built and let at exorbitant rents, particularly in suburbs and resorts, by people who already own other houses or occupy State-owned flats.

It is, however, obvious that a great qualitative revolution in housing is taking place. The clearest indication of this is that the target is now '15 million flats' in seven years and not '600 to 650 million square metres of living space'. Moreover, while in 1955 most of the houses built consisted of large flats of two, three, or four rooms, designed for occupation by several families, the vast majority of modern flats are at least designed for single-family occupation Much more attention is paid to town planning, including the development of micro-districts and satellite towns, and, for the first time, there is talk of the need to undertake demographic studies in various towns to determine the kind of living space to be provided

The individual flats, it is true, cannot be called luxurious. The Minister of Construction, addressing the Town Planners' Congress, had to reject the proposals for lifts in four- or five-storey houses, larger kitchens and halls, waste disposal chutes, and the elimination of passage rooms: their adoption, he said, would decrease the plan by 1 million flats

Elsewhere,[1] the necessity for passage rooms is justified on two grounds. First, they improve the 'coefficient' of living space to total space, by which the plans are judged, and secondly they make it difficult for the local authorities to put two unrelated small families into a single-family flat. Difficult perhaps, but not impossible. Investigation has shown that 4·4 per cent of single-family flats are still shared and that they house 9 per cent of all families in such flats. The target of one room per person by 1975 seems rather remote.

[1] *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, 9 June 1960

The Next President of the United Stat

NINETEEN-SIXTY was the year which was to discredit finally primary elections which are supposed to give the American vot say in their party's choice of candidates for the Presidency. Fc 1960 no Republican contestant entered the primaries in those states which have these elections, and only two Democra Senator Kennedy and Senator Humphrey. The sophisticated was that the two would knock each other out and leave the fessional Democratic politicians to choose between Senator Lyn Johnson and Mr Adlai Stevenson. In fact, Senator Kenr knocked out Mr Humphrey and proved himself such a vote-g that by July, when the Democrats met in Los Angeles to nomi their Presidential candidate, they had no practical alternative to Kennedy If ever a man won the nomination through the prim —and, of course, a lot of other things as well—he did.

Nineteen-sixty was the year which was to see the end—or at the drastic reform—of the convention system of nominating P dential candidates. For this was the year in which both parties in effect picked their candidates in advance and had left the vention nothing to do but confirm that choice. Yet this year parties developed during the convention a greater (although haps only temporary) unity, a clearer view of what they stood an understanding of the variety of problems which they must s in a way that they could never do if they did not come together in place from all over this huge country every four years. This is only occasion on which any large group of the rank and file of e party gathers, often the only occasion on which even the deleg from individual states meet each other Maybe much of the ritu entertainment and demonstrations on behalf of the potential ca dates is false and overdone; maybe the speeches are too many too long, although there is more variety and interest and less b dom than those who watch only on television might think. But one who wants to abolish the conventions has to offer some o way, both of nominating candidates for the Presidency of all United States and also of enabling the two parties to become bo genuinely representative of the whole of this diverse and consta changing nation.

Mr Adlai Stevenson, or rather his devotees, provided the r excitement at the Democratic convention. In spite of having l defeated twice, in 1952 and 1956, by President Eisenhower,

Stevenson still held a body of solid support within his party among people who felt that he was the only man fully qualified to be President But their efforts on his behalf broke against his refusal to cooperate and against Mr Kennedy's grip on a majority of the delegates And in the course of these efforts it became clear that to support Mr Stevenson was more a cult than a practical political stand the combination of original New Dealers, led by Mrs Eleanor Roosevelt, and starry-eyed young people who rallied around him gave a curiously old-fashioned impression.

This was largely because it contrasted so sharply with the efficient steam-rolling organization of Mr Kennedy and his brothers 'bossism' brought up to date. Yet their methods left many of the delegates bitter and disgruntled, particularly of course those who in their hearts preferred Mr Stevenson or Mr Johnson. An attempt was made to pacify the former by asking Mr Stevenson to help in formulating Mr Kennedy's foreign policy (although it is doubtful whether anybody but the candidate himself will actually formulate it) and by giving an unusually liberal flavour, particularly on proposals for safeguarding the civil rights of Negroes, to the platform adopted by the convention as the official statement of the party's policy.

But this platform was an added insult to many of Mr Johnson's supporters, especially those from the South, for most of them came from the conservative wing of the party. To pacify them and to counter the danger of a southern revolt Mr Kennedy, to almost everyone's surprise, offered Mr Johnson the vice-presidential nomination; the offer was accepted, also most surprisingly. Since such a playing-off of one section of the party against another is not likely to attract the high-minded independent voters to Mr Kennedy, and since Mr Johnson is disliked by trade unionists, Negroes and liberals, all groups whose votes Mr Kennedy needs, there were those who thought that Mr Johnson's presence on the Democratic ticket might do more harm than good This view has been strengthened by the recent upsurge of prejudice in the South against Mr Kennedy's Roman Catholicism which makes it seem possible—indeed, at the time of writing, probable—that even with Mr Johnson on the ticket the Democrats will lose some of the most important southern states, including Mr Johnson's own Texas. But Mr Johnson has been campaigning with unexpected success in other parts of the country and has been getting on particularly well with the farmers, something which the city-bred Mr Kennedy finds it hard to do. Mr Johnson's main function is to counteract by

his greater age and experience the criticism that Mr Kennedy is too young to be President. As leader for years of the Democratic majority in the Senate, Mr Johnson has been closer to the centre of government than Mr Kennedy, and has an established reputation for political ability and sagacity.

So far, however, Mr Johnson is not venturing into the Far West—or apparently into Michigan, where the political influence of the trade unions is strongest—because it is there that liberal resentment against both his nomination and that of Mr Kennedy is felt most deeply. In California, for various reasons, of which the chief is that the revival of the Democratic party in that state coincided with Mr Stevenson's two Presidential campaigns, his supporters are particularly influential in the party organization and there is a danger that they may not work wholeheartedly for Mr Kennedy They have been trying to strike a bargain, by insisting that Mr Stevenson must be promised the Secretaryship of State; this in itself is almost enough to ensure that Mr Kennedy will not offer him the post There is a somewhat similar danger in New York, and yet it will be almost impossible for Mr Kennedy to win unless he can carry these states, the two most populous in the country

An unenthusiastic organization is likely to mean a light vote, and by tradition this favours the Republicans since normally it is the ill-educated, impoverished voter who cannot be bothered to go to the polls; if he does go he is almost certain to vote Democratic Roughly three-fifths of the committed voters belong to the Democratic party and the Republicans therefore start with a big disadvantage It was because of this, and because the Democrats had been doing so well recently in congressional and other elections, that at the Republican convention, in spite of the repeated protestations that Vice-President Nixon, whose nomination was a foregone conclusion, could not fail to win the election, much of what went on there was really jockeying for position, should he be defeated on 8 November, between Senator Barry Goldwater of Arizona, a dynamic and intelligent reactionary, and Governor Rockefeller of New York, an equally dynamic and intelligent progressive

Mr Nixon recognizes better than anyone else that he has a hard fight before him Since he must win a high proportion of the independent votes which were responsible for the Eisenhower victories, it is essential, or so at any rate it looked at first, for him to demonstrate that he is a liberal. Mr Rockefeller was not a serious challenger for the Presidential nomination, but by threatening to initiate a fight

on the convention floor unless the platform paid tribute to his liberal views on defence, civil rights, and other matters, he gave Mr Nixon a welcome opportunity of proving that he was more progressive than the Eisenhower Administration without offending the President who is, after all, still the head of his party and his country.

Mr Nixon excused himself by saying that Mr Eisenhower's programme was for the nineteen-fifties and that he himself was outlining a new programme to suit the new conditions of the nineteen-sixties But whether Mr Nixon, who as Vice-President has been given more responsibility than have his predecessors in that office, will be able to dissociate himself personally from Mr Eisenhower's record is doubtful—and there are those who wonder if he would be wise to try to do so. After all, Mr Eisenhower has shown himself the greatest vote-getter in American political history, and he would do so again this year were he able to run for the Presidency.

Since the election campaign proper began, early in September, there have been signs that Mr Nixon himself has had second thoughts on this point He has been presenting himself as a man above party, concerned only about the future of his country. According to him, the Republicans have answered the Communist challenge effectively by establishing peace through strength and the Democrats are not only unpatriotic but guilty of 'negative thinking' and of undermining their country's prestige when they argue that the defence of the United States has become dangerously weak and that its world influence has declined as a result of the lack of drive and imagination which has characterized the Eisenhower Administration.

The popular appeal of Mr Nixon's case is strengthened by the presence of Mr Cabot Lodge on the Republican ticket as the vice-presidential nominee. Mr Nixon himself insisted on this when many politicians thought that he would have been wiser to choose someone more acceptable to the mid-western conservatives who had been shocked by Mr Nixon's liberalism at the convention. Mr Lodge is all that they suspect most—an aristocratic and internationally minded easterner; moreover he has already been defeated once by Mr Kennedy, in the Massachusetts senatorial election in 1952. But as United States Ambassador to the United Nations he has been seen constantly by everyone with a television set, being tough with the Russians. His ability to do this without getting the United States into war is obviously carrying weight with the voters, particularly in the Middle West where the Democrats' past history

has given them a reputation of being both a war party—they were in power in 1917 and 1941—and a pro-Communist party—they recognized the Soviet Government in Russia and were the target of Senator McCarthy's attacks.

Mr Khrushchev's visit to New York to exert pressure on the United Nations, which is taking place while this article is in the press, obviously makes it even more difficult than it already was for Mr Kennedy to attack this Republican approach He has already felt obliged to point out to Mr Khrushchev that mutual party criticism during the election period does not mean that the country is not united in its opposition to Communism. If, as seems likely, the international situation deteriorates further before November, more force will be given to Mr Nixon's secondary argument that a complete change of administration would involve an untimely disruption of governmental processes So the Republicans will not necessarily suffer even if the peace which they claim to have brought to the country fades away. Nevertheless it is in foreign policy that the failures of the Eisenhower period have been most blatant and that the need for leadership, for seizing the opportunities of today—Mr Kennedy's great cry—appears most clearly. It will be unfortunate if Mr Khrushchev succeeds in keeping what should be the great issue of this election from being discussed in full.

Mr Nixon is also obviously aware of the need for new departures, even though so far they have been given little place in his speeches This is perhaps because he has been speaking at party rallies, rather than to the unconverted, and because his audiences have shown little enthusiasm for change. So far, indeed, neither candidate has discussed any campaign issue in detail; they have merely been travelling backwards and forwards across the country as fast as possible, appearing in as many places as possible, 'projecting their images' on the newspaper headlines and the television screens. But when they appear together on those screens, as they are to do shortly, to debate the main questions which face the country, then surely they will be forced to outline specific policies. It will be interesting to see if the variations between them are matters of principle, or only of degree, so far the latter has seemed to be the case.

If Mr Kennedy's attack on Mr Nixon's foreign policy is in danger of being inhibited by Mr Khrushchev, his attack on the other great Republican asset—the prosperity which has accompanied the peace—is being pushed by circumstances into the forefront of the campaign. This year was supposed to be a boom year, but all the statis-

ave been consistently disappointing. Economic activity re- at a high level but the trend is down, not up, although there is to be a seasonal upturn just before the election. More and more .s are forecasting a recession in the new year; more important the voting point of view is the fact that unemployment re- obstinately high—nearly 6 per cent of the labour force in it—and is serious in a number of places. If by November the are really worried about the economic situation at home, then emocrats will certainly benefit For it is on domestic econo- olicy that there is the greatest difference between the two s, and Mr Kennedy is already concentrating on this in his ıes.

: Democrats argue that there would be jobs for everyone if overnment would take active steps to encourage economic h, particularly by spending more on public works, highways, 's, and other social developments which are needed if Ameri- ll potential is to be utilized. Such spending, in the Republican would either be inflationary, since it would unbalance the 't, or it would mean higher taxes. The Democrats contend r that the Republican Administration's restrictions on bor- g are at the root of the present economic difficulties, and they make credit more easily available But should Mr Nixon be 'xt President and should the recession have materialized by ıe he takes office in January, there is little doubt that he would himself much more sympathetic to remedies of this type than ıgencies of the election campaign will allow him to admit.

: difficulty which the voters have in choosing between two lates whose policies are so similar is compounded by the fact ıe candidates themselves are also very alike—although differ- ın both policies and characters may become more apparent as mpaign develops. Each party chose as its candidate the man ad proved himself the one most likely to win the election and e most obviously suited to be President. Neither Mr Steven- r Mr Rockefeller had shown the determination or the political which the job requires today although, should a really serious ency arise, the country may regret that it has deprived itself ır imaginative and idealistic inspiration. It has left itself in- ly with a President who is a product of a business machine, anization man, a cold, ambitious, self-confident professional. is is what both Mr Kennedy and Mr Nixon are. But they are nergetic, intellectual, competent, well-trained young men,

ready to consult experts, full of ideas about how the country should be run and qualified to do it efficiently.

There are, of course, drawbacks about them both as candidates. A surprising number of people dislike and distrust Mr Nixon, not quite knowing why and not really willing to admit it. He has a number of rather unsavoury rumours in his past but no one denies that he has grown with his responsibilities and has acquitted himself with distinction in recent years. He has the advantage of being a poor boy who has made his own way in the political world with spectacular speed, while Mr Kennedy was born with great wealth in a family of established political influence. This is an odd reversal of the usual distinction between the two parties, for the Democrats have normally been the party of the under-privileged, the Republicans of big business.

Mr Kennedy is a Roman Catholic, the second to be nominated for the Presidency in the history of the United States, the first was Al Smith in 1928 and he brought the Democrats a disastrous defeat, in which bigotted opposition to his religion played a large part. Although it had been recognized that the present election also was certain to be influenced by religious prejudice, this had not been expected to come into the open to the extent that it has already done, particularly in the South. It is suspected that the outburst of anti-Catholic propaganda has been financed by wealthy conservatives who want Mr Kennedy to be defeated not because of his religion but because of his economic liberalism. Mr Kennedy has stated his position, his determination that his religion will not be allowed to interfere with his constitutional duty should he become President, with a sincerity and outspokenness that cannot but impress all fair-minded voters. Mr Nixon himself is doing his best to keep religion from becoming an election issue; he knows that the Republicans are likely to lose more than they gain by criticizing Mr Kennedy's religion, especially since the Catholic vote is of vital importance today in the big cities and the key states—California, New York, Pennsylvania—without which the election cannot be won.

How far it is true that Senator Kennedy is less experienced than Mr Nixon is doubtful. He is only four years younger although he looks more youthful than that. Neither candidate has had any administrative or departmental practice, although Mr Nixon has attended Cabinet meetings for the past seven years and he has also travelled all over the world as a representative of the United States and shown an impressive ability to grasp the immediate problems of

intries he has visited. But Mr Kennedy has actually lived
, has studied foreign affairs more deeply over a longer period,
ved on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and has
ly a better comprehension of the human elements involved in
tional relations.

year neither candidate can count on the support of any par-
section of the country· Mr Kennedy cannot be sure of the
nally Democratic South, nor can Mr Nixon rely on the tra-
l Republicanism of New England and the Middle Western
ates. In any case none of these comparatively small states are
is in the big industrial states that the votes are concentrated,
re the fight will be desperate. Even if Mr Nixon wins the
ncy his party is unlikely to have a majority in the Congress
will be elected at the same time For this reason many people
d it difficult to choose between candidates who are so alike
their good qualities and in their bad, and have such similar
, feel that Mr Kennedy would be preferable as President
would have better control of Congress and would thus find
to implement his plans.

at least was the opinion until the short concluding session
ast Congress in August, after the nominating conventions,
out to be so disastrous for the Democrats in general, in spite
majority of two to one, and for Senator Kennedy's pro-
of liberal legislation in particular. While there is no com-
between Mr Kennedy's present influence and that which he
ave should he face the Congress as a newly elected President
d just turned the Republicans out of the White House, his
owing in August explains why observers in Washington no
ake it for granted, as many of them did immediately after the
tions, that he can hardly fail to win. While it is not observers
ington but ordinary Americans all across the country who
ose the next President of the United States, all the present
e suggests that the voters are equally doubtful about which
y want. Their indifference presents a challenge to the candi-
hich both are rushing out to meet.

NANCY BALFOUR

Pavlov or Khrushchev?

Soviet Methods in Political Warfare

THE distinguished clinical psychologist Dr William Sargant aroused considerable interest with a letter to *The Times* (18 May 1960) in which he suggested that the Soviet Union uses Pavlovian techniques in its political warfare against the West. One example he gave, and the immediate occasion of his letter, was the Soviet treatment of the U2 incident and its bearing on the approaching Summit Conference In the breakdown of that conference a few days later many people saw further evidence for Dr Sargant's hypothesis, which was restated in an article attributed to 'A Distinguished Practitioner of Psychological Medicine', published in *The Sunday Times* of 3 July 1960.

The great variety of responses to Dr Sargant's initiative unfortunately included no detailed attempt to trace a Pavlovian pattern in Soviet international behaviour, and no thorough explanation as to how the techniques of physiological experiments on animals under laboratory conditions can be applied in psychological operations against whole human societies over which the operator has no physical control. The additional information to be drawn from Dr Sargant's interesting book *The Battle for the Mind*[1] does not satisfactorily fill this gap. In the absence of a full exposition wags could point to the erratic behaviour of the West as evidence that it is the operator and the Soviet Union the victim in a Pavlovian experiment to produce mental confusion and ultimate breakdown Some people who were at first struck by the similarity between Pavlov's usage of his dogs and some aspects of Soviet behaviour towards the West decided that there was after all no more than a loose analogy, and that to draw far-reaching conclusions from it was not much more sensible than trying to explain Soviet policy by reference to the principles of elementary mechanics, simply because our descriptions of it make frequent use of such terms as pressure, stress, and relaxation.

Whatever we may think of the relevance of Pavlovian physiology to social psychology (and there is no sign that the Russians themselves have found in this a fruitful subject for research), and however certain we may be that Dr Sargant wrongly interprets the events which he mentions as examples of Pavlovian techniques in Soviet

[1] London, Heinemann, 1957.

ıational practice, it would be wrong not to ask ourselves why able at this stage to put forward his suggestion so plausibly.

DR SARGANT'S THESIS

Sargant believes[1] that the Soviet Union is engaged in a 'battle en's minds' so intensive that unless we 'get a better underıng of Russian methods of psychological warfare' the West may 'a resounding defeat . . . far more devastating in its subse- effects than the outcome of the present race for rocket macy'. Since Pavlovian theory has an ideological monopoly in t psychological studies, the Soviet Union's advisers on ological warfare must be Pavlovians. 'Now, Pavlov showed go . . . that one of the surest ways of breaking down the ner- tability of the dog and other animals, and producing in them of uncontrollable neurotic excitement, which may later lead hysterical and submissive behaviour, and finally even to de- ve apathy, is to give a trained, co-operative but anxious animal lom series of positively and negatively conditioned stimuli or s. A hungry, tense animal, for instance, who has been used to lerly laboratory existence, in which certain given signals are ed by food and others by no food, can quickly become neu- nd confused when he tries to sort out a sequence of positive egative food signals, followed indiscriminately by food or no which do not, and never were intended to, make sense to him he beginning. This quite simple physiological technique has ound just as applicable to man and has been repeatedly used itish and American politicians, press, and public in recent As examples of random series of signals intended to confuse, ırgant mentions conflicting Soviet statements about the y significance of the first sputnik, about the probable fate of g sent up in a later sputnik, and about the prospects for the ıt Conference after the U2 incident. The American authority lov, Dr George Sutherland, is quoted in the *Sunday Times* as saying that 'if the method of repeated positive and nega- gnalling was used too continuously by the Russians it could ad on to a global neurosis.'

ording to Dr Sargant, the way to avoid 'the inevitable disturb- of judgment, the increase in hysterical suggestibility which ult from the skilled use of powerful physiological processes' berately to ignore the signals and stop trying to make any

quotations which follow are from his letter to *The Times* of 18 May 1960.

sense of them'. 'Pavlov could not break down those dogs wh
no notice at all of the experimental flashing lights specially p
for their undoing.' Only the dogs who 'did their best to co-
were easily broken down. Unfortunately, says Dr Sarga
press of both our countries has to relay all these confus
alternating signals, without also explaining what may re
happening, thus tending unwittingly to play the Russian
ganda game for them.'

OBJECTIONS

There is in fact no close correspondence between Pavlo
cedures as described by Dr Sargant and any operation in ps
gical warfare which the Soviet Union is carrying out or n
present think practicable

To begin with, although many people in the West are 'a
can they really be said to be 'trained' or 'co-operative'? H
been a period in which the Soviet Union accustomed us
regular association of particular signals with particular rewa
punishments, so that it could later confuse us by random sig
There has not. What the Soviet Union has accustomed us t
signals indicating a prospect of improved relations and b
lasting peace are likely at any time to be followed by other
indicating a deterioration in relations and a danger of war. V
Pavlov was careful to keep distinct his system of signals
system of rewards and punishments to which they were
related and later irrelevant, this can hardly be said to be the
Soviet international behaviour, where, in fact, the signal is it
the reward or the punishment. We are used to a steady succe
'war' and 'peace' signals—to put it crudely—and also to the i
there is neither war nor peace.

To this Dr Sargant might say that he is not concerned v
fluctuating hopes and fears produced by an alternation of thr
promises, regular or random, but with the effect of a baff
quence of actions and statements which are at once vaguely
ing and meaningless. These random signals we try to relate
system of rewards and punishments already experienced, l
set of logical significances inculcated in us not by the Russi
by our normal experience.

But there are other conditions of the Pavlovian experim
sides the preliminary positive conditioning, which cannot b
leled in political warfare. The Soviet Union cannot 'carry u

and hungry'—cannot obtain complete physical control over us, or, we are well-balanced people, fix our attention on a series of ran-om signals which we soon realize have no immediate practical gnificance. The Pavlovian who straps down an individual human eing on his experimental stand can no doubt reduce him quite asily to the level of a dog (Pavlov often reduced his dogs to a sub-anine level by inflicting serious physical damage on them before etting to work on their minds). But it is very doubtful whether the oviet Union would expect to be able to reduce human beings inctioning in organized groups outside its control to a state of ysterical confusion by addressing to them a baffling series of ierely verbal signals. The free human being's most likely response such a procedure would surely be to ignore it, as Dr Sargant ad-ises, because being human he has a better memory and a keener ialytical intelligence than the dog, and because being free he can irect his attention to meaningful signals of practical significance him We may wonder, too, whether the U.S S.R. really wants to sk driving the victims of its psychological warfare into that stage 'uncontrollable neurotic excitement' which precedes hysteria id subservience After all, it was only because they were firmly rapped down that Pavlov's dogs did not bite their tormentors.

It is possible, to judge from *The Battle for the Mind*, that Dr argant would regard these objections as so many quibbles, and in-st that *mutatis mutandis* the Soviet Union is doing to the West what avlov did to his dogs We must however draw one further distinc-on which Dr Sargant's argument cannot accommodate. Unlike avlov in the experiment, the Soviet Union does not in practice nit random and confusing signals If we want to seek from experi-ental psychology a parallel for what the Soviet Union is actually oing, I believe that we should find a more satisfactory one in the ocess of preliminary positive conditioning rather than in the ex-eriment designed to produce mental breakdown.

We can in fact dispense with jargon altogether, and say that the oviet Union is, in the simplest and most obvious way, trying to ach us, to train us, to indoctrinate us: not to reduce us to a state of nfusion, but to inculcate in us a set of ideas which will induce us to have positively in a specific fashion. Now I do not mean by this at the Soviet Union places its hopes on 'converting' us by appeal-g to our reason, or by foisting on us an elaborate system of half-uths and falsehoods (although many of our counter-propagandists ink that this is an important aspect of Soviet activity). The great

objection to such an enterprise, as to experiments in Pavlovian confusion, is that most of us would simply not pay attention. No, the Soviet Union is not trying to madden us by its inexplicability, nor to persuade us of its morality and rationality. It is clearly set on instilling into us a conviction that it is stronger than the West, that the disparity will grow, that the Soviet Union is irresistible, that even now it could destroy its enemies without perishing itself, but that it is intent on maintaining peace unless unbearably provoked, that it will never accept the compromises on the most dangerous international problems which are all that the West can offer, that in the end the West will have to co-operate on Soviet terms. . . In fact, far from trying to baffle us, the Soviet Union projects a remarkably simple and stable image of itself and of the future.

The technique of training is of course totally different from that of mental destruction. The trainer wants his subject to perceive with perfect lucidity which actions should be performed and which avoided. Orders and prohibitions must be regularly related to a system of rewards and punishments. If he is dealing with human beings or previously conditioned animals he may substitute promises and threats for rewards and punishments. Quite often he will utter promise and threat in the same context to force the subject into one course of action and deter it from another. His authority over his subject depends on consistency, and on his ability to convince the subject that he has the power to carry out his threats and promises.

Obviously, the Soviet Government wishes to confuse us in the ordinary sense—to keep us guessing about its immediate intentions, the diplomatic cards up its sleeve, its tactical timing. It is plainly desirable from the Soviet point of view that we should be at our wit's end as to what to do next short of giving in to Soviet wishes Some of us may be confused by the contrast between the intransigence of the Soviet Union in practice and its tireless professions of willingness to negotiate; between its hints of military support for backward against imperialist countries, which might turn a minor local conflict into a major war, and its insistence on its peaceful intentions. But our confusion is the result either of skilful Soviet manœuvring or of insufficient attention on our part to the realities of Soviet policy. It would be very unfair of us to accuse the Soviet Union of trying to mislead us about its views on the nature of the relationship between the two camps, the outcome of the struggle, or even the general techniques by which the struggle will be carried on

We have no excuse at all, at this stage, for allowing ourselves to be confused by the rapid alternations between menace and blandishment in Soviet propaganda. If the Soviet Union threatened all the time it could not keep up its dialogue with the West. One of our difficulties is that there is often a considerable delay between Soviet actions which promise better times ahead and the statement of the impossible terms on which the promise can be realized. But we surely have a long enough experience of the Soviet Union to repress any premature optimism. We can trust our partners in the dialogue to deliver us from all confusion, and to make it absolutely clear to us where we stand. One thing we cannot do is to ignore Soviet signals. It is impossible simply to will ourselves not to notice them; and we cannot refuse to speculate on their significance unless we are defeatist, afraid to continue the dialogue and to call the Soviet bluff.

KHRUSHCHEV'S WAR OF NERVES

Though I do not share Dr Sargant's view that the study of Pavlov helps us to understand Soviet methods of political warfare, or gives us any means of resisting them, I believe that he has done an important service in raising a vital and little-explored question. There is no denying that the Soviet Union can, and does, work upon Western anxieties, and above all on the fear of war, more effectively now than ever before. The particular propaganda techniques used for this purpose are not intrinsically interesting, and there is no reason to believe that they owe anything to psychological research. The reason for the Soviet Union's recent comparative success in psychological warfare is simply that many people believe that it is now equal if not superior to the West in military strength, and that the balance between the two camps is likely to change further to the Soviet advantage. The sharp change in the balance of strength has depressed many people in the West, and rendered them more susceptible to propaganda about the inevitable victory of the Soviet Union in the struggle between the two camps. It is because so many of us are depressed—not by deliberately meaningless signals, but by unmistakable signs of Soviet strength and intransigence—that the Pavlovian hypothesis, expounded for so many years to deaf ears, now obtains a hearing. I do not know when Dr Sutherland made his remark about global neurosis, but I have no doubt that the acutest anxiety state is to be found in the United States, and is the result simply of Soviet successes in rocket development, the realization that the United States is after all highly vulnerable, and does not

now enjoy, or at any rate will not enjoy for long, even a slight military superiority over the Soviet Union.

In my view, the Soviet Union's policies over the next few years are calculated on the assumption (mistaken, let us hope) that they are an interim period which will end with the attainment of absolute military and economic superiority over the West. One of the three main strands of Soviet policy in this period will be the attempt to wreck Western unity and destroy the will to resist by undermining the morale of the major Western countries. It is in this connection that I believe Dr Sargant's initiative to be valuable. It is astonishing how little even those of us who are to some extent professionally concerned know about the impact of Soviet international behaviour on wide sections of our own people. Still less do we understand the varieties of popular reaction in other countries. It is possible that, in our ignorance, we base our counter-propaganda on wrong assumptions. (The lack of satisfactory opinion-surveys in the West is not nowadays a disadvantage to the Soviet Union, which no longer relies so much on subtle nagging as on displays of strength, and flamboyant international gestures. It needs no special investigation to show that these are certainly the most effective means of impressing any mass audience.)

If we regarded the popular press as an accurate mirror of the public mood we might think that it oscillates between wild alarm and fatuous optimism, so that the Soviet Union could, as Dr Sargant hints that it does, carry out its Pavlovian experiments by remote control, through the medium of our newspapers. My impression is that any item of news on international affairs must be heavily charged with sensationalism to penetrate to the mass readership, and that even so it usually produces only a slight *frisson* I am ready to believe that Soviet experts have considered the uses and limitations of this particular medium—there is no obvious reason why they should not understand the relationship between press and public in this country. If so, they may have realized that it is in fact difficult to fix the attention of the public on a baffling series of contradictory or meaningless signals: most people quite automatically do what Dr Sargant advises and ignore them. On the other hand, it is quite easy to imprint on the consciousness of the public a constantly repeated, simple, disturbing image.

Looking at Dr Sargant's examples of the Pavlovian technique in operation it is fairly plain that he does not accurately describe what the Soviet Union did on these occasions. This is not the place for

yet another discussion of Mr Khrushchev's behaviour in Paris last May, but probably no one would dispute, after examining the whole series of Soviet statements, that Soviet reactions to the U2 incident formed a perfectly coherent pattern, 'meaningful' in every particular if referred to the current objectives of Soviet policy. It is difficult to see what is meant by the conflicting statements about the military significance of the first sputnik. To innocent readers the Soviet Union appeared to be saying—not necessarily truthfully—that that particular launching had no military research purpose—or, more generally, reminding us that the Soviet Union never acts with other than peaceful intentions: if what was meant was indeed that sputniks in general have no military significance then this was too gross and obvious a misstatement to confuse anybody. As for the space-travelling dog, its story was demonstrably exploited not by the Soviet Union for Pavlovian reasons but by the Western press in an ill-conceived attempt to arouse humanitarian feeling against the Soviet Union.

The Soviet experts have surely realized that their mass audience in the West is sceptical and not very attentive to the minutiae of international affairs. No one who is not paid to do so will follow the intricate course of prolonged negotiations even on such a fateful matter as disarmament. Most people regard such discussions as a complex game, in which it is very difficult for the outsider to understand any particular move, and which is likely to go on inconclusively for a very long time They therefore do not follow these things closely Can we seriously imagine that the Soviet Union could alarm the British people (even with the maximum assistance from irresponsible sections of the press) by iffing and offing about a summit conference—unless of course the breakdown of such a conference meant imminent war? As it is, they do not expect summit conferences to settle very much for very long, nor any worse result of breakdown than a period of tiresome preparation for another conference I am not saying that this is the healthiest and most desirable state of mind for the public to be in—only that, if my estimate of public opinion on such matters, which can neither be supported nor refuted with scientific evidence, is correct, the Soviet Union would be wasting its time to indulge in some of the exercises of which Dr Sargant suspects it; and equally, that our own counter-propagandists are probably wasting much of the time they spend in demonstrating the immorality or irrationality of Soviet behaviour.

Complacency about our own unexcitable people, and the realiza-

tion that the Soviet Union does not conduct its psychological warfare in precisely the way that Dr Sargant describes, must not prevent us from giving proper consideration to the danger of which Dr Sargant's letter reminds us: that the Soviet Union can in fact, by means so simple that it would be laughable to pin any scientific label on them, spread despondency, feelings of inferiority, constant fear of war coupled with the expectation that the Soviet Union would win if war breaks out, a growing conviction that peace can only be preserved on Soviet terms and that these terms are after all not unreasonable... So far, the Soviet Union has perhaps not been very successful in spreading this defeatist mood—but can we even be sure about that? What is certain is that under Mr Khrushchev, and since its successes in rocketry have filled it either with genuine confidence in its military superiority or with a belief that it can safely indulge in militaristic bluff on a large scale, the dissemination of such feelings has become a major object of Soviet policy.

One point worth noting is that this typical Khrushchevian tactic has its domestic uses. An argument advanced against Dr Sargant's thesis was that his hypothetical random signals would do as much harm in the Soviet as in the Western camp. Inevitably, someone enquired whether the peoples of the Soviet Union and its allies were not in fact the main target of Pavlovian operations—whether, after all, the Soviet Union was not above all concerned with bludgeoning its own subjects into a state of dazed subservience? Few people nowadays believe that the Soviet Union has any extraordinary difficulty in maintaining discipline, without any longer even making extensive use of the conventional weapons of coercion available to a dictatorship: and the evidence is that the regime is doing its best to develop an enthusiastic positive attitude to itself on the part of its subjects. Surely the image of an invincible Soviet Union, able to enforce its wishes on the West, will increase the enthusiasm of many and the awe of all Soviet citizens for their rulers? Again, I do not suggest that even in its own country the Soviet Union has so far successfully established this image: but, since the sputniks, it has at least not been patently absurd.

We shall have to begin considering the problem of self-defence in the war of nerves, to which Dr Sargant has called attention, and we should be wise to agree with him at least in treating it as a psychological battle and not a debate. The Soviet Union at one time carried on the struggle against the West mainly in words. The volume of words, Heaven knows, has not decreased, but the big arguments

e those actions which speak louder. Whenever the Soviet
makes some spectacular advance in military technology, or
Western statesmen capriciously and rudely, or 'unreasonably'
off negotiations, or utters threats which it would hardly be
d to carry out but which the West is unlikely to challenge, it
es anxiety about its own power and the relative weakness of
st. Nothing is more absurd, and less effective in reassuring
lic, than the efforts of Western propagandists to prove that,
ance, Mr Khrushchev has lost a point in the contest, as they
e of it, because he behaved badly at Paris. The point which
ne to the public is that he does not think it necessary to be-
ell—that he feels strong enough to snap his fingers at the
d to show his confidence that he can whistle the conference
n when he chooses.

propagandists should, of course, be busy pointing out the
ations in the image of itself which the Soviet Union projects
they can advantageously take more care than they have
nes done in the past not to foster complacent illusions in the
But they can fight no major defensive action in the war of
until our statesmen supply them with the weapons. We can-
ect that the West should, with a hey presto, launch whenever
y a bigger and better sputnik. It is surely not too much to
fresh effort to build an effective defensive alliance, to regain
ative in areas where we directly compete with the Soviet
to project a convincing and inspiring vision of the future we
. perhaps even, just occasionally, when the Soviet Union is
tedly bluffing, to call its bluff.

danger we have to face is not that the Soviet Union, by in-
propaganda techniques, will reduce us to a pack of neurotic
it that by superior organization, bolder use of its resources,
er bullying it will obtain over us something like the initial
ge which any man has over any dog.

H. T. WILLETTS

The New France in the New Europe

THREE years ago, French postage stamps showed Europe as an open building site: today they depict Europe as a chain of six links, closed firmly in upon itself. Consciously or subconsciously, the designers of the P.T T. have not only kept up with economic progress: they have also mirrored a revolution in French foreign policy.

In 1954, when France wrecked the European Defence Community, three arguments were among the most telling: that European integration would restore sovereignty and equality to the Germans; that it would be dangerously unbalanced without British participation; and that it would lead to an Economic Community for which the French economy was unprepared. Today, on each of these arguments, feelings in France are, if anything, all the other way—and that, piquantly enough, just when the bitterest opponents of the E D.C. have come to power there. On the political side, this reversal of French attitudes began well before the demise of the Fourth Republic. Indeed after the great emotional upsurge over the E.D.C., it looked almost as if the French public had exhausted its more violent anti-German feelings. The present close alliance had not yet been achieved: but sentiments about the Germans had become more neutral, like those about the Belgians or the Dutch Once this fear of Germany had evaporated, the craving for Britain as a balancing factor against the Germans disappeared also And so, until 1958, French objections to European integration became above all economic.

ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS

France, if not the sick man, was the hypochondriac of Europe Massive industrial investments under the Monnet Plan, far-reaching contributions to the development of Africa, wars first in Indo-China and then in Algeria, and the pursuit of an independent nuclear deterrent combined with a generous social policy at home entailed heavy expenditure: and successive weak Governments were unable to raise the revenue which, together with United States aid, should have prevented inflation. The benefits of several devaluations of the franc were wasted by failure to hold the domestic price-level: French exporters found themselves priced out of many markets, and the balance of payments was causing constant concern.

When the Foreign Ministers of the Six met at Messina in 1955

the political objective of European unity remained uppermost in their minds. The French were prepared to agree to cultural projects, to joint atomic programmes, to transport integration—but the Benelux countries and Germany succeeded in obtaining agreement on the wider scheme of an Economic Community. This represented a deliberate direct attack on the chief remaining obstacle to France's readiness for political integration.

In the detailed negotiations on the treaty for a European Economic Community, France's partners gave her the benefit of the doubt throughout: France had the external bargaining power that comes to an unstable Government dependent on a volatile Assembly. She was bought with concession after concession. France was afraid of competition from third countries; thus, to keep its external tariff fairly high, the Community chose to base it on the arithmetical average of the four constituent tariff systems, moreover, French customs duties were in some cases deemed to be higher than those actually applied, and some (the famous 'List G') were left open for subsequent negotiation. France was afraid of competition above all in the agricultural field. thus the common market in agriculture became a matter of common organization rather than of mutual free trade France insisted on bringing her overseas territories into the Community, and they were given favourable treatment in trade; moreover, large non-recoverable funds were placed at her disposal by the other countries for investment overseas The French industrialists attributed their high costs to the comparatively generous benefits financed from their social charges at their insistence, therefore, provisions on the harmonization of wage costs, equal pay for equal work, paid holidays, overtime rates, and similar matters were written into the treaty. The French had not really thought that the plan for an Economic Community would become reality. (They were not the only ones to take that view.) Maybe they would have been content with less. But, bluff or not, their tactics succeeded. As substantially all their demands were met neither the Government nor the business community felt able to oppose the Rome Treaty in the end.

Paradoxically enough, it was Britain who helped to bring about the conversion of French business interests to the Six, for their reversal of attitude was in part a tactical move Only by turning champions of the Six, some felt, could they torpedo the Free Trade Area. One of the officials of the Economic Community once remarked that there were two statues to be put up in Brussels: one to

Joe Stalin, the other to Reggie Maudling. However unfair pers
such a remark might be, traditional French protectionism ce
could not swallow the British scheme for the Free Trade Area
France should open her frontiers not only to the other five, wl
granted her such far-reaching concessions, but to some half-
or dozen other countries as well—and all that without specia
cessions and without harmonization of at least some eleme
production costs—seemed too much to those who had acc
even the Common Market only reluctantly, and who expec
make full use of all the escape clauses provided to fit their s
needs. In more abstract terms, they considered it unfair that
trading advantages should be obtained by those who prove
willing to shoulder all the other obligations contained in the
Treaty (and without which, the French had insisted *vis-à-vi*
own partners in the Six, free trade was unacceptable to them
contribution to investment in Africa and in Southern Italy and
backward regions, the social fund for the conversion of enter
and the retraining of workers, and the harmonization of agricu
and other policies. Moreover they argued that it was techn
impossible to operate the British scheme; Britain, they fel
taken up a curiously dogmatic standpoint for such an em
nation, and it became an intellectual sport in Paris to knock
every device that the British put up.

There followed the fateful 13 May 1958, the installation
Fifth Republic, and, at the very end of the year, General de G
new economic programme of '*vérité et sévérité*': a frankness
recognized the depreciation of the franc by a devaluation of
cent and a discipline which prevented the advantages of th
valuation being frittered away in a new bout of inflation. Th
President was determined to keep his treaty obligations, a
escape clauses ever needed to be invoked. For, once the cur
adjustment had been made, the basic soundness of the F
economy stood revealed: and, having taken the plunge, F
business, much to its own surprise, soon found its wings in th
air of competition and expansion across national boundaries.

The Fifth Republic here reaped the benefit of the policies
Fourth—policies which had in no small measure contribut
popular dissatisfaction with the old regime. For the Monnet
had put investment first—and investment in the basic energy
and heavy equipment before the development of the consum
dustries. As a result the general index of industrial productio

risen by over half between 1953 and 1958—a rise only fractional below that of the Federal Republic. This remarkable performan was achieved in spite of a rise of only 4 per cent in industrial en ployment (whereas the Federal Republic in the same period wa able to expand its employment by 24 per cent).[1]

The Fourth Republic was in fact not only making physical ir vestments but also carrying a heavy burden of human investmer as well. While the generations born in the ten years 1936–4 numbered less than 600,000 for each year, the generations born fro 1946 to 1950 numbered more than 800,000 in each year, and thos born since 1951 have remained only slightly below that figure For the past ten years, therefore, the number of young peopl coming on to the labour market each year has been less than thre quarters of the number of new mouths to be fed. Only now will th opposite trend set in as a reward, with a consequent sudden ex pansion of productive capacity. (In Germany the low birth-rate c the post-war period will shortly produce just the reverse effec while more than 800,000 inhabitants of the Federal Republic wer born in each of the years 1935–41, indeed nearly 950,000 in bot 1939 and 1940, the generations born in the years 1944–8 never reac the 700,000 mark and fall almost to 500,000 for 1945.[3]) It is hardl surprising if Frenchmen now feel that their economy has turned it tightest corner and that they have good structural reasons fo economic self-confidence.

There has in fact been a revolution in the mentality of Frenc business. This is partly due to natural factors: a new generation c more dynamic young Frenchmen, born in the 1920s, whose forma tive years were marked by the upheavals of the 1940s, are takin over from the more easy-going protectionist 'old guard'. Frenc business is fast losing its inflation complex: it no longer takes it fo granted that anything produced can be sold at good profit margin at home. It is beginning to take a real interest in modern busines methods, in rationalization, expansion, and in exports. Wher formerly it was suspicious of foreign investment in France, toda American firms are welcomed. Organizations such as the *Jeune Patrons* and the *Comité Franc-Dollar* foster the new spirit, whic

[1] *Bulletin Général de Statistiques*, Nos 7–8, 1960 (Office Statistique des Communautés Européennes, Brussels)

[2] Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques, *Annuair Statistique de la France 1959*, p 7

[3] Statistisches Bundesamt, *Statistisches Jahrbuch fur die Bundesrepubli Deutschland 1958*, p 38.

has come to imbue even the *Conseil National du Patronat*
The Common Market has acted as a tremendous psy
shock: devaluation and the underlying soundness of the
have permitted that shock not to depress but to elate.

Indeed the first results achieved by French business
new dispensation have been impressive. Exporters decide
Germany a test market. Here was their chief competito
could beard him in his own den, the whole new struct
work. At the Hanover Fair, France was the leading exh
some sectors, German industrialists are beginning to
of French inroads into their market.

The combined mechanical and psychological effects o
ments in the domestic economic structure, of devaluatio
the first but as yet formally non-discriminatory steps to
Common Market may be traced in the development of th
balance of trade. While exports had been stagnant betw
and 1958, they rose rapidly from the beginning of 1959
months later exports to the E.E.C. partners were running
cent above the 1958 figure, and other exports were up by
Imports from France's partners in the Community we
by 50 per cent, but imports from the rest of the world had
than 5 per cent and indeed were still well below those of
heavy trade deficit of 1957, when exports paid for little
four-fifths of imports, had been turned into a respectab
by 1959, and this year that surplus has so far been m

Both in conjunction with the new exporting mentality

FRANCE'S TRADE BALANCE BY AREA
(Monthly averages in $m.)

	1957	1958	1959	196 (1st h
E E C				
Exports	106	95	127	16
Imports	109	102	114	15
Trade balance	−3	−7	+13	+1
REST OF THE WORLD				
Exports	315	332	341	41
Imports	401	365	310	38
Trade balance	−86	−33	+31	+3
TOTAL TRADE				
Exports	421	427	468	58
Imports	510	467	424	53
Trade Balance	−89	−40	+44	+4

SOURCE: *Bulletin Général de Statistiques*, Nos 7–8, 1960.

haps even more in order to exercise at the new level of the Community institutions those pressure group activities to which business has accustomed itself on the national level, French business men are now meeting their opposite numbers in other countries in a big way. They have been leading spirits in the formation of a host of new international industrial and business associations, of which there are literally hundreds now accredited to the Commission in Brussels. They vary from the all-embracing UNICE (*Union des Industries de la Communauté Européenne*) and the Permanent Conference of E.E.C. Chambers of Commerce to the E.E.C. Mustard Industry Committee and the European Union of Publicity Organizations in Brussels, the Common Market Committee of the International Hairdressers' Federation in Paris, the European Ribbon and Elastics Association in Arnhem, the European Union of Milk Traders in Bonn, and the Working Party for E.E.C. Problems of the Sanitary Chinaware Manufacturers in Milan. Hardly a week passes without a whole string of *rencontres* at which common problems and common attitudes towards the Commission and the national Governments are discussed.

It was Adam Smith who said that business men never assemble, even if only for pleasure, without some new conspiracy being hatched against the general public. Whether as a conspiracy against the general public or to make arrangements in the interests of economic efficiency, there is no doubt that the last two years have seen a vast crystallization of Franco-German industrial and commercial agreements and measures of business integration directly provoked by the Common Market. Peugeot and Mercedes-Benz, As de Trefle and Agfa Leverkusen, Fouga and Messerschmidt, Desmarais and BV-Aral, Rhone-Poulenc and Bayer Leverkusen, Centrale de Dynamite and Hoechst, Breguet and Dornier, Lip and Holzer, Lavallette and Bosch, Manurhin and Auto-Union, Nord-Aviation and Focke-Wulf, to mention only some of the more famous names in the aeroplane and motor, chemical, and mechanical industries of the two countries, have all concluded various kinds of agreement: for the exchange of patents, for manufacture under licence, for the marketing of each other's products, for the joint manufacture of new products. Much the same kind of activity is going on between French firms and Belgian, Dutch, and Italian firms. Having once begun to make their plans on the basis of the Common Market, it is not surprising that French business men are now demanding the acceleration of its development.

C

It is, however, important to emphasize that, while French self-confidence is equal to at any rate the first stage of the Common Market, it is far from rising high enough as yet to face free trade The *Conseil National du Patronat Français* supported the Hallstein proposal for acceleration, but opposed the reduction in the external tariff of the Community and demanded a speeding-up not simply in the mutual tariff reductions, but also in the harmonization of national policies. Just as France's conversion to the Common Market itself had in it a very real element of avoiding the greater of two evils (the Free Trade Area), so today there is also a trace of ulterior motives about the demands of French industry for the acceleration of the Common Market's time-table: a quicker pace of continental integration would render less likely any free trade arrangement with the British and the Outer Seven (Of all the countries of the Six, France has least interest in trade with the Outer Seven: only 9 per cent of her trade is with the E.F.T A as against 27 per cent for the Community as a whole.) French industry for the moment does not fear British competition in France herself so much as in Germany and in other partner countries. And no doubt—a more dubious motive—there are also those who feel that, in spite of the very considerable trust-breaking provisions of the Treaty, agreements restricting competition (as against agreements principally lowering costs) can be made more easily in a smaller framework. As one official told me, 'We are getting to know the Germans and we like working with them. We think less and less about Britain we realize now that we can get on very well without you.'

POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Parallel with this conversion of French business to the Common Market, there has been a revolution in the thinking of the Government. Certainly General de Gaulle has gone out of his way to praise the healthy effects of the Economic Community on the economy of France. But it is above all on the political side, and for political reasons, that he has changed his position to the point of a *volte-face*

With General de Gaulle's accession to power in 1958 British hopes for an accommodation with the Six had risen: neither General de Gaulle nor, later, M. Debré could be classed as enthusiasts for a Little Europe (M. Debré had voted against every single European Community) or as enemies of Britain and friends of Germany. Yet it was only under the new regime that at last a forthright statement of France's real intentions could be heard. M. Soustelle's

famous press conference of 14 November 1958 removed the whole basis on which the negotiations had been carried on by declaring that the very concept of a free trade area was quite unacceptable to France. There is a French comedy film in which a man while shaving replies to all remarks addressed to him: '*Ah, si on avait un gouvernement!*' This heartfelt wish of France's neighbours had at last been met. but, for Britain, the answer, delayed for so long, proved a dusty disappointment. For not only did all France's economic objections to the free trade area remain, but also the new regime soon found political considerations impelling it in the same direction.

The new emphasis on France's national greatness, far from leading de Gaulle into making gestures of friendship towards Britain, led him rather into consolidating his relations with Bonn. In the race for nuclear power (based, in the French case, on the assumption that it is better to have exploded a bomb than to have it to explode), Britain, not Germany, was the rival. In North Africa—the very *raison d'être* of the new regime—it was Britain, not Germany, who had delivered arms to Tunisia, whose attitude in the United Nations had lacked the enthusiastic solidarity expected from a fellow colonial Power, and whose whole African policy was an embarrassment to the French. (Indeed in some eyes Dr Nkrumah through his relations with M Sekou Touré was only another agent of British imperialism) Dr Adenauer, on the other hand, needed French support against Mr Macmillan over the Berlin question, and was prepared to pay a heavy price to secure it, both in political support and also in cash France needed short-term funds to settle her foreign exchange debts and she needed long-term funds for overseas investment: both these could cross the Rhine, but not the Channel. In fact, for the new French Government, the Economic Community became a Eurafrican as much as a European scheme. And thus the Common Market, far from acting as a reconciler of France and Germany, became a by-product of the Paris-Bonn axis.

But General de Gaulle was concerned as much as anything else with France's weight in the councils of the West. Formally, this pre-occupation with 'Anglo-Saxon hegemony' took the form of his demand for a tripartite directorate in which France too would rank with America as a leading great Power. Materially, France is of course too small to fill such a role by herself So, too, is Britain: but what gives Britain her special relationship and influence with the United States is not simply shared language and tradition, but above all her leadership role in the Commonwealth. Fundamental to

General de Gaulle's thinking on all this today is his determination to use the European Community to buttress French weakness as leader and spokesman of the Six, France also would have a key place in the inner circle of the free world.

The present mood of French self-confidence is not confined to the economy. Diplomats who for years have been representing weak Governments or even mere caretaker administrations suddenly find themselves listened to again with respect. Some recent French vetoes seem almost to represent a working-off of accumulated feelings of inferiority: indeed one Frenchman has described the failure of the free trade area negotiations as 'our revenge for your having liberated us in 1944'. Fear of Germany, whether under Dr Adenauer or under his successor, has evaporated The Quai d'Orsay feels that, given its experience and its exceptionally able personnel, given French prestige and the peculiar historical position in which Germany is placed, the leadership of the Six will undoubtedly fall to France

It follows that for political no less than economic reasons France has no interest in British participation in the European Community. As the fear of Germany has disappeared, so has the craving for Britain to act as a balancing factor to Germany within Europe On the contrary, British participation would snatch her unique position from France and only reinforce Britain's own influence — with effects which, in some French eyes, might be disastrous, particularly in Africa. For a battle won by the Prussians, some Frenchmen feel, Britain has had a good century of world leadership since Waterloo, and she should be content with that.

One should however see nothing that is rootedly anti-British in all this It is understandable that France should, at this juncture, attempt if possible to reserve this dynamic new structure of the European Community for her very own. She might in fact well want to see a strong Britain with a consolidated Commonwealth that could stand beside France over against the less experienced, less sophisticated, but fast upsurging younger nations of America, Africa, and Asia

General de Gaulle's first diplomatic battle was played at Bad Kreuznach in 1958 with Dr Adenauer against the British and thus the free trade area project came to nothing His second round was played with Mr Dillon in Paris at the beginning of this year and here the French negotiators went some way in their endeavour to establish that Britain was only one country like any other outside the

Six, and that the larger Europe of the fifteen or eighteen nations hac ceased to have economic relevance. The time may soon come for a third round to be played with Britain simultaneously against Ger many and the United States. Visionaries in Paris see a French o: European sphere of influence that stretches round the Mediter ranean over the area of the old Roman Empire, and a British o Commonwealth thalassocracy in partnership with it. Though Bri- tain is the hereditary enemy of France, the Commonwealth coulc become the natural ally of the Common Market. Between them, twc such structures might guide America and uphold European value: and traditions *vis-à-vis* the rest of the world.

Since the whole relationship with Britain over the 'Sixes anc Sevens' issue is an embarrassing complication, one may expect the French negotiators to be willing in the end to make considerable commercial concessions on particular points · it is in their interest tc minimize all friction and to make the economic division of Europe as tolerable as possible in order to maintain the Six inviolate. Anc there the national preoccupation parallels the thinking of many European federalists Disappointed in 1950 and 1951 with Britain's negative attitude to functional supranationalism, they felt that ar empirical nation like the British would only be convinced by *faits accomplis* The suspicions since aroused in many federalists' minds by British reactions—from the Eden Plan of 1952 via the Grand Design of 1957 to the Profumo proposals of 1960—are also shared by many whose concern is more with France the fear that Britain, having failed to wreck the Six from without, will now attempt to dc so from within is constantly under-estimated in this country Both the Quai d'Orsay and some of the 'Europeans' thus feel that Britain must be kept at bay until the Six are consolidated much further: and the later the negotiations with Britain are resumed, the stronger wil be the position of the Six and the less will Britain be able to hold up their progress

But of course General de Gaulle's conversion to the Economic Community and his temporary alliance with some of the federalists over acceleration and the Community's external relations by nc means imply his acceptance of their political ideals On the nature of the progress and consolidation of the Six there is a fundamenta conflict of aim. The federalists today are anxious to develop the political side of European unity, in which they have placed such a large investment of hopes and emotion. they are all the more anxious to hasten this progress as they fear that the Europe of

fraternity, of which they dreamt while they were in concentration camps and fighting in the resistance movements, may fast become a Europe of big business and cartels. General de Gaulle, on the other hand, has himself reminded federalists who are delighted with his actions that his Europe is not theirs. The 'great confederation' of which he speaks remains, in M. Debré's words, a Europe of the Fatherlands. The federalists who wish to develop the political importance of supranationalism are therefore facing a hard task General de Gaulle's acceptance of European institutions is, for the moment at least, an acceptance of existing treaty obligations, but of nothing beyond that.

The federalists have now tabled their detailed proposals for the direct election by universal suffrage of the European Parliament which, for the moment, is elected indirectly by the national Parliaments. Given the authority that will come from direct election, they feel that this Parliament should then acquire much greater control of the three supranational executives of the Coal and Steel Community, Euratom, and the Economic Community. In order to enhance the authority of these executives *vis-à-vis* the national Governments they propose a merger of the three into one. Both these proposals are meeting with firm resistance in Paris, the former even though it is entailed by the Rome Treaty, the latter in spite of the case for an overall energy policy instead of the present dispersal of competence between three institutions, one dealing with coal, the second with nuclear energy, and the third with oil and other conventional sources of power.

From the French side, two quite different ideas have been put forward. The French Government officially insists on the creation of a political secretariat independent of the supranational executives and has suggested a European referendum as an alternative rather than a prerequisite for European elections.[1] Federalists are divided as to how far they should accept these ideas rather than fight them: any further political co-operation, and also any popular consultation on a European basis, might, some think, contribute to European unity in the long run, whatever the intentions of their proponent.

It is partly the present French attitude which has led Dr Adenauer into making a new attempt to open the door to Britain Baulked of his political hopes for a more intensive European integration, he

[1] General de Gaulle's press conference of 5 September, which took place after these lines were written, has forcibly underlined these demands.

ants to use the time to develop the politically more extensive ean idea, which has always included Britain in its concept. ilure of the Summit Conference has in his view once more hted the inappropriateness of narrow national preoccupa- and has both relieved some of the tension in Anglo-German ns and made its continuance all the more intolerable. Nothing en heard from Paris on this invitation to Britain, but France s not the whole of Europe. The Dutch and the Germans, even lgians and the Italians, are much more open to British ad- to the Six. If Britain today is sincere in her political thinking, ie federalists will be prepared to put aside their suspicions; rtainly General de Gaulle cannot afford to appear in the eyes partners and of America as the wrecker of wider unity. Un- edly, Britain is being offered another chance.

UWE KITZINGER

e Organization of American States

T events in the Caribbean region and the inter-American ences at San José and Bogotá have given some prominence to rnational organization of which little is normally heard in this y: the Organization of American States (O.A.S.). Moreover, ave highlighted two of the most vital questions concerning ter-American system: the difficulty of reconciling United aims and those of the Latin American countries within the , and the relationship of the O.A.S. to the United Nations. st has always been a major problem for the inter-American because of the striking disparity of political and economic between the United States and her southern neighbours. The merican system has to some extent served to mitigate the status of the Latin American countries. The second is a post- oblem, since no comparable situation existed between the ir inter-American system and the League of Nations.

EARLIER MACHINERY FOR ASSOCIATION

Organization of American States is the post-war form of an ition, embracing the United States and the Latin American

Republics, which has existed for over seventy years. The ideological basis of this association is the Western Hemisphere Idea, whose core has been 'the proposition that the peoples of this Hemisphere stand in a special relationship to one another which sets them apart from the rest of the world'.[1] This proposition may be seen in the Monroe Doctrine as well as in the Pan American movement. Never more than partially valid, the Western Hemisphere Idea has become increasingly questionable in the post-war world. It has been at times strongly reinforced by threats of aggression from outside the hemisphere and more often weakened by disputes within

The First International Conference of American States, which established the association (then called the International Union of American Republics) and gave it a permanent secretariat (later to be named the Pan American Union), was held in Washington in 1889-90. Seven more such gatherings, and a very much larger number of special technical conferences, were held between then and the outbreak of the second World War. But the achievements of Pan Americanism were meagre until the Seventh International Conference, held at Montevideo in 1933. The unilateral character of the Monroe Doctrine and its widening interpretation with the growth of United States power aroused bitter resentment among the Latin Americans Divided by disputes among themselves and looking to their northern neighbour for favours, they were unable to present a united front against her But U S. domination of the Pan American Union and repeated interventions in the Caribbean region made effective inter-American co-operation impossible

Prospects for the inter-American system improved when the development of the Good Neighbour policy by President Franklin Roosevelt coincided with a growing threat from Europe in the 1930s. At Montevideo, the United States accepted the principle of 'non-intervention' with reservation At a special Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace held at Buenos Aires in 1936, 'non-intervention' was accepted without reservation, new measures were taken to improve the machinery for settling inter-American disputes peacefully; and the principle of consultation was agreed upon, should the peace of the Western Hemisphere be disturbed by either an American or a non-American State The Declaration of Lima, at the Eighth International Conference in 1938, made provision for the Meeting of Ministers of Foreign

[1] Arthur P Whitaker, *The Western Hemisphere Idea Its Rise and Decline* (Ithaca, New York, 1954), p 1

Affairs which eventually was to become an 'Organ of Consultation'.

By the eve of the second World War the inter-American system had at last begun to take shape as a genuine system of regional security. But it lacked a formal constitution or charter, and included a large number of agencies and organizations whose relationships with one another and with the Pan American Union were often of a tenuous character. After the outbreak of war the machinery of consultation became operative and three Meetings of Foreign Ministers were held during the war period: the first at Panama, in 1939; the second at Havana, in 1940; and the third at Rio de Janeiro in 1942. There was much closer inter-American co-operation during these years, notably in the economic field, and many new inter-American agencies sprang up to give it effect. The question was how far it would survive into the post-war world, especially since the United States was already concerned with planning a new general international organization And the Latin American countries had not been consulted before the important Dumbarton Oaks Conference.

The Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace, held at Mexico City in February–March 1945, took up the question of the post-war inter-American system. The Act of Chapultepec created a defensive alliance against aggression from within or outside the hemisphere for the duration of the war and foreshadowed the conclusion of a permanent treaty after peace had been established The Ninth International Conference was recommended to reorganize, consolidate, and strengthen the inter-American system and give it an 'organic pact' or charter, also to improve the inter-American peace machinery.

The reorganized inter-American system would function in relationship with the new general international organization, and at the San Francisco Conference the Latin Americans proved strong supporters of regionalism. Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter, dealing with regional arrangements, provides that members of the United Nations taking part in these shall 'make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes' through them before referring such disputes to the Security Council (Article 52). But no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council, except against an ex-enemy State of the last war (Article 53). So the Latin Americans, with United States support, pressed for the inclusion of Article 51, which affirms that nothing in the United Nations Charter shall 'impair the inherent right of in-

dividual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs a
a member of the United Nations, until the Security Coun
taken the measures necessary to maintain international pea
security'.

The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, ca
out one of the main recommendations of the Mexico City C
ence, was signed in Rio de Janeiro on 2 September 1947. It p
to be the first collective security pact based on Article 51
United Nations Charter. Each member of the Rio pact agr
assist in meeting an armed attack against any of them on requ
the State or States directly attacked, determining itself th
mediate measures it will take. The Organ of Consultation sha
vene without delay to examine these measures and agree upo
lective action. The latter may range from the recall of ch
diplomatic missions to the use of armed force, and all memb
bound by decisions (taken by a two-thirds majority) to apply
measures 'with the sole exception that no State shall be requ
use armed force without its consent' (Article 20).

In addition to collective action to meet armed attack, th
Treaty calls for immediate consultation should the territor
tegrity, sovereignty, or political independence of any Am
State be affected by an aggression which is not an armed attac
any conflict within or outside the continent, 'or by any other
situation that might endanger the peace of America' (Arti
Thus, the provisions of the Rio Treaty cover aggression b
American State against another, as well as from outsi
hemisphere. Moreover, the pact has a dual character. In mee
armed attack, action taken under its terms would fall under A
51 of the United Nations Charter. In other cases, since Art
refers only to the inherent right of self-defence against
attack, it would operate as a regional arrangement under C
VIII. In these cases, according to the Charter, enforcement
requires the authorization of the Security Council. During
years, the question of aggression 'other than by armed atta
attained increasing significance in international affairs, inc
those of the Western Hemisphere.

Senator Vandenberg described the Rio Treaty as 'not a sub
for the U.N., but a supplement to the U.N. and part of its m
ery'. Although, in practice, the last part of this statement wo
difficult to substantiate, the pact does more than pay lip-ser
the rights and obligations of the signatories under the

Nations Charter. Its members agree immediately to send the Security Council 'complete information concerning the activities undertaken or in contemplation in the exercise of the right of self-defence or for the purpose of maintaining inter-American peace and security' (Article 5). They shall use the inter-American peace procedures before referring disputes arising between them to the United Nations. This last undertaking is also included in the Charter of the O.A.S. and other agreements signed at the Ninth International Conference held at Bogotá in March–May 1948.

THE O.A.S. CHARTER

The Charter of the Organization of American States is divided into three parts. The first deals with the nature, purposes, and principles of the O.A.S., the fundamental rights and duties of States, pacific settlement of disputes, collective security, and economic, social, and cultural standards; the second describes the organs through which the Organization accomplishes its purposes; the third contains miscellaneous provisions, deals with ratification and entry into force, and affirms that none of this Charter's provisions shall be construed as impairing the rights and obligations of the signatories under the United Nations Charter.

The Organization of American States is described in Article 1 as a regional agency 'within the United Nations' and reference is also made in the first chapter to its 'regional obligations under the Charter of the United Nations'. It has five essential purposes: to strengthen the peace and security of the continent; to prevent possible causes of difficulties and to ensure the pacific settlement of disputes that may occur among the member States; to provide for common action on the part of those States in the event of aggression, to seek the solution of political, juridical, and economic problems arising between them; and to promote, by co-operative action, their economic, social, and cultural development.

The second chapter reaffirms principles which express the ideals of the inter-American system. These include the assertion that 'the solidarity of the American States and the high aims which are sought through it require the political organization of those States on the basis of the effective exercise of representative democracy' (Article 5*d*) The third chapter, entitled 'Fundamental Rights and Duties of States', contains the two inter-American concepts most cherished by Latin Americans: the juridical equality of States and 'non-intervention'. Article 15 in this chapter affirms that 'no State or

group of States has the right to intervene, directly or indirec any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of an State' and Article 17 that 'the territory of a State is inviolabl the other hand, Article 19 declares that 'measures adopted maintenance of peace and security in accordance with e treaties do not constitute a violation of the principles set f Articles 15 and 17.'

Chapters IV and V, dealing respectively with the imp questions of pacific settlement of disputes and collective se are not comprehensive, for separate treaties cover them th of Bogotá and the Rio Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance Th remaining chapters of Part One are devoted to economic, soci cultural standards, which are described briefly in general term

Part Two of the Charter describes the organs of the O A S are six: the Inter-American Conference, the Meeting of sultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs; the Council, th American Union; Specialized Conferences; and Spec Organizations.

The Inter-American Conference, the new, abbreviated na the International Conference of American States, is descri 'the supreme organ' of the O A.S The oldest of the inter-Am institutions, it decides the general action and policy of the Org tion and determines the structure and functions of its orga member States have the right to be represented at the American Conference, which shall convene every five yea time fixed by the Council of the O.A.S. after consultation w Government of the country where it is to be held.[1] Its progr and regulations are prepared by the Council and submitted member States for consideration

The Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign convenes whenever necessary 'in order to consider problem urgent nature and of common interest to the American Stat to serve as the Organ of Consultation'. Any member of the may request the Council to call a Meeting of Consultation, Organ of Consultation under the terms of the Rio Treaty, a m must be called at once by the chairman of the Council to agre measures against an armed attack

The Council of the Organization comprises one representa

[1] The last Inter-American Conference (the Tenth) was held at Ca 1954. The Eleventh Conference, due to take place at Quito, Ecuador, in 1 been postponed more than once

each member State, with the rank of Ambassador. It may deal with any matter referred to it by the Inter-American Conference or the Meeting of Consultation, and serves provisionally as Organ of Consultation under the Rio Treaty. The Council is responsible for the proper functioning of the Pan American Union. It will also promote and facilitate collaboration between the O.A.S. and the United Nations and between inter-American specialized organizations and similar international agencies. The Council, which functions at the seat of the Pan American Union, formulates its own regulations and itself has three organs: the Inter-American Economic and Social Council; the Inter-American Council of Jurists; and the Inter-American Cultural Council.

The Pan American Union is 'the central and permanent organ of the Organization of American States and the General Secretariat of the Organization'. It is directed by the Secretary-General of the O.A.S. The Specialized Conferences meet to deal with special technical matters or to develop specific aspects of inter-American co-operation The Specialized Organizations are 'the inter-governmental organizations established by multilateral agreements and having specific functions with respect to technical matters of common interest to the American States'. They shall establish co-operative relations with world agencies of the same character in order to co-ordinate their activities, while at the same time preserving their identity and status as integral parts of the O.A.S., even when they perform regional functions of international agencies.

The third part of the Charter contains, in addition to the Article affirming the rights and obligations of members under the United Nations Charter, miscellaneous provisions and a final chapter on ratification and entry into force. It lays down that amendments to the O A.S Charter may be adopted only at an Inter-American Conference convened for the purpose.

Among other agreements reached at the Ninth Conference were the Inter-American Treaty of Pacific Settlement, or Pact of Bogotá, and the Economic Agreement of Bogotá. The first, replacing existing peace agreements, sought to ensure 'that no dispute between American States shall fail of definitive settlement within a reasonable period'. The second attempted the equally difficult task of reconciling the economic philosophy and interests of the world's most advanced industrial power with those of twenty other countries most of which were relatively little industrialized and were over-dependent upon the sale of raw materials to the first country.

Both agreements were signed with reservations which rei
them largely ineffective even if ratified.

ASSOCIATION IN A CHANGED ENVIRONMENT

The strengthening of the institutions of the inter-Americ
tem took place within an environment which differed in a nun
important ways from the pre-war period. First, there now
a much wider international organization of which all Am
States were members; the inter-American system would be
ing within this world system. This clearly struck a blow
Western Hemisphere Idea. Moreover, the United States w
a global power and the Latin Americans were to have growin
tacts, especially through the United Nations, with the count
other continents. Within the inter-American system the
States and the Latin Americans already had a different o
priorities. The former was concerned increasingly with se
the latter with economic development and, of course, the ma
aid from their more wealthy neighbour in furthering it.

The United States has sought above all to check the expan
international Communism and to obtain Latin American sup
doing so. A resolution at Bogotá (1948) condemned intern
Communism and other totalitarian systems. The Fourth M
of Foreign Ministers (Washington, 1951) was called by the
States, after the outbreak of the Korean war, to conside
action in the face of 'the aggressive policy of international
munism'. The main business of the Tenth Inter-America
ference (held at Caracas in 1954), from the United States
of view at least, was Resolution XCIII: 'Declaration of Sol
for the Preservation of the Political Integrity of the American
against the Intervention of International Communism'. At t
José Meetings of Foreign Ministers in August 1960 the ch
jective of the United States delegation was a resolution conde
Communist intervention in the Western Hemisphere t
gaining control of an American State. Guatemala was the S
question at Caracas; Cuba, of course, at San José.

The Latin Americans were uneasy on both occasions,
possible United States intervention more than international
munism. Indeed the Latin Americans have tended to minim
Communist threat and to adopt an attitude more akin to neut
in any case, their leaders, and notably President Kubitsc
Brazil, have stressed the importance of economic and social de

ment as the best bulwark against international Communism. The Latin American delegates at major conferences have tried to emphasize economic issues, and the idea of economic aid from the United States as a reward for political support of her policies has firm roots in inter-American relations. It has proved impossible so far to bridge the chasm dividing Latin American demands and viewpoint in the matter of economic co-operation on the one hand from those of the United States on the other, but under pressure of political events the United States has been forced to make concessions. Thus Vice-President Nixon's unhappy experiences in Latin America in 1958 led his country finally to support an Inter-American Development Bank; the Cuban situation brought forth the Eisenhower proposals discussed at Bogotá in September.

In the meantime the inter-American peace machinery has been concerned with over twenty disputes between American States, some being dealt with by the Council of the O.A.S. as the provisional Organ of Consultation under the Rio Treaty, others by the Inter-American Peace Committee, a body authorized during the last war, whose status as a part of the inter-American peace machinery was confirmed at Santiago in 1959. Most of these disputes arose in the Caribbean region, where relations have been exacerbated in recent years by the overthrow of the dictatorships of Pérez Jiménez in Venezuela and Batista in Cuba. The Trujillo dictatorship in the Dominican Republic has been the object of mounting hostility on the part of its neighbours and there has been a general demand for action to bring about its downfall. The Fifth Meeting of Consultation, held at Santiago in August 1959, discussed the Caribbean situation and referred it to the Inter-American Peace Committee.

The great majority of these inter-American disputes were of a 'local' character and did not involve the application of sanctions under the terms of the Rio Treaty. An important issue was raised over the Guatemala crisis in 1954, however, though it was not resolved. The Arbenz Government claimed it was the victim of aggression by its neighbours and appealed to the Security Council. The United States, bitterly hostile towards Arbenz and determined to prevent the Soviet Union from taking a hand in Western Hemisphere affairs, insisted that the Guatemala crisis was a regional dispute falling within the competence of the O.A.S. But before the inter-American peace machinery could deal with the question the Arbenz Government had been overthrown. Serious misgivings were felt about the Guatemala affair. Many Latin Americans suspected

the United States of engineering Arbenz's downfall and wer ly concerned over an apparent restriction on the right of a m of the O.A.S. to have recourse to the United Nations.

More recently there have been the disputes between Ver and the Dominican Republic and between the United Stat Cuba, considered at the Sixth and Seventh Meetings of Co tion held at San José in August 1960. In the latter case the Nations was briefly involved when Cuba appealed to the S Council against 'economic aggression' by the United States. complaint was referred to the O.A.S., with which the United had already lodged charges against Dr Castro's Governmen Government of the Dominican Republic was condemned José for participation in acts of aggression and intervention Venezuela. Moreover, the Sixth Meeting of Consultation pro to recommend the application of diplomatic and economi tions against the offender. This created a precedent with O.A.S., being the first time such action had been taken un terms of the Rio Treaty. It also constituted enforcement act quiring the authorization of the Security Council under Art of the United Nations Charter The Soviet Union raised thi tion in the Security Council shortly afterwards; in the eve Council 'took note' of a report on the matter submitted Secretary-General of the O A.S.

The juridical relationship between the O A S. and the Nations is, of course, much less significant than politic economic relationships within the Western Hemisphere a tween the American States and the rest of the world. Latin can votes in the United Nations have often been valuable United States; while the Latin Americans have found the Economic Commission for Latin America useful.

Within the hemisphere, the new economic programme ap at the Bogotá Conference (Act of Bogotá) has yet to materiali the resolution of the Seventh Meeting of Consultation conde the intervention of international Communism has not resol quarrel between the United States and Cuba. What is mo State Department has reaffirmed United States adherence Monroe Doctrine, for so long an obstacle to effective inter- can co-operation. Clearly, testing days lie ahead for the Org tion of American States as well as for the United Nations, which it proclaims itself to be a regional agency.

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Notes of the Month

he United States, Cuba, and the Monroe Doctrine

THE Monroe Doctrine has been very much in the news this sum-
ier and the question has been raised of its place in United States
reign policy today. It is now evident that although the concepts so
losely associated with the Doctrine—isolationism and the Western
lemisphere Idea—have been greatly weakened in the post-war
orld, United States devotion to the Doctrine has not diminished.
'his is not really surprising, since the present threat to the United
tates from outside the hemisphere is far greater than any before.
s in President Monroe's time, the threat involves the extension to
ie Americas of an extra-continental system. In 1960 it is inter-
ational Communism and the focal point is Cuba.

On 9 July 1960 Mr Khrushchev, in a speech strongly supporting
r Castro, stressed United States vulnerability He was quoted as
iving that 'Figuratively speaking, in case of necessity, Soviet
rtillerymen can support the Cuban people with their rocket fire if
ggressive forces in the Pentagon dare to start an intervention
gainst Cuba ' On the same day, President Eisenhower, citing Mr
hrushchev's speech as showing a 'clear intention to establish Cuba
i a role serving Soviet purposes in this hemisphere', warned that
ie United States would not permit 'the establishment of a regime
ominated by international Communism in the Western Hemi-
here' Commenting on the President's statement at a news con-
rence three days later, Mr Khrushchev contended that the Mon-
e Doctrine had lost its validity; it was dead and should be buried.
The Russian leader's assertion caused the State Department to
firm that 'the principles of the Monroe Doctrine are as valid today
s they were in 1823 when the Doctrine was proclaimed.' It
escribed the Doctrine as 'supported by the inter-American
curity system through the Organization of the American States'.
'his is important, for the Monroe Doctrine has not been 'Pan-
mericanized'. It has been reinforced, but not replaced, by the
iter-American system. On this point, Mr Dulles described the

Guatemalan situation of 1954[1] as 'a direct challenge to the Monro
Doctrine' and explicitly stated that 'no member of the Rio pact give
up what the Charter of the United Nations calls the inherent righ
of self-defence; that right is reserved.'

Cuba in 1960 clearly presents a much more serious problem tha
Guatemala six years ago. However great or small Communist in
fluence in Cuba may be, Castro's policies have been bitterly hostil
to United States interests, and friendship with the Soviet Unio
has reached the point where Cuba claims to enjoy Russian protec
tion against possible United States aggression. For many ordinar
Americans, the sight of Mr Khrushchev and Dr Castro embracin
on American soil must have seemed final proof, were such neede
of the reality of an unholy alliance operating dangerously close t
their shores.

Nevertheless, the Eisenhower Administration has endeavoure
to be circumspect in handling Cuba and to engage the support
the other Latin American countries through the O.A.S But, i
spite of Castro's excesses, this last task has not been easy Th
Declaration of the Seventh (San José) Meeting of Consultation
American Foreign Ministers condemned intervention in th
Western Hemisphere by an extra-continental Power, but withou
mentioning Cuba. Even so, many Latin American ministers wer
reported to have signed it 'with heavy hearts' Latin Americans sti
fear United States intervention (so long associated with the Mon
roe Doctrine) at least as much as intervention by an extra-con
tinental Power.

Soviet attempts to establish a Communist regime having beer
somewhat generally, condemned, what if the Cuban people vote
themselves a Communist government? President Eisenhower ha
said he does not believe this possible. A similar view was taken b
President Monroe: 'It is impossible that the allied (Holy Allianc
Powers should extend their political system to any portion of eithe
continent without endangering our peace and happiness; nor ca
anyone believe that our southern brethren, if left to themselve
would adopt it of their own accord.'

A Communist regime in Cuba could only, in the American view
be a beach-head for international Communism and, as such,
serious threat to the United States. This, in principle, the Unite
States will not tolerate; in practice, she has bided her time, perhap

[1] For comment on the Guatemalan Revolution see *The World Today*, Jul
1954.

ping that opposition to Castro will grow in Cuba and in Latin nerica as a whole. If neither of these things happens and the nited States becomes convinced that Cuba is a Russian satellite, these circumstances under which she would invoke the Docne and 'go it alone'?

There is, of course, the specific circumstance of the United ates naval base at Guantanamo Bay Dr Castro has said Cuba will mand its evacuation in due course, he has Mr Khrushchev's vocal pport in making this demand. A Republican Senator has made the eresting assertion that the Eisenhower Administration would no ore surrender Guantanamo Naval Base to Cuba than it would give Quemoy and Matsu to the Communist Chinese.

Clearly there must be a point at which the United States would ervene in Cuba under the Monroe Doctrine. For the latter is conned fundamentally with United States interests and, above all, r security. It is unilateral in character, and, in the last resort, the nited States will be judge of when her interests and security are eatened and what action she will take to defend them That has t been changed by the development of the inter-American sysn, it has been confirmed by Mr Khrushchev's challenge to the onroe Doctrine.

w States at the United Nations

THE original membership of the United Nations was based upon attendance at the San Francisco Conference, which was held in 45, before the end of the second World War. Invitations to the nference were issued by the four war-time allies, the United ites, the United Kingdom, the U.S.S R., and Nationalist China, o were known as the sponsoring Powers. Forty-six States were at it represented, and when the Charter was adopted in 1946 the ginal signatories numbered fifty-one. Between 1946 and 1958 rty-two new member-States were admitted and two States, ypt and Syria, coalesced, so that the membership in August 50 was eighty-two. Article 4, paragraph 1, of the Charter declares t membership is 'open to all other peace-loving States which ept the obligations contained in the Charter . . . and, in the judgnt of the Organization, are able and willing to carry out these igations'. New States are admitted by decision of the General sembly after a recommendation by the Security Council. Every h recommendation must be backed by the votes of seven of the ven Council members, including the votes of the five permanent

members—Nationalist China, France, the U.S.S.R., the Unite Kingdom, and the United States. A two-thirds majority is necessar in the Assembly.

Neither Western nor Eastern Germany has been admitted t membership. Switzerland is debarred from applying by her his toric treaties of permanent neutrality, but similar consideration did not debar Luxembourg from becoming the smallest of th original members. Of these, two are in an anomalous position Nationalist China, which, effectively, means the island of Taiwa (Formosa) with a population of 9 million, the 600 million of main land China being unrepresented; and the Union of South Afric which, since 1956, has withdrawn from many of the activities of th U.N. as a protest against the alleged interference of the Assembl in its domestic affairs.

Six applications for membership are pending, five of them havin been the subject of controversy for many years; they are Mongoli the two parts of Vietnam, and the two parts of Korea The sixt applicant is Mauretania, the only constituent State of the Frenc *communauté* in Africa which has not yet attained to formal inde pendence owing to a dispute between France and Morocco as to it extent and status. British students whose eyes have been fixed o Commonwealth problems may not have noticed the unfortunat fragmentation of the *communauté* Attempts to hold together th former federal systems of French West Africa and French Equa torial Africa have failed, as has the attempt to make a new combina tion of the Western States into a Mali federation Seven forme French colonies, of which only one or two are economically viabl were recommended *en bloc* by the Security Council for membershi of the U.N., on 23 August 1960, without discussion.

Soviet Russia, effectively, has three votes in the Assembly sinc full membership has been extended to Byelorussia and the Ukrai as well as to the U.S.S.R. proper. In addition there are the Russia satellite countries in Europe

In the Commonwealth, Nigeria and Cyprus have attained to inde pendence and U.N. membership in 1960. The West Indies shoul not be long in taking this path. (The future of Central and Eas Africa is too uncertain to be discussed in this Note.) Independenc has been promised to Sierra Leone and to British Guiana and, wea though their economies are, it would seem impossible to deny ther a status which has been given to Somalia, Chad, and the Gabon There will then remain the problem of providing for the future o

ie very small colonies, a problem which has been much confused y the precipitate admission to U.N. membership of States which, y any reckoning, are too ill-organized to stand alone or too small to ield any influence in world affairs. The premature grants of full itional status to the Cameroun and the Congo speak for themselves.
The twelve smallest communities which have been admitted to N. membership are:

	Population	*Date of Admission*
Iceland	169,000	1946
Luxembourg	320,000	Original member
Gabon	417,000	1960
Cyprus	549,000	1960
Congo (Fr.)	780,000	1960
Panama	995,000	Original member
Costa Rica	1,076,000	Original member
Togoland (Fr.)	1,100,000	1960
Libya	1,153,000	1955
République Centrafricaine	1,161,000	1960
Liberia	1,200,000	Original member
Somalia	1,330,000	1960

The populations of all twelve added together do not amount to ie third of the population of Nigeria. In October 1960 the mem-rship of U.N. was ninety-nine, and if Mauretania (population o,000) is admitted she will be the hundredth member.

mmunist Morality and Private Housing in the U.S.S.R.

THE encouragement of private building in the U.S.S.R., describ-in our last issue,[1] has lasted a very short time. In a long article *zvestia*, 16 October 1960), dealing with Communist morality and e growing manifestations of bourgeois property-owning psy-ology, there occurs a curious paragraph: 'At present, the issue of vances for private building of houses and summer villas in towns d urban settlements has been discontinued. According to the ggestions made by the working people, the construction of private mmer villas and the development of private allotment holdings is nsidered undesirable in the future.' Co-operative building is parently not affected.

It is interesting that the announcement of such a major reversal of licy should be tucked away in an obscure paragraph of an irrele-nt article. Two causes for this sudden change of policy are vious. The first is the shortage of building materials. They are arly insufficient to carry out the vast official building programme

[1] See 'Soviet Target Fifteen Million Flats', in *The World Today*, October 60, pp. 414 ff.

as well as supplying private builders. The second cause is a mora one. The question has been posed in many articles (including th one quoted above), what is to be the future of private cars an houses under Communism? The ideal solution envisaged is Stat apartments for all urban dwellers, and a vast network of summe villas and boarding-houses which would be 'more convenient' tha private villas, the necessity for which would then be past. Also vast car-hire organization would obviate the need for private car

The pernicious moral effect of private house-building and ownin is twofold. It encourages the creation of private building concern mostly organized in gangs of a few workers Sometimes they se only their labour, always at an exorbitant price. Or they might pro vide part of the materials as well But having no legitimate sources o supply, these are mostly stolen. Obviously, such manifestations o private enterprise are not welcome The effect on citizens embarkin on private building is even worse This was illustrated in a patheti article entitled 'What is happening to Zikeyev' (*Partiinaya Zhizn* No. 19, 1960). An honest Communist in a responsible position de cided to build a house. In addition to employing unsavoury privat labour, he had to get his materials by using his influence with im portant friends who had no right to supply him and had to cook thei books to do so. When the house was built, he had to sublet part of to cover the expense, thus himself joining the ranks of 'speculators His work suffered and his morals and those of many of his friend were gravely undermined. The only way out of this dilemma wa to present the house to the State But perhaps this is not a solutio that would appeal to many.

We print below designs for some typical family flats[1] which fo reasons of space had to be excluded from our last issue.

[1] *Izvestia*, 3 March 1960.

Fig. 1 Useful space: 44 8 square meters.

Fig. 2. Useful space: 43 0 square meters.

Fig. 3. Useful space: 45.3 square meters.

Berlin Between East and West

30 August 1960 the Communist regime in Eastern Germany sed East Berlin to citizens of the German Federal Republic for days unless they were in possession of special permits. This ectly contravened the Four-Power agreement of May 1949 ording to which free access to all Berlin by specified road, rail, ter, and air routes was guaranteed. The reason given for the ban s that meetings of two kinds were to be held in West Berlin at the l of the period: the first kind involved former prisoners of war o had been held for many years in Russia, while the second would ng together people expelled at the end of the war from their nes farther east Such gatherings had regularly taken place in st Berlin, although with less ceremony, in the past.

The five days, having elicited only protests to Moscow from the nch, British, and Americans, turned out to be a dress rehearsal 8 September the ban was renewed indefinitely, the Allies osting with restrictions on East German travel and Bonn with at t only moral exhortations to West Germans not to go to the utsche Demokratische Republik', or D.D.R. After this the mmunists cut the salami slices thinner[1] with new quibbles inving, for instance, the right of entry into Berlin of foreign lomatists not accredited to the Pankow regime But it was clear t a new phase in the German Question had begun

Valter Ulbricht and his Russian backers almost certainly believe t they can edge the Allied troops out of West Berlin in the next years, perhaps sooner Every time the West Germans claim that st Berlin belongs to them, when they bring the Bundestag to lin or talk of doing so, or when the Social Democrats declare the yor of West Berlin to be their rival candidate against Adenauer, rally if not legally they weaken the position of the Allied comnders. If this is the sovereign Federal Republic, the simple man ht well ask, what is this foreign occupation doing here? The hority of the Western Powers in West Berlin has then to be rephasized The Communists do not fail to exploit this paradox

For many years the population of Berlin has shown its sense and rage. no love was lost between the Berliners and Hitler. The st Berliners have no illusions about 'democracy' under Ulbricht they live too close to it. The Federal Republic has helped West

[1] The Germans, following Rákosi, call the Communist method 'salami es' because a salami sausage is cut in thin slices till nothing is left

Berlin to abolish its unemployment, a very remarkable feat in t
circumstances. And yet even the morale of West Berlin is liable
invisible corrosion. When the five days' ban was introduced fro
the East, West Berlin seemed unshaken, and its taxi-drivers, righ
celebrated for their articulate opinions, expressed their confiden
to their clients. There was nevertheless a breath of a new uneasin
in the air. The British were thought to be unsympathetic, the Fren
were known to have other cares, and the Americans to be in pr
election disarray. And there is always the secret doubt as to ho
much other Germans care, especially Dr Adenauer's Governme
about a Socialist West Berlin. It was true that since May 1960 t
differences on foreign policy between Christian Democrats a
Social Democrats had disappeared in Western Germany: inde
since their meeting at Godesberg in November 1959 the Sociali
had adopted an altogether more prudent general course On t
other hand Willy Brandt, the young Mayor of Berlin, had been p
forward as the Socialist rival to Adenauer, as the Socialist candid
for the Chancellorship in the West German elections next year W
this an attempt to exploit the Berlin question for party purpose

Willy Brandt is a source of strength and of weakness for We
Berlin. Older officials of the Socialist Party tend to resent him as
opportunist and even as a 'playboy'; like his political opponen
they criticize him for having changed his name, for his foreign wi
and for the Norwegian spoken in his home. They resent the or
man cult which he does not discourage at the meetings he address
For Willy Brandt is undoubtedly a master of publicity and in
mensely popular with the masses. No one believes that he will bri
about a Socialist majority next year though he will probably a
appreciably to the Socialist vote. Anxiety lest Brandt may des
Berlin for Bonn may be inevitable: it is part of the general anxie
which is cruelly exploited from across the zonal frontier. For mo
than twelve months now, the wife of any Federal German offic
working in Berlin has been liable to receive telephone calls wrong
informing her that her husband has been killed in a car accident
threatening to remove her to a lunatic asylum. Clearly it is hoped
the Communists who do this that the wife will refuse to stay
Berlin and that it will be difficult to fill her husband's place if
asks to be transferred. People will stand up to this sort of thing fo
time, but not perhaps indefinitely.

It is still relatively easy for people to escape from the D D R
Western Germany via Berlin, and the stream of refugees has be

lled this year by farmers and clergy as well as professional men, uding many teachers: in August 1960 about 21,000 people left D.D.R., nearly twice as many as in August 1959. The odious l war of political agents[1] between the two Germanies will con-ie · some of the Eastern ones are, of course, disguised as refugees. nmunist penetration of the West German trade unions is con-rable. As for dramatic disclosures of invasion plans, they are bably inevitable. Ulbricht's ban against West German entry into t Berlin, followed by the Allied and West German reactions ady indicated, did not so much intensify the division of Berlin—st Berliners were in theory as free as before to go to East Berlin vice versa[2]—but it deepened the division between Western Eastern Germany.

or the ordinary, by now more or less apathetic, citizen of Leip-or Halle who lives behind a second frontier beyond East Berlin, most important connection with Western Germany is provided trade. The D.D.R. has been glad to import iron and steel, hinery, chemicals, and bituminous coal from the Federal ublic, and had notably increased these imports in 1959 as com-'d with 1958. In return it has been able to supply lignite, mineral and agricultural produce, more of the two latter but less lignite 959 than in 1958. A new East-West trade agreement was made, wing for further increases, on 20 August 1960, exactly ten days re the Ulbricht ban Leading West German industrialists, such tto Wolf, had concerned themselves to develop their trade with D D.R. Indeed in West Berlin, in the five days of Ulbricht's first , some bitterness was felt over the readiness of West German ness men—over a thousand of them—to accept Ulbricht's en-agement to them to finish their business as usual at the autumn at Leipzig. The subsequent decision in Bonn, supported by the man Federation of Industry, to boycott Leipzig next spring was wed on 30 September by three months' notice to Ulbricht iinating the agreement for trade between West and East Ger-y at the end of the year unless he abandoned his inroads upon Four-Power status of Berlin. There was much obvious hesita- before this step was taken, its adversaries stressing West in's dependence upon East German lignite and food supplies.

[1])n 6 October the Defence Ministry in Bonn referred to 16,000 East German s in the Federal Republic.

[2])uring this year about 40,000 people have been coming daily from East n and the D D R to work in West Berlin and about 13,000 West Berliners been working in East Berlin.

Further, a trade war, to be effective, will have to be internationally fought if the D.D.R. is not to replace its West German imports in countries—apart from the Communist bloc—such as Sweden On the other hand, although trade with the Federal Republic has comprised only 11 per cent of East Germany's foreign trade this year, Swedish steel cannot replace some of the D.D.R.'s special imports from the Ruhr, nor has Sweden any interest to export more to East Germany, which has not enough to offer in return.

What do the West Germans think of it all, their country divided for the last fifteen years by the Iron Curtain itself, and the city that was their capital for seventy-five years isolated within Communist territory and with a miniature iron curtain of its own which descends at the Brandenburger Tor? Their attitude is in the first place conditioned by their miraculous prosperity, a prosperity much more astonishing than that of Britain since it was based upon a contraction of territory and an unexpected supply of labour from the territory which was lost. This prosperity is so overriding that it has swallowed up the coal crisis of 1958. today foreign coal-miners are being engaged. It is so overriding that from an anti-Socialist Government labour is yet able to obtain nearly all that it could enjoy in a welfare state. The industrious Germans now take off as long a week-end as if they were British:[1] indeed the *Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund* is pressing hard in all directions for a forty-hour week, and in the case of the powerful metal-workers an agreement made at Bad Homburg last summer provides for the introduction of the forty-hour week between 1962 and 1965. As for wages, skilled labour is so short that the D.G.B cannot always keep abreast—in its demands—of the wages employers are ready to offer At present only industrial and office workers are insured against old age and sickness, but old age pensions have in the last couple of years been increased and related to the cost of living. The next steps are to be the insurance of the professional classes and the peasants, and there is talk of children's allowances beginning with the second child instead of the third Meanwhile official help has become available to, very roughly, 25 per cent of West Germany's student population, who until three years ago were notoriously neglected The only social trump in Ulbricht's hand is the much greater educational assistance which he can offer at the price of ideological subjection.

[1] This means so much overtime on Sundays that the familiar jokes have appeared (e g in *Die Zeit*, 9 September 1960) about being able to recover from it when one is back to normal work on Monday There is some advocacy in German religious circles of a prohibition of Sunday work

The atmosphere seems less hectic in Western Germany than it was a few years ago, more quiet and secure. In spite of Mr Khrushchev's performances this year, people in Western Germany as elsewhere are probably less afraid of nuclear war. Further, they are less afraid of a recession—why should there be such a thing at all now that all the backward countries of the world are clamouring for machines? By contrast with the Weimar Republic, the Federal Republic is generally accepted. This hitherto paternal type of democracy, with adequate freedom of opinion, seems to suit a great many Germans: it is well known that nearly 4 million of them have visited the Bundestag since its inauguration, displaying an interest which seemed real. Young Germans, in particular, seem to have a usefully sceptical attitude towards old political myths and a genuinely international approach. Judging by the students at Bonn University, they insist upon knowing about the recent past On the whole young people—but not only the young—reacted strongly against the swastika rash last Christmas, and were shocked by the Swedish film called *Mein Kampf* which was recently shown, mercilessly bringing Nazi Germany to life.

There is indeed no doubt that enlightened influences are at work in Army circles, in some schools and universities, and among the organizations co-ordinated in the *Bundesjugendring* which involves something like a quarter of the young people under twenty-five in Western Germany. Yet two obstacles jeopardize the outcome. On the one hand the enlightened influences are bogged down by various kinds of sabotage or inertia: on the other there are certain facts which are taboo

The taboo against honesty where Germany's eastern frontiers are concerned is alarming for the future of Germany and therefore for that of all Europe: a straightforward statement about them is automatically condemned as both peculiar and anti-German, and it is shelved. This was well illustrated when the eminent philosopher Professor Karl Jaspers raised the whole matter in a televised interview on 10 August and in five articles beginning on 26 August in *Die Zeit*. It was characteristic of contemporary Germany that these remarkable and intensely patriotic and humane utterances were evaded on the ground that the proposal to turn the D.D.R. into another Austria does not appear to be realizable.

Two forms of collective dishonesty overlap among West Germans today. One consists of the public attitude towards the organizations of former refugees from east of the Oder–Neisse

frontier or from the German-speaking regions of Czechoslovakia Between one-fifth and a quarter[1] of the population of the Federal Republic is of eastern or Sudeten German origin, but these people have now lived as citizens of Western Germany on the average for fifteen years and their children are West Germans. Their integration into Western Germany was a magnificent achievement of which Germans, one would have thought, might be proud. But no, here begins the taboo The integration must not be too directly mentioned because to do so would be to admit that the Germans who formerly lived in East Prussia, Silesia, or Northern Bohemia no longer live there, and that with their departure those territories ceased to be German *de facto* if not *de jure*, however German they used to be.[2] All fair-minded and well-informed people in Germany know that in the Hitler period fearful cruelties were committed by Germans when they drove Poles and Czechs from their homes, and they know that after Hitler's defeat it was to be feared that the Poles and Czechs would retaliate as they did, the more since it suited Moscow for them to do so. A few courageous and unconventional people in Germany will openly agree that the country beyond the Oder is lost for good. large numbers will tell one that of course many people (it is often obscure as to whether the speaker is included) admit this privately. Official West German voices, however, help to build up the legend that injustice and cruelty only occurred when the Germans were expelled by the Poles and Czechs Apart from deplorable cruelty, the chief injustice at that time, as Professor Jaspers has pointed out, consisted in the fact that the East Germans had to pay more bitterly than the West Germans for Hitler's iniquities.

The Federal Government contributes to the funds of the refugee organizations in Western Germany, and Federal Ministers—the Chancellor in the case of the East Prussians at Dusseldorf on 10 July 1960, and the Vice-Chancellor in that of the Upper Silesians at the same place on 28 August—have frequently addressed their rallies with dexterous ambiguity: the refugees were officially welcomed in Berlin during the first week-end in September. They, most of them now comfortable citizens of a flourishing Western Germany, are told that as East Prussians or Upper Silesians they have a right to

[1] Depending upon the basis of calculation

[2] It is still the regular thing for refugee leaders to proclaim in their speeches that, for instance, '*Schlesien ist und bleibt eine deutsche Provinz*' (speech by a Silesian leader in Bonn on 27 April 1960), although Silesia is today a highly developed Polish region

elf-determination. This right is not defined, though it is generally aken to mean a right to go back, *en masse* and permanently, to their ormer homes: it is coupled with a pious renunciation of the use of orce without which self-determination in this sense is impossible Thus the cult of Germany's rights beyond the Oder breeds a curious olitical schizophrenia which—if the Germans would but face it—discredits Western Germany's good name.

Of course the Western Powers have repeated this year in reply to Polish question that they stand by their declaration at Potsdam in 1945 according to which the German–Polish frontier is only pro-isional until a Peace Treaty has been signed. The Federal Govern-nent considers the Potsdam declaration to justify an official Ger-nan claim to the frontiers of 31 December 1937, before Hitler nnexed Austria. The legalistic German mind attaches great sig-nificance to such theoretical 'rights'. the Germans forget that this egalism is likely to appear as irredentism to any of Germany's eighbours who have been made most aware of her at times when er leaders were decrying 'scraps of paper' or glorying in *Macht-* or *Realpolitik*

A further complication was introduced with the foundation in 954 of the *Unteilbares Deutschland* (Indivisible Germany) group This organization places its chief emphasis upon condemnation of he division between the Federal Republic and the D.D.R and ppeals to the public to do all it can to counteract their separation, nforced by Russia for the second time in 1953 Here no other ationality is involved, and the situation is the painful one indicated bove in relation to the latest phase in Berlin. Instinctive sympathy, herefore, goes to *Unteilbares Deutschland*, which however turns out o be the second form of collective dishonesty overlapping with the irst Apart from the paradoxical fact that a firm front in Berlin today neans cutting the D.D.R. off more completely from the Federal Republic, the maps of Germany sponsored by *Unteilbares Deutsch-and* are disquieting. Germany always appears on them in three ieces, the Federal Republic, the D.D.R., which in Germany is alled not Ost- but Mitteldeutschland—and, as the third piece, the erritories formerly German beyond the Oder, the 'German East'. nd somehow there is often something symbolic which blots out omorze, or what the Germans called the Polish corridor, on the nap, so that, as Professor Jaspers has also recently suggested, the nage of Bismarckian Germany is recreated and the frontiers of 1914 nplicitly claimed. This is part of that—as it were—freezing

backwards which many people called 'restoration' after 19

When one discusses these things with Germans of the hig integrity who wish to face the facts they will say that, although rights which Germany claims are unrealizable except by the m she has vowed never to use, it would be bad diplomacy to renou them in advance: they may add that the Constitution of the Fec Republic assures some kind of reunification.[2] They will say, quite openly that as the older generation of refugees from the dies out the claims will be forgotten, but that German pu opinion cannot yet ignore the wounds of expulsion They may that the strain of fanatical nationalism that is probably inevitab the refugee organizations among people who suffered only bec they were German might easily develop into a neo-Nazism, a st at-nothing exaltation of Germanism.

The German claims which appear irredentist to non-Germ whether their governments are Communist or not, will presum persist or die away according to what is taught to the children at school. On 16 March 1956 a special committee for Ger education (*Deutscher Ausschuss fur das Erziehungs- und Bildu wesen*) published a memorandum on 'Eastern Europe in Ger Education', and this was recommended to schools and univers by the Ministers for Education of the *Länder* in the follo December. The memorandum made a brave effort to face the t about Germany's relationship to Eastern Europe, beginning w recognition of Germany's own faults. But even this memoran indulged in evasive ambiguities ending with the demand that (man teachers should desire German unity (undefined) wi Europe, and the whole recommendation was based upon the i to teach children to understand the special role of German Eastern Europe, deploring the lack of 'historical consciousne German union' (*gesamtdeutsches Geschichtsbewusstsein*) in the j

Having experienced the evasiveness of many Germans in cussing these subjects, it is hard to believe that the majorit

[1] On 16 October, at the feast of St Hedwig, patron saint of Berlin, Car Dopfner, Catholic Bishop of that city, preached a magnificent appeal for h acceptance of the results of defeat.

[2] Some Germans even say that the Constitution forbids any renunciat except by a reunited Germany, i e that only the renounced thing coul nounce Professor Jaspers thinks the Constitution needs revision 'This [West Germany] can have no stability if it be based upon an external aim \ is unrealizable for as far ahead as we can see: it can only be consolidated thi its own internal substance Its political independence has hitherto been n superficial; it needs now to be realized through a Constitution which is true character'

teachers do not evade them too. Although education has been officially denazified, for one reason or another new textbooks have often been slow to come into use. Many teachers are themselves former refugees from what was Eastern Germany and are likely to think in terms of their own experiences rather than the real results. Children of school age are encouraged to participate in refugees' rallies, often parading in Silesian or Pomeranian costume in a sea of the flags of former German provinces. *Unteilbares Deutschland* probably makes an even greater emotional appeal to schoolchildren, and for this reason has at times caused anxiety to sober judges. The exaltation of an undefined German unity, dissociated from the tyranny and anti-semitism of Hitler and coupled with the democratic constitution of the *Bundesrepublik*, whether this occurs in school or through *Unteilbares Deutschland* or the *Bundesjugendring*, is not going to help German children to face the facts of the present Facing these facts, moreover, is made harder because Communist propaganda has tried to capture them. Indeed there is some danger of a new German nationalism with one feature in common with National Socialism, i e that it is equated with anti-Communism.

The importance of refugee pressure groups increases with the approach of the Federal elections in 1961. The refugees' party, the *Gesamtdeutsche Block/B.H E*, disappeared from the Bundestag in 1957 because it did not gain 5 per cent of the total number of votes The bigger parties do not want it back, but to prevent its return they must attract the voters to whom it might appeal · their leaders must, moreover, be prepared for its return. In any case, since they might wish for its support, negotiations with both the Christian Democrats and the Socialists have been begun by a leader of the Refugees' Party, Frank Seiboth, a Sudeten German.

Apart from nostalgia for the Germany of Bismarck, there is a large pressure group with close links with Austria which makes a territorial claim not officially sponsored in Bonn except by another Sudeten German, Dr Seebohm, Dr Adenauer's Minister of Transport The leaders of the former Sudeten Germans' organizations in Western Germany are apt to imply that the Munich agreement of 1938 is still valid. This would give Bonn a claim to Hitler's *Sudetengau*, which was Austrian but not German before 1918. People familiar with the history of Bohemia are familiar with the intransigent racialism of both its Germans and its Czechs. They are aware that Austria–Hungary was wrecked as much by the Bohemian

question as by anything, and they may find themselves in anx agreement with the distinguished Austrian who remarked a years ago that, the Sudeten Germans having destroyed the Austria, it was to be hoped that they would not cause the new (many to come to grief.

The connection between the question of Berlin and that of (many's Eastern frontiers is obviously close: Berlin is the knot which all the various threads are tied. Several French and Br newspapers, in the week when Ulbricht's new offensive agains Four-Power status of Berlin began, made clear that they could approve of the aggravation of Berlin's predicament by what *Times* called 'overdoing things'. The German reaction was tc at the windmill of British enmity: fortunately, however, Brit new approach to European trade is welcome to Bonn and poin an Anglo-German community of interest.

ELIZABETH WISKEMAN

Extremes in Japanese Politics

LET me begin with two quotations. First, 'We favour an etl education, based on love of our country, pride in our people, a belief in peace, democracy, and humanism. . . We must be stea in our respect for the soil of our ancestors and for our two-thous year-old history ' And secondly, 'It is our aim to restore the i pendent sovereignty of the Japanese nation and to establis eternally neutral Japan By securing a coalition between the A peoples we shall strive for final emancipation from colonial [At home] we shall work for a classless society by means of a peac noble, revolutionary movement. We shall stabilize the peo livelihood by carrying out a planned economy.'

Most readers will probably agree that these two quotations c very well have come from the same source. In fact, the first is fr speech by Mr Nozaka, the present Secretary-General of the J Communist Party, and the second one is from the manifest the Japan Revolutionary Chrysanthemum-Flag Comrades' sociation, one of the hundreds of extreme rightist organizat that have sprung up during the post-war period.

One could find dozens of similar examples, but this pair will be sufficient to suggest that, in some ways at least, the two extremes in Japanese politics are very close indeed. In the first place, they are often similar in their approach to the main problems with which Japan is faced. Both reveal strong nationalist attitudes and, despite frequent references to 'peace', both share a determination to pursue nationalist objectives by forceful means. Though they often use democratic slogans, their approach is thoroughly anti-democratic and opposed to the parliamentary system and to the liberal ideals for which the West stands. Both attack the existing Government for its weak attitude to foreign Powers, for the personal ambition of its leaders, and for permitting corruption in high places. Their attacks are not limited to words but also take the form of violent actions. In the case of the extreme Right the outstanding instance is the assassination of the Socialist leader, Mr Asanuma, on 12 October 1960, we may also recall the various assassination attempts against the former Prime Minister, Mr Yoshida, and the recent attack on the Prime Minister, Mr Kishi. In the case of the Left we need look back no further than a few months ago when thousands of demonstrators fought the police and burst into the precincts of the Diet building to oppose the revision of the U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty.

Secondly, the extremes are similar in the type of personality that they attract. It is the type that Dr Eysenck, in his analysis of the personality traits of English Fascists and Communists,[1] has described as 'tough-minded'. The typical marks of the tough-minded personality are aggression, dominance, fanaticism, rigidity, intolerance, narrow-mindedness, and authoritarianism; and these in fact tend to be among the salient characteristics both of Japanese Communists and crypto-Communists and of members of the extreme rightist groups.

At the time of the recent demonstrations in Tokyo against the revision of the Security Treaty several observers compared the attitude and personality of the left-wing student leaders who organized the rioting with those of the young officers in the 1930s who belonged to the Imperial Way Faction and who were responsible for the sanguinary events of February 1936. Like the young officers, the student extremists came largely from peasant families and were driven by a deep hatred of capitalism and of the *status quo*. In both cases the young extremists were incensed with the Government for

[1] *Psychology of Politics* (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1954)

its corruption and for its failure to adopt a more independent tude to the West; in both cases their opposition took the form desperate sort of violence reminiscent of traditional Samurai haviour. The analogy should not be pressed too far, but it is doubtedly significant. An interesting fact that seems to confirm similarity in personality between members of the extreme R and the extreme Left is the ease with which so many of them[1] l been able to switch from one extreme to the other. An ex-men of the Japan Communist Party is far more at home in a revolut ary rightist organization than he would be in a moderate soci group.

Thirdly, the two extremes in Japan thrive on the same clim Both profit from loss of faith in parliamentary institutions democracy; both breed successfully in an atmosphere of spiri vacuum; finally, and most important, it is only in case of a se crisis, economic or military, that either extreme has a chanc gaining any real power.

The first point to remember, then, is that the two extreme Japan are in many ways far closer than superficial impressions m suggest. Japanese politics are not to be represented by a stra line with the Communist Party at one end and the right-v nationalist movement at the other, but rather by an almost comp circle in which the two extremities are far nearer to each other t to the more moderate groups in between. Or, as Mr Tsukui, a v known right-wing theoretician, has put it, 'The Right and the in Japan are separated by only a paper's width '

It should, nevertheless, be emphasized that now, as before war, the extreme Left and the extreme Right in Japan are other's most deadly enemies. Although they may play into one other's hands there is, it would seem, no chance that they will deliberately work together against the political centre. If in a of crisis—and, in particular of economic crisis involving a sl drop in foreign trade, mass unemployment, falling living standa and so on—Japan's present democratic structure should foun either the extreme Left or the extreme Right will be able to as itself in a way that at the moment is quite impossible. Both w profit from the discrediting of democratic institutions and lea from the atmosphere of disillusion and unrest that would pre

[1] For example, Tanaka Seigen, Nabeyama Sadachicka, Akamatsum K maro, Mitamura Shiro, Asahara Kenzo, Tajima Yoshiyuki, Kazama Jol Oyama Iwao, Sano Manabu.

and from their own inherent readiness to use tough solutions to meet desperate problems. For a time both extremes might gain in strength as the political centre collapsed and as people, thoroughly disabused about Western-style democracy, gravitated to one extreme or the other. It is likely, however, that before long a strong authoritarian government would emerge, either under the extreme Left or under the Right, and that one of its first moves would be to crush the opposition.

This brings us to the crucial question of whether it is the extreme Left or the extreme Right that stands to profit more from a drastic weakening of the centre. A great deal has been written and spoken in Japan about this question and it is only possible here to suggest a few of the main factors. The matter is full of imponderables, since so much depends on the precise conditions in which the weakening of the democratic centre and the polarization between the two extremes come about, and also on the conditions that prevail in the rest of the world at that time. The question, however, is sufficiently important, both for the Japanese and for ourselves, to merit some speculation, and in the process we may discover some useful points not only about Japan but about other countries in which the democratic structure is still unstable.

In the first place, a simple comparison of numerical strength will not get us very far. Numbers have not been the decisive factor in bringing Communist parties to power in most other countries, and it would be foolish to be lulled into complacency by the present numerical weakness of the Japanese Communists. This applies even more strongly to the Japanese extreme Right which, unlike the Communist Party, is not particularly interested in gaining mass support For what they are worth, however, here are a few figures. It is estimated that the Communist Party has something over 100,000 members, more than half of them coming from the six largest cities. In the last Lower House elections (1958) the Communists received a little over one million votes (about 2·6 per cent of the popular vote) and one member was elected.

When we turn to the extreme Right, instead of a single, well-organized, tightly disciplined party we find hundreds and hundreds of societies usually organized on a traditional, personal basis. In 1956 the Police Agency listed about a thousand rightist organizations with a total membership of some 100,000 (approximately the same as the Communists). Of these about ninety were described as important (fifty descending from pre-war groups and forty being

new societies). My own estimate of the total membership of rightist groups is between 80,000 and 90,000. In the elections the rightist candidates do not present a common front and, although they can usually be identified as representing the extreme Right, they normally stand as official candidates of the Liberal-Democratic Party, which is sufficiently catholic in scope to include anything from an old-fashioned liberal like Mr Yoshida to a rabid ultra-nationalist like Shindo Kazuma. In the 1958 elections the extreme rightist candidates received a total of some 860,000 votes (about 2 3 per cent of the popular vote) and nine were elected.

So far as numbers are concerned, therefore, there is not much to choose between the two extremes. In comparing their potentialities, however, the significant factors are those that would enable them to gain power, not under present conditions, but in a time of crisis when the existing form of government had proved itself unable to meet the challenge.

The Communists have certain clear advantages. They are infinitely better organized than the extreme rightist groups and do not suffer from the cliquish, personal aspect that keeps the latter in a constant state of disunity. They have a clear line on the main problems confronting Japan (though to be sure a line that frequently shifts on orders from Moscow or Peking), whereas the rightist groups disagree on numerous important points and have never been able to present a common front. The Communists can offer a positive image of the future and one that supposedly involves a steady improvement of living standards and a permanent elimination of unemployment and of the other aspects of economic injustice that would be so conspicuous at a time of crisis In addition, the Communists are in a far better position than the Rightists to exploit certain prevailing sentiments, such as those against war, nuclear weapons, and the remilitarization of Japan, they are also better suited than the Rightists for exploiting nationalist feelings on such issues as American bases in Japan and the future of Okinawa. Again, while the right-wing organizations exist in something of a vacuum, the Communist Party has allies among certain elements of the Socialist Party, organized labour, the student movement, the teachers' union, and the intelligentsia.

When all these factors have been taken into account, however, I still believe that in the event of the breakdown of the present type of democratic regime Japan is far more likely to swing to some form of extreme rightist politics than to Communism. This view is based on

numerous considerations which can be outlined only very briefly here. The first point is that nationalism, though different in many ways from its pre-war manifestation, remains the strongest underlying force in the country, and that the extreme Right is far more closely attuned to the present form of Japanese nationalism than is the Left. The left wing in Japan has done its best to exploit nationalist sentiment of the anti-American variety, but for all its sound and fury it has had very little success so far as the majority of the population is concerned. In a time of crisis, when the nation-group looks for scapegoats and turns fiercely on symbols of unpatriotism, this could once more prove to be the undoing of the Left. The Rightists, on the other hand, are the representatives *par excellence* of Japanese patriotism. The conservatives are subject to nationalist attack for their close ties with the West, and the extreme Left is suspiciously linked in people's minds with Russia and Communist China; the extreme Rightists, on the other hand, though many of them may reluctantly recognize the need for temporary ties with America, are wedded to no foreign country and to no foreign interests Again, while both democracy and Communism have a strongly foreign flavour, right-wing nationalism, with its call for a return to a completely indigenous Emperor system and to time-honoured national traditions, is Japanese through and through.

This is related to a second point, namely, that the extreme Rightists are far more in tune than the Communists with Japanese traditions in general In almost every way they fit into the Japanese 'atmosphere' better than the Left. This atmosphere has of course changed greatly since before the war. Japanese society is far freer and more open than it has ever been in the past. Yet despite all the Westernization and democratization Japan remains remarkably Japanese—socially, politically, and culturally. Rightist groups and their leaders can appeal to a desire for cultural security and continuity in a way that is impossible for the Communists, who, despite all their talk of respect for the nation's cultural traditions, are widely regarded as 'foreign' and iconoclastic. In view of the widespread persistence in Japan of pre-modern conditions and sentiments, this association of the Rightists with traditional ways is an important source of potential strength.

The traditional appeal of the extreme Right applies especially in provincial and rural areas. This brings me to a third consideration: farmers and other country folk, with their strong traditionalism, their deeply ingrained anti-urban sentiment, their suspicion of

foreign innovations, would in a time of crisis be more susceptibl the ideas of a reform from the Right than to the internation slanted theories of the Left. It is significant that the strength of extreme Left in rural and provincial areas should have remai negligible in the post-war period, and that these are the areas wh extreme Rightist candidates have had their greatest electoral s cess. The conservatism and stability that have characterized ru areas since the land reform would be seriously impaired in cas economic crisis This would play into the hands of any extre group that was able to attack the supposed sources of agrarian d culties and to promise a solution; but it appears likely that some fo of right-wing radicalism, in which a return to the Emperor syst and Japanism was combined with economic reform, would hav better chance of exploiting economic discontent than Communi Despite Japan's dramatic industrialization, farmers still make some 43 per cent of the population, and they constitute the larg homogeneous interest group in the country. In his recent study the political attitudes of farmers Professor Dore[1] stresses the ext to which farmers still accept the traditional anti-individua values, such as unity and harmony, which in time of crisis car easily lend support to a totalitarian solution. He notes that m than half of the farmers he questioned thought Japan, with her broken Imperial line, was 'still the land of the gods' and that 80 cent agreed that Japan should be the leader of Asia, and that m should be done in schools to inspire children with a proper sens patriotism.

A fourth factor that would tend to favour the extreme Rightist that in case of a critical weakening of the existing system the pow ful Conservative elements in the country would almost invaria back them in preference to the Communists. Under normal circu stances Conservative politicians, bureaucrats, and business men be expected to uphold the present form of government, but i should ever come to a choice there is little doubt as to which of two extremes would be the lesser evil for most of them A sev economic crisis would almost certainly be accompanied by co siderable labour unrest and other forms of social tension, as wel by a rapid growth of ultra-leftist influence in the trade unions a elsewhere. If the Government seemed unable to deal with the cr under the parliamentary system, many business leaders might

[1] R P Dore, *Land Reform in Japan* (Oxford University Press for R Institute of International Affairs, 1959)

it to give at least partial support to extreme right-wing groups and olicies, which (like Nazism before 1933) might appear to be the est defence against the supreme disaster of Communism. It is also mportant to remember that, whereas an unbridgeable chasm separ-ates the ruling Conservative party from the extreme Left, many ex-reme right-wing personalities have close connections with this arty, and that those Rightists who have been elected to the Diet ince 1953 have almost always stood as official candidates of the Conservative party. The well-entrenched power of the Conserva-ives would inevitably favour the extreme Right rather than the xtreme Left. Assuming that at the time of crisis government was till in the hands of the Conservatives (and it is hard to imagine that hey will be removed from power by legal means for a very long time ndeed), it is they who would have control of the State machinery, ncluding the police and the National Defence Forces. If things eemed to hang in the balance between the extreme Left and the xtreme Right, this immensely powerful machinery would in-lubitably be used against the Communists. Thus the realities of resent leadership in Japan would favour the extreme Right.

The realities of Japan's position in the cold war world would also ncline the country towards the Right rather than to Communism So long as international tension continues and so long as the Con-ervatives remain in power, it is likely that the United States will etain considerable influence on Japan in both the military and the conomic fields. It is, of course, the hope of the United States and f the West in general that Japan will preserve her present demo-ratic structure. If, however, the country should swing to one ex-reme or the other, there is no doubt as to which would be the greater lisaster for the West, and it is clear that the United States in par-icular would use all its considerable influence in co-operating with apanese Conservatives to prevent such a development. It is doubt-ul whether a swing to the extreme Right, unfortunate as it might eem, would elicit any such reaction. The Communist countries vould, of course, decry the growth of rightist power, but given heir relatively small influence on Japan's policy it is hard to see vhat they could do to prevent it, other than to pursue a policy of pen interference which in the present pattern of alignments might resumably lead to world war and thus make the question of whether apan swung to the Left or to the Right seem very unimportant ndeed—even to the Japanese themselves.

A final advantage of the extreme Right in a country where the

principle of continuity is so highly valued as in Japan is that tl
rise would in all probability not require any violent or abr
change in the existing patterns of political power. While a swin
the extreme Left would involve almost total disruption of the p
sent order, both domestically and internationally, a swing to
Right could take place in such a way as to preserve the institutic
façade of the existing system and to assure continuity, in adminis
tion and elsewhere, between the period of party supremacy .
that of authoritarian rule.

The problem is fraught with imponderables and we are certai
in no position to come to any hard-and-fast conclusions. Japa
dependent even more than most countries on developments in
outside world. A rapid strengthening of the Communist Pow
vis-à-vis the West could in time of crisis have an effect on determ
ing Japan's future course that would outweigh all the factors t
have been mentioned. A severe setback in trade relations with
West, especially if the Communist countries took action to allev
the consequences, could have a similar result It can only be s
gested in conclusion that in our preoccupation with the possibi
of Japan's turning to the extreme Left and allying herself with
Communist Powers, we should not overlook the many factors t
in a time of crisis might incline her to return to some form of rig
wing totalitarian dictatorship As has been seen, the two extrei
are in many ways similar and thrive on the same general climate
we are aware of the dangers we can at least recognize the respec
symptoms even though we may be unable or unwilling to prev
the onset of the disease.

IVAN MORRI

Crisis Impending in the Dominican Republic?

THE Dominican Republic, the site of the first permanent Europ
settlement in the Western World, is the domain of the lon
dictatorship in contemporary Latin America. Generalissimo Ra
Leonidas Trujillo has ruled the country since 1930, but du
recent months his dictatorship has been threatened by both

rnal aggression and internal dissension. If either of these forces, or ,s age—he was sixty-nine on 24 October—should bring his era to a ose, the repercussions might spread from the Caribbean through ie rest of Latin America: they might even affect the constantly ifting balance in the United Nations and in the cold war.

Until 1930 this small country of 18,816 square miles which :cupies the eastern two-thirds of the island between Cuba and uerto Rico gave little evidence of its present potential importance. into Domingo[1] was one of the poorest of the Spanish colonies. he *Conquistadores* found so little gold and silver there that many ft for New Spain and Peru when they learned of the fabulous disveries of these metals by Cortés and Pizarro during the 1520s and ;30s Since mountains cover about three-fifths of the total area, riculture enabled only a few planters and traders to become ealthy The early Spaniards fought among themselves and exrminated the aboriginal Indians Shortly after the end of the idian wars, about 1560, British, French, and Dutch buccaneers 'gan devastating raids, notably those by Admirals Drake in 1586 id Penn in 1655. Spain, without great reluctance, surrendered the estern third of the island to France in 1697. Santo Domingo a ntury later had a population of only some 125,000, of whom ,000 were slaves and a large number mulattoes. Most of the population of all colours were illiterate.[2] Spain permitted practically no irticipation, even to the Spanish settlers, in the government of the lony

The history of the Dominican Republic to 1930 was almost as leful as that of Santo Domingo. During the nineteenth century aitians repeatedly invaded the eastern part of the island, governed from 1822 to 1843—misgoverned it according to many historians and meddled in its affairs until the end of the century. When the ominican Republic gained its independence from Haiti in 1844, any Dominican leaders were so pessimistic about the ability of the epublic to maintain a stable government that they invited Spain in 61 to re-establish a colonial government. Spanish misrule led to e War of Restoration which further devastated the country before dependence was regained in 1865 Soon thereafter, the attempt of e United States, abetted by some Dominican politicians, to annex

[1] The early name for the island was Hispaniola Santo Domingo is the correct ne for the Spanish colony and Saint-Domingue for the French colony.

[2] M L. Moreau de Saint-Méry, *Descripción de la Parte Española de Santo mingo* (translated from the French by C Armando Rodríquez, Ciudad ujillo, 1944), pp 160–3, 317–21, 348–9.

the Republic increased the chronic turmoil. In 1869 unscrupulou
Dominican rulers contracted the onerous Hartmont loan with a
English banking firm. The squandering of the small sum actual
received from this loan necessitated new loans and frequent revo
lutions[1] and eventually led to bankruptcy at the beginning of th
twentieth century. The United States, in order to prevent Britai
France, Germany, and Belgium from intervening for the protectio
of their respective bondholders, established a customs receiversh
in 1905. This receivership paid off most of the foreign debt and
the same time increased the revenues available to the Dominica
Treasury. But American banking firms furthered the politic
influence of the United States, and American sugar-cane plante
acquired extensive holdings When Dominican leaders resisted th
attempt of the United States to supervise the expenditures of th
Dominican Government, the United States changed the custom
receivership to a military government which lasted from 1916
1924. In 1930 Trujillo exploited a new turbulent situation to g
himself 'elected' President. The last thirty years have been the E
of Trujillo.

This Era poses the usual problems which confront the historia
of a dictatorship They must analyse the liabilities and the assets of
dictatorship: the suppression of civil liberties, the driving into exi
of opponents, the murders; and, on the other hand, the undeniab
material improvements. Historians must also seek to establish th
reciprocal relationship between the 'Great Man' and the 'Gre
Events'.

Trujillo, except for brief interludes, was President from 1930
1952 when he engineered the election of his brother Héctor Th
latter, a puppet of the Generalissimo, held office until 3 Augu
1960 when he resigned because of 'ill health'. His successor, Vic
President Joaquín Balaquer, has been one of the most sycophant
adulators of the Dictator Since 1931 Trujillo has permitted on
one party, the *Partido Dominicano* When women were first grante
the suffrage in 1942, they were as vociferous as the men in cam
paigning for the one-party candidates [2] Even if there had been a
opposition party, Trujillo's control of the press, the radio, and th
election machinery would have rendered the chances of oppositio

[1] There were some twenty-two governments between 1865 and 1899, an
General Ulises Heureaux ruled for twelve of these years, 1887–99 See Sumr
Welles, *Naboth's Vineyard The Dominican Republic, 1844–1924* (2 vols , Ne
York, 1928), *passim*

[2] The writer witnessed the campaign

andidates as hopeless as those under the dictatorships of Salazar, talin, Mussolini, Hitler, and Franco.

The number of Trujillo's opponents who were imprisoned, nurdered, exiled, or cajoled into supporting him has been estimated t several thousands. The most notorious case, that of Professor esús María Galíndez de Suárez, demonstrates the difficulty of pinointing the number. Galíndez, a bitter critic of Trujillo, had fled New York where he became a professor at Columbia University. On 12 March 1956 he mysteriously disappeared after entering a subay station in downtown New York On 3 December of the same ear Gerald Lester Murphy, an American private aeroplane pilot, ied mysteriously in Ciudad Trujillo Early in 1957 a Dominican viator, Octavio Antonio de la Maza, was reported to have comitted suicide in prison in Ciudad Trujillo and to have left a note tributing his suicide to remorse because during a fight with lurphy the latter had fallen to his death in the sea Dominican xiles in the United States, supported by many well-known merican liberals and influential newspapers and magazines, insted that Murphy had kidnapped Galíndez and flown him to the ominican Republic where he 'died'; that de la Maza had killed lurphy to keep him from talking, and that de la Maza had been lled for the same reason. Despite demands by the United States tate Department for an explanation from the Dominican Government, the culpability of the Dominican Government has not been idicially established. Although a noted American liberal lawyer, lorris Ernst, who conducted an investigation paid for by the ominican Government, absolved it, many Americans continued hold it responsible. Almost as notorious was the death in 1959 of amón Marrero, Minister of Labour, whose automobile 'fell' off ie side of a mountain after he had allegedly visited Dominican iles in New York City

Even when one discounts some of the extravagant claims made by rujillo's well-paid public relations firms, the very substantial aterial achievement since 1930 cannot be gainsaid. At that time the ankrupt and poverty-ridden country had a foreign debt of over 20 million and a total government revenue of about $7 million In 940 a treaty with the United States abolished the customs collectorip, and in 1947 the foreign debt was paid off in full. Once a riceiporting country, it became 'the rice-bowl of the Caribbean' with ports in 1958 valued at $16·5 million. Other important exports are offee, cocoa beans, chocolate, leaf tobacco, meat products, and

fufural. This last product, which is made from *bagasse* (a residue sugar cane), is one of the most exciting of modern synthetics, used manufacturing nylon, plastics, synthetic rubber, pharmaceutica and in oil refining.

Sugar is, however, the mainstay of the Dominican economy 1959 exports to the United Kingdom amounted to £7,451,1 and sugar accounted for £7,220,752. This was a decline fr £11,806,030 and £11,698,646 respectively for 1958.[1] The Domi can Republic exported to the United States in 1957 cane sugar of t value of less than £2,800,000 and in 1959 of less than £3 milli These figures represented about one-tenth and one-ninth resp tively of the total Dominican exports to the United States. Hen sugar exports to the United States, which are subject to a qu fixed by Congress at a price about twice that on the world mark do not constitute a potent United States economic weapon This all the more true because in 1957 and 1958 the total value Dominican exports to all parts of the world was $161,018,320 a $136,614,711 respectively.[2]

Dominican exports have exceeded imports by sizable sums du ing the past ten years Since a very small percentage of this favo able balance of trade is based upon the export of depleting r materials such as iron ore and cement manufactured from gypsu the balance is not particularly unhealthy. This balance has be reduced to about £5 million annually in the last five years beca of the purchase of increased quantities of machinery and articles transport, principally from the United States. While the Unit Kingdom exports and re-exports in 1959 totalled only £1,586,3 of which road vehicles and aircraft accounted for £626,447, United States in 1955 exported to the Dominican Republic ro transport vehicles, machinery, apparatus, and other finish manufactures to the order of £14 million. Germany, including Federal Republic and the Soviet Zone, was second to the Unit States in the value of the export of pipe and iron fittings, iron a steel manufactures, machinery, and apparatus, and third w respect to electrical machinery and apparatus[3]

[1] Information furnished by the Commercial Attaché at the British Emba in Washington, October 1960

[2] Information furnished by the Commercial Attaché at the (former) Dom can Republic Embassy in Washington, October 1960

[3] For United Kingdom exports, see fn. 1 above For the others, see Uni States Department of Commerce, Bureau of Foreign Commerce, *Trade of United States with Latin America*, 1960 (*World Trade Information Seri Part 3, Statistical Reports*, No. 60–11).

Increasingly, however, the Dominican Republic boasts of its
bility to construct its own machinery. A report in 1958 asserted that
almost all the machinery required by the . . . sugar mills is built' by
Dominican factory which 'has every up-to-date installation for the
erfect casting of iron, copper, and other industrial metals'. Per-
aps the most grandiose and potentially important project is the
onstruction of shipyards at Rio Haina, the site of one of the largest
ugar mills in the world. One of the five planned dry docks would
ccommodate vessels up to 560 feet long and eighty-six feet wide.
'he British Ambassador to the Dominican Republic reported in 1957
project for the construction of a nuclear power station at Rio Haina.
Aost of the electrical power production, 192 million kilowatt hours
1 1957, was sold to industry Other factories produce shoes, soap,
urniture, hats, shirts, venetian blinds, piping for sewers, fertilizers,
ricks, roof and floor tiles, glass, photolithic engraving, cigars,
igarettes, peanut oil, and the already mentioned cement and fufural.
'rujillo has evidently been endeavouring to make his country less
nd less dependent on foreign countries. More than 2,000 miles of
ll-weather roads suitable for motor transport provide rapid move-
ient of goods, people—and troops. The Generalissimo would,
owever, have to purchase abroad the jet planes for which a new
irport near Boca Chica has been constructed. Jet planes would in-
rease the number of tourists for whom there is keen competition by
iost of the Caribbean islands.

Trujillo has maintained a balanced rhythm between agricultural
nd industrial expansion. New farm lands have been created on
)rested slopes and at the same time a programme of scientific
eafforestation has been sponsored by his Government. About a
undred irrigation canals—there were said to be only four in 1930—
ave increased the arable land The Agricultural and Industrial
ank, established in 1943, has made loans and given free land to
irmers, made available more than 1,000 tractors and other agri-
ultural machinery, and provided tools and instruction in the use of
iachinery. The completion of a cadastral survey has further en-
)uraged farmers to become owners of their plots of land.

The Generalissimo attracted foreign capital investments by his
ght control of both the government and the economy and by
)ecial inducements such as the acquisition of necessary properties,
)nvertibility of currency, and a fairly long-term exemption from
ixes and import duties. As these investors gaze upon the Cuban
:ene in October 1960, they are probably even more disposed to

overlook the apparatus of dictatorship in the Dominican Republi
This comfortable feeling is enhanced by the Dominican slogan 'N
Time for Communists.'

This expansion of industry and agriculture raised revenues fro
$7 million in 1930 to an estimated $131,525,000 in 1957.[1] Tl
revenues would be higher were it not for the fact that many indu
tries are owned by Trujillo, his family, and numerous sycophant
Some critics assert that their personal fortune amounts to at lea
$500 million.

The syphoning-off of such a large sum has, of course, reduce
Government expenditures. Naturally, a disproportionate amount
the Budget is allocated to the armed forces, usually about on
fourth of the total Budget of some $120 million. The item for tl
'Presidency' was budgeted in 1956 at $5,533,868. Great strides ha
been made in education and the fine arts, public health, welfare, ar
social assistance. But these Budget items were relatively low in 195
$9,240,135 for education and fine arts, $4,736,623 for public healt
and $2,085,168 for welfare and social assistance, or a little more th
one-seventh of the total expenditures. The Public Works depar
ment, which received $8,929,936 in 1956, constructs some of tl
most modern and modernistic highways and government building
but also numerous monuments and other tributes to 'The Ben
factor', 'The Father of His Country' Some of these monuments,
well as private residences and automobile licence plates, have tl
inscription '*Dios y Trujillo*'. Recent visitors have told the writ
that behind some of the buildings are slums which are not a part
the escorted tour.

It can hardly be gainsaid that Trujillo has played a major role
transforming his country. Were it not for the facts that he is a di
tator and that the term 'Operation Bootstrap' has been applied
Puerto Rico, some of Trujillo's public relations men would prol
ably have added the phrase to their adulatory descriptions. Wh
manner of man is the Generalissimo?

Despite the somewhat farcical efforts of his official biographers
prove that he is of 'noble, pure Castilian blood', the evidence is co
vincing that he has some Negro blood. He is a light-brown mulatt

[1] For information about the developments see United Kingdom, Board Trade, Overseas Economic Surveys *Dominican Republic: Economic and Co mercial Conditions in the Dominican Republic* (London, 1957) and United Stat Department of Commerce, Bureau of Foreign Commerce, *World Trade I formation Service, Part 3, Statistical Reports*

[2] See U.K., Overseas Economic Surveys, *op cit.*, p. 23.

is brother Héctor is so dark that he has been called 'El Negro'. He robably had only four years of formal education. There seems to be o legal evidence extant that he was—as is sometimes stated—a attle rustler' or that he was imprisoned for forgery and theft uring the American Occupation of 1916 to 1924. But he did learn iuch about military government during this period when he became colonel in the National Police. In 1927 he rose to the rank of eneral commanding the Dominican Army, the new name for the lational Police.[1]

His control of the army enabled him to win the 'election' for resident in 1930. A devastating hurricane in that year provided im with the opportunity to lay the foundation for his police state. ut neither the turmoil preceding the elections nor the hurricane xplains how he emerged the victor in the elections, how he inugurated with extraordinary vigour his programme of reconstruction after the hurricane, and how he has retained power since that me Moreover, Trujillo seems to be the only member of his family ndowed with the qualities which have enabled him to maintain a ictatorship longer than that of any contemporary individual except rime Minister Salazar of Portugal Historians can do little more ian record the facts Psychologists can perhaps 'explain' Salazar, lussolini, Hitler, Lenin, Stalin, and Khrushchev.

That Trujillo works hard is conceded even by most of his severest itics They also recognize his pride in gaining respect for the ominican people. Even his insistence that peasants coming into ties shall wear shoes—which are sometimes sandals—is an indicaon of this pride. More important is the fact that this pride drove m to pay off the foreign debt and to prevent foreign meddling in control of the country.

The human resources of the Dominican Republic presented a fficult problem In 1950 the total population was 2,135,872. Only out 14 per cent were white, some 16 per cent Negroes, and 70 r cent coloured. There were about 9,000 Englishmen, and about 02 per cent Orientals, largely Chinese.[2] Most Dominicans, escially the non-whites, had received little formal education. nerous debts and frequent revolutions had left most of them im-

[1] A typical eulogy is Lawrence de Besault, *President Trujillo His Work and Dominican Republic* (3rd ed , Santiago, Dominican Republic, 1941) The most cent indictment is Germán Ornes, *Trujillo Little Caesar of the Caribbean* dinburgh, New York, Toronto, 1958)

[2] Dominican Republic, *Album Estadistico Gráfico, MCMLXIV, Año del ntenario* (Ciudad Trujillo, 1944), Lámina 7 and preceding pages (pages not imbered)

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poverished. Moreover, even in 1950, 76·2 per cent of the to
population lived in villages of fewer than 500 inhabitants; the pe
centage was probably higher in 1930. Of the 508,551 urban dwelle
in 1950, 183,553 or 23·8 per cent lived in the capital city, Ciud
Trujillo. The population density of the Republic as a whole was 44
per square kilometre, whereas in Haiti it was 112·1 per squa
kilometre.[1]

On the other hand, the natural resources of the Dominic
Republic are not inconsiderable. The Cibao Valley, about 150 mil
long and from ten to thirty miles wide, is one of the most fertile
the West Indies. Several rivers have made possible numerous irrig
tion projects. Arable land, including the principal sugar-produci
region in the south-east, constitutes about 30 per cent of the to
surface. None of the plains in Haiti is as large or as fertile as Cib
Valley or the south-eastern region. The rainfall is rarely hea
enough to cause rivers to overflow their course or to destroy cro
Despite wide variations in temperature the climate is on the wh
equable. The humidity, except in some places near sea level, is n
excessive. There have been no major earthquakes or hurricanes
recent years. Haiti, on the other hand, has suffered some devastati
hurricanes in recent years. These differences in population de
sity, extent of arable land, and number and intensity of hu
ricanes account in part for the relative backwardness of Haiti B
even some Haitians have yearned at times for a dictatorship *à
Trujillo.*

Trujillo has also benefited from the generally benign attitude
the United States. The hot and cold policy of the United States t
ward this dictatorship is understandable not only because of t
sizable American investments which are not likely to be expr
priated so long as Trujillo remains in power, and because of h
recent unremitting opposition to Communism, but also because t
United States has a guided missile tracking station and other mi
tary installations in the Dominican Republic. These facts explain
large measure the friendship shown to Trujillo by Preside
Eisenhower, Vice-President Nixon, and other high-ranking Unit
States officials. When Trujillo's eldest son, Rafael, Jr, failed to gra
uate—because of excessive absences—from the United States Arn
Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth, Kans
Trujillo retaliated by temporarily denying the United States t

[1] United States Department of Commerce, *Census Atlas Maps of La
America Greater Antilles*, Map 6

use of military installations.[1] Friendly relations were soon restored.

The United States is further impeded in its policy towards Trujillo by reason of its Good Neighbour Policy, enunciated by President Franklin D. Roosevelt in his inaugural address of 1933, and by its acceptance, at the Seventh International Conference of American States at Montevideo in 1933, of the principle of non-intervention. But what constitutes intervention? Does it mean only the use of force or does it include diplomatic interposition or indeed the absence of diplomatic interposition? It can hardly be denied that the U S. helped Batista to remain in power in Cuba by refraining from 'intervening' against him. Nor that the United States embargo on arms and ammunition to Batista hastened his overthrow by Castro Likewise, the failure of the United States to exercise sufficient diplomatic and economic pressure to cause the overthrow of Castro may be, and in some quarters is, interpreted as intervention in his behalf

Today, in mid-October 1960, it may be argued that the failure of the United States to intervene decisively against Trujillo constitutes intervention in his behalf. Diplomatic relations were severed on 26 August 1960 following the unanimous decision of the Foreign Ministers of the American States at San José on 20 August to break off diplomatic relations with the Trujillo regime and to apply economic sanctions against it. But this can be considered little more than a slap on the wrist, since there has been no reduction of the quota of Dominican sugar imported into the United States. The only action which could be regarded as an economic sanction has been the persistent refusal by the State Department, acting through the Department of Agriculture, to authorize purchases of sugar from the Dominican Republic in excess of its assigned quota to replace Cuba's sugar exports to the U.S., although such supplementary purchases were authorized during July and August from twelve countries, including five Latin American countries that do not have U.S. sugar quotas.

There remains the intriguing question whether acts of the Organization of American States (O.A.S.), a regional organization authorized by the Charter of the United Nations,[2] are subject to the

[1] See Julio García Lourdes, 'The Dominican Republic Blazes the Path to Progress', *Auge* (Mexico City), 16 August 1955, for evidence of the friendship of American Government officials. The English press followed with curious but restrained interest the extra-curricular activities of Rafael, Jr.

[2] See 'The Organization of American States', by Gordon Connell-Smith, in *The World Today*, October 1960

formidable Article 2, paragraph 7 of the Charter which s
'Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authoriz
United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially w
the domestic jurisdiction of any state.'

For the time being Trujillo seems to be safe from suffici
strong 'non-intervention' that might cause him to topple
power. The opposition of the Catholic hierarchy, which contri
to the overthrow of Perón, Jiménez, and Castro, seems to be m
Trujillo apparently feels that he does not need to organize '
taneous' demonstrations demanding that he again become
dent. Or is it that he does not have the physical and mental str
to take over the ceremonial duties of President? The lack of re
information in the United States—the severance of diplomat
lations led to the withdrawal of the United States Informatior
vice—makes it extremely risky to forecast events in the Domi
Republic.

Britain has a considerable interest in the outcome. The U
Kingdom during the first seven months of 1957 took 42·6 pe
of the Dominican exports, as compared with 25·3 per cent in
and 20·6 per cent in 1954. During the same period, the U
States took 31 4, 45·1, 56 6, and 21·8 per cent respectively
such exports The United Kingdom also has an interest in the
tenance of peace in the Caribbean Trujillo has 'No Time for
munism', but Castro does, and he is making threatening gestu
Guantanamo Bay.[1] Will the free world continue to suppo
dictator Trujillo because he is the principal bulwark against p
tial Soviet and Chinese 'non-intervention'?

RAYFORD W. LO

[1] See above, Note of the Month, p 459

Progress East of the Oder–Neisse

Recent Developments in the Polish Western Territories

UP to two or three years ago a visit to the Polish Western territories was an interesting but still rather gloomy experience. After the war the area was even worse off than most of Central Europe. Following the bombing and fighting came the mass transfers of population arranged at Potsdam. In 1945 it was estimated that the area's industrial capacity had been reduced by 60 per cent. Forty-five per cent of its urban dwellings and over 90 per cent of its livestock had been destroyed. Four-fifths of its cultivable land was lying fallow The Government set up a Ministry for the Recovered Territories under Mr Gomulka in the autumn of that year, but the situation in Poland as a whole was too serious for it to concentrate its attention on them. The city of Warsaw had been 85 per cent destroyed and during the next decade 1 milliard old bricks were sent from Wrocław, itself over two-thirds destroyed, to help to rebuild the capital It is not surprising, therefore, that until recently Wrocław was on the whole still depressing to look at, with areas of desolation and heaps of rubble waiting to be cleared away Nor is it surprising that the process of resettlement and economic reconstruction of the whole area was far from being completed.

The Western territories make a very different impression on a visitor today. For a historian, a sociologist, or a lover of freedom who sympathizes with Poland's ordeal as a nation, there can be few more stimulating or moving experiences than to travel through this area now and find out what is going on

Its total population at present exceeds 7·6 million, compared with 8 6 million before the war. The official estimate of the Polish indigenous population in 1945 is about 1 2 million, of whom 300,000 have since died. The estimate for the Germans living in the area in 1958 was 6,000, while a reputable West German source put it at over 35,000 In any case, over 6·6 million of the present inhabitants were not there when the war ended According to official sources this number is made up approximately as follows:

Children born in the Western territories since 1945 — 2 6 million
Settlers from other regions in Poland — 2·1 million
Persons repatriated from the U.S S R — 1·7 million
Re-immigrants from the West — 0·2 million

What has been achieved in the Western territories since the v
therefore been done by people preponderantly new to the area
youthfulness is remarkable. Over a third of them, as the
figures show, were born since the war. The Polish birth-rate
the 1950s has been the highest in Europe apart from Albania
ing between 30·7 per thousand in 1950 and 26·3 in 1958. T
for the Western territories has exceeded that for the rest of
by figures ranging from 47 to 37 per cent. In 1958 in the
Szczecin, 36·4 per cent of the population were under eighte
79·7 per cent under forty. At one stage the average age of wo
the Szczecin shipyards was between twenty-two and twenty

The term 'Western territories' is misleading but convenie
used to describe those areas in the west, south-west, and n
Poland which were part of the German State before the w
which were placed by the Potsdam agreement under Pol
ministration pending the final peace settlement. In default of
joint action by the Powers concerned they have become *de fa*
of the Polish State, the Poles maintaining the view that the
men at Potsdam would not have arranged for the wholesale t
of population had they not envisaged that the settlement w
lasting. The territories comprise the whole of the provi
Koszalin, Szczecin, Zielona Góra, Wrocław, and Opole, the
part of Olsztyn, nearly a third of Gdańsk, and small st
Bialystok, Katowice, and Poznań. Usually they are equated w
first seven provinces. This makes statistical accuracy diffic
the discrepancies are small provided account is taken of the f
the former German industrial towns of Gliwice, Bytom, and
have been incorporated in the province of Katowice.

In his book, *Unter polnischer Verwaltung*, which was publi
1957,[1] Charles Wasserman wrote as follows.

> No one concerns himself about the fact that East Prussia,
> Pomerania, East Brandenburg, and Silesia were settled for cent
> Germans. Here was once a border country without civilization. W
> exceptions it was the Germans who introduced culture and civi
> here. Today this same country sinks back again into its original sta
> far indeed, has its decay already advanced.[2]

In recent controversies between Poland and Germany the
have, on the whole, shown more restraint and common sens
German revisionists. But it is this kind of statement which
them bitter and emotional.

[1] Hamburg, Blüchert-Verlag [2] Writer's translation.

For several generations before Hitler came to power more thai 2½ million Germans took part in the flight, the *Ostflucht*, from th(present Western territories. Hindenburg devoted vast sums o money to the *Osthilfe* in an endeavour to keep the landowners in th(East solvent, and the apparatus of Nazi propaganda was directed t(checking the flow of East Germans towards the West. In contrast t(this record the Poles during the past fifteen years, under exceptionally difficult conditions, have made the best effort so far to develop the area effectively. Much still remains to be done. The destroyed cities have not yet been fully rebuilt. Agricultural production is still below the pre-war standard. But within a few years the population will exceed the 1939 level, the number employed in industry already does so, and the total industrial output is much higher than it was before the war. Already the province of Wrocław has the highest industrial production in Poland after Katowice.

The main tasks have been to rebuild the damaged economy, to integrate the new population, and to plan industrial development on such a scale as will absorb the increased numbers of young people who will reach working age during the next few years At present children born during the war are entering employment, but in 1964 and 1965 the post-war bulge years will take full effect, and by 1966 the number of young people between the ages of fifteen and nineteen will have more than doubled.

In many ways the situation presents an ideal opportunity for planners in a socialist economy. The area is comparatively undeveloped and has considerable, if not abundant, natural resources. The population is young and enterprising, and its members are not so firmly attached to their places of residence as to make movement of workers a serious problem. The Government has political as well as economic motives for wishing the region to prosper and has increased the funds allocated to it under the new five-year plan starting next year. After Mr Gomulka's return to power in 1956, the Ministry for the Recovered Territories having ceased to exist, a Government Committee for the Western Territories was set up with Vice-Premier Zenon Nowak as chairman, and an extraordinary Parliamentary Committee as well. An officially sponsored Society for the Development of the Western Territories was also established which, through the voluntary membership of its local committees, has accomplished a great deal. Furthermore, the inherent weaknesses of a planned economy, corruption, lack of discipline, and inefficiency, from which Poland is by no means free, are

less likely to become serious problems in a part of the c
which receives so much public attention and where so muc
stake.

Industrial development is taking three different forms: t
construction and expansion of industries already in existe
especially suited to the localities in which they have grown u
utilization of hitherto neglected natural resources, and the est
ment of suitable new secondary industries—secondary f
national point of view—in regions with insufficient resour
determine the economic pattern.

For obvious reasons the first of these received priority af
war: in a country where so much had to be done it required th
effort and capital expenditure. In this category came the hea
dustries of Wrocław, the great expansion of the chemical in
at Kędzierzyn, in the province of Opole, which was start
I. G. Farben during the war, and the sugar factories and
processing plants needed owing to the area's basically agric
character. In Wrocław, also, the present emphasis on electro
to be explained, partly at least, by the presence of a disting
specialist in the subject at the city's technical college.

The second type of development has been made possib
result of successful geological surveys carried out with t
operation of the School of Mining in Cracow The discoverie
included deposits of zinc and lead ores, large formations of
coal, particularly in Wrocław and Zielona Góra, and near the l
of the same two provinces, between Legnica and Głogów, wh
turn out to be the richest copper deposits in Europe.

With the development of Polish industry there is an urger
for more electric power. One of the most economical meth
using brown coal is to generate power from it near the mines
transport costs. Over the long term therefore it is planned to l
series of power stations on the brown-coal fields in the W
territories. The one project which is already well under wa
Turoszów, in the extreme south-west corner of Poland so
Zgorzelec (Görlitz). It is one of the largest and most impress
dustrial developments in Poland, and the total cost will be be
10 and 12 million złoties A vast new open-cast brown-coal
being opened up to yield 12 million tons a year, 11 million of
will be used for a power station to have an ultimate proc
capacity of 1,400 megawatts. Half of the current will be con
in the province of Wrocław and the remainder will be shared

other provinces, some of it going as far east as the western extremi ties of Warsaw and Lublin provinces The total output is intended for internal Polish use, but the current will be linked up in a net- work with East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and the Soviet Union, so that it can be used, if necessary, to help the other countries at times of peak consumption.

The newly discovered copper deposits near Głogów should en able Poland to produce eventually over 100,000 tons of copper a year. One mine is going into operation this year, and two or three more are to follow at intervals of about eighteen months.

Another of the natural resources of the Western territories scarcely however a new discovery, is the sea A remarkable and characteristic development is the enterprise with which the econo mic potentialities of the sea and the sea coast are being exploited.

The greatest achievement in the case of the harbours has been the speed and efficiency with which the serious war damage has been repaired. Allied bombing was followed by deliberate destruction by the Germans before they left. Over 40 per cent of the installations of the three main ports, Gdynia, Gdańsk, and Szczecin, were destroy- ed In Gdynia harbour there were twenty-three wrecks and the Germans had mined seven kilometres of quay at intervals of twenty metres. In Szczecin only three out of a total of 156 cranes were still in action. Now Poland has more harbour capacity than she at present needs. In 1959 the total tonnage of goods loaded and un- loaded in the three ports respectively was 5·5, 5 2, and 7·3 million. In Szczecin there have been two interesting developments since the war. It has been necessary to redesign the harbour approaches taking into account the dominant north–south rather than east–west lines of communication, as the port now serves west and south Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary rather than Berlin and East Prussia Also nearly 100 per cent of the dockers had had no previous experience of the job before they started work after the war.

In the last ten years too there has been an astonishing growth of the Polish shipbuilding industry. Before the war there was scarcely any shipbuilding in Poland, although one ship was launched at Gdynia in 1938. Now there are large shipyards at each of the three big ports, and Poland ranks eleventh amongst the world's ship- builders. In 1958 the tonnage completed amounted to 174,900. For the next five years the order books are almost full, and in 1965 the output is expected to double the 1958 figure. Here again Szczecin

has had to cope with the problem of a new population with litt
no experience of life in a seaport. When the first ship was laun
there in 1952 there was not one experienced engineer in the s
yards, which had to depend on consultants from Gdańsk
Gdynia. Now the situation is very different.

The greater part of Polish shipbuilding has been for export
during the last three years the proportion retained for dom
shipping lines has become larger. No doubt under the stimul
the shipbuilding industry, the Polish mercantile marine ha
creased to a total of 610,000 tons by the end of last year, as comp
with 86,500 tons in 1938 This has been accompanied by a cons
able growth in the fishing industry, the total catch of sea fish amc
ing to 145,900 tons in 1959 contrasted with 33,000 tons in 1938

One final possibility for using the economic possibilities o
sea has not been neglected—the development of the towns an
lages along the Baltic coast for tourist purposes. During
Stalinist period long stretches of coast were inaccessible for sec
reasons, but since October 1956 the restrictions have been few.
development of the seaside tourist industry has been a boon,
ticularly for the provinces of Szczecin and Koszalin and for t
dwellers throughout Poland with whom a holiday at the sea is
popular.

The importance of introducing suitable secondary industries
an area is in inverse proportion to the availability of natura
sources. It is therefore of special significance in the cases of
zalin and Olsztyn and also, to a lesser extent, Zielona Góra
Szczecin. In this connection a planned economy has great ad
ages. For the good of an area the Government can take action w
few or none would be prepared to take under a system of pr
enterprise. Sometimes it involves transferring concerns fror
dustrial areas in central Poland where there is no lack of em
ment. More often it will mean setting up a large number of s
enterprises which do not utilize bulky raw materials or for which
terials must in any case be imported from abroad. The followin
three typical examples. In wooded areas factories for ma
matches, furniture, and pressed wood have been set up. In the
of Zielona Góra a highly successful enterprise is producing 1
different types of electrical meter: it already employs 1,000 wo
and the number is expected to rise to 2,500 within four years. I
rural areas of the same province it is planned to develop fresh-
fisheries, because the land is poor and there are 25,000 hecta

lakes and ponds. In general, one is left with the impression that even in the worst endowed districts the obstacles will somehow be overcome and jobs found for at least most of the children who will be seeking employment before long.

Although the Western territories must rely on industry to absorb their growing labour force, the area's economy has traditionally been based mainly on agriculture, which is still of vital importance to the territories themselves and to Poland.

There are several reasons why agriculture has tended to lag behind industry in these regions. First, the new settlers mostly came from places where farming conditions were different. Secondly, the desolation and damage were disheartening in the extreme and were accentuated by the feeling of political uncertainty which at first prevailed. Thirdly, before October 1956 the Government notoriously neglected agriculture and failed to provide for it the investment funds of which in this area it was particularly in need. Lastly, farming in the Western territories had always been on a comparatively large scale, as a result, more than twice as much land was allotted to State farms there (about 26 per cent) as the average for Poland as a whole; and, as Mr Gomulka admitted in his big speech of 20 October 1956, the State farms were at the time proving to be the least efficient in Poland.

The first two of these difficulties have largely been overcome by time. There are many indications that farmers are becoming attached to their land, and it is a healthy sign that some of them have become disputatious about their rights and their boundaries. Since 1956 the Government has given more funds to the Western territories for agriculture, and the farmers themselves have increased the scale of their investments. The State farms also are being more efficiently managed Heavy deficits have been reduced to small deficits and in some cases even turned into modest profits. There is more mechanization, greater use of fertilizers, and the principle is now becoming generally accepted that the director of a State farm should be a graduate of an agricultural college as well as a good practical farmer.

For the improvement of Polish agriculture as a whole the Government has laid down the principle that co-operation and collectivization can only be successful if they are voluntary. In June of last year it decided to centre its efforts round the encouragement and subsidizing of the so-called agricultural circles, voluntary associations of farmers which have a long and good record in the Polish country-

side. Even conservative agricultural experts in Poland agree the 'parcelization' tendency is the worst enemy of efficiency that yields can most easily be improved through mechaniza facilitated by organization on a larger scale. From the point of of the future, therefore, the Western territories have substa advantages on their side. It is a hopeful sign that their agricul circles have been buying a large number of tractors and in sev provinces are experimenting with cultivating limited areas of in common. In 1958 the area already produced a third of Pola grain crop and over a quarter of its cattle, pigs, and sheep.

Since the number of children of school age is so large the vision of adequate school accommodation has naturally be serious problem It has been complicated by the fact that in the districts the Germans used a system of one-class or two- schools, in which children of very different ages were taugh gether, whereas the Polish educational system is based on the se class school Consequently the buildings inherited were often suitable for present purposes. However, the very extent of the p lem has acted as a stimulus. The provincial and city autho have been so keenly aware of the urgency of the need that sp efforts have been made to meet it As a result, the accommoda position does not appear to be worse than in other parts of country, where since the war a two- or three-shift system has been unavoidable Many teachers have had to be brought in other parts of Poland, though the supply is now adequate S educationists in Warsaw maintain that standards in the Wes not as high as in central Poland but, if this judgment is to s degree justified, it reflects a state of affairs in which the territ will not in the end acquiesce.

In higher education there have been important developm since the war. There were formerly seven institutions of unive standing in the area, including six training colleges for teachers, a total of 7,000 students There are now twenty-one institutions over 46,000 students, some of the most important being the versity of Wrocław, the Medical Schools at Gdańsk, Szcz Wrocław, and Zabrze, four Technical Colleges, and three Sch of Agriculture. They provide higher educational facilities fo youth of the area, many of whom before the war attended univ ties in other parts of Germany. They have helped in the rapi placement of ~~the~~ many thousands of Polish doctors, teachers, other university graduates, who were deliberately annihilate

the Nazis during the occupation. Their main function in the future will be to train the scholars, teachers, doctors, and the innumerable engineers and technical specialists required by an increasingly industrialized society.

Cultural life in the territories is still in the experimental stage except in such important centres as Wrocław and Gdańsk where there were traditions on which to build But the achievements have already been impressive. For example, Koszalin and Zielona Góra, two new provincial capitals with about 40,000 and 50,000 inhabitants respectively, both have a symphony orchestra and a theatre which give performances in the capital and tour smaller centres in the provinces. Zielona Góra, before the war a quiet country town with only 26,000 inhabitants, has also an active cultural society, founded on private initiative, which carries out many forms of activity, historical, ethnographical, and artistic, and runs a cultural periodical. There is a lively interest in the theatre and music throughout Poland. A leading English pianist recently toured Poland, including the Western territories, and told the writer that, although owing to exchange regulations the venture was not profitable financially, he would always be happy to return to such pleasant and appreciative audiences

An achievement which strikes every visitor is the reconstruction of historic buildings which has already been carried out Outstanding examples are the old town in Gdańsk, the town hall and market square in Wrocław, and Wrocław cathedral. The cathedral, which was to a large extent destroyed, has been entirely reglazed with modern stained glass that suits the Gothic character of the building and is of a high artistic standard. Poland is fortunate in having the craftsmen who can restore the old decorations with accuracy and skill But it is not all a matter of luck In Gdańsk a State planning department and workshop have been set up to deal with restoration work Young craftsmen are being trained in special vocational schools, while planners and supervisors are produced by the Fine Arts Departments of Cracow and Toruń universities.

Perhaps the most significant recent development is the social integration of the people who came originally from such a wide variety of places. It is the result of the growing up of a new generation who arrived in the territories as young children and can remember no other homes. It is due also to the pride of the older inhabitants in what they have achieved. It is reflected in the growth of interest in local history and customs and in the formation of regional

societies which take pride in their villages and towns and ir
preservation of historical monuments. A sense of adventure ren
but the people are no longer newcomers in a strange territory

RICHARD HISCOC

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Note of the Month

Some Reflections on the Monckton Report

THE Report of the Monckton Commission[1] came to three main conclusions in its analysis of the present situation in Central Africa: first, that opposition to the Federation is real and not the work of a handful of agitators; second, that the retention of the Federation by force is out of the question; and third, the majority recognized that there were real advantages in Federation, principally in the economic field. The majority were agreed that if Federation were to continue, confidence in it must be created by prompt and far-reaching reforms. A successfully reformed Federation could then be a powerful factor in promoting better race relations generally, and African enthusiasm might be fired by the important contribution such a Federation could make to the future of Africa.

Perhaps the most controversial of the Report's recommendations is that on secession. The propriety of the Commission's consideration of this matter has been raised in doubt, but the record of previous inquiries, particularly in connection with overseas affairs, has shown that the most successful commissions have often extended their scope far beyond what might have been originally intended. That of Lord Durham, for instance, in 1838, was sent to Canada for the adjustment of certain important questions regarding the Provinces of upper and lower Canada, and came back having advised the abolition of the two Provinces and their amalgamation in a new overseas colony with responsible government, an extension of the terms of reference which could hardly have been envisaged originally. It would therefore seem that the Monckton Commission was in the best tradition in choosing to give the very widest interpretation to its terms of reference.

The precedent for inserting into a federal Constitution a provision for its possible dissolution is more dubious. The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, however, is itself without precedent and unique in that it is a federation of three quite unequal Territories, two of which are still legally, constitutionally, and to a great

[1] Published on 11 October 1960 as Cmnd 1148.

extent practically subordinate to an exterior Government, t
the United Kingdom. The provision for secession is not the
a provision permitting one or more of the equal components
Federation to secede under certain conditions, but really a
sion for the U.K. Government to reassume its responsibilit
the constitutional development of the two dependent Terr
should their inhabitants so desire. In these exceptional ci
stances the Monckton Commission can hardly be criticized f
lieving that a provision of this kind was essential to an atten
persuade the African population of the two Northern Terr
to continue in the Federation. Moreover, if the reforms sug
by the Commission are accepted by the U.K. Government a
two Northern Territories, the main objections are likely to
from Southern Rhodesia, who is asked by the Commissi
make a radical change not only in her constitutional and po
arrangements but also in her way of life and her whole outlo
the future. These very rapid changes are in many ways the
fundamental of the recommendations, and the right of sec
may therefore have an obverse side.

The question of safeguards has also undergone a fundan
change since the 1953 Constitution rejected such provision
Bill of Rights and the other proposals now put forward. In
the immediate concern in Africa was pre-eminently the de
ment of the African majority and its protection by legal, con
tional, and juridical means to provide for a transition to a
equal form of society. The beneficiaries of the safeguards wer
expected to be the native population of the three Territorie
recently the pace of change has been so swift, not only in th
deration but throughout the whole of Africa, that the pri
minority to be safeguarded ultimately will be the Europeans

The safeguards proposed in the Report are of two kinds,
and political. The first is a Bill of Rights, for which the Cor
sion cited the proposed Canadian Bill But the model of the
pean Convention for the Protection of Human Rights, which
basis of the relevant provisions included in the Constitut
Nigeria, might seem to be more suited to the Central African
tion than the Bill for Canada, a country in which a high sta
of personal and political freedom has obtained for genera
Moreover, the Canadian Bill is regarded by the minority rep
quite inappropriate to the African situation, especially since i
tains a proviso permitting the rights and freedoms declared

Bill to be abrogated by a subsequent Act of Parliament. Both the Nigerian and the Indian Constitutions include provisions on rights of access to employment, particularly under the State, and, perhaps more important, cover specific provisions for the legal enforcement of such rights through a system of courts, and these would seem to be especially appropriate to the Central African Federation. It should be noted that any Bill of Rights would necessitate a very big change not only in the emergency legislation in Southern Rhodesia but in the legislation already on her Statute Book, or the interpretation of such legislation. The minority report draws attention to this.

But a Bill of Rights is in itself insufficient in a situation where existing legislation and, more important, habits of thought underwrite a whole system of racial discrimination. A much more elaborate attempt has therefore been made in the Report to work out a delaying device, namely a Council or Councils of State empowered to delay legislation discriminating unfairly against one of the communities. This is a difficult device to operate even in a fairly homogeneous society, and it is particularly difficult at a time when, rightly or wrongly, the ideas of one-man-one-vote, of majority rule in a single House of Parliament, of responsible Cabinet Government are increasingly identified by politically conscious people as prerequisites of any acceptable form of government. Any special delaying device is rendered unpopular by the necessity of departing from these criteria. Moreover, it cannot avoid being exceedingly complicated. The Commission itself could not work out in Rhodesian conditions a system by which a Council of State could be selected in a way which would be regarded by all communities as impartial There is also the question of the point at which the Council should take up legislation or other action for treatment. This question, as well as that of finding a balance within the Federal legislature and of working out a suitable electoral system if there is to be parity of representation between the two main races, presents difficulties which will be formidable for an ultimate electorate that is largely inexperienced. The success of these safeguards would thus seem to depend on their being simple, and therefore a single Council of State would be preferable to four. It also depends on their being able to command the confidence of all the communities, and this would imply an enormous psychological sacrifice, whatever the material considerations, on the part of the white population of Southern Rhodesia.

In fact all the proposed reforms in the Constitution will sh
establishment in Southern Rhodesia, and in many respe
Review Conference due to open on 5 December in London is
to find its greatest difficulty in bringing Southern Rhodes
compromise. The proposals in the majority Report for pa
representation in the Federal Parliament, though they are o
the objection of endorsing a racial basis for representation a
also in direct opposition to the more normal staged develo
are obviously an effort to meet the Southern Rhodesian fea
early African majority. Southern Rhodesia must in any case
cile herself to the immediate prospect of an African majority
Legislatures of the two Northern Territories.

The advantages of Federation were considered by the m
of the Commission to be mainly economic, namely, that a co
market provided much more valuable opportunities whe
larger economic unit was more credit-worthy and where th
nomies of the three Territories were largely complementa
this field, however, the Report might well be open to the cr
that its findings are based on a lack of historical perspective
a certain fallacy in economic reasoning. The Central Africa
nomy as a whole is a poor one, its real hub being the cop
dustry of Northern Rhodesia, an industry which, as the
points out, lacks the stability of gold. The economic argume
Federation as presented by the Report are based on agreem
share the spoils, principally of this industry, but these argu
rest on two possible misconceptions, first that such Federal
perity is bound to continue, and secondly that each of the
tories has the right to share in such prosperity irrespective
contribution to it. It has been assumed that the Federation
entity stronger than the sum of its parts. It does not follow
ever, that reforms in the Federal Constitution and devolut
powers to the Territorial Governments, in an effort to ke
Federation in being, will automatically increase economic
ency; they might well decrease efficiency in a way which the
ation could ill afford.

Equally, it cannot be assumed that in the event of the bre
of the Federation the modern economies to which the people
three Territories have become accustomed under Federation
be continued in the separate Territories. It is necessary f
three Territories to realize that if they weaken their economi
tion too much by political concessions they may find themse

a situation from which it would take them a very long time to recover. The real issue may well be one of order versus chaos, and political concessions which stretch the Federation to breaking point might well result in economic disaster for the whole area. The population of the Federation has more than doubled in recent years and, though a large number of people now live in a money economy, there is still proportionately as great a degree of subsistence economy as there was before. The real battle in the economic field, therefore, is not between the races but on behalf of them all against a possible economic breakdown, against a very dangerous economic situation if Federation is allowed to disintegrate.

From the point of view of industrialists operating in the Federation and of the credit-worthiness of the area, it would seem impossible to divorce the question of the future of the Federation from that of the Territories, particularly in view of the devolution of powers to the Territories suggested in the Report. Moreover, it is essential to distinguish between industries such as mining and industries such as local manufacturing for the home market. In the case of mining, the product is almost exclusively for export and therefore the overseas investor will be principally interested in the Territorial development in Northern Rhodesia, which is likely to occur whether the Federation continues or not. In any case it is likely to be the Territorial rather than the Federal Government which will determine the general attitude towards private enterprise, labour conditions, public services such as power and railroad facilities, etc. The size of the home market and the possibility that it might well be reduced in the future if the right of secession is allowed will, on the other hand, obviously affect the attractiveness of local manufacturing industries for the overseas investor. The Report recognizes that both private and public investment depend on the degree of political stability which it is possible to achieve in the area and the amount of public confidence which can be built up. Any doubts as to the security of investment in a reformed Federation might well be regarded by business interests operating there as a small price to pay for the continuation of some form of Federation for at least another period of years and the avoidance of immediate and possibly permanent fragmentation.

What is likely to happen at the Review Conference? In particular, what can the U.K. Government do if the Conference results in deadlock? It would be legally possible for the U.K. Parliament to rescind the Order in Council of August 1953 which brought the

Federation into being. In that case constitutionally the three Te tories would resume their original relation with the U.K. Gove ment. In practice, however, it would be almost impossible to turn to the precise *status quo ante* Federation. Southern Rhode if her delegation to the Review Conference is led by Sir Ed Whitehead with no moderating influence from Sir Robert Tr gold or anyone else, could be manœuvred into leaving the Fede tion, but that would be against the general policy of the U Government and against the spirit of the Report. And for South Rhodesia herself such a policy would be disastrous. She would f a severe slump, which she would not be able to ride easily, and would almost inevitably be drawn within the orbit of the Unior South Africa. The two Northern Territories would revert to Co nial Office rule but with an accelerated impetus towards s government, there is also the possibility that these Territoi would orientate themselves with the East African area. The air at the Conference of such an alternative might conceivably ind the Southern Rhodesian delegation to agree to a working comp mise.

There would appear, however, to be general support in the U Parliament and among articulate British public opinion for approach to the problem embodied in the Monckton Rep Britain's aim at the Review Conference will be to pursue not o her tactical objective of maintaining law and order and good g ernment in Central Africa, but also her strategic objective of holding her record of integrity and good faith in Commonwe and colonial affairs. She can provide for constitutional advanc Northern Rhodesia along the lines already laid down for Ny land She can inaugurate a really massive, even if expensive, tra ing programme for Africans emerging towards self-government an effort to avert the lacuna in responsible trained Africans wh has been such a serious feature of the Congo crisis. It is also coming increasingly clear that the U.K. will need to provide c siderable financial help in underwriting the recommendation the Report if they are to be implemented, and this help will n to be on a much more extensive scale than the Exchequer loans assistance through the Colonial Development and Welfare Dep ment specifically suggested in the Report.

In approaching the Review Conference, Britain will doubt bear in mind two pitfalls which she has so far successfully avoi in her colonial policy, what we may call the 'Congo situation'

the 'Algerian situation'. British policy in Africa has cause to be proud of the middle way it has consistently pursued in gradual training and preparation for self-government and independence. It is often a difficult and unpopular course, but such a course might well be continued in the Northern Territories even if the Federation did dissolve. The violent anti-Belgian feeling of the Congo does not seem to have a counterpart in the Northern Territories of the Federation. In Northern Rhodesia the Africans still appear to have a respect for the U.K. Government, and if that Government makes plain its determination to pursue its traditional policy of evolution towards self-government, the only quarrel there, as in Nyasaland, would be about the pace rather than about the ultimate end. What we might term the 'Algerian situation', the maintenance of the present regime by force, is a solution which, in view of the deep-seated African opposition, cannot be seriously entertained.

A new type of Federation, under another name, could be worked out at the Review Conference and along these lines the Monckton Report has attempted to construct a bridge between the minimum African demands consistent with the continuance of Federation and the maximum concessions the Europeans are prepared to make. An even looser association along such lines as the East Africa High Commission could have been recommended but was rejected by the majority Report as unlikely to achieve the same economic advantages as Federation. The U.K. Government would seem to have few bargaining counters when it comes to the Conference and to be by no means as deeply concerned in the issue as the other two main negotiating bodies, but the ultimate responsibility for the well-being of Central Africa still rests with the British Parliament. The crux of the whole question lies in the attitude of the European community of Southern Rhodesia, from whom the greatest sacrifices are likely to be demanded in an effort to reach a solution, and who are the most likely to suffer, both politically and economically, if no successful outcome is evolved.

CORRIGENDUM

In 'Progress East of the Oder–Neisse', in *The World Today*, November 1960, p. 494, five lines from the bottom, 'between 10 and 12 million zloties' should read 'between 10 and 12 billion zloties'.

Mr Khrushchev and the Neutrals at the United Nations

THE Fifteenth General Assembly is now drawing to its close i circumstances which augur ill for the future of the United Nation The office of Secretary-General and the Security Council, the tw executive organs, are under an attack from Soviet Russia th reveals a willingness to paralyse the organization if Communi terms are not accepted. One of those terms, the admission of Com munist China in place of Nationalist China, is adamantly rejecte by the United States, which so far has had its way with th Assembly on this point; and any modification of U.S. policy o such an issue is impossible during the political hiatus caused by th change of President.

The situation was very different as the delegates began t assemble in September. By protesting against the actions of M Hammarskjöld, Mr Zorin had blown up a cloud no bigger than th Congo on a school atlas but, this apart, the U.N. seemed excitingl alive and even mature. The complex of big, little, and middl Powers, the executive, and the bureaucracy had generated enoug energy to make the organization seem a third force in worl affairs. Looking back over the two months it seems that this indee may have been the trouble, for the neutral group of States at th core of the Afro-Asian bloc have sought to use the weight of the votes, by methods of democracy essentially foreign to the structur of the organization, to revise policies and organs in their favour

It is a staunch principle of neutral policy that the Unite Nations Charter must be preserved as the conscience of inter national affairs. In defence of this principle the Bandung Power fought off Mr Khrushchev's initiative during the first star studded month of this Assembly's existence. Mr Khrushchev pre cipitated the crisis in a manner which suggested premeditation, an it was he more than anyone who turned the U.N. building into chaotic 'summit' for big and little leaders by calling satellites an friends to join him there and stand witness to his words. It was th irony of subsequent events that neutral initiatives, intended to su neither of the world blocs, have played into the hands of the no absent Mr Khrushchev. The U.N., which the neutrals are pledge to preserve at all costs, seems in danger of being severely frost bitten in the cold war.

Mr Khrushchev hammered at three issues: disarmament, the admission of Communist China, and the need to reorganize the executive of the United Nations. He could hardly have expected to make any progress on disarmament in such a heterogeneous collection of statesmen, and propaganda among them was scarcely worth while when the principal leaders had been subject to his more intimate persuasion in Moscow or their own State capitals. The other two issues were related. It was manifestly absurd, he maintained, that Taiwan, with its exiled Chinese Government and its 10 million inhabitants, should masquerade as a great Power on the Security Council and in the Assembly in place of the mainland and its 600 million inhabitants. Mr Khrushchev contended that this anomaly was due to United States manipulation of the United Nations. The novel factor in his policy at this Assembly was the contention that the Secretary-General's office and its present incumbent were extensions of State Department diplomacy.

He must have known that the neutrals, many of which had grown up diplomatically with the United Nations, would be antagonized by any great Power that attempted to weaken the organization; and to weaken it was exactly Mr Khrushchev's intention. He did not precisely say so; indeed one understood from him that he desired to strengthen it; but just before he left he told pressmen that Russia had signed the United Nations Charter—a treaty—on the agreement of the Powers that the executive authority of the organization would rest in the Security Council, on which the five permanent members would have the right of veto; he said, in effect, that he did not recognize any change in these terms and this meant that he opposed the development of authority in the Assembly.

There was an evident dichotomy in his policy at the Assembly. On the one hand, he wanted to preserve the Assembly as a forum of debate; on the other, he wanted to make sure that the whole organization was brought once again firmly under the control of the great Powers. He lived the first and talked the second. Let us all go and gather at the rostrum, he said; and he set an example himself by boarding the *Baltica* for New York. Once there he showed the neutral statesmen by his presence, by casting his vote for President, by diligent attention to the duties of delegation leader, that he was bursting with respect for the world organization. He would, he declared, be the last to leave, be willing to stay to the end of the year, if useful purposes were served. There was at times a rumbumptious jollity in his behaviour which made one feel he was

glad to be at home among his ain folk at the U.N. His speeches l
a different tone. The United Nations, he said, had been from
outset an instrument of Western, and particularly United Sta
policy. In one ominous passage he underlined the essential po
relationship of the States even inside those sacred walls by point
out that the United States' pre-eminence in the organization mi
have been justified by its strength but, now that it was no lon
militarily supreme, the pre-eminence could no longer be justifi
He warned that the Communist States would know what to d
Mr Hammarskjold did not resign and, relating the matter to
question of Communist China, threatened that the Sino-So
bloc might be compelled to form its own united nations.

Mr Khrushchev's attitude was not without its logic. Whethe
not Taiwan was Chinese, it was beyond question that China
not Taiwan. It was also true that the responsibility and authorit
the five great Powers were preserved by treaty in the Secu
Council and their voting control over matters of substance
distinct from procedure). If Soviet Russia had frequently used
veto it was, he would say, because the scales were weighted
favour of the West and that could not be tolerated by the Cc
munist world in the cold war. The veto, in short, was vital
could not be permitted that the Assembly should by its methoc
'combining for peace', so-called, by-pass the Security Council
instigate actions that would inevitably be in line with U.S po
and executed by a Secretary-General who was only too read
carry them out.

The Congo was a topical case in point. Mr Hammarskjold in
vened at the behest of the Security Council with startling sp
and efficiency which is not belied by the chaotic outcome. I
brought the United Nations mission into collision with the in
pendent Soviet action in the Congo and contributed eventuall
the expulsion of the Communist technical and diplomatic missic
Unfortunately, in the blood and bathos of it all, the elected Pr
Minister, Mr Lumumba, fell from power with a peculiar bounc
movement that created the maximum political confusion.
Zorin promptly denounced Mr Hammarskjold for exceeding
instructions from the Council in a manner that furthered
interests of the colonialist Powers. The African States were
happy about the collapse of Mr Lumumba's authority but l
heard and seen enough at the conference of independent Afri
States at Addis Ababa in June to regard with some reserve

Lumumba himself. In discussions with associated Asian States, a resolution was framed which supported Mr Hammarskjöld's action. Mr Zorin promptly vetoed—the first Soviet veto of an Afro-Asian resolution. The case went to an emergency Assembly summoned at the request of the United States and another Afro-Asian resolution, albeit worded with greater equivocation, was passed by a substantial majority over the protests of the Soviet bloc. Mr Khrushchev stepped off the *Baltica* to find a straight case of the General Assembly getting too big for its boots.

One might even imagine that Mr Zorin contributed to its timeliness, for Mr Khrushchev did not waste a moment in mounting his attack against Mr Hammarskjold and demanding a reform of his office. He did not call in question the zeal of the Assembly, which Russia had often used, and even more frequently sought to use. (There was no Soviet opposition to the Assembly intervention in 1956 against the Anglo-French veto in the Security Council over Suez) He simply demanded that Mr Hammarskjold, aider and abetter of colonialists, should take courage to resign and that the excessive power of his office should be modified by the appointment of three Secretaries-General, appointed one each from the Western Powers, the Soviet bloc, and the uncommitted nations, who would act in concert only on their unanimous agreement. Mr Khrushchev proposed, in short, that the veto should be extended to actions instigated by the Assembly by building it into the executive office through which the Assembly must act.

Mr Nehru, President Tito, President Nasser, President Soekarno, and President Nkrumah assumed the leadership of neutral opinion at the Assembly, but any reference to a 'third force' and a neutral bloc was an unwarranted suggestion of consistent opinion; it hardly existed even among the five self-appointed leaders. There was no attempt to achieve uniformity except on limited issues. Mr Nehru had successfully established the principle at Bandung that attempts to establish a bloc would increase friction and disputes and that efforts should be directed to finding policies which commanded maximum agreement and might lead to the widening of the field of understanding and the narrowing of disputes. There were, therefore, many shades of opinion and reaction aroused by Mr Khrushchev.

In general, the Afro-Asian States were greatly disturbed by both the tone and the content of his statements. They were, as many of them frankly admitted in public and private, frightened by the

course of international events; and the neutral core of them had come in the spirit of Bandung to press for pacification. Those of them that hoped the Soviet leader intended to ease the tension caused by the collapse of the Paris summit conference were quickly disillusioned. Quite apart from his attack on the United Nations executive, he laced his speeches, whether they were delivered in anger or with careful moderation, with threats that heightened all their fears. It was implicit in all he said that the gulf between the two great Powers could be widened beyond repair unless the assembled nations found some way to satisfy his demands.

There was broad agreement among the Afro-Asians that the cold war should be kept out of Africa and that steps should be taken to end it altogether. Mr Khrushchev got little overt support for his protests about the U2 incident, for even if they opposed the flight they did not think it sufficient reason to wreck the Paris summit meeting and to prevent another. They were equally of the opinion that the White House and the State Department were stiffnecked about it and they thought Mr Kennedy's contention that the U.S. could have apologized about the U2 was very reasonable. The resolution tabled by the five leading neutralist States was impartially directed to the two big Powers in the cold war, asking them to renew contacts for the purpose of ending world tension. On the question of disarmament the neutrals called loudly enough for it but were slow to commit themselves, at least in the general debate which opened the session, to support for Mr Khrushchev's policy. Mr Nehru stated the essence of his case in terms which were acceptable to the Western Powers when he said that, in order to overcome fear during the process of disarming, it should take place in stages without disturbing the balance of power at any point. The neutral States were clearly doing their utmost to be neutral in the cold war, which was underlying everything.

The panic-stricken flight of the Communist missions from the Congo greatly eased Mr Khrushchev's position on that question, for in trying to keep the cold war out of Africa even those States showing more than average tolerance of Soviet policy would certainly have been ready to condemn Communist intervention. There was undoubtedly widespread suspicion of the course of events after U.N. intervention. The fall of Lumumba, the preservation of Tshombe's Katanga administration, and the return of many Belgians seemed to threaten the independence and unity of the country.

No one, in fact, could make much sense of the situation in the 'ongo, which, in chaos and bloodshed, had manufactured for it-elf, in a few short months, an almost insoluble problem of consti-itional authority and military rule. The neutrals were unwilling i these circumstances to lay the blame for the shortcomings in the 'ongo operation on Mr Hammarskjöld. Even President Nkrumah, rhose speech certainly gave the impression that he might do so, ought to correct this impression immediately after his conversa-ons with other neutralist statesmen. The Afro-Asians' desire to ave a committee of their own to supervise the Congo operation 'as directed as much against the possibility of big Power inter-ention as from suspicion of Mr Khrushchev, and this was emonstrated beyond doubt when Mr Khrushchev called in xtremely bitter terms for the Secretary-General's resignation. resident Nasser was able to tell Mr Hammarskjold that in refus-ig to resign he could count on the support of the neutral States; id the brief speech of the Secretary-General, in which resignation as refused, was given an ovation which many said had never efore been equalled in United Nations history.

Mr Hammarskjöld's argument, that he represented all the ations and would not resign at the behest of one great Power as ng as his mandate lasted, expressed the views of the neutral tates. Many of them had reason to be grateful to him. President asser, who is known to respect him, presented obliquely a power-il argument against Mr Khrushchev when he thanked the ssembly for helping to save his country from aggression in 1956. was no doubt true that United States influence was consider-ıle; there were many faults; it was high time, for example, that ie Security Council and the Trusteeship Council should be ılarged to provide more adequate regional representation; but iey felt that the power and influence of the Assembly were grow-g. They needed it; it matched their common fears with a ommunity of friends.

Peace, they argued, was the concern not only of those Powers ıpable of waging a world war but of all peoples; for all stood to iffer in war. (Asian States never forget that the first atom bombs opped in anger fell on Japan.) It was their contention that future ımmit conferences should be held under the aegis of the United ations so that the nations of the world should be able to ay their parts in the preservation of peace; and if the handling the problem of peace and war in this way should for the pre-

sent be impracticable, it was the end towards which they should strive.

It followed from the neutrals' attitude to the United Nations that they were inclined to view as dangerous the Soviet proposal to saddle the organization with a trio of probably irreconcilable executives. The neutrals up to this point had done little to please the Soviet bloc, and one Polish woman delegate complained plaintively to an Iraqi delegate that they were all being 'too neutral' One must assume that the Communist States see neutrality in Marxian fashion as a dynamic concept expressing the transit of dependent States across the political firmament into the Communist world. Mr Khrushchev may have thought that the growth of Soviet influence in Asia was now sufficiently advanced for him to push the neutrals further on the road by personal influence If so, he failed; and if he did not openly avow his anger he sometimes implied it, and his facial expression, as seen through the microscope of the U.N. closed-circuit television, often revealed it. His applause for neutral spokesmen was often only formal President Nasser's speech got only a perfunctory clap, and the Bulgarian delegation did not applaud at all. The U.N. monitors noted, however, that Moscow Radio was broadcasting some sharp admonitions of neutral policies, with particular reference to India, the U.A.R., and Yugoslavia.

On the face of it, the Western Powers emerged fairly well from Mr Khrushchev's campaign. Even the speeches of the principal Western spokesmen (with the exception of Mr Menzies' unnecessary intervention against the five-Power 'summit' resolution) caught the spectrum of neutral opinion somewhere between tolerance and pleasure. This was particularly true of Mr Macmillan's speech, although he was as firmly in line with the Western alliance as he possibly could be, and in respect of Germany, where the problem of Britain's immediate European policy was at stake, he was thought by many to have gone too far. As might have been expected, the speech delighted the Americans and infuriated Mr Khrushchev because it carried a big sector of U.N. opinion with it There were neutral delegates, of course, who saw that Mr Macmillan had given little away, but the speech seemed sensitive to their feelings in the Assembly. His emphasis on the part fear was playing in the crisis—fear in Russia and the United States as well as in all other countries—expressed a common sentiment, and his simple demand that the Powers should do something which

ered progress towards disarmament, even if it were only a work-
; conference of technicians, touched a cord of impatience with
;at Powers which was general among the non-great nations. They
nted the great Powers to keep talking; and when Mr Khrush-
ev ridiculed Mr Macmillan's proposal, he did not find an echo in
: non-Communist world as one saw it in that rectangle of Man-
ttan between 42nd and 46th Streets.

President Eisenhower is reported to have swum with the tide of
utral opinion by telling President Nasser that he accepted the
utral policy. He thus formally interred the moribund Eisenhower
i-Communist doctrine which had annoyed a great part of
ional opinion in the Arab world.

Yet it remained impossible to say that the West had gained by
r Khrushchev's failure to make progress. Mr Khrushchev
lded none of his positions when he flew back to Moscow, con-
ent in the knowledge that neither the long record of liberated
ritories of which Mr Macmillan justly boasted nor the impres-
e presence of Nigeria would soothe the festering pressure on
itral opinion of the Algerian and South West African problems
1 of China. The progressive liberation of Africa in which this
sembly took so much pride remains a liberation from Western
wers; and, whatever difficulties may yet arise from the liberation
British dependent territories, the problems of Algeria and South
:st Africa were already present. The absence of these two terri-
ies from the Assembly received emphasis from the presence of
lilliputian States which crept in from the French empire. On
se issues Russia and the neutrals would come together again and
neutrals and the West would draw apart.

t is not the purpose of this article to pursue the Fifteenth
sembly into the tortuous alignments of its later stage. Clearly
viet policy was waiting to exploit the opportunities ahead, and
se would be created by others. The demand of the Afro-Asian
tes for the enlargement of the Trusteeship Council and Security
uncil in keeping with the growth of the membership of the
ited Nations was one. The Western support for the election of
tugal and Belgium to fill vacant places on the Security and
isteeship Councils was a gratuitous offering. Portugal is an
epentant colonial Power in a state of permanent quarrel with
lia, the leading neutral Power, over Goa; Belgium is regarded
some African States as the cause of the Congo crisis and its per-
ence. To propose their election was bound to be considered by

the uncommitted States as an unneutral act—unneutral, that is, as between colonialism and Communism.

Finally there is the case of Communist China. The neutral States regard the opposition of the United States to her admission with extreme irritation. In their opinion the U.S.A. is using the United Nations to further its own strategic purposes in the Far East and they argue that if America makes the organization an instrument of its cold-war policy no one can blame Russia for doing the same. They believe, and so do many other States who for one reason or another go along with the United States, that the United Nations has no right to deny admission to the Government of 600 million people while applauding in triumph the entry of diminutive and backward States from Africa Mr Khrushchev knew that he had a solid body of support, perhaps more than was represented in the voting, and left no doubt that he did not intend to let this matter go by default any longer.

It is clear that the reputation of Communist China has declined very much in Asia since the Bandung conference of 1955. Today there is no little fear of her, for the conquest of Tibet and the tone of much of her propaganda have made Communist China seem the potential aggressor of the future. Part of the Asiatic support for her admission now comes from States that want to keep an eye on her in public.

Most observers seem to hold the view that next year United States pressure will be unable to prevent the subject reaching the agenda. This year the majority by which it was kept off the agenda was smaller than ever, although this time the proposal, as submitted by Soviet Russia instead of India, called for outright exclusion of Taiwan and its replacement as permanent member by Communist China. This possibly went further than some of the Afro-Asian States would desire, for not all are prepared to say that Taiwan's 10 million inhabitants should be disenfranchised internationally, as subjects, in theory, of the mainland Government It could well be that the Assembly would be prepared to vote for Communist China as the permanent member but refuse to unseat Taiwan. If this result emerged from the complicated procedural wrangle it would involve, both China and Taiwan might refuse to sit. In any case, whatever the outcome of a free vote on the subject might be, it is evident that in present circumstances the Soviet Union can exploit the need of the neutrals for the United Nations and, if it is prepared to go far enough, can sterilize the whole

organization until the admission of People's China on Communist terms. The impatience of the neutrals to change the United Nations in their favour seems in the end to have played into Soviet hands.

TOM LITTLE

Brazil's New President

BRAZIL not only reflects all the problems of Latin America but she does so in terms of the wide screen. She is by far the largest of all the twenty Latin American republics, with the biggest population —already nearing 70 million—and potentially one of the richest. Her problems, social and economic, are on the same scale. In a changing world she could become either a new power or an economic slum. That is the challenge which faces Brazilian policy makers; and perhaps the most challenging job in Latin America today is that of President of this giant of a country with agonizing growing pains. The man whom an overwhelming majority of Brazilians chose on 3 October, Senhor Janio Quadros, would seem to have all the qualities for the task, including persistence and a sense of humour; and they will all be severely tested when he takes office early in 1961 for a five-year term.

Senhor Quadros takes over a country which has made tremendous strides by any standards even in the past decade. The slogan of President Kubitscheck's Government was 'fifty years' progress in five', and the monuments to his drive are certainly impressive: new industries which did not exist five years ago; vast new electrification and road-building schemes; and a shining new capital, Brasilia, which is alternatively described as the biggest folly of the twentieth century or the most imaginative development undertaking anywhere in the past fifty years. But President Kubitscheck is a devout member of the 'build now and pay later' school; and together with the new industries, power stations, roads and railways, and Brasilia, he also hands over to his successor some formidable problems in the way of galloping inflation, serious foreign exchange difficulties, and fuming social unrest. To make it all the harder he has also changed the mentality of Brazilians. They have come to accept the idea that any measures, however sane,

'hich might entail a slowing up of Brazil's prodigious expansion re almost a betrayal of trust on the part of any politician who night suggest them. Brazilians have set their hearts on becoming real industrial power, on being able to make their country's voice eard in the world by virtue of economic independence and expan-ion generally. It all adds up to the biggest problem of all which enhor Quadros inherits: how to restrain his more extravagantly mbitious countrymen and tailor economic policy to more rational atterns, which he will undoubtedly have to do, without risking an conomic or a political crash.

Senhor Quadros, who is only forty-three, has a political career 'hich goes back a mere fourteen years. Yet few Brazilian politicians, ven those who can boast of decades of public life, have acquired uite as much prestige, admiration, and affection among all classes f Brazilians. Senhor Quadros knows his people almost as inti-nately as he knows his own family. He also has the invaluable uality of being able to talk to different sections of Brazilian pinion in precisely the right manner and words. This quality has arned him the reputation of being nothing more than an un-nhibited demagogue, and it is perhaps one of the most inept escriptions of the man and his nature, as his political opponents iscovered to their cost in this latest election. Senhor Quadros was lected not merely by one class but by Brazilians of all walks of fe who saw in him a symbol of a new integrity.

The decisive majority which Senhor Quadros won at the polls oes not mean that he will be left politically unhindered to get on 'ith the job of administering his country's affairs. There is a fac-on which bitterly opposes him. The most dangerous element in nis are the more rabid nationalists. To one degree or another the najority of Latin Americans today are nationalistic-minded in the ense that they still suspect foreign capital, and particularly U.S apital, of trying to exercise far too much control over their conomic and political life. Cuba is an extreme example of an ruption of such feelings, even though basically they were very argely justified. But more rabid nationalists have what can only be escribed as a dog-in-the-manger mentality. This is evident in 'enezuela, for instance, where a hard core of nationalists resent the act that they need foreign help to develop their oil resources omething of the same feeling exists in Argentina, too. In Brazil, n some respects, nationalist sentiment has been taken to even more xasperating lengths, and one result of this is that great reserves of

her national wealth remain buried in the earth. The Brazilians cannot afford to operate these assets—oil, for example—themselves yet they recoil at the thought of allowing foreign money and experience in to do the job for them or even on a purely co-operative basis as the Argentines have done.

The nationalists in this last election backed the Government candidate, Marshal Lott—the Communists did, too, because they want to make nationalism a proprietary slogan of their own—and although Marshal Lott's defeat might seem to imply a humiliating rout for the nationalists and the extreme Left wing, it does not mean to say that this faction in Brazilian political thinking does not still exercise a great deal of influence. Nationalism, as symbolized by such slogans as 'The Oil is Ours', is accepted by most ordinary Brazilians as no more than necessary protection of what the nationalists describe in trumpeting terms as 'dignity and economic sovereignty'. The Communists also wield influence, but of another sort. Their hunting grounds are the universities, intellectual and press circles, and the trade unions. Brazilian trade unions are not strictly autonomous. Their leaders must enjoy official approval and so the Communists direct their efforts, and by no means unsuccessfully so, at the rank and file.

This nationalist/Left-wing faction will be the one which will undoubtedly try to create difficulties for Senhor Quadros's administration for it suspects him of being a potential butcher of some of their most sacred cows. Senhor Quadros, for instance, is accused of being far too friendly towards foreign investors. There is yet another element which is not at all happy with a person like Senhor Quadros in the Presidency. This is a section of the army. It is not merely because he defeated a military candidate. The military, particularly the army, in Brazil, as in most other Latin American countries, have always played a decisive role in political life and Senhor Quadros is not too friendly disposed towards politicians in uniform. Like a great many Brazilians he feels that soldiers should stick to their barracks and leave politics to civilians. It is just possible, therefore, that he may experience some of the same sort of troubles which President Betancourt of Venezuela, who also dislikes soldiers in politics, has to grapple with from time to time.

On the political front the biggest problem Senhor Quadros faces is the fact that at heart he is an independent, although in his campaign for the Presidency he was backed by the major Government Opposition party, the National Democratic Union (U.D.N.), and

by a section of the Brazilian Labour Party (P.T.B.) whose leader, Senhor João Goulart, was elected Vice-President. In previous campaigns, as for instance when he stood for Governor of the state of São Paulo, he was officially backed only by the smaller parties Although, when he takes office next year, he will have strong support in Congress and in state legislatures, he still does not have a party which he can call his own and which would guarantee him the necessary machinery to lend weight to his policy making A Brazilian President has a great deal of personal authority. But Senhor Quadros would be the first Brazilian President to try to exercise this without being backed by actual membership of a major party. (Yet he is also the first Presidential candidate to defeat the Government party machinery.) It is evident that this need to ensure a political backing in the sense of the loyalty of a major party machine is something which is very much on his mind

Three courses are open to him. First, he could attempt to go it alone, counting on the success of his administration to keep intact the popular support and the backing he received from what almost amounts to a coalition of parties and splinter groups. Secondly, he may try to form a party of his own, taking in not only the greater part of the U.D.N. and the P.T.B., but also dissident groups of the present Government party, the Social Democratic Party (P S D) Thirdly, he may try to take over the leadership of an existing party, in which case the most likely one would be the Brazilian Labour Party. But this would mean having to ease out or in some way neutralize its present leader, Senhor João Goulart, his Vice-President. Senhor Goulart still enjoys prestige among the working class for the simple reason that he was the protégé and a right-hand man of the former dictator and later elected President, Dr Getulio Vargas, the man who only thirty years ago earned the gratitude of the masses by such simple measures as decreeing a limitation of working hours and other basic rights. To this day he is remembered as 'The Father of the Poor'.

Senhor Goulart personally has lost some of his appeal for, as some Brazilians remark wryly, 'You cannot live off a dead man for ever.' Furthermore, Senhor Goulart is a somewhat explosive personality and his demagogic attitudes and his flirting with the Communists and other extremists have not helped him much The Brazilian Labour Party itself only enjoyed prestige, although it never became a major party, because it was Getulio Vargas's creation. If a man like Senhor Quadros took over the leadership of the

P.T.B. it could mean a shot in the arm to the party. He might b able to transform it into a political body which would lean over t the left, but not far enough to frighten away middle-of-the-roa potential membership. Its doors would have to be closed to extrem ists of any shade of opinion, and such a party would then be ver much in tune with growing political sentiments in Brazil. Th direction of these was clearly shown in the results of this lates election.

Senhor Quadros has a good deal of thinking to do in the next fe months, for the kaleidoscopic complexity of the Brazilian politic scene often confounds even Brazilian experts; and, typically, h refuses to be rushed. He has given no real hint yet of whom he ma choose as his ministers and other collaborators In fact, soon afte his election was assured, he quietly slipped out of the country an sailed to Europe—Britain, a country for which he has a warr affection, being his first port of call

While a great many Brazilians are jubilant at Senhor Quadros' election, others are very definitely uneasy. But any Brazilian wh takes his country's interests, as distinct from politics, seriously i wondering what Senhor Quadros's policies will be. It might seer almost offensive to suggest that even those who elected him t office should have reason to ask such questions. Surely after hi long campaign, during which he travelled all over the country Senhor Quadros must have made his policies clear? Furthermore he is the first Brazilian Presidential candidate who even campaign ed from abroad In Cuba, Israel, Western Germany, and othe countries which he visited in the early stages of his unofficial cam paign he made statements which were meant not only for his hosts ears but for audiences back at home. For instance, his applause fo the Castro revolution in Havana, though restrained, nevertheles reassured the Brazilian popular voter. His opponents complaine bitterly that he ensured the Brazilian Jewish vote from Tel Aviv Senhor Quadros has been called many things by his opponents and one of the charges against him is that he is a man with n clearly defined or set policies. He demoralizes his critics by heartil agreeing with them. He explains that he has no set policies, n fixed ideas. Only fools, he argues, are not prepared to adap policies and ideas to circumstances and requirements.

Yet many Brazilians feel confident that they have chosen th right man; and one reason for this is his impressive record a Governor of the state of São Paulo, the industrial and the mos

important agricultural centre of Brazil and overall the most prosperous state in the Union. It is also the state with the largest electorate. When Senhor Quadros became Governor, São Paulo's finances were chaotic, and it seemed the epitome of irony that a state with such resources should have become virtually bankrupt Senhor Quadros, together with a dedicated team of advisers, many of them completely divorced from politics, performed what has often been described as a feat of financial wizardry, restoring prosperity and administrative morality.

He carried out his cleaning-up campaign almost ruthlessly but often with hilarious results. He once ordered, overnight, that all civil servants should report for duty next morning. What happened convulsed Brazilians with laughter, for hundreds of political appointees could not even find their departments and those who did had to stand in the corridors as there was no room for them even to sit. He often wrote his dispatches in rhyme and made a great many ears burn with his remarks about the contamination by parasites, not insect but human, of the administrative edifice The most important word he ever learnt in his life, he often says, was 'No', and it was one word which opportunists and seekers of favours were absolutely sure of hearing. Not unnaturally, Senhor Quadros made a great many enemies. But he also won a tremendous amount of admiration and respect. He had begun to earn these earlier when he was elected Mayor of the city of São Paulo in 1947. The symbol of his campaign then was a broom, with which he promised to sweep corruption and inefficiency not just under the carpet but out of the house, out of the streets, and out of the city. It was, so his opponents sniffed, just another gimmick, but a broom has been his symbol ever since; his supporters, in fact, carry miniature brooms as badges in their buttonholes.

Senhor Quadros also earned his reputation as a demagogue because of his disregard for his personal appearance. His opponents claim it was not disregard at all but a calculated attempt to make him appear when talking to ordinary, working-class Brazilians as being nothing more than an ordinary, working-class Brazilian himself. He would appear on platforms in a rumpled suit, badly in need of a haircut and a shave, and with holes in his shoes which his enemies suggested unkindly he had cut himself. He was also accused of carrying around dandruff in a pepperpot which he sprinkled on his shoulders before addressing a meeting. In his campaign for President, Senhor Quadros did not resort to such

tics. But in the minds of many Brazilians the image he had
ated of the little man, honestly battling against the rapacious
chinery of the big political blocs, remained. There was, how-
er, another image, that of a man who got things done; and there
s the prosperous state of São Paulo, with its tidy finances and its
lustries booming, to prove it.

What many Brazilians hope for now is that Senhor Quadros will
ply the same policies to running Brazil as he did to rehabilitating
o Paulo; and they are probably justified, for it seems likely that
will appoint a cabinet of men whose essential qualification will
ability rather than political affiliations. Obviously he cannot
ore entirely the political allegiances of his new ministers if he is
try to build up a permanent political backing for himself. But
will probably try to appoint men whose political affiliations and
lity are properly blended. Concerning his Government's broad
licy he has given no precise indications, for he took his creed of
apting policies to circumstances into his campaign. Industrial
d farming interests were made to feel that he understood their
blems and pretensions thoroughly, which he undoubtedly does.
e working and middle classes were also reassured that here was
nan who understood their point of view, which is also true And
the only promise which Senhor Quadros has made is that he
l do all he can, and get the best people in the country to help
n, to put Brazil on firm economic rails. He has promised no
htning cures or any revolutionary reversals of policy. While he
vocates closer relations with Russia and the Soviet bloc, he
aks even more warmly of Brazil's traditional ties with the
ited States, and above all with Western Europe.

Foreign interests and foreign Governments, particularly the
ited States, will probably have to handle the Quadros admini-
ation with tact. It is not that he is, like so many Latin American
ders, over-touchy; it is simply that he has an aversion to being
shed around by anybody, including his own people. But he is no
thoritarian in embryo, and his clowning of some years ago and
striving for effect on a political platform may make some on-
kers forget that he is a man of very clear and rational ideas and
th a considerable academic background. He comes from a
ddle-class family; his father was a doctor and he himself read
v and later taught literature before taking up politics. However
ich he may seek for effect, his upbringing will not allow him to
se into mere rantings. He can pulverize an opponent but he is

not destructive merely for the sake of destructiveness. He is a m who can look like a tramp yet always talks like a don. Of one thi many Brazilians are evidently quite sure: Senhor Janio Quadr with his broom, means business and Brazilians of the old ord and the nationalists and the Communists and even certain forei interests with out-of-date ideas, are not going to like it.

ANDREW MARSHALL

The Republic of Cyprus

From the Zurich Agreement to Independence

UNDER the London Agreement, signed on 19 February 195 British rule in Cyprus was due to end not later than one y from that date But before the Republic could be established t Constitution and the final texts of three treaties had to be drafte administrative arrangements had to be made for the transfer power, and for the holding of Presidential, Parliamentary, a Communal elections in Cyprus. Three committees were form shortly after the London Conference. The Transitional Committ in Nicosia, composed of the Governor, Sir Hugh Foot, a Cypriot members, was responsible for the adaptation of gover ment machinery in preparation for independence. The Joi Constitutional Commission, composed of a Swiss legal adviser a Greek, Turkish, and Cypriot representatives, was also based Cyprus. The London Joint Committee, composed of represen tives from the British, Greek, and Turkish Governments and t two Cypriot communities, was charged with drafting the fi treaties.

The independence of Cyprus is safeguarded by Britain, Gree and Turkey under the Treaty of Guarantee, which (Article 1) p cluded either the union of Cyprus with any other State or par tion. The Treaty of Alliance provides for co-operation betwe Greece, Turkey, and the Republic in common defence, for t stationing of Greek and Turkish military contingents in the islar and for the training of a Cypriot army. The Treaty of Establis

[1] *Conference on Cyprus Documents signed . . . at Lancaster House on Febru 19, 1959* (Cmnd 679) For events leading up to the Zurich and London Agr ments see 'Cyprus. Conflict and Reconciliation', in *The World Today*, April 19

ment concerns the retention of British sovereign bases ai ancillary facilities in Republican territory, and problems of finan and nationality arising out of the end of colonial rule. The texts the first two treaties were presented at the Zurich and Lond Conferences and required little alteration. Work on the Treaty Establishment, with its complex administrative and legal pro lems, did not begin until after the London Agreement was signe

LAWLESSNESS AFTER THE AMNESTY

The early preparations for independence took place against background of lawlessness. The release of EOKA prisoners ai suspects in March 1959 was premature in the interests of securi even if politically expedient. Many gunmen kept their arms aft the voluntary surrender called for by Archbishop Makarios and t British authorities. Incidents occurred between Greeks ai British soldiers, also amongst the Greeks themselves. Two Gree were murdered by EOKA as a reprisal in circumstances of gre brutality.

Greco–Turkish tension persisted except at the level of the tv leaders, Archbishop Makarios and Dr Kutchuk, who ma several joint appeals to their respective communities to avo clashes. A joint committee was set up to investigate incidents villages with mixed populations On 4 July Archbishop Makari and Dr Kutchuk appealed to the local press, a perennial source mischief-making between Greeks and Turks, to co-operate restoring friendly relations In September, after widespread ou breaks of violence in both communities, the Communist-l AKEL party (officially banned but still active) called on all arm groups to surrender their weapons. Archbishop Makarios and I Kutchuk jointly requested the public to co-operate in fighting t current wave of crime.

On 18 October a British naval patrol boarded and searched t *Deniz* off the coast of Cyprus, and seized two cases of ammuniti before the vessel was scuttled by its crew. The *Deniz* was register in Izmir, and its crew of three were Turkish subjects. The cri intensified suspicions in Cyprus that the Turkish undergroun TMT, was still active, and that the Turks were stockpiling ar and ammunition as a precaution against future trouble with t Greeks or a breakdown of the London Agreement. Public con dence was severely shaken. The Government of Cyprus, with t

[1] Texts of all three treaties in *Cyprus*, Cmnd 1093, July 1960

support of Archbishop Makarios and Dr Kutchuk, appea
Greeks and Turks to hand in illegal arms and ammunition t
leaders by 4 November, on the understanding that no off
would be prosecuted until after that date. The response was
The deadline was nevertheless extended for a short period.

After the *Deniz* episode, Archbishop Makarios suspend
work of the Greek team on the Joint Constitutional Comm
This action dismayed the Turks, who viewed every dela
threat to the survival of the London Agreement and the nun
advantages they had gained under the settlement. Dr Kı
immediately denounced smuggling activities, and ques
whether the *Deniz* was bound for Cyprus. The Turkish lead
Denktash, in Athens at the time for the signing of the Tre
Alliance, publicly criticized the Archbishop for breaking
constitutional discussions, and dismissed the incident as no
than the gun-running activities of the Greek extremists
Turkish Government formally denied that it had ever ap
the smuggling of arms to Cyprus, and Ankara Radio claime
the *Deniz* was hunting dolphins On 11 November, howev
crew of the *Deniz* were found guilty by a Famagusta court
illegal possession of ammunition in Cyprus territorial wate
sentenced to one year's imprisonment. In view of wider in
the Governor commuted the sentences, and the three mer
immediately deported.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

Tension was aggravated by renewed political activity on tl
of the Greeks. In April 1959, EDMA, the political succes
EOKA, was formed out of ex-fighters in support of Makari
the settlement. During a three-day rally held at the end of
EDMA publicized its first policy statement, promising wea
the farmer and opportunity for youth. But the occasio
chiefly significant for the militant Hellenism preached by s
the former EOKA leaders and the provocative effect th
bound to have on the Turks. In the spring the Communists
a new youth movement, EDON. On 28 June, the Left-wing l
held a mass meeting in Nicosia. Speakers attacked the Zuri
London Agreements and the efforts of the Right wing to
polize the island's political life.

In May the Greek mayors, both Nationalist and Comm
came into open conflict with Archbishop Makarios over Art

of the Zurich Agreement, which provides for separate Greek an
Turkish municipalities. Dr Dervis, the Nationalist Mayor c
Nicosia and a former supporter of Makarios, publicly denie
reports in an Athens newspaper that he had approved Article 2
when it was discussed in London. He also made a vigorous attac
against the Archbishop and the Greek Government, claiming tha
the London Agreement was signed by him under pressure. Th
mayors demanded that Article 20 should be amended and severel
criticized preliminary proposals made by Makarios for its imple
mentation on the ground that these would have transferred certai
functions hitherto exercised by the municipalities to the centra
Government. The mayors, as the only important elected repre
sentatives in Cyprus, constituted a formidable body in unite
opposition. The Archbishop nevertheless reasserted his deter
mination to stand by the Agreements.

The trouble with the mayors subsided temporarily, but wa
soon replaced by a new threat to the settlement, in the shape of
rift between Archbishop Makarios and the former leader o
EOKA, General Grivas. The rivalries of the ex-fighters in th
struggle for power in Cyprus, and the General's personal politica
ambitions in Greece, lay at the root of the crisis. At the end of July
Grivas warned Cypriots against the ratification of the Londo
Agreement, stating that the signatories had entered into verba
commitments of which he had no knowledge at the time. D
Kutchuk promptly faced this new danger to Turkish interests b
supporting Makarios and urging the Greek Government to curl
the harmful activities of Grivas. Senior EDMA officials journeye
to Athens, but their efforts to bring about a reconciliation betwee
Grivas and Makarios proved abortive.

In August, the Cyprus Enosis Front (KEM), a subversiv
organization which had first appeared in May, circulated leaflet
attacking Makarios and threatening to resort to violence in a
renewed campaign for *Enosis*. The Bishop of Kyrenia stated fron
the pulpit that Cyprus would achieve *Enosis* once Grivas becam
Prime Minister of Greece. These developments coincided witl
gun-running activities on the part of the Greeks; and at the end o
the month the British authorities decided to rearm sectors of th
police. The atmosphere of conspiracy was heightened in Septem
ber by reports of a plot by KEM to assassinate Makarios and star
civil war in the island. A leading EDMA official was dismissed or
the Archbishop's instructions in connection with the plot; th

editor of *Ethniki*, which had criticized the dismissal, was beaten up by armed gangs.

Grivas invited Makarios to discuss the matter in Athens, denounced the reports of a plot as a pretext devised to justify further concessions by the Archbishop to the British and the Turks, and challenged him to publish all the evidence. The rift was finally patched up during talks held between the two men in strict secrecy on the island of Rhodes in October. But the façade of unity was precarious; the rivalries which divided the Right wing had merely been pushed below the surface.

Shortly after Makarios returned from Rhodes, the Greek mayors of the six main towns resumed their offensive and submitted a memorandum to the Archbishop calling for the replacement of his Advisory Council by a pan-Cyprian Congress representative of the people, and for revision of the Zurich and London Agreements. On 30 October Dr Dervis announced that the mayors had decided to boycott the Council, which he claimed represented no one except the Archbishop himself.

Criticism of Makarios was growing on many fronts. His transitional Cabinet consisted almost exclusively of former EOKA men and their close associates; most of them were young and inexperienced. Older men of influence in the island, Rightists and Leftists equally, were ignored. With the approach of the Presidential elections, the main targets for attack were the Archbishop's alleged 'dictatorial methods' and the terms of the settlement. The appearance in November of a new weekly newspaper, *Epalxis*, reflecting the views of the Bishop of Kyrenia, marked the start of a campaign for the overthrow of the Zurich and London Agreements and the removal of Makarios as the island's political leader.

On 15 November, Mr John Klerides, a distinguished citizen of moderate views, and his former political rival Dr Dervis organized a large meeting in Nicosia, at which it was unanimously decided to form a new party, the Democratic Union, with the object of opposing Makarios in the Presidential elections Dr Dervis attacked the Greek Government and the United States for their part in the Cyprus settlement, and the Archbishop for failing to use the *Deniz* episode as an argument against the clauses related to the stationing of Greek and Turkish troops in Cyprus Mr Klerides described the Agreements as worse than the Macmillan Plan of 1958,[1] and stated that the policy of the Democratic Union

[1] See *The World Today*, April 1959, pp. 143–4.

should be to support a Presidential candidate who would avoid dictatorial actions and appoint ministers solely on the recommendations of the elected representatives, and parliamentary candidates who would oppose expenditure on a Cypriot army. At the end of the month Mr Klerides was nominated the Democratic Union's candidate for the Presidency.

The ban on the Communist-led AKEL party, imposed at the end of 1955, was not lifted until early December. AKEL's attitude was at first uncertain. But after the Archbishop's offer of seven seats in the House of Representatives had been rejected by AKEL, whose terms for co-operation in the Presidential contest were also unacceptable to him, the party, backed by the powerful Leftist labour federation, PEO, came out in full support of Mr Klerides. Thus the Democratic Union had rallied to its side Right-wing extremists who were determined to overthrow the Agreements at any price; Communists who were sufficiently realistic to accept the settlement as an interim necessity; and many men of ability and moderation. EDMA, as a concession to its numerous critics, had reappeared as the Patriotic Front, and its members resorted to a smear campaign of extreme viciousness. Mass meetings were held by both groups; and fighting broke out between the Right and the Left in several districts. Both Archbishop Makarios and Mr Klerides appealed for order.

Apart from sporadic outbursts of violence, polling day on 13 December went off peacefully. Registered electors numbered 238,879; abstentions were negligible. Makarios gained 144,501 votes, Klerides 71,753 [1] The ban on AKEL and the belated formation of the Democratic Union had given the Archbishop's opponents little time to organize. Moreover, local observers considered that he partly owed his victory to the conservativeness of the women, who in Cyprus tend to follow blindly the lead given by the Church irrespective of the political views held by their husbands. Nevertheless it was significant that a third of the electorate had voted against the Archbishop, who less than a year earlier had figured as the sole political spokesman for the Greek population.

Dr Kutchuk, who was unopposed, automatically became Turkish Vice-President-elect on nomination day.

PREPARATIONS FOR INDEPENDENCE

In spite of the disturbed political situation, preparations for

[1] Cyprus Government, *Cyprus. The Transitional Year*, Vol. III, pp. 6 and 7.

independence went ahead. But the Transitional Committee, w
held its first meeting on 4 March 1959, was alone in making r
progress. During the transitional period, responsibility
administration was, wherever possible, shared with the Cypı
and the Joint Council, composed of the Governor's Exec
Council and the Transitional Council, functioned as the
governing body. The first hurdle in setting up a ministerial sy
was cleared at the end of March when Archbishop Makarios
Dr Kutchuk reached agreement over the allocation of duties
tween the Greeks and Turks. Early in April the Governor acce
the recommendations made by the two Cypriot leaders for app
ments to the Transitional Committee; seven Greek and four T
ish members of the committee were later invited to take up m
terial posts. Special arrangements were made for the new mini
to study the work of the departments under their supervision

On 1 July the development of the ministerial system entere
final stages. Apart from the special powers reserved to the Go
nor, the Chief Justice, the Financial Secretary, and the Accour
General, the Cypriot ministers were enabled to submit policy
posals to the Joint Council, and to take responsibility for
execution of the Council's decisions in relation to their
departments.

Government services were reorganized, and Cypriots prom
to the highest posts. By the end of 1959 Cyprus was, for all p
tical purposes, self-governing, and most of the officials
Britain had left the island. The fact that the administration
tinued to function relatively smoothly through the diff
transitional period was, however, chiefly due to the Cypriot
service.

THE CONSTITUTION

The Joint Constitutional Commission was bound by the twe
seven basic articles laid down at Zurich,[1] which under the tern
the settlement cannot be changed. These articles had already
the subject of violent criticism among the Greeks; and the C
mission's first public action was to issue a sharp rebuke to
local press.[2]

The basic articles provide for a Presidential regime with a G
President and a Turkish Vice-President; a Supreme Constituti

[1] See Cmnd 679, pp 5-9.
[2] *Cyprus: The Transitional Year*, Vol. II, p. 1, Press Release 4, 1 June

Court, and a High Court composed of Greek and Turkish judges, to be presided over in both cases by a neutral; the creation of separate Greek and Turkish municipalities in the five largest towns; a Cypriot army of 2,000, which must be 60 per cent Greek and 40 per cent Turkish; security forces with a complement of 2,000 men, in a ratio of 70 per cent Greek to 30 per cent Turkish; and allocation of posts in the civil service on the same basis.

Executive authority is vested in the President and the Vice-President; the Council of Ministers must be composed of seven Greeks and three Turks, appointed respectively by the President and Vice-President, and may be chosen from outside the House of Representatives. One of the key ministries, Defence, Finance, or Foreign Affairs, must be held by a Turk. Legislative authority is vested in the House of Representatives, which is elected every five years by universal suffrage in the ratio of 70 per cent Greek to 30 per cent Turkish members. Authority in religious, educational, and cultural matters is exercised through separate Greek and Turkish Communal Chambers.

The President and Vice-President have the right to veto finally, either conjointly or separately, any law concerning defence, security, or foreign affairs. The judges of the Supreme Constitutional Court and the High Court of Justice are appointed jointly by the President and the Vice-President. Any reduction or increase in the strength of the Cypriot army, and the introduction of compulsory military service, require the agreement of both men. The question whether the arrangements for separate municipalities are to continue must be examined by the President and Vice-President within four years. The final text of the Constitution, consisting of 199 articles, was not completed until 6 April 1960, seven weeks after the original date for independence. But the Commission left in its wake a trail of dissension over the 30–70 per cent ratio in the civil service. The Turks were anxious to see this condition implemented before British rule ended. But without dismissing Greek officials or creating unnecessary posts this course was clearly impracticable. Turkish objections persisted through the summer, and threatened to hold up the proclamation of independence.

The Constitution is the legacy of Greco–Turkish strife, a political compromise in the face of grave difficulties rather than a model for sound government on democratic lines. It shows, moreover, some bias in relation to party politics. For instance, the break-up of the extensive and fertile lands owned by the Greek

Orthodox Church, an agricultural reform long overdue, cannot carried out by any Government except with the permission of t ecclesiastical authorities.

THE ANGLO-CYPRIOT NEGOTIATIONS

The Greek Cypriots bitterly resented the fact that the politi fate of their island, apart from the question of British bases, w largely settled over their heads by Greece and Turkey at Zuri After the settlement, Archbishop Makarios tried to mitigate tl resentment by extracting as many concessions as possible from t British, whose military requirements were only vaguely outlin during the hasty proceedings of the London Conference. T London documents which provided 'the agreed foundation for t final settlement of the problem of Cyprus'[1] left ample scope i interpretation and manœuvre.

Negotiations centred on two issues: the size of the areas to i main under British sovereignty and the ancillary facilities to granted in the territory of the future Republic. The broad aim the Greek Cypriot negotiators was to eliminate any lingeri vestiges of 'colonialism', and to secure the maximum financ advantage out of the arrangement with Britain. Sharp differen arose from the start over the practical and political implications sovereignty and the size of the base areas. In February 1959 t British Foreign Secretary mentioned that the area required Britain would cover 150 to 170 sq. miles and include 16,0 inhabitants.[2] For administrative reasons the British Government its own accord subsequently reduced this preliminary assessme to 4,500 inhabitants. The Cypriot delegation was the first to ma a specific proposal for the delineation of the bases, in the shape o rough sketch shown to Mr Duncan Sandys in Cyprus on 24 Ap The area suggested totalled thirty-six sq. miles, excluded all v lages, and was totally inadequate to meet British military nee Nevertheless the Minister of Defence, Mr Sandys, assured Arc bishop Makarios that full weight would be given to the Cypr view that no villages should be included in the base areas.[3]

The first British proposals for the bases were presented in t London Committee in May. These provided for an area of 1 sq. miles and included seven villages. The Cypriot delegati

[1] Cmnd. 679, p. 4.
[2] Hansard, *Commons Debates*, 1 February 1959, Vol 616, cols 636–44
[3] *Cyprus: The Transitional Year*, Vol. 1, p. 26, Press Release 3, 24 April 19

responded in June with detailed counter-proposals based on their earlier suggestion informally raised with Mr Duncan Sandys. In October the British Government made its first major concession in proposing an area of 120 sq. miles and the exclusion of all villages except Akrotiri, which had to be included in the base area owing to its proximity to the runway.

While Cyprus was a British colony, the bases operated in conjunction with a large number of military sites located throughout the island. It was now necessary to reduce the number of such sites and concentrate as many facilities as possible inside the bases. During the spring and summer of 1959 the British delegation was engaged in extensive surveys, mainly of a technical nature, and the first British proposals for sites and facilities to be retained in the Republic were not tabled until August. By December few final decisions had been taken; almost every other line of the voluminous draft treaty was bracketed to indicate an objection or a reservation. Nevertheless, British officials at high level in Cyprus expressed the view that the Republic could still be established by 19 February 1960; and early in the New Year advance contingents of Greek and Turkish troops arrived in the island according to schedule.

In the middle of January the British, Greek, and Turkish Foreign Ministers and the two Cypriot leaders met in London to review the work of the London Committee. After a short conference it was unanimously decided on 18 January to postpone independence by one month. Discussions continued through working committees. By the end of January the second edition of the draft treaty was printed. This progress was facilitated by the presence in London of Archbishop Makarios and by further important concessions on the part of the British. The British Government stated in a policy declaration that it did not intend to set up 'colonies', to develop the bases for anything other than military purposes, or to set up civilian commercial and industrial enterprises in competition with those of the Republic. It was agreed that Dhekelia power station, despite its key position in the heart of the base, should remain under Republican sovereignty, and that traffic control at Nicosia airfield, a right clearly reserved to Britain in the London Agreement, should be taken over once Cypriots qualified for the work became available. The Republican Government was invited to provide certain public services for Cypriots in the base areas; and an offer was made to rehouse in the Republic, at British expense, any villagers wishing to leave Akro-

tiri. On 1 February the British Foreign Secretary stated that Br ish requirements had now been reduced to the absolute minimu

Four days later the Under-Secretary of State for Colonies, M Julian Amery, arrived in Cyprus. During his visit the Cyprio made new proposals, and on the British side aid was increased £10 million over a five-year period; but no agreement was reache On 8 February the Cyprus Government announced that the nece sary legislation could not be adopted by the British Parliament time for the new independence date, 19 March. Archbish Makarios immediately criticized the postponement and was su ported by Dr Kutchuk, who had made an attempt at mediati before Mr Amery's departure from the island. On 9 February M Selwyn Lloyd repeated that British requirements were t minimum. Nevertheless the return of Mr Amery to Cyprus 23 February encouraged the belief that the British were about make new concessions.

The work of the London Committee had been transferred Cyprus, and the negotiations now entered their final and mo difficult stage. Five weeks of tedious bargaining, in which Gre Cypriot mistrust of the British reached its climax, destroyed hopes of a speedy settlement. The Turks, exasperated by t niggling tactics of the Greeks, finally boycotted the negotiations details concerning NAAFI's position within the bases; but t talks ended in agreement on 17 March. Towards the end of t month the negotiators returned to the questions of financial aid an the size and administration of the bases. Mr Amery, who was du to leave on an official visit for the West Indies, had meanwhi received fresh instructions to stay in Cyprus until agreement w reached. The Greek leaders now adopted tougher tactics O 1 April, the fifth anniversary of the beginning of the EOKA cam paign, Makarios threatened to launch a civil disobedience car paign and to implement the Zurich and London Agreements his own should the British persist in postponing independenc This outburst, with its references to the glories of EOKA and hin of a renewed struggle, antagonized the Turkish leaders I Kutchuk reminded the Archbishop that the Turks would revert their former stand (i.e. partition) should the Greeks revive t demand for *Enosis*: he pointed out the futility of any attempt on t part of the Archbishop to enforce the Agreements alone, since t Constitution had no legal validity unless the Treaties of Guarant and Alliance were signed at the same time, and stressed the exte

of the concessions already made by the British. On 2 April Dr Kutchuk made a new proposal for a base area of 100 sq. miles. Twelve days later Mr Amery stated that differences on the question of size had been substantially narrowed.[1]

Meanwhile the problems created by the postponement of independence had grown. The island's economy was stagnant; both communities faced serious unemployment. Relations between the Greeks and Turks were exacerbated by Turkish fears that the collapse of the Agreements was imminent. On the other hand the delay encouraged Greek critics of the Agreements. But the methods used by the Archbishop's followers in the attempt to silence opposition gave cause for grave concern. On 26 April Mr Pharmakides, the editor of *Ethniki*, which had continuously attacked Makarios and the settlement, was kidnapped by gunmen. After widespread agitation, in which Left-wing activity played an important part, he was released a sick man, having been held blindfold for eleven days under sentence of execution.

By mid-April much of the text of the Treaty of Establishment had been agreed, but the size and administration of the bases and the question of financial aid were still outstanding. Moreover, new difficulties had come to the fore. Greek anxieties about the future of the bases in the event of a British withdrawal had persisted since the London Conference in 1959. Legal experts held the view that the existence of British sovereign bases formed an integral part of the London Agreement; any undertaking concerning their future disposal would, therefore, require the consent of all the parties. But the Greek Government and the Greek Cypriot leaders were not content to leave well alone, and the problem of finding a formula acceptable to both Greece and Turkey introduced new hazards for the prospects of a settlement on the basis of the Zurich and London Agreements. The Cypriot Greek leaders, furthermore, were now insisting that the undertakings given in the British policy declaration on the bases[2] should be made legally binding. On 16 May Archbishop Makarios accused Britain of using the argument of unemployment to force the Cypriots into unacceptable concessions. Mr Amery denied the Archbishop's claim that a deadlock existed, and was supported in this view by Dr Kutchuk. The Governor authorized measures to alleviate unemployment but warned the public that economic catastrophe

[1] *Cyprus: The Transitional Year*, Vol IV, p 14, Press Release 8, 14 April 1960
[2] See Cmnd. 1093, pp. 201–5.

could only be prevented by a prompt settlement of the litical question and the establishment of the Republic by summer.[1]

On 18 May Archbishop Makarios refused Mr Amery's inv tion to resume talks. The overthrow of the Menderes Governm in Turkey at the end of that month interrupted negotiations w Greece and Turkey over the cession formula, and aggravated atmosphere of uncertainty in Cyprus. The Archbishop reactec the event by reasserting his determination to stand by the Agr ments. At this stage two courses lay open to him. Unless British Parliament passed the necessary legislation before the su mer recess, independence was certain to be delayed until winter. The Archbishop might have gambled on obtaining s better terms, but the potential advantages were offset by dangers inherent in the local situation—economic hardship, co munal strife, and an intensification of the campaign for the ab gation of the Agreements. Negotiations were resumed on 23 Ju after an adjournment of seven weeks. The cession issue v resolved in an exchange of Notes between the British Governm and the two Cypriot leaders.[2] Aid was increased from £10 mill to £12 million over the five-year period. On 1 July the British a Cypriot delegations announced that agreement had been reacl on all outstanding questions.

Under the final settlement[3] Britain retains a total area of nine nine sq. miles—forming the Akrotiri Sovereign Base Area and Dhekelia Sovereign Base Area. The Air Officer Commanding-Chief, Middle East Air Force, R.A.F., is in charge of administ tion; the cost is borne on the Air estimates. By-passes are un construction to ensure unbroken communications under Brit control inside the two areas. Three pockets of Republican territo however, remain in the centre of the Dhekelia base. No fronti exist between the base areas and the Republic. The Cypriots ha extensive rights governing employment and administration ins the bases. They also have—subject to the 'military requireme and security needs' of the British Government—freedom of acc and communications to and from the base areas, and of emplo ment and cultivation in the areas, and freedom of navigation a

[1] *Cyprus. The Transitional Year*, Vol. IV, p 23, Press Release 5, 18 M 1960

[2] Cmnd. 1093, p 207.

[3] Arrangements made under the final settlement are covered by the Treaty Establishment and a series of exchanges of Notes.

fishing in the adjacent territorial waters.[1] British jurisdiction over Cypriots in the base areas is exercised solely in relation to offences affecting security. Such concessions, granted to meet the Cypriot demand that the island should remain a single economic and administrative unit, were made at the expense of security.

The bases are not self-contained. Eighteen sites which, for geographical or technical reasons, cannot be given up are to be permanently retained under Republican sovereignty. These include the radar installations on Mount Troodos and the Dhekelia electric power station. The loss of two large training areas, originally included in the bases, has necessitated alternative arrangements in the Republic. The British have special port facilities, and in the absence or insufficiency of staff, labour, or equipment at Famagusta port or Dhekelia power station they are entitled to meet the deficiency from their own resources. They are also authorized to fit suppressors to any apparatus in nearby villages which interferes with installations in the Dhekelia base. In the event of an emergency, as determined by Britain, the British authorities have the right to assume the exclusive control of air traffic at Nicosia airfield.

British and Cypriot interests are in theory protected by the numerous legal safeguards written into the Treaty of Establishment and its related Agreements. But the success of the arrangements made for the bases will mainly depend on political stability in the island and continuing co-operation between the British and Republican authorities.

THE FINAL STAGES

The end of the negotiations cleared the way for elections. Though the island was still under British rule, the Electoral Law, introduced in December 1959, was based on recommendations made by the Constitutional Commission. The law provided for universal suffrage; for six multi-member constituencies; and for the election of thirty-five Greeks and fifteen Turks to the House of Representatives. Electors were entitled to vote for the candidates of more than one party provided that the number of votes cast on any single ballot sheet did not exceed the number of candidates in any one constituency. The law was the subject of acute controversy on the ground of its complexity and because the size of the constituencies made a victory for the Patriotic Front a certainty and the election of Opposition candidates virtually impossible.

[1] Cmnd. 1093, p. 201.

AKEL, which had tested its strength in the Presidential e
tions, agreed to co-operate with the Patriotic Front in exchange
five seats in the House of Representatives offered by the A
bishop. This switch in allegiance was prompted by tactical c
siderations rather than by a change of ideology. The Democr
Union took no part owing to the discriminatory character of
electoral system. Polling day, on 1 August, resulted in an easy
for the Patriotic Front, which gained thirty seats out of the th
five allocated to Greek members. All five AKEL candidates v
elected. But the three ex-EOKA fighters belonging to the extr
Rightist anti-Makarios front obtained only an insignificant num
of votes. Thirty-six per cent of the Greek electorate, howe
abstained. In Larnaca, where AKEL was not represented, abs
tions rose to 59 per cent. The most likely explanation for
apathy of Greek voters was the conviction that a victory for
Patriotic Front was inevitable. It is perhaps significant
although the Archbishop's supporters had the benefit this tim
AKEL's votes in three large constituencies, abstentions co
sponded approximately in number to the votes cast against
Archbishop in the Presidential elections. Dr Kutchuk's Turl
National Party was also returned with little opposition.

Elections for the Communal Chambers were held a week l
and completed the preparations for independence. The n
Republic came into being on 16 August, eighteen months after
signing of the Zurich and London Agreements. The event
greeted with relief and jubilation by the Turks but met with l
enthusiasm on the part of the Greeks, whose reactions to the set
ment from the time of Zurich had ranged from open hostilit
cynicism and disillusion.

NANCY CRAWSHAW

The substance of this article will appear in a forthcoming book to
published by Eyre and Spottiswoode.

Armies in Eastern Europe

THE controversy about Western defence policies remains unsolv
There are still experts who believe that the development of therm
nuclear weapons makes large-scale reductions in 'conventio

arms and in manpower both possible and necessary. Yet there is an increasingly vocal school of thought which stands for greater emphasis on the maintenance and strengthening of the non-nuclear capacity of our forces, holding that less absolute reliance on the nuclear deterrent may reduce the risk of a nuclear war. In the world balance of military power the Communist countries may be ahead as far as rockets and missiles are concerned, but these technological advantages are sometimes doubtful and generally only of a temporary nature. There is, however, no doubt at all of Communist superiority in respect of the size of standing armies—in quantity of non-nuclear arms and numbers of men the Communist bloc is in an overwhelmingly favourable position. This is true even if the vast contribution of the Chinese People's Liberation Army is discounted.

Much of this numerical strength of the Communist bloc in Europe is drawn from the Soviet Union's East European allies. With the possible exception of Hungary, the armies of these countries seem efficient and, except for that of Rumania, they are well equipped. Estimates about the exact number of divisions vary slightly in view of the complete absence of official information. The total strength of the armed forces of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, and East Germany stands at about 850,000 men. This does not include para-military units, such as frontier guards and internal security troops, of whom there are about 300,000.

The Polish army underwent considerable changes after the 1956 crisis. The steps then taken to halt the decline of the Polish economy included a cut in military expenditure, and the army was reduced from twenty divisions to fifteen. The political upheaval in Poland had more significant effects on the armed forces: almost the entire leadership was changed and all Soviet military advisers left the country. Rokossovsky, the Soviet Marshal of Polish origin, who combined membership of the Polish Politburo with the post of Minister of Defence, was sent back to Moscow, where he re-entered the Soviet service. Marian Spychalski, one of Gomulka's closest associates, took charge of the Ministry of Defence. Officers who had been dismissed and jailed in the Stalinist period were reinstated. The contribution made by the Polish forces who fought with the Western allies during the last war was at long last acknowledged. Indeed, Poland is the only member of the Warsaw Treaty Organization—the Communist defence bloc—without an

official military mission responsible to Warsaw Treaty Hea quarters in Moscow.

The almost fundamental change in Soviet–Polish relationshi after October 1956 caused Moscow to divert some of its attenti from Poland to the more reliable Czechoslovak army. The politic stability and relative economic steadiness which the Prag Government managed to maintain throughout the crisis peri appear to have convinced the Soviet leadership that the Czech slovak army might repay investment more advantageously than i Polish counterpart. Of course, the Czech army also had to under the effects of changes in the Party line on various occasions. Aft the 1948 Communist *coup d'état* all officers with pro-Weste leanings and affiliations were retired or reduced to insignifica appointments. Men prominently connected with the war-tin Czechoslovak forces in the West were tried and imprisoned executed. The mainspring of this drive to establish absolute Con munist control over the armed forces, Colonel Reicin, himself fe victim to the purge which followed the fall of Rudolf Slánský 1952.

The unyielding Stalinist policy in the Czechoslovak army w reflected by the appointment of Alexej Čepička to the post Minister of Defence in 1950. Detested as an unscrupulous care politician, he was dismissed in 1956 for having encouraged th 'personality cult'. In fact, he was the only major Czechoslova scapegoat to be sacrificed on the altar of destalinization.

The Czechoslovak army seems to have absorbed these shocl placidly, and the Soviet Union has therefore drawn the justifiab conclusion that it is worth while to concentrate on training an equipping this allied force. Since 1956 the Czechs have receive priority in deliveries of modern Soviet equipment. Theirs is th only East European army, outside Russia, with airborne units divisional size. The quality of their material is enhanced by the hig standard of the Czechoslovak arms industry, which cannot b equalled by any other East European country. Indeed, the Czech slovak armoured corps uses both Soviet and Czech-designed tank Thus the fifteen Czechoslovak divisions represent a formidab addition to Communist armed strength.

The eleven divisions of the Bulgarian army are a compact an well-integrated force, and four of these divisions are mechanize Many of the senior officers gained their battle experience with th Soviet army during the last war, and the training and organizatio

of the Bulgarian army approximate closely to the Soviet model. The attacks on Marshal Zhukov mounted in Moscow in 1957, because of his desire to reduce the influence and position of political officers and Party officials in the Soviet army, had direct repercussions in Bulgaria. The C.P.S.U. criticism of Zhukov's views was applied to Bulgarian conditions and quoted for that purpose by official spokesmen. The Bulgarian Minister of Defence, General Panchevski, was demoted in June 1958, and a Party plenum held later that year dealt mainly with the maintenance of Party control over the army.

The fifteen Rumanian divisions are not as well equipped as the other East European armies, and it seems likely that they are intended merely as a manpower reserve.

In Hungary, however, there has been a determined attempt to rebuild a modern army from the wreckage of 1956 From the Communist point of view, the army failed almost completely during that crisis Only one regiment out of ten divisions fought wholeheartedly against the insurgents The army, on the whole, stood apart; the rising against the Russians and their Hungarian agents was not a soldiers' mutiny. In some cases the troops handed over their arms to the insurgents; single units, like the cadets and labour companies of the Kilian barracks, fought the Russians to the end, and individual officers, like General Maleter or General Kiraly, placed themselves in the van of what they knew to be a lost cause. But the Hungarian army as a whole played a passive part. Nevertheless its virtual disintegration was almost complete; during the insurrection many men simply left their units, some to take part in the rising, others just to go home to their families. After the suppression of the revolt the officer corps was subjected to a severe purge. The dissolved and demoralized divisions had to be reconstituted in very difficult economic conditions, and this process has been slow. To date only some four divisions have been rebuilt.

The development of the East German *Volksarmee* is directly related to the issue of German rearmament. At present there are about seven divisions in the German Democratic Republic. Two of them are reported to be armoured, and the whole force seems to be well trained and well equipped. The remilitarization of the Soviet zone of occupation began long before the existence of an East German army was implied by the adherence of the German Democratic Republic to the Warsaw Treaty Organization in 1955, and was officially acknowledged by the incorporation of an East German contribution to the military forces of the Warsaw Pact in January

1956.[1] It preceded the policy of remilitarization in West Germa although the inclusion of the Federal Republic in N.A.T.O. always cited by Communist spokesmen as the reason for E German rearmament.

Some of the East European air forces provide a valuable additi to the fighter defences of the Soviet bloc. Poland and Czechoslova each dispose of about 1,000 jet fighters; these are modelled on t Soviet MIG-series. Both these countries make these aircraft, a the Klimov turbojets powering them, under licence. An E German air force is now being developed, and its pilots are trair for jet flying in the U.S.S.R. and in Czechoslovakia. The other E European air forces are not very significant.

The Polish and East German navies add a few destroyers, frigat coastal submarines, and small craft to the Communist potential the Baltic. In the Black Sea, the Rumanians and Bulgarians dispo mainly of obsolete and obsolescent vessels.

The East European Governments also try to create a milit spirit among all sections of the population Pre-military training carried out in schools, offices, and factories by mass associations co-operation with the armed forces, somewhat on the lines D.O.S.A.A.F.[2] in the U.S.S.R. Civilians are trained in civil defen first aid, elementary arms drill, and parachute jumping. P military training is usually compulsory for university students both sexes. There are special badges awarded for skills achieved the various branches of this kind of activity, and particular attenti is paid to the training of civil defence personnel in anti-nucl techniques. In addition, thousands of trusted Communists in dustry are organized in factory militias, armed with small arms a ostensibly intended to protect nationalized industries agai saboteurs and internal enemies. They have little military value, t they provide an auxiliary power reserve for the Communist Par Moreover, all these 'civilian' organizations enable large numbers citizens to become used to handling arms.

At one time the East European forces might have been useful the event of armed conflict without direct Soviet participation. I Soviet military doctrine, which has become gradually attuned to t concepts of the nuclear missile age, has abandoned the idea of v by proxy, as practised in Korea. More than three years ago Marsl

[1] In 'The Problem of Germany and European Security', in *The World Tod* May 1959, p. 213, footnote 1, this date was given in error as 28 May 1958 should read 28 January 1956.

[2] Voluntary Association for Assistance to the Army, Air Force, and Navy

Vassilevsky stressed that 'world wars grow out of small wars',[1] and, given the present state of military thinking in both East and West, a war limited only to the satellites on the Communist side in Europe does not lie within the realm of possibility.

But the military worth of the Soviet Union's East European allies consists of much more than men, ships, and planes. Their divisions can be used as bargaining counters in negotiations about disarmament and the reduction of standing armies: the Communists can always offer to disband an East European division in exchange for the dissolution of a similar N.A.T.O. unit Usually Soviet proposals call for cuts in the West German military establishment to be balanced by proportionate limitations in the People's Democracies, the essential difference being that the *Bundeswehr* represents the core of the N.A.T.O. military effort in Central Europe, while the East European armies certainly do not form the basis of the Communist military position.

From the Soviet point of view, the territory and physical location of the East European countries are their greatest asset. They form a belt around the Western fringe of the U.S.S.R., which appears to be of some value in the eyes of the Soviet staff, even in the nuclear age. Despite their technological progress, the Communists still allow much of their strategic thinking to move along non-nuclear lines, and in this context the value of the territory of Eastern Europe cannot be disputed. Moreover, the coming of the missile has enhanced the strategic value of this area, for rockets must have bases, and even the potential existence of Soviet installations in East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia adds further strength to the Communist military position in Europe. This does not mean that the East European armies themselves have been provided with Soviet-made missiles, or that they possess any nuclear capability at all. Indeed, the men of these armies seem reserved for a 'conventional' part in the show of Communist armed strength, but there are no such reservations about the territories of the East European States.

The armed forces of the U.S.S.R., Poland, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Rumania are linked by the Warsaw Treaty Organization. This was set up in 1955 as a formal counterpart to N.A.T.O. It has its political machinery and military headquarters in Moscow. The Council of Ministers—in theory the supreme body of the organization—on occasion serves as a useful collective sounding board for Communist policy statements. The

[1] *Krasnaya Zvezda*, 14 August 1957.

Warsaw Treaty also legalizes the position of Soviet forces i
of the East European countries, as it allows the stationing of
from one member-State on the territory of another. In practi
Soviet troops are stationed outside their own territories—th
for example, no Hungarian divisions in Russia. During th
garian revolt in 1956 the Nagy Government denounced th
saw Treaty and thus hoped to destroy the legal pretext for t
sence of Soviet troops in the country. In the event, this der
tion must have been among the factors which influenced Mc
decision in favour of a show-down in Budapest.

The Commander-in-Chief of the Warsaw Treaty is a
Marshal,[1] and the Defence Ministers of all the other m
States are listed as his deputies. This command structure w
useless in combat; it bears out the view that the main c
the Warsaw Treaty Organization is to co-ordinate traini
standardize equipment. In case of war, the Soviet Gener
would obviously be the directing body of the Communist wa
in Europe and the East European armies would be pra
absorbed in the Soviet forces.

In peace time, on the other hand, co-ordination is an im
task, and the Warsaw Treaty headquarters appears to be c
trating on this task with some success. In view of the prepond
of the Soviet armaments and aircraft industries within the
munist bloc, some measure of standardization of weapons i
or less automatic. According to some reports, almost co
standardization has already been achieved in respect of fro
fighter aircraft, semi-automatic carbines, sub-machine gu
recoil-less anti-tank guns.

The permanent military missions, accredited by V
Treaty headquarters to all member countries except Poland,
vise the co-ordination of training in the use of this equipme
regular progress reports are sent to Moscow. The headquar
doubt carries on a certain amount of joint planning in mobil
procedures and logistics.

The organizational structure and framework of an allia
useless unless all its members are equally determined and
fulfil their obligations. Repeated purges resulting from cha
the Party line have periodically affected the East European
forces. The effects of these upheavals have doubtless been
mental, and the military efficiency of the People's Democrac

[1] At present this post is held by Marshal Grechko.

suffered from time to time. Yet none of the purges in Eastern Europe since the war can be compared with the terror of 1937–8 in the Soviet Union. The Red Army then was among the chief victims of the great purge—about half its officer corps vanished and three marshals, together with some seventy generals, lost their lives. Nevertheless, it survived to stave off the German attack three years later and to turn defeat into victory. The military effect of political purges should not be overestimated.

Communist armies are political in so far as there is a constant endeavour to make quite certain that the Party's control over the armed forces remains unchallenged. This is combined with permanent pressure designed to indoctrinate the troops with the ideology of Communism and its current attitude toward international problems. At the top, the Chief Political Administrations of the East European armies support the Party organization in keeping the professional heads of the armed forces under supervision. At a lower level the work of indoctrination and political supervision falls to the political officers who are responsible to the Chief Political Administration. They are expected to keep their military colleagues in line with Party policy and to maintain an uninterrupted watch on the morale of the troops.

At times these pressures are resented. For example, in 1958 Bulgarian officers were subjected to a series of personal attacks in the press, which named even company commanders, for allegedly obstructing the work of political officers. Even in Poland, where the political climate has been somewhat less rigorous, General Spychalski has recently called on political officers to do more to counteract 'liberal tendencies, ideological deviations, and religious inclinations'.[1] In December 1957 the Party gave up some of the means of control over the army by abolishing the right of intelligence officers serving with the police-security forces to investigate army matters.[2] In 1960 the fight against 'liberal tendencies' is under way again.

The moot question concerns the ultimate reliability of the East European armies should war break out. Ideological problems exist; many of the men must be opposed to Communism on personal grounds; their leaders may resent having to take orders from Moscow, and East European nationalism might again turn against Soviet Russia. But does this mean that these armies would not fight? If that were true, the Warsaw Treaty would be worthless, regardless of the number of divisions now available in Eastern Europe.

[1] *Zolnierz Wolnosci*, 5 May 1960. [2] Warsaw Radio, 30 December 1957.

After the 1956 crisis it was generally held that the fundamental reliability of the East European armies had been exposed. This not really the case however; if the soldiers of the People's Der cracies had been waiting for a chance to turn on their Soviet all the autumn of 1956 provided the ideal opportunity. In real political control everywhere, except in Hungary, proved str enough to safeguard the Communist regimes. Control broke dc in Hungary because the main instrument of control, the Hungai Communist Party, disintegrated. Even after the collapse of Rákosi-Gerö regime, the Hungarian army remained more or inactive. At best its attitude during the insurrection showed th: was no exception to the rule that all armies are reluctant to turn tl weapons against their own people. Even in Eastern Europe, was nothing new. For instance in the summer of 1953, Cz soldiers were said to have refused to disperse a crowd of worker Plzeň, when they demonstrated against the rigours of the curre reform of that year. The only logical deduction which can be m is that the East European armies are unreliable as far as their ternal police functions are concerned. It would be extremely wise to jump to the conclusion that they would never fight by side of the U.S.S.R. against an external foe.

In case of war the attitude of the East European peoples armies would certainly depend on the specific situation at the ti If the Federal German Republic were to stand in the van of Western alliance, the Czech and Polish armies would most pr ably be willing allies on the Soviet side. The former would figh keep the Germans out of the Sudetenland, the latter would do tl utmost to hold on to their Western provinces acquired at G many's expense. Similarly, a conflict in the Balkans might engage enthusiasm of the Bulgarian army once old antagonisms direc against Greece or Turkey had been aroused.

On the other hand, the Communists might find it very diffic to get the East Germans to go to war against the Federal Repub Indeed, in time, even Polish or Czech suspicions of German tentions might be lulled, although that is unlikely. The point to made is that any forecast of the reaction of the East European arm in the event of war is impossible. The most optimistic estim could only describe their attitude as uncertain. It would theref be unrealistic to base any political or military calculations on expectation that they might desert the Soviet cause.